JUDGMENT : G.K. Misra, C.J. - At the time of hearing Mr. Rath conceded that P. Penteya v. Executive Officer N.A.O. Bhubaneswar 38 (1972) C.L.T. 915 directly covers this case, and that the writ application is to be dismissed if the aforesaid decision lays down the correct law. He accordingly contended that the case should be referred to a larger Bench for a decision if the aforesaid judgment lays down the correct law. As the case involves an important question of law, we heard the matter at length to see if the law has been correctly laid down in the aforesaid decision. 2. Though a number of points had been taken in the writ application, the only substantial question of law that was placed at the time of hearing is that Section 344 of the Orissa Municipal Act (Act 23 of 1950) (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Act') is ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution. Facts relevant to this contention may only be stated: 3. The Petitioner has a small hotel in Janapatha Road, New Capital, Bhubaneswar. Admittedly, the construction was made without obtaining permission of the Notified Area Council. The Executive Officer of the Notified Area Council, Bhubaneswar, issued a notice (Annexure 1) on 24-1-1963 which ran thus: Whereas I am satisfied that you have constructed a thatched house and opened a (sic) shop without taking my permission, I do hereby order you in exercise of my power conferred on me u/s 273(A) of the Orissa Municipal Act to demolish the said unauthorized construction by the 31-1-1963 instant, under an intimation to this office. The Petitioner did not demolish the unauthorized construction in accordance with the aforesaid notice. There is no dispute that a notice u/s 273-A(2) has not been served on the Petitioner. It is at this stage that the writ application has been filed challenging the constitutionality of Section 344 of he Act. 4. To appreciate the contention of the Petitioner, Sections 273-A, 274 and 344 of the Act may be noticed. There is no dispute that a notice u/s 273-A(2) has not been served on the Petitioner. It is at this stage that the writ application has been filed challenging the constitutionality of Section 344 of he Act. 4. To appreciate the contention of the Petitioner, Sections 273-A, 274 and 344 of the Act may be noticed. They are extracted below: 273-A Demolition or alteration of building work unlawfully commenced, carried on or completed: (1) If the Executive Officer is satisfied : (1) that the construction or reconstruction of any building or well- (a) has been commenced without obtaining the permission of the Executive Officer or where an appeal has been preferred to the council in contravention of any order passed by the council in appeal; or (b) is being carried on, or has been completed otherwise than in accordance with the plans of particulars on which such permission or order was based; or (c) is being carried on, or has been completed in breach of any of the provisions of this Act or of any rule or by-law made under this Act or of any direction or requisition lawfully given or made under this Act or such rules or by-laws ; or (ii) that any alterations required by any notice issued u/s 27 have not been duly made; or (iii) that any alteration of or addition to any building or any other work made or done for any purpose in, to or upon any building, has been commenced or is being carried on or has been completed in breach of Section 273, he may make a provisional order requiring the owner or the builder to demolish the work done, or so much of it as, in the opinion of the Executive Officer, has been unlawfully executed or to make such alterations as may in the opinion of the Executive Officer be necessary to bring the work into conformity with the Act. By laws, rules, direction or requisition as aforesaid, or with the plans and particulars on which such permission or order was based and may also direct that until the said order is complied with the owner or builder shall refrain from proceeding with the building or well. By laws, rules, direction or requisition as aforesaid, or with the plans and particulars on which such permission or order was based and may also direct that until the said order is complied with the owner or builder shall refrain from proceeding with the building or well. (2) The Executive Officer shall serve a copy of the provisional order made under Sub-section (1) on the owner of the building or well together with a notice requiring him to show cause within a reasonable time to be mentioned in such notice why the order shall not be confirmed. (3) If the owner fails to show cause to the satisfaction of the Executive Officer, the Executive Officer may confirm the order with any modification he may think fit to make, and such order shall then be binding on the owner. 274. Appeal against order of Executive Officer. Any person aggrieved by the orders of the Executive Officer made under any of the provisions of this Chapter may, within thirty days from the date of the order, appeal to the Municipal Council. x x x x 344. Time for complying with notice, order, and power to enforce in default : (1) Whenever by any notice, requisition or order under this Act, or under any rule or regulation or by law made under it any person is required to execute any work or to take any measures or do anything, a reasonable time shall be named in such notice, requisition or order within which the work shall be executed, the measures taken or the thing done. (2) If such notice, requisition or order is not complied with within the time so named, the Chairman of the Municipal Council concerned may cause such work to be executed or may take any measures or do any thing which may, in his opinion, be necessary for giving due effect to the notice, requisition or order aforesaid. (3) If no penalty has been specially provided in this Act for failure to comply with such notice, the said person shall be liable on conviction by a Magistrate to a fine not exceeding fifty rupees for every such offence. 5. (3) If no penalty has been specially provided in this Act for failure to comply with such notice, the said person shall be liable on conviction by a Magistrate to a fine not exceeding fifty rupees for every such offence. 5. It would thus be seen that u/s 273-A of the act, the Executive Officer is to pass a provisional order requiring the owner or the builder to demolish the work done if it is in contravention of the provisions laid down in Sub-section (1). Under Sub-section (2) the Executive Officer shall serve a copy of the provisional order made under Sub-section (1) on the owner of the building or well together with notice requiring him to show cause within a reasonable time to be mentioned in such notice why the order shall not be confirmed. If the owner fails to show cause to the satisfaction of the Executive Officer, the provisional order may be confirmed with such modification as the Executive Officer thinks fit and the order shall then be binding on the owner. The final order is subject to appeal as provided in Section 274. An appeal lies to the Municipal Council within thirty days from the date of the order. 6. Section 344 is to be read in conjunction with Section 273-A. Section 344 requires mention of a reasonable time in the notice, requisition or order within which the work shall be executed. If the notice, requisition or order is not complied with within the time so named, the Chairman of the Notified Areas Council may cause such work to be executed. 7. In this case, only the provisional order u/s 273-A(1) had been passed calling upon the Petitioner to demolish the unauthorised construction. The notice u/s 273-A(2) has not been issued to him and the final order confirming the provisional order has not yet, been passed. Necessarily, no order directing execution u/s 344 has been passed, and the question of the Notified Area Council getting the unauthorised construction dismantled at this stage does not arise. The petition is rather premature and it is for this that the constitutionality of Section 344 has been attacked on the basis of an apprehended danger hanging on the head of the Petitioner. 8. Mr. Rath's argument may now be noticed. The petition is rather premature and it is for this that the constitutionality of Section 344 has been attacked on the basis of an apprehended danger hanging on the head of the Petitioner. 8. Mr. Rath's argument may now be noticed. He contends that it is open to the Notified Area Council (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the N.A. Co') to institute a suit in the Civil Court for the relief covered by Section 344, and that the same remedy being available in two different forums altogether different in character, Section 344 is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. This contention necessitates an examination of the question whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit by the N.A.C. for directing dismantling of the unauthorised construction. 9. Civil Court's jurisdiction has not been expressly barred under the Act. The question is whether it has been implied by barred. If the third test laid down by Willes, J. in Wolverhampton New Water Works Company v. Nawkesford (1889) 6 C.B.IN.S. 336, is applicable to this case, then the jurisdiction of the Civil Court will be impliedly barred. The third test was laid down by the distinguished Judge thus: But there is a third class, viz., where a liability not existing at common law is created by a statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it. The remedy provided by the statute must be followed, and it is not competent to the party to pursue the course applicable to cases of the second class. The second class of cases referred to therein is where the statute gives the right to sue merely but provides no particular form of remedy; there the party can only proceed by action at common law. 10. Applying this test to the facts of the case, we are to explore the nature of the liability which is enforceable against the Petitioner and whether such a liability exists' in common law. 11. It is well known that ownership in property has several characteristics. The owner of the property can dispose of the same in any manner he likes. He can even destroy the property. He can also use the property in any manner he likes, unless his act causes an injury to another actionable at law. 11. It is well known that ownership in property has several characteristics. The owner of the property can dispose of the same in any manner he likes. He can even destroy the property. He can also use the property in any manner he likes, unless his act causes an injury to another actionable at law. Thus, in common law, the owner of the property has the right to put any construction on his land as he chooses. There is no liability in common law prohibiting him to make a construction on his own land in any manner he chooses. Such a liability has now been created under the Act by Sections 273-A and 344, and for enforcement of such liability, the Statute has also provided a remedy. The provisions are that before any construction is put on a land within the area of N.A.C. permission of the N.A.C. is mandatory. Plans for construction of the building are to be submitted for approval of the N.A.C. When a building is constructed without permission and approval of the plan, it is open to the N.A.C. to issue notice to the owner to get the same dismantled. The owner gets an opportunity to show cause and to be heard. He has a right of appeal. If the provisional order is ultimately confirmed after hearing, the owner gets a reasonable notice for removal of the unauthorised construction before the final order of the N.A.C. is put into execution. Thus, a complete code, almost parallel to what exists in Civil Code, has been prescribed by the Statute. The third test laid down by Willes, J. thus applies in terms. The remedy provided by the Statute must be followed, and it is not competent to the party to pursue a remedy in Civil Court which was available at common law. 13. Mr. Rath placed strong reliance on Dhulabhai and Others Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Another, and contended that P. Penteya v. Executive Officer N.A.O. Bhubaneswar, was not correctly decided as this Supreme Court decision was not taken into considerations by the Bench. The dictum of Willes J. was referred to and accepted in paragraph 8 in Bhulabhai State of M.P. 3. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Another, and contended that P. Penteya v. Executive Officer N.A.O. Bhubaneswar, was not correctly decided as this Supreme Court decision was not taken into considerations by the Bench. The dictum of Willes J. was referred to and accepted in paragraph 8 in Bhulabhai State of M.P. 3. After examining all the relevant decisions on the point, their Lordships lad down the following propositions of which the relevant ones may be extracted below: (I) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the Special Tribunal the Civil Courts' jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the Civil Court would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. (2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the Court, an examination of the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary, and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the Tribunal so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in Civil Courts are prescribed by the said statute or not. (3) Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act as ultra vires cannot be brought before Tribunals constituted under that Act. Even the High Court cannot go into that question on a revision or reference from the decision of the Tribunal. ** ** ** (7) An exclusion of jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply. We are unable to see how this decision is of any help to Mr. Rath's contention. ** ** ** (7) An exclusion of jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply. We are unable to see how this decision is of any help to Mr. Rath's contention. On an examination of the scheme of the Act we are satisfied that all questions about the liability for dismantling an unauthorised structure shall be determined by the Executive Officer of the N.A.C. and the remedies normally associated with actions in Civil Courts have been prescribed in the statute in Sections 273-A, 274 and 344. 14. It is not contended that any provision of the Act has not been complied with, or that the Executive Officer did not act in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure in which case action in Civil Court would lie. In respect of remedies provided under the Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court has been implied by barred. 15. On the aforesaid analysis, we are of firm opinion that P. Penteya v. Executive Officer, N.A.O. Bhubaneswar 38 (1972) C.L.T. 915, was correctly decided, and there is no necessity to refer this case to a larger Bench. 16. The writ application has no merit and is accordingly dismissed but in the circumstances without costs. S. Acharya, J 17. I agree.