Order: The accused is the revision petitioner. The charge against him was under section 170, Indian Penal Code. He was prosecuted for having pretended himself to be a Police Head Constable at about 7 p.m. on 26th October, 1971 in front of Toshiba Anand Factory, and so pretending stopped P.W. 6 who was going along the road with a cycle belonging to P.W. 3, and detaining him and the cycle demanded from him a sum of Rs. 25 to release the cycle. The trial Court found him guilty under section 170, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced him under thereof to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months. An appeal filed by the revision petitioner was dismissed. 2. In this revision, the argument of Sri T.K. Venugopalan, the learned Counsel for the revision, petitioner, is two fold viz., (1) the prosecution on its own showing has failed to establish that the accused while pretending to hold the office of Police Head Constable, in such — assumed character did, or attempted, to do, any act under the colour of such office 10 attract section 170, Indian Penal Code; and (2) the Courts below have failed to note the significance of the admission of P.W. 7, the Head Constable who recorded Exhibit P-1 First Information statement, that it contained not only what P.W. 6, the informant told him, but also the information he gathered by questioning the accused. 3. The portion of the evidence under attack on the first ground stated above relates to the evidence of P. W. 6 who had stated as follows: “26-10-71 — thiyathi vaikitki 7 ‘manikku gnaan Varghese enna calintae kattadikkan Toshiba Anand bulbintae aauthu athaniyil kondu poyee. Avidae vechu prathi entae cycleil pidichhu light undo ennu chothichhu. Gnan iila ennu paranju. Over load kearamo ennu chothichhu. Okkuk ayilla ennu gnat paranju. Entae cycleil pidichhathu aanennu paranju. Rendu rupa thannal vidamennu prathi paranju. Gnan rupa koduthilla. Appol ninnae arrest chaithirikkunnu vennu prathi ennodu paranju.” Basing on this evidence of P.W.6 the argument on behalf of the Revision Petitioner is that the question by the accused whether there was light, need not necessarily relate to an exercise of assusmed power of a Police Officer. It is also argued that the further question by the accused to P.W. 6 whether he could take over-load, suggests that what the accused meant and wanted was. a lift on the cycle. It is also argued that the further question by the accused to P.W. 6 whether he could take over-load, suggests that what the accused meant and wanted was. a lift on the cycle. It was only thereafter when P.W. 6 had told him that over-loading was rot possible that the accused stopped the cycle in his assumed capacity as the Head Constable of Angamaly Police Station, and told him that he would be let off if only he was willing to pay Rs. 2 to him It is pointed out that even if in the pretended exercise of the assumed character of the office of the Head Constable he had asked for Rs. 2 as a bribe for letting him off it does not form part of the function of a Police Officer, and as such, it cannot be said that in exercise of the assumed character of the authority of the Police Officer he had asked for Rs. 2. Therefore, the ingredients for attracting section 170 of the Indian Penal Code, have not been established in this case. In support of this argument reliance is placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner on the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Biswanath v. State1. The facts of that case were as follows: The petitioner went On board the Japanese vessel S.S. Ganages Mara and represented himself as a Customs Officer and wanted presents from the Purser and the Master of the vessel. He received a ballpointed pencil from the Purser and a packet of handkerchiefs from the Master. The facts, as alleged, were not seriously disputed by the petitioner; the principal argument was that even assuming all the facts, as alleged, to be true, no offence under section 170, Indian Penal Code, was committed inasmuch as nothing was done “under colour of such office”. After analysing the rquirements of section 170, Indian Penal Code, A.K. Das, J., who delivered the judgment of the Division Bench, laid down the essential facts to be proved in a prosecution under section 170, Indian Penal Code, as follows: (1) that the accused falsely pretended to be or personated to be a public servant; (2) that he did so knowingly; and (3) that when assuming such character he did or attempted to do something under colour of such office. Taking the view that the prosecution had failed to prove that the act was done under colour of:he pretended office, the Court held that no offence under section 170, Indian Penal Code, was committed by the petitioner-accused. Similar was the view taken by the Patna High Court in Sukhdeo Pathak v. Emperor2. In that case the accused was charged with an offence under section 170, Indian Penal Code,because he avoided paying one anna for a platform ticket by pretending, upon entering the station platform, that he was a C.I.D Officer. It was held that the act did not constitute an offence under section 170, Indian Penal Code, on the reasoning that the mere assumption of false character without any attempt to do any official act is not sufficient to bring the offender within the meaning of that section. In a later decision reported in Lakshminarayan v Emperor3, the above decision was followed by the Patna High Court. That was a case in which the High Court held that the promise to appoint One as a constable or writing something nonsense and unintelligible on paper cannot be regarded as act done under colour of office of C.I.D. Officer. It was pointed out in that decision that: “the act done ‘under colour’ of an office is an act having some relation to the office which the accused pretends to hold. A mere promise to appoint a person as a constable does not amount to an act under colour of the office of a C.I.D. officer. Such recommendation or promise might be made, not necessarily by a C.I.D. officer only.” 4. The State Prosecutor points out that view contrary to what has been expressed in the above decisions cited by the revision petitioner has been taken by Banerji, J., in Emperor v. Aziz-tid-din4, in which case it was held that to constitute the offence provided for by section 170 of the Indian Penal Code, it was not necessary that the act done or attempted to be done should be such an act as might legally be done by the public servant personated. The facts of that case were as follows: The applicant, Aziz-ud-din, came one day from Saharanpur to Muzaffarnagar without a ticket, and was arrested in the act of demanding one anna’s worth of fruit from a fruit-seller for one pice on the ground that he was a head-constable. The facts of that case were as follows: The applicant, Aziz-ud-din, came one day from Saharanpur to Muzaffarnagar without a ticket, and was arrested in the act of demanding one anna’s worth of fruit from a fruit-seller for one pice on the ground that he was a head-constable. However, the reasoning given by the Division Benches of the Calcutta and Patna High Courts in the more recent decisions in my opinion appears to reflect the true spirit of the section. If the view expressed in the decision of the Allahabad High. Court, referred to above, is accepted, as pointed out by Das, J., in Biswanath v. State1, it would virtually make the clause “under colour of such office” redundant, but the section not only provides that the act shall be done in such assumed character, but also under colour of such office. 5. The State Prosecutor points out that in any event, the act of arrest of P.W.6 by the accused under the pretended authority of the Police Officer would fall within the mischief of section 170 of the Penal Code. There is force in this contention, but considering the fact that the accused was not in uniform, whether P.W.6 could have taken it for granted that the accused was really a Police Officer appears to be doubtful. On this point, what has been spoken to by P.W.6 has not been corroborated by the evidence of any other witness. 6. Now coming to the second point it is contended by the learned Counsel for the revision petitioner that Exhibit P-1 is not admissible in evidence in so far as it is vitiated by the inclusion of information given by the accused when questioned by P.W.7. P.W.7 has not categorically stated as to what exactly is the portion of the information furnished by the accused and what exactly was the portion of the information given by P.W.6. According to him, he had dotted out points when the information was given by P.W.6, and that First Information statement actually was written from the police station whereas the information was given by P.W.6 from the office of P.W.2. According to him, he had dotted out points when the information was given by P.W.6, and that First Information statement actually was written from the police station whereas the information was given by P.W.6 from the office of P.W.2. The Supreme Court has in Nisar Ali v. The State of Uttar Pradesh1, observed as follows: “A first information report is not a substantive piece of evidence and can only be used to corroborate the statement of the maker under section 157 of the Evidence Act or to contradict it under section 145 of that Act. It cannot be used as evidence against the maker at the trial if he himself becomes an accused, nor to corroborate or contradict other witnesses.” What was really sought in this case was to admit in evidence Exhibit P-1 statement, part of which has been prepared on the basis of the information furnished by the accused to be used against him. This is illegal in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court. 7. For the reasons given above, this revision is allowed, the conviction and sentence passed by the Courts below are set aside, and the accused is acquitted. The bond executed by him shall stand cancelled.