JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - In this group of special appeals a Division Bench, being of the opinion that the decision of this Court in S.C. Misra v. State of U.P. 1971 ALJ 1027, 1971(2) SLR 624 : 1971 ALJ 1027. AWR (J) 49 requires reconsideration, has referred the following question for decision by a Full Bench: "Whether termination of service Under Rule 3-A(iv) without intending to inflict any punishment would nonetheless per se be an order of punishment requiring compliance with rules panted on page 193 of the Manual? 2. In Second Appeal No. 3429 of 1966 a learned single Judge has referred the following question to a larger Bench: "Whether the decision of Division Bench in Sp. A. No. 663 of 1970 lays down correct law in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of S.R. Tewari v. District Board, Agra , AIR 1964 SC 1680 .? The reference to the special appeal decision if to the case of S.C. Misra mentioned above. 3. In all these cases the services of a permanent employee have been terminated by a simple notice of termination given by the District Board Under Rule 3-A of the Rules relating to the servants of the Board. 4. The question is whether under the District Boards Act, 1922, the Board is invested with the power to determine the employment of a permanent (sic) of the, Board otherwise than by way of dismissal or punishment. 5. Section 82 of the Act confers administrative authority upon the President and the Secretary in respect of several matters relating to the servants dl the Board specified therein including power to appoint, punish, dismiss, etc., the servants of the Board, Section 84 makes the provisions of Sections 72, 73, 80 and 82 subject to the provisions of: "(a).................. (b) any rule imposing any conditions on the appointment of persons to offices or to any particular office requiring professional skill and on the punishment or dismissal of persons so appointed and; on their liability to service under the orders of any Government on the occurrence of any emergency. (c)............... (d) any other rule relating to servants of a board. Section 172 of the Act confers rule making authority upon the State Government. (c)............... (d) any other rule relating to servants of a board. Section 172 of the Act confers rule making authority upon the State Government. By Clause (2) the State Government may make rules consistent with the Act- (a) Providing for any matter for which power to make provision is conferred, expressly or by implication, on the State Government by this or any other enactment in force at the commencement of this Act; and (b) Generally for the guidance of a Board or any Committee of a Board or any Government officer in any matter connected with the carrying cut of the provisions of this Act. 6. In exercise of the rule-making power the State Government has framed a set of rules. In Ch. III of the rules dealing with officers and servants of the Board there occurs Rule 3-A which provides: "The period of office of a permanent servant of the board other than a Government servant in its employ shall not determine until: (i) his resignation has been accepted in writing by the authority competent to appoint his successor, or he ceases to be in service by the operation of the rules regulating the retirement of district boards servants, or (ii) he has given such authority at least three months' notice where his pay exceeds Rs. 15 and in other cases at least one month's notice, or (iii) he has paid or assigned to the board a sum equal to three months' pay where his pay exceeds Rs. 15 and in other cases a sum equal to one month's pay. (iv) he has been given by the authority competent to appoint his successor not less than three months' notice or a sum equal to three months' pay in lieu of notice where his pay exceeds Rs. 15 and in other cases not less than one month's notice or a sum equal to one month's pay in lieu of notice. The other material rule was framed by the Government by the notification dated 25th March, 1946. It provided: "No Officer or servant shall be dismissed, removed or reduced without a reasonable opportunity being given to him of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. Any written defence tendered shall be recorded and a written order shall be passed thereon. It provided: "No Officer or servant shall be dismissed, removed or reduced without a reasonable opportunity being given to him of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. Any written defence tendered shall be recorded and a written order shall be passed thereon. Every order of dismissal, removal or reduction shall be in writing and shall specify the charge brought, the defence and the reasons for the order. 7. The validity of Rule 3-A was considered by the Supreme Court in S.R. Tewari v. District Board, Agra , AIR 1964 SC 1680 . After considering the relevant and material provisions mentioned above, the Supreme Court held that the power of the Board to appoint or punish the servants of the Board is subject, among others, to the rules imposing conditions on the appointment of persons to the offices and on the punishment or dismissal of persons who were appointed as well as to rules relating to servants of the Board mentioned in Clause (b) and (d) of Section 84 read with Section 172(2). It was held that the rule providing for the procedure for termination of employment of servants of the Board is a rule relating to servants of the Board and may properly be made Under Section 84(d) read with Section 172(2), Power to appoint ordinarily carries with it the power to terminate appointment and a power to determine may, in the absence of restrictions express or implied, be exercised subject to the conditions prescribed in that behalf by the authority competent to appoint. The power to terminate employment is therefore to be found in Section 82 and the method of its exercise is prescribed by the rules referred to in Section 84. The rules deal with the conditions under which an officer or servant may be dismissed (the dismissal being by way of punishment) and also under which determination of employment may take place. 8. The Supreme Court further held that the expressions "dismiss" or "dismissal" occurring in Sections 82 and 84 as well as in the notification dated 25th March, 1946, have the same connotation. They refer to orders of punishment. 8. The Supreme Court further held that the expressions "dismiss" or "dismissal" occurring in Sections 82 and 84 as well as in the notification dated 25th March, 1946, have the same connotation. They refer to orders of punishment. It was held that an order of determination of employment which is not of the nature of an order of dismissal, has by virtue of the rules framed Under Clause (d) of Section 84 to be exercised consistently with Rule 3-A and an order of dismissal involving punishment must be exercised consistently with the rule or regulation framed under the notification dated March 25, 1946, Under Section 84(b) and (d). 9. According to this decision of the Supreme Court, Rule 3-A is valid and can be utilised by the competent authority when the services of a permanent employee are to be determined simpliciter without intending to inflict any punishment. Rule 3-A as well as the rule framed under the notification dated March 25, 1946, operate in different fields, the latter covering a case of an order of punishment by way of dismissal or removal only. 10. Learned Counsel appearing for the employees invited our attention to the Supreme Court's decision in Moti Ram Deka v. North East Frontier Railway , AIR 1964 SC 600 . In that case the question was whether the termination of services of a permanent railway servant Under Rule 148(3) or 149(3) of the Railway Establishment Code, Vol. 1 amounts to his removal or dismissal Under Article 311 of the Constitution. Gajendragadkar, J. speaking for the majority stressed that Fundamental Rule 9(14) occurring in the Railway Establishment Code, Vol. II defines "lien" as meaning the title of a railway servant to hold substantively, either immediately or on the termination of a period or periods of absence, a permanent post, including a tenure post, to which he has been appointed substantively. The expression "permanent post" was defined in Fundamental Rule 9(22) so mean a post carrying a definite rate of pay sanctioned without limit of time. The expression "permanent post" was defined in Fundamental Rule 9(22) so mean a post carrying a definite rate of pay sanctioned without limit of time. It was observed that as a result or the relevant definitions, a permanent post carried a definite rate of pay without a limit of time and a servant who substantively holds a permanent post has a title to hold the post to which he is substantively appointed and that in terms means that a permanent servant has aright to hold the post until he reaches the (sic) of superannuation or until he is compulsorily retired under the relevant rule Emphasis was laid upon the rule giving title to substantively hold a permanent post in the shape of a Men. It will be seen that the Supreme Court did not hold that the right flows from the prescription of an age of superannuation or from me provision of compulsory retirement after reaching a particular age. In paragraph 19 it was observed: "It is in the light of this position that we must now (sic) to examine the question as to whether the termination of the permanent servant's services either Under Rule 148(3) or Rule 149(3) amounts to his removal or not. In paragraph 26 it was observed: "A person who substantively holds a permanent post has a right to continue in service subject, of course, to the rule of superannuation land the rule as to compulsory retirement. If for any other reason that right is invaded and he is asked to leave his service, the termination of his service must inevitably mean the defeat of his right to continue in service and as such it is in the nature of a penalty and amounts to removal. In other words, termination of the services of a permanent servant otherwise than on the ground of superannuation, or compulsory retirement must, per se, amount to his removal and so, if by Rule 148(3) or Rule 149(3) such a termination is brought about, the Rule dearly contravenes Article 311(2) and must be held to be invalid. In other words, termination of the services of a permanent servant otherwise than on the ground of superannuation, or compulsory retirement must, per se, amount to his removal and so, if by Rule 148(3) or Rule 149(3) such a termination is brought about, the Rule dearly contravenes Article 311(2) and must be held to be invalid. In paragraph 32 it was observed that if the termination does not amount to removal then of course Article 311(2) would be inapplicable and the challenge to the validity of the impugned rules would fail These observations show that the rule was held invalid because it contravened the guarantee secured by a higher law namely Article 311(2) of the Constitution, The, rules framed under a statutory authority cannot override the effect of the constitutional guarantee. The impugned rules were held to violate Article 311(2). They were not held invalid on the ground that they were in conflict with, the provisions for dismissal or removal provided for in the later part of Rules 148(3) and 149(3). If Article 311(2) had not been there, Rule 148(3) could not have been held invalid on there ground that a termination thereunder was tantamount to removal within meaning of the latter part of the same rule. 11. In this situation S.R. Tewari's case gains prominence. In the case it was held that both Rule 3-A providing for determination on notice and the rule framed under notification dated 26th March, 1946, laying down the procedure for dismissal or removal as a measure of punishment co-exist. Reading the two decisions together, it teems clear to us that Rule 3-A could not be held invalid on the ground that determination of service under it would be per se removal or dismissal within gleaning of the rule framed under the Notification dated 25th March 1946. In regard to servants of the District 'Board there is no overriding guarantee -Hike Article 311(2). 12. S.R. Tewari's case was decided on 15th April, 1963 by a Bench confuting of B.P. Sinha, C.J., J.G. Shah and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, JJ. The unanimous judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. Mod Ram Deka's case was decided nearly 8 months later on 15th December 1963 by a seven Judge Bench of which Shah and Rajagopala Ayyangar, JJ. were also members. The unanimous judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. Mod Ram Deka's case was decided nearly 8 months later on 15th December 1963 by a seven Judge Bench of which Shah and Rajagopala Ayyangar, JJ. were also members. In none of the judgments delivered in Moti Ram Deka's case was S.R. Tewari's case considered or even referred to. Even Shah, J. who gave a dissenting opinion in Moti Ram Deka's case did not refer to S.R. Tewari's decision. Evidently, the decision in S.R. Tewari's case was not considered material or relevant because District Board employees do not have guarantee as the Government servants have Under Article 311(2), of the Constitution. Ex-hypothesi, Moti Rain Deka's case is not applicable to District Board servants who are to be governed by S.R. Tewari's case. 13. It was urged that the regulation regarding retention and retirement of District Board employees confers a right upon the employees to remain in service till the age of superannuation. The regulation which is in law a rule framed by the State Government Under Section 172 of the District Boards Act, provides: "No officer or servant of the board shall ordinarily be retained in the service of the board, after he attains the age of 60 years and in no case after he attains the age of 65 years. This rule restricts the right of the board to retain a servant of the board or officer after a certain age. It regulates the procedure for granting extension. The various rules framed relating to the servants or officers of the District Board nowhere speak of an officer having a lien on a post or office. It will be remembered that in Moti Ram Deka's case the Supreme Court spelt out a right to retain the post from the definition of the term "lien" given in the rules. The right or title was not deduced from the prescription of the age of superannuation. 14. Moveover, the various rules framed by the State Government have the same operative efficacy. According to S.R. Tewari's case Rule 3-A was valid even though there was a rule laying down the procedure for dismissal or removal. Rule 3-A was not held as being subject to the rule with respect to dismissal or removal. 14. Moveover, the various rules framed by the State Government have the same operative efficacy. According to S.R. Tewari's case Rule 3-A was valid even though there was a rule laying down the procedure for dismissal or removal. Rule 3-A was not held as being subject to the rule with respect to dismissal or removal. Similarly, the rule relating to retention and retirement will have to be read harmoniously with other rules including Rule 3-A. If the rule relating to retirement is held to confer a right to hold the post till the age of superannuation, Rule 3-A would stand completely nullified. There is nothing in any part of the rule regarding retention and retirement giving it an overriding effect over Rule 3-A. In our opinion, all these rules co-exist and apply in their respective fields. The rule regarding retention and retirement does not confer an absolute right upon an officer or servant of the Board to the post held by him. The right to continue in service is subject to the operation of all these rules; His services can be determined Under Rule 3-A, he may be dismissed or removed under the rule relating thereto and that he cannot ordinarily be retained in service after he attains the prescribed age. 15. In S.C. Misra v. State of U.P. 1971(2) SLR 624 ,1971 ALJ 1027.(supra) a Division Bench applied the decision in Moti Ram Deka's case to a case of termination of a restrict Board employee Under Rule 3-A. The Bench extensively applied the observations of Gajendragadkar, J. in Deka's case. It did not, while discussing this question, even refer to S.R. Tewari's case. It held that the rule prescribing the age of superannuation for District Board employees gives the right to hold the post till that age and termination of his employment before he reaches that age would per se be punishment as it entails the forfeiture of his employment. In our opinion, this decision does not lay down the law correctly. 16. We would answer the question referred to us in the special appeals in the negative and the question referred in the second appeal by saying that the decision in Special Appeal No. 663 of 1970 does not lay down the law correctly in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in S.R. Tewari's case. 17. 16. We would answer the question referred to us in the special appeals in the negative and the question referred in the second appeal by saying that the decision in Special Appeal No. 663 of 1970 does not lay down the law correctly in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in S.R. Tewari's case. 17. Let the papers be laid before the Bench concerned with this opinion and answer. Question answered.