JUDGMENT : G.K. Misra, C.J. - The Plaintiff is the adopted son of late Maharaja Dr. Vikaram Deb Varma of Jeypore who died on 15-4-1951. There is no dispute that on his death the Plaintiff inherited all the properties of the late Maharaja. The Plaintiff's case is that the Defendant is the illegitimate son of the late Maharaja through a concubine. Though the Defendant was entitled to maintenance he was not entitled to any right of residence. The disputed house belonged to the Maharaja. The Defendant was allowed to occupy the same in the year 1948. As he has no right of occupation he was called upon by the Plaintiff to vacate the house. But as he refused to vacate the house, the suit was filed on 28-7-1965 for eviction and for damages of Rs. 3000/- from 1-9-1964 to 30-6-1965. Relief was sought in respect of future damages also. 2. In the written statement the Defendant admitted that the Plaintiff was the adopted son of late Maharaja and that on his death he inherited all his properties and got compensation from the Government on the abolition of the estate sometime in 1952. The Defendant's main case is that the house was gifted away to him by the late Maharaja to whom his mother was married in Gandharba form and that he has acquired a title by prescription being in possession for more than 12 years in his own right, title and interest. In the alternative he also pleaded that he was entitled to right of residence, and until a suitable house was provided to him he was entitled to continue in the suit house. 3. The learned Subordinate Judge held that the Defendants failed to establish that he acquired title to the disputed house by adverse possession. He was of the view that the initial occupation was permissive and the Defendant always continued in permissive possession. On the alternative plea taken by the Defendant that he was entitled to maintenance and residence, the learned Subordinate Judge accepted the defence case. He accordingly dismissed the suit. The Plaintiff has filed this appeal. 4. The learned advocates for the parties bring to our notice the fact that the Defendant died on 13-4-1972. On his death his legal heirs, Respondents I-a to I-j were substituted. These legal heirs include the widow, sons and daughters of late Kamalanath Ray, the original Defendant. 5. He accordingly dismissed the suit. The Plaintiff has filed this appeal. 4. The learned advocates for the parties bring to our notice the fact that the Defendant died on 13-4-1972. On his death his legal heirs, Respondents I-a to I-j were substituted. These legal heirs include the widow, sons and daughters of late Kamalanath Ray, the original Defendant. 5. The first question for consideration is whether the Defendant acquired a title by adverse possession. The oral evidence and documents given in the case unmistakeably show that the Maharaja allowed the Defendant to occupy the disputed house as he was a son. He did not part with title. Law is elementary that without execution of a registered deed of gift the title of the Maharaja cannot be extinguished, the value of the disputed property being much more than Rs. 100/-. Initial possession being permissive, any length of user, even more than the prescriptive period, cannot convert the permissive character into an adverse one. It is, therefore, unnecessary to re-examine the evidence led on the point. After having carefully gone through the discussion made by the learned Subordinate Judge, we are satisfied that the finding that the Defendant did not acquire any title by adverse possession is justified. Mr. Ramdas was unable to present any convincing argument whereby that finding could be property assailed. 6. The next question for consideration is whether the right of maintenance includes the right of residence. There is no dispute that the Defendant was entitled to maintenance, being the illegitimate son of the last holder of the impartible state, the late Maharaja of Jeypore. In paragraph 551 of Mulla's Hindu Law the position has been summed up. It has been said that an illegitimate son is entitled to maintenance for life. Under the Mitakhara Law an illegitimate son is entitled to maintenance as long as he lives, in recognition of his status as a member of his father's family and by reason of his exclusion from inheritance among the regenerate classes. Charandas Vassonji Thakar and Ors. v. Nagubai Mangalorekar and Ors. AIR 1929 Bom. 452, their lordships held that subsistence or maintenance must include residence and should not be confined to food and raiment. In Gadiraju Chinna Krishnamraju and Ors. v. Chintalapudi Reddamma and Ors. AIR 1961 Mad. Charandas Vassonji Thakar and Ors. v. Nagubai Mangalorekar and Ors. AIR 1929 Bom. 452, their lordships held that subsistence or maintenance must include residence and should not be confined to food and raiment. In Gadiraju Chinna Krishnamraju and Ors. v. Chintalapudi Reddamma and Ors. AIR 1961 Mad. 608, it was laid down that the presumption in the case of a maintenance grant when nothingelse is known and where the document of grant is not forthcoming, and, if forthcoming, ambiguous in its terms, is that it is intended to enure for the life time of the grantee and not beyond. In this case there is no document of the maintenance grant. There is no pleading or proof of any custom that the maintenance grant would enure beyond the lifetime of the grantee. This is, therefore, a simple case and the Defendant was entitled to maintenance and residence only during his lifetime. In Mothey Anja Ratna Raja Kumar Vs. Koney Narayana Rao and Others their lordships accepted Ananthaya v. Vishnu ILR Mad. 160 as laying down the correct law. Therein the dictum laid down in Gadiraju Chinna Krishnamraju and Ors. v. Chintalapudi Reddamma and Ors. AIR 1961 Mad. 608, was approved, though that case was not referred to. On a review of the aforesaid authorities, conclusion is irresistible in the facts and circumstances of this case that the Defendant had the right of residence in the disputed house which was allowed to him by his late father till his death on 13-4-1972. 7. An-interesting question was raised by Mr. Ramdas that on the death of the Defendant the cause of action does not survive, and that the suit is liable to be dismissed against the legal representatives who are not entitled to inherit the right of maintenance and residence. The argument, though ingenious, is fallacious. 8. With regard to the question whether the Defendant acquired a title by adverse possession, the legal representatives were necessary parties. If the finding would have been that the Defendant had acquired such a title the legal representatives would have been the beneficiary of that finding and would have inherited the disputed property. Though the finding is adverse to the deceased-Defendant, such a conclusion must be reached in the presence of the legal representatives. 9. If the finding would have been that the Defendant had acquired such a title the legal representatives would have been the beneficiary of that finding and would have inherited the disputed property. Though the finding is adverse to the deceased-Defendant, such a conclusion must be reached in the presence of the legal representatives. 9. The next question for consideration is whether, after the defence plea of acquisition of title by adverse possession is repelled, the suit is to be dismissed as the legal representatives do not claim any interest in respect of maintenance and residence. These legal representatives are not rank trespassers. They were licensee under the deceased-Defendant who was in permissive occupation. Such licensees are liable to be evicted in any action against the Defendant who himself had no right to hold the property against the true owner after his death. If the legal representatives had been rank trespassers not having any connection with the original Defendant, the position might have been different. Take for instance the case where after the death of the Defendant third party rank trespassers forcibly entered into the disputed house. In such a case, the Plaintiff's suit is liable to be dismissed and he has to again go to the Civil Court to take an action for eviction against such rank trespassers. But the position here is completely different. The widow, sons and daughters occupied the house under the aegis of the deceased Defendant. If the deceased-Defendant had no right to continue, then those persons were liable to be evicted with him. 10. The Plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to the relief of eviction. He is not entitled to any damages against the deceased Defendant till 13-4-1972, as the latter had a right of residence till then. The prayer for damages must be accordingly dismissed. 11. On the aforesaid analysis, the appeal is allowed so far as the relief of eviction is concerned and is dismissed relating to the prayer for damages. The suit is decreed in part. In the circumstances, parties will bear their own costs throughout. S. Acharya, J. 12. I agree.