Judgment :- MAHARAJAN, J: 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment of Ramaprasada Rao J. in C.M.A. No. 298 of 1962 and arises under the following circumstances: 2. In O.S. No. 25 of 1957 on the file of the Rajamundry District Court, one Appa Rao, the first respondent herein, obtained a decree against his own grandfather, one Raja Rao Venkata Kumara Mahipathi, who died during the pendency of these proceedings, and whose legal representatives are respondent 2 to 11. The first respondent being the grand son of the judgment debtor has also been recorded as one of the legal representatives. In E.P.R. No. 4 of 1961, the decree-holder filed a petition to execute his decree after getting it transferred from the Rajamundry Court to the Sub Court of Ootacamund and had the disputed property attached on 11th January 1961. On 6th February, 1961 one Raju Bettan the appellant herein, and one Raju Gounder referred a claim petition in E.A. 92 of 1961 under O. 21 rule 58 C.P.C. The foundation of their claim was that under Ex. A.1, a deed dated 4th January 1961, The judgment debtor had agreed to sell the disputed property in their favour for Rs. 99,000, that on 4th January 1961, they paid him Rs. 25000 being a portion of the sale price and were put in possession of the disputed property on 4th January 1961 itself and that they paid the balance and secured a registered sale deed Ex. A.2 on 16th January 1961. Their contention was that on the date of attachment 11th January 1961 they were in possession of the property in their own right, and not on behalf of the judgment debtor. This claim was opposed by the decree-holder. By order dated 13th July 1961 the learned Subordinate Judge of Ootacamund dismissed the claim petition after holding that at the time of the attachment it was the judgment debtor who was in possession of the property attached and not the claimants, and that Ex. A.1 and A.2 were the result of collusion between the judgment debtor and the claimants. Subsequently the claimants filed E.A. 531 of 1961 under O. 47, R. 1, C.P.C. for review of the order dated 13th July 1961 whereby E.A. 92 of 1961 was dismissed. A.1 and A.2 were the result of collusion between the judgment debtor and the claimants. Subsequently the claimants filed E.A. 531 of 1961 under O. 47, R. 1, C.P.C. for review of the order dated 13th July 1961 whereby E.A. 92 of 1961 was dismissed. Notice of this application was ordered to the decree-holder who appeared by counsel and advanced arguments in support of the earlier order, a review of which was applied for. The learned Subordinate Judge allowed the review petition with costs reversed the order of dismissal of the claim petition allowed the claim and directed the attachment in E.P. 4 of 1961 to be raised. In his order of review the learned Subordinate Judge has elaborately considered the case of the claimants for review, and after demonstrating that his original order was guilty of certain errors, reviewed the same. In the original order the learned Subordinate Judge held that Ex. A.1, the agreement of sale, must have been brought into existence fraudulently and in collusion between the judgment debtor and the claimants but in the order allowing the review petition he felt constrained to change this view for the following reason. 3. In the first place, he omitted to consider the affidavits which has been filed during the claim proceedings one by Mr. Devaraj Urs an advocate of Coonoor, who had attested Ex. A.1 and A.2, and who sworn that he was present at the time Ex. A.1 was concluded and attested it and that he was also present when in part performance of the agreement of sale the claimants were put in possession of the property in dispute. A similar affidavit had been filed by T.K. Govindaraj, who was the monigar of Coonoor village. The learned Judge says that though these affidavits had been filed even in the claim proceedings, the claimants advocate had by inadvertence failed to mark them, with the result they had escaped judicial attention. A similar affidavit had been filed by T.K. Govindaraj, who was the monigar of Coonoor village. The learned Judge says that though these affidavits had been filed even in the claim proceedings, the claimants advocate had by inadvertence failed to mark them, with the result they had escaped judicial attention. Had these affidavits been brought to his notice says the learned Judge, he would certainly have come to the conclusion that the agreement and the sale were genuine transactions and that in pursuance of the agreement the claimants had actually been inducted into possession of the property even prior to the date of attachment Another mistake, which, according to the learned Judge, he had committed, while dismissing the claim petition, was that he was under the impression that only a sum of Rs. 25,000 had actually been parted with by the claimants under the agreement and the sale deed, but at the time of review it was brought to his notice that the claimant had, under the terms of Ex. A-1 and A-2, expressly undertaken to discharge two mortgages of the judgment debtor aggregating to Rs. 73,720 and that out of the sale consideration of Rs. 99,900 the said amount of Rs. 73,720 was reserved with the claimants for redemption of the mortgages. This discovery, says the learned Judge, put a different complexion upon his appreciation of Ex. A-1 and A-2. 4. Under O. 47, R. 1 C.P.C., any person considering himself aggrieved by an order from which no appeal is allowed and who (1) from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree or order was passed or made, or (2) on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or (3) for any other sufficient reason, may apply for review of judgment to the court which passed the order. In this case the affidavits filed by the advocate and the monigar were before the Court when the original order dismissing the claim was made. It cannot, therefore, be said that there was any discovery by the claimants of new and important matter. The important matter was already there on the file of the court. In this case the affidavits filed by the advocate and the monigar were before the Court when the original order dismissing the claim was made. It cannot, therefore, be said that there was any discovery by the claimants of new and important matter. The important matter was already there on the file of the court. The misfortune of the claimants was that the learned Judge did not advert his mind to that important matter. It cannot, therefore, be said that the first ground of ‘discovery of new and important matter’ was available in support of the application for review. Nor could the second ground ‘mistake or error apparent on the face of the record’ be pressed into service. But the third ground ‘for any other sufficient reason’ was certainly available, and it would cover, in our view, the subsequent discovery by the Judge of important matter, which had been produced before him, but which, on his own showing, he did not advert his mind to. 5. After the learned Subordinate Judge reviewed his own order, the decree-holder filed C.M.A. No. 298 of 1962 on the file of this court. The learned Judge allowed the appeal, set aside the revised order of the Subordinate Judge in Ex. A-531 of 1961 and restored his original order passed in E.A. 92 of 1961. It was vehemently argued before the learned Judge that the appeal against the order reviewing the original order was not maintainable on the grounds urged by the decree-holder, because the appeal did not fall within the ambit of O. 47, R. 7, C.P.C. In support of this argument reliance was placed upon Gopala Iyer v. Ramaswami Sastrigal 31 Mad. 49, Madura Brahmayya v. Vedula Velamma 31 M.L.J. 509 and Srinivasa Iyengar v. Official Assignee, Madras 50 Mad. 891. The learned Judge, without following those rulings, referred to Hemanthan Chetti v. Narayana Chetti 27 Mad. 602 and to an obiter dictim of Rajamannar, C.J., in Ananthalakshmi v. M.I. and F. Trust A.I.R. 1954 Mad. 927; 1954-1, M.L.J. 19 and adopting the reasoning contained in the obiter, held that the order of the learned Subordinate Judge was without jurisdiction and violative of O. 47, R. 4, C.P.C. and ‘against the rigid prescribed limits for the exercise of such jurisdiction under O. 47, R 1. It is against this order one of the claimants has preferred this Letters Patent appeal. 6. It is against this order one of the claimants has preferred this Letters Patent appeal. 6. The learned Judge has reversed the order granting the review on different grounds, one of which is that it involves a violation of O. 47 R. 1 C.P.C. That rule provides that a person aggrieved by an order may apply for a review of the order to the Court which passed it by making out any of the three grounds mentioned in that rule. Assuming without conceding that an order directing a review can be attacked on the ground that it involves a violation of R. 1 O. 47 C.P.C., we shall examine if the learned Subordinate Judge, who granted the review acted in violation of that rule. It is true that the third ground mentioned in the rule must be ejusdem generis with the first two grounds. Was there then ‘any other sufficient reason’ for the court to grant review in this case, though certain circumstances and affidavits were placed before the court even before the passing of the original order, the court due to inadvertence refrained from directing its attention to those circumstances and affidavits. If discovery by the party of new and important matter subsequent to the order can be placed in justification of a review there is much more reason to justify the review when some ‘important’ matter was before the court at the time of the original order, but due to no fault of the party, the court inadvertently shut out that matter from consideration and acted as if that matter was not before it. According to the learned appellate Judge, there is nothing important or significant about the two circumstances which influenced the Subordinate Judge to change his original view. We disagree. The affidavits of the advocate and the V.M. were to the effect that they were present when Ex. A.1 was executed and when the claimants were put in possession of the property in, part performance of Ex. A.1. These affidavits had a vital bearing on the truth of the claimants case and if accepted, could legitimately tilt the scales in favour of the claimants. There was also the newly discovered circumstance that the; claimants had not only paid Rs. 25,000 under Ex. A.1 but also had undertaken to discharge two prior mortgages to the tune of Rs. 73,700. These affidavits had a vital bearing on the truth of the claimants case and if accepted, could legitimately tilt the scales in favour of the claimants. There was also the newly discovered circumstance that the; claimants had not only paid Rs. 25,000 under Ex. A.1 but also had undertaken to discharge two prior mortgages to the tune of Rs. 73,700. These circumstances taken together could dispel the doubt of the Sub Judge, and lend assurance to the claimants case that they were in possession in their own right in pursuance of a bona fide arrangement. It is not usual for a Judge to go back upon his own judgment and we must in fairness to the Sub-Judge, say that without any inhibition he allowed the newly discovered circumstance to change his previously expressed conclusion. 7. The learned appellate Judge has criticised the Sub Judge for having acted upon affidavit evidence, which according to the learned Judge, is inadmissible; because the affidavits were filed without any order of the court as contemplated in O. 19, R. 1, C.P.C. We are unable to share this view. It is true that under O. 19, R. 1, C.P.C. it is open to a court at any time in any proceeding to order that any particular fact or facts may be proved by affidavit. But O. 19, R. 2 C.P.C. expressly provides that upon any application, evidence may be given by affidavit, although the court may at the instance of either party, order the attendance for cross-examination of the deponent. Under this rule, even without an order of court, it is open to a party in an application to file an affidavit, and once it is filed, it is open to the opposite party to move the court for a direction to the deponent of the affidavit to attend court for cross examination. In this case, though the affidavits were filed by the claimants. The decree-holder never objected to the filing of the affidavits on the ground he had no notice of the affidavits Vide Rule 36 of the Civil Rules of Practice. Nor did he apply to the court for an order directing the deponents of the affidavits to appear in court for cross-examination. In these circumstances, we think that the learned Subordinate Judge was right to act upon the affidavit. Nor did he apply to the court for an order directing the deponents of the affidavits to appear in court for cross-examination. In these circumstances, we think that the learned Subordinate Judge was right to act upon the affidavit. In fact, it is a long standing practice of the courts in the mofussial to dispose of claim petitions mainly on affidavit evidence and to discourage the leading of oral evidence in these summary proceedings. Such a practice is sanctioned by law. 8. We shall next proceed to consider whether an order directing a review can be attacked in appeal on the ground that it involves a violation of O. 47, R. 1 C.P.C. Before doing so we, may refer to O. 43, R. 1 C.P.C., which says that an order under R. 4 of O. 47 granting an application for review is appealable under the provisions of S. 104 C.P.C. But it has been held consistently by this court that O. 43, R. 1 of the Code does not give a general right of appeal and that it is controlled by O. 47, R. 7 of the Code— Vide Gopala Iyer v. Ramaswami Sastrigal 31 Mad. 49, Srinivasa Iyer v. Nataraja Iyer 1915-II-L.W. 366, Maduru Brahmayya v. Vadula Vellamma , 31 M.L.J. 509, Srinivasa Iyengar v. Official Assignee, Madras 50 Mad. 891 and Mrs. Ananthalakshmi ammal v. Hindustan Investment and Financial Trust Ltd. , 31 M.L.J. 509 (D.B.) O. 47, R. 7 runs as follows: “7(1). An order of the court rejecting the application shall not be appealable; but an order granting an application may be objected to on the ground that the order was i (a)(b) in contravention of the provisions of R. 4, or (c) after the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed therefore and without sufficient cause. Such objection may be taken it once by an appeal from the order granting the application or in any appeal from the final decree or order passed or made in the suit”. Such objection may be taken it once by an appeal from the order granting the application or in any appeal from the final decree or order passed or made in the suit”. This rule refers to contravention of R. 4, which has two clauses, the first of which says that “Where it appears to the court that there is not sufficient grounds for review, it shall reject the application, and the second of which says that, where the court is of opinion that the application for review should be granted it shall grant the same; Provided that: (a) no such application shall be granted without previous notice to the opposite party, to enable him to appear and be heard in support of the decree or order, a review of which is applied for; and (b) no such application shall be granted on the ground of discovery of new matter or evidence which the applicant alleges was not within his knowledge, or could not be adduced by him when the decree or order was passed or made, without Strict proof of such allegation.” It may be noticed that R. 7 does not say that an order granting an application for review may be objected to on the ground that there has been a contravention of the provisions of R. 1, although it says that it may be objected to on the ground that the order was in contravention of the provisions of R. 4. This lacuna has led to difference of opinion among the High Courts as to the scope of an appeal against an order granting an application tor review. One view is that even if the order granting a review involves a violation of O. 47, R. 1 of the Code, the violation cannot be made the ground of attack against the order in an appeal and that the only ground of attack available in an appeal is that there has been a violation of either of the conditions laid down in the proviso to sub Cl. (2) of R. 4, O. 47. (2) of R. 4, O. 47. In other words, where the court orders that the application for review should be granted, the only ground upon which that order can be attacked in appeal is that it has been passed (a) without previous notice of the application for review to the opposite party, or (b) without strict proof of the new matter or evidence, which, according to the applicant, was not within his knowledge at the time of the original order and has been discovered by him subsequently. Such an order should not be attacked on any of the grounds mentioned in O. 47 R. 1, C.P.C. because, it is said, the policy of the Legislature is that where a court has reviewed its own order, alter expressing its subjective opinion that the application for review should be granted, it should not be placed in the embarrassing situation of its opinion being adversely commented upon in appeal. A Division Bench of this court has observed in Maduru Brahmayya v. Vedula Vellamma 31 M.L.J. 509 (D.B.) as follows: “The intention of the legislature is that the grounds which satisfied a court that its own judgment requires reconsideration should not be subjected to adverse comment in a court of appeal.” Consequently, the Division Bench held that thought the order of the Subordinate Judge in that case reviewing his earlier order was very unsatisfactory, the Appellate court was precluded from reversing that order, because the grant of the review aid not contravene cl. (2) of R. 4. The resulting position is that in an appeal against an order granting a review, it is not open to the appellant to attack the opinion of the court on the ground that it involves a violation of R. 1 of O. 47 of the Code. This is no doubt the result of putting a rather narrow construction upon the relevant provisions of the C.P.C. ourselves seriously thought of referring the matter to a Full Bench. But then, we felt bound by the ruling of this court in Gopala Iyer v. Ramaswami Sastrigal 31 Mad. 49 Srinivasa Iyer v. Nataraja Iyer , 1915 II L.W. 366 and Maduru Brahmayya v. Vedula Vellamma which have held the field or nearly 60 years. But then, we felt bound by the ruling of this court in Gopala Iyer v. Ramaswami Sastrigal 31 Mad. 49 Srinivasa Iyer v. Nataraja Iyer , 1915 II L.W. 366 and Maduru Brahmayya v. Vedula Vellamma which have held the field or nearly 60 years. The learned Judge has relied upon the obiter dicta of Rajamannar, C.J. in Mrs Ananthalakshmi Ammal v. Hindustan Investment and Financial Trust Ltd. , 1951 2 M.L.J. 19; 21; 1954 Mad. 927 where the learned Chief Justice says— “We do not see any justification for construg in Rs. 4 in R. 7(1)(b) as confined to rule 4(2). In fact, this attractive argument was presented before the Division Bench in Maduru Brahmayya v. Vedula Vellamma 31 M.L.J. 509 (D.B.) and was negatived in the following words: “Mr. Ramesams contention is that even in this view, the reference to rule 4 in rule 7(1)(b) is to all the clauses in rule 4 and not to clause (2) of it only. Prima facie, the contention seems plausible, but on looking into the matter closely, it is clear that clause (1) of rule 4 is not within the rule, because, speaks of the rejection of the application and not of the granting of it. In the view that we have taken that the word ‘application’ in rule (7) means ‘order’, this contention of the learned vakil must be negatived. The authorities are also against him. Manindra Chandra Roy Chowdry v. Balaramdas 11 C.L.J. 161 Ali Akbar v. Kurshed 27 All. 695 Mr. Ramesam suggested that although the sufficiency on the ground for admitting a review may not be open to criticism by the appellate court, if the lower court does not state in terms that these are sufficient grounds, the appellate court is entitled to set the order aside. Some observations in the Bombay and Peria SS. N. Co., Ltd. v. S.S. Zuari , 12 Bom 171 lend support to this contention. We are unable to accept it. As pointed out by Mr. Nagabhusbanam, the old Code enjoined upon the court the necessity for recording its reasons for noting that there are sufficient grounds. These words have been omitted in the new Code. Further, it is only reasonable to assume that a Judge granting a review is satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for doing so. As pointed out by Mr. Nagabhusbanam, the old Code enjoined upon the court the necessity for recording its reasons for noting that there are sufficient grounds. These words have been omitted in the new Code. Further, it is only reasonable to assume that a Judge granting a review is satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for doing so. As pointed out by the Judicial Committee in In the matter of the petition of Hadjee Abdoollah Reasut Hossein v. Hadjee Abdoolah 2 cal 131 the Legislature does not contemplate the calculation of a degree of sufficiency. We must therefore, hold that as the grant of the review does not contravene clause (2) of S. 4, the fact that the reasons of the Subordinate Judge are not satisfactory for entertaining the application is not a ground which is open to the appellant” These observations show that the obiter dicta of Rajamannar. C.J. do not represent the correct legal position, Of course, there is much to be said in favour of the view that a violation or contravention of O. 47, R. 4(2) would by implication involve a violation of O. 47. R. 1 of the Code as well, because, cl. 2 says, where the court is of opinion that the application for review should be granted, it shall grant the same. Is this opinion of the court merely subjective, or should it be influenced by the considerations prescribed by the Code in R. 1 of O. 47. If the Legislature had used the words “Where it appears to the court that there are sufficient grounds for review, it shall grant the application for review”, it would have been easier to hold that the grounds upon which the courts of the opinion are founded can be canvased in appeal. But, the language of sub-rule(2) of R. 4 being what it is, it does give room for differing interpretations. It may with some force be contended that the grounds of objection in an appeal under O. 47, R. 7 of the Code shall not be confined to the requirements of the provisions but may extend to the propriety of the opinion itself, which has resulted in granting the review. But then, we have to reject this contention, bound as we are, by a series of rulings of this court in which the narrower interpretation has been accepted. 9. But then, we have to reject this contention, bound as we are, by a series of rulings of this court in which the narrower interpretation has been accepted. 9. We may, however, note that though the order granting a review may not be subject to a full-fledged attack in appeal, the ultimate judgment after review can always be attacked on its merits in appeal, if any appeal is provided under the law or by way of revision. In this case, the order having been passed in a claim proceeding in favour of the claimant, the decree-holder could not treate the same as an appealable order under S-47. C.P.C. He could only file a revision. Even if we treat the appeal to the High Court as a revision, it cannot be said that the order of the learned Subordinate Judge is either illegal or perverse, such as to justify interference with it in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. But after all, the order passed is only a summary order, and it is open to the decree-holder to institute a suit to have it set aside. We have been told at the Bar that the decree-holder is only the grandson of the judgment debtor. As the decree-holders advocate reported ‘no instructions’ in the Letters Patent appeal we were curious to know the reasons behind this report. Learned counsel for the appellant says that according to information received by him, there has been a settlement between the decree-holder and the judgment debtor. Whatever the reason may be, it is open to the decree-holder to institute a suit, even though he may fail in this appeal to have the claim order set aside. 10. In the result, we allow the appeal, set aside the order of the second appellate Judge and restore the order of the Subordinates Judge in E.A. 531 of 1971 dated 30th October 1961, There will be no order as to costs.