Ram Krishna Parashar v. Chironji Lal Vaishya — 1973 DIGILAW 57 (MP)

OPINION P.K. Tare, C.J .- 1. A learned Single Judge of this Court, differing from the view taken by one of us, namely, S.M.N. Raina, J. in State of M.P. V. Caltex (India) Ltd. & 2 others, 1969 JLJ SN 101, has referred the following two questions for the opinion of a larger Bench :- (1) Where the period of notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure has not expired, can an intending plaintiff file a substantive application under section 151 C.P.C., simpliciter, praying for grant of a temporary injunction to maintain status quo until be is able to institute the suit? (2) Can the Court, acting on such an application, grant the temporary injunction prayed for having resort to section 151 of the Code. 2. The reference made by the learned Single Judge arises on the following facts. A plot of land situated within the Municipal limits of Lashkar Gwalior, was allotted to the applicant by the Collector, Gwalior. The petitioner intends to construct a house on the plot after obtaining the sanction of the Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. The grievance of the first respondent, Chironjilal was that the said plot included within its area a part of the Public road so that the allotment in favour of the petitioner could not have been validly made and consequently the petitioner was not entitled to construct a house on that area. The first respondent is a business man owning motor cars and tempoes and his allegation is that in consequence of the aforesaid construction, he would be greatly in convenienced by the narrowing of the public road, since his house is located nearby. The first respondent, therefore, intended to file a civil suit against the petitioner and respondents 2 and 3 consequently, he served a notice under S. 80, C.P.C. on the Collector and under S. 401 of the Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, on the Commissioner of the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior, on 6-4-1972, stating his intention to file a suit against the proposed defendants and claiming the reliefs, including one of injunction. On 11.4.1972, the first respondent, Chirongilal filed an application under S. 151, C.P.C. simpliciter, describing it as a Miscellaneous civil case in the Court of 5th Civil Judge Class II, Gwalior, impleading the petitioner and respondents 2 and 3 as opposite party and praying for the issue of a temporary injunction restraining construction of a house on the area of the plot, which according to him, was as a part of the public road. The explanation for resorting to this unusual course as given in the application was that the period of notice under S. 80 C.P.C. and S. 401 of the M. P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, not having expired, no suit could be filed before the expiry of the period prescribed by the said sections and since the matter was of great urgency in view of the proposed construction to be raised by the petitioner, the application was being filed for claiming a temporary injunction to maintain the status quo till the intended suit was filed and a temporary injunction was obtained from the civil Court. The first respondent also annexed to that application under S. 151, C.P.C. a copy of the proposed plaint and also asserted that the proposed suit would be filed after the expiry of the period of notice. 3. The trial Judge, acting on the said application, under S. 151 C.P.C. granted a temporary injunction as prayed for be order, dated 28-4-1972, and that injunction is still in force, At the time the injunction was granted, there was no suit pending and consequently. Order 39, rule 1, C.P.C. or Order 39, rule 2, C.P.C. was in applicable in terms. Aggrieved by the temporary injunction, one of the defendants filed the present revision. 4. On behalf of the petitioner, it was argued that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain such an application, which was not in a pending case and consequently, the Court had no jurisdiction to issue a temporary injunction in exercise of inherent powers. 5. Aggrieved by the temporary injunction, one of the defendants filed the present revision. 4. On behalf of the petitioner, it was argued that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain such an application, which was not in a pending case and consequently, the Court had no jurisdiction to issue a temporary injunction in exercise of inherent powers. 5. On behalf of the first respondent it was argued that as a civil suit could not be filed before the expiry of the period of notice, resort to inherent powers of the Court in the matter of granting an injunction was necessary in order to meet a special situation and if inherent powers were not to be exercised, the suit itself might be rendered infructuous in case the petitioner completed construction of the building on the plot. Such construction would create complications. For that proposition the learned counsel for the respondent relied on the view taken by Raina J. in State of M.P. v. Caltex (India) & others, (supra). The learned Single Judge, not accepting the view of Raina J. in the said case has made this reference to a larger Bench. 6. There can be no doubt that in such a case Order 39, rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. will be wholly out of question. Both the rules contemplate pendency of a suit. Such a matter can only be covered by S. 151, CPC., which keeps intact the powers of Civil Court to do substantial justice between the parties. The section lays down that nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice, or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. This section is clearly enacted by way of clarification that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure shall under no circumstances limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court, to pass orders for the two purposes, namely, to meet the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. As such, there can be no doubt that all matters relating to procedure in Civil Court are governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and it is not the object of S. 151, CPC, to set at naught the specific provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. As such, there can be no doubt that all matters relating to procedure in Civil Court are governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and it is not the object of S. 151, CPC, to set at naught the specific provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. A resort to the inherent powers ought to be made in exceptional cases for the specific purpose indicated by the section and such resort should be by way of an exception and not as a general rule. There may be situations where the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure do net provide for meeting a particular situation and the facts of a particular case may not attract the specific provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, such as in the present case the grant of an injunction between the period from the date of notice till the date of filing the suit. Thus, it is to be noted that the instant case is not covered by Order 39, rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. Can it be asserted on behalf of the petitioner that resort to inherent power of the Court ought not to be made even for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. Within the period of two months provided by a statutory notice, as per S. 80 C.P.C. or S. 401 of M.P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, the defendant may raise construction or the defendant may demolish the construction, which is standing on a plot. The question is whether the Court will be so helpless as to deny to a proposed plaintiff the relief of an injunction during that period when he is prevented by the specific provisions of a statute from filing a suit. We propose to deal with this question in some detail as it involves an important aspect of inherent powers exercisable by Civil Court. 7. Raina, J. mainly placed reliance on the pronouncement of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Manoharlal Chopra v. Hiralal, AIR 1962 SC 527 , wherein there Lordships made the following observations :- "There is no such expression in S. 94 which expressly prohibits the issue of a temporary injunction in circumstances not covered by Order XXXIX or by any rules made under the Code. It is will settled that the provisions of the Code are not exhaustive for the simple reason that the Legislature is incapable of contemplating all the possible circumstances which may arise, in future litigation and consequently for providing the procedure for them." Following the said pronouncement of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, the Mysore High Court in Shivraya v. Sharanappa, AIR 1965 My. 34 observed as follows :- "It can no longer be open to doubt that even in respect of matters not falling under the provisions of Order 39, it would be within the competence of the Court when the interests of justice so require, to make an appropriate order in the exercise of its inherent powers." Raina, J. in State of M. P. v. Caltex (India) Ltd. and Ors. (supra) mainly relied on the said two cases. 8. We may next examine the reasons why the learned Single Judge was unable to concur with the view expressed by Raina, J. in the said case. The first reason that persuaded the learned Single Judge to come to that conclusion was that injunctions, whether temporary or perpetual, can he granted in a suit only. A temporary injunction can be granted at any stage during has pendency of a suit; while a permanent injunction can be granted by a decree at the conclusion of the suit. Therefore, in the opinion of the learned Single Judge; 151, CPC. cannot all be resorted to when no suit is filed. The learned Judge also observed that although temporary injunctions might be granted in miscellaneous proceedings, which strictly speaking are not suits, but that would be by virtue of S. 141, CPC; which expressly provides that the procedure prescribed in the Code in regard to suits shall be followed as far as it can be made applicable to all proceedings in any Court of Civil jurisdiction. The second reason was that the learned Single Judge adverted to the Pronouncement of their Lordships of the Supreme Court with regard to the scope of S. 151, CPC. laid down the following principles in M/s amchand and sons v. Kanhayalal, AIR 1966 SC 1899 . "The words of the section appear to be rather wide. But the decisions of this Court, by construction, limited the scope of the said section............................ laid down the following principles in M/s amchand and sons v. Kanhayalal, AIR 1966 SC 1899 . "The words of the section appear to be rather wide. But the decisions of this Court, by construction, limited the scope of the said section............................ " "having regard to the said decisions, the scope of the inherent power of a Court under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure may be defined thus. The inherent power of a Court is in addition to and complementary to the powers expressly conferred under the Code. But that power will not be exercised if its exercise is inconsistent with, or comes into conflict with, any of the powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred by the other provisions of the Code. If there are express provisions exhaustively covering a particular topic, they give rise to a necessary implication that no power shall be exercised in respect of the said topic otherwise than in the manner prescribed by the said provisions..............." The learned Single Judge also observed that with regard to the nature of power available under S. 151, CPC, there can be no doubt that the provision does not confer a fresh jurisdiction upon a Court which it does not already possess. The provision is not in that sense substantive in nature, but deals only with the rule of procedure so that it can be resorted to only in a pending cause. The learned Single Judge relied on the pronouncement of their Lordship of the Supreme Court in Mohanlal Chopra v. Hiralal, AIR 1962 SC 527 , as also the subsequent pronouncement of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Raja Soap Factory v. S. P. Santharai, AIR 1965 SC 1449 . 9. With respect to these Supreme Court cases relied on by the learned Single Judge, there can be no doubt that injunctions can ordinarily be granted in a pending suit. The Court cannot abrogate to itself jurisdiction, which it has none, But, all the same, the Court can certainly devise a procedure which should not be inconsistent with the specific provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and this inherent power to do substantial justice between the parties, in our opinion, cannot be limited to pending suits only. But such power can be exercised in miscellaneous proceedings as well. But such power can be exercised in miscellaneous proceedings as well. Otherwise in some types of cases the Civil Courts will be helpless and powerless and will have to suffer a miscarriage of justice or will have to suffer an abuse of the process of the Court with open eyes. In our opinion, the Civil Courts are not so helpless or powerless and, in situations not specifically covered by the specific provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, the procedure can be devised by he law Courts for the two purposes mentioned in section 151, CPC; unless such procedure be prohibited by the provisions of law. Otherwise, devising of such a procedure would, in our opinion, be perfectly permissible. Of course, we also feel that resort to inherent power ought not to be made very frequently, as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. The resort to those powers cannot be made so as to set at naught the specific provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, where the matter is specifically covered by a particular provision of the Code of Civil Procedure, there can be resort to inherent powers. Such resort can be made only in situations which are not contemplated by the legislature, but where resort to such powers would be necessary for the two purposes mentioned in S. 151, CPC. Of course, we can agree with the view that resort to such powers should not be a rule, but only by way of an exception to meet a particular situation not contemplated by the Code of Civil Procedure. We may further observe that it has been laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the said cases that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are not exhaustive. Therefore, their Lordships also contemplate situations which may not be covered by the specific provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, but which may be peculiar situations. It is only to such cases that we would limit the application of inherent powers on the lines analogous to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was for that reason that their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Manoharlal Chopra v. R. B. R. R. Seth Hiralal (supra) held if a case be specifically covered by section 10, CPC; a resort to inherent powers cannot be made for staying a suit. It was for that reason that their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Manoharlal Chopra v. R. B. R. R. Seth Hiralal (supra) held if a case be specifically covered by section 10, CPC; a resort to inherent powers cannot be made for staying a suit. However, their Lordships also comtemplated a situation where such a stay might be necessary and the matter may not be covered by Order 39, rules 1 and 2, CPC; Therefore, their Lordships laid down that even apart from the provisions of Order 39, rules 1 and 2, CPC; the Court has the power to grant an injunction in exercise of inherent powers to meet a particular situation, which may not be covered by Order 39, rules 1 and 2, CPC. It is only to such exceptional cases to which resort to inherent powers might be made and we do not think that the learned Single Judge was right in holding that the pronouncements of their Lordships of the Supreme Court prohibit a resort to inherent powers even in cases which fall outside the specific provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. 10. The learned Single Judge referred to the observations of Sulaiman, C.J. in Lala Atma Ram v. Beni Prasad, AIR 1934 All 585, wherein the learned Chief Justice, delivering the Judgment on behalf of the Division Bench, laid down that ordinarily resort to inherent powers would be limited to the Court's jurisdiction to deal with proceedings pending before it. We may observe that the learned Chief Justice advisedly used the word 'proceeding' and not 'suit'. We fail to appreciate as to why miscellaneous proceedings cannot be initiated for the purpose of obtaining an injunction during the period a plaintiff is prohibited from filing a suit before the expiry of the period of statutory notice. The learned Single Judge also referred to the observations of Rajagopala Ayyanger, J. (as he then was) in Re : His Holiness Shrila Sri Subramania Dasika, AIR 1958 Mad 284 , wherein the learned Judge held that S. 151, CPC. would apply to the exercise of jurisdiction when once matter is before the Court and it cannot confer jurisdiction to entertain a proceeding. We may observe that we are in full agreement with the observations of the learned Judge. would apply to the exercise of jurisdiction when once matter is before the Court and it cannot confer jurisdiction to entertain a proceeding. We may observe that we are in full agreement with the observations of the learned Judge. The section by itself does not confer any right on a party to initiated proceedings, but the proceedings are initiated according to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and there is no bar to tie initiation of a miscellaneous case for the purpose of obtaining the interim relief from a Court of law where a party is specifically prohibited from filing a suit before the expiry of certain prescribed period. Therefore, initiation of proceedings will certainly be under the Code of Civil Procedure and in those proceedings once initiated, resort to inherrnt powers, in our opinion, can be made. The learned Single Judge further relied on the observations of Dua C.J. (as he then was) in Mohan Singh v. Roshanlal, AIR 1970 Delhi 88. We may observe that we are not in disagreement with what the learned Chief Justice has observed in the said case. But what we are unable to appreciate is the conclusion arrived at by the learned Single Judge on the basis of the observations made in the cases mentioned above. But these observations would not lead to the conclusion that even miscellaneous, proceedings cannot be initiated by virtue of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure for the purpose of obtaining an interim relief. Again we may stress that injunctions can be obtained not only in a suit, but also in miscellaneous proceedings properly initiated under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. 11. The learned Single Judge then referred to the case of Union of India v. Brij Nath, AIR 1971 All 209 . The facts in that case were that a suit was filed against the Union of India for a permanent injunction without a prior notice under S. 80, CPC. wherein a prayer for a temporary injunction was also made. The matter was urged. The question for consideration before S.K. Verma, J. (as he then was) was whether a temporary injunction could be granted in a suit which had not been properly initiated. There can be no doubt that the provisions of S.80, CPC. wherein a prayer for a temporary injunction was also made. The matter was urged. The question for consideration before S.K. Verma, J. (as he then was) was whether a temporary injunction could be granted in a suit which had not been properly initiated. There can be no doubt that the provisions of S.80, CPC. being mandatory, a suit cannot be filed before the expiry of the period prescribed by the section and in that sence no proceeding could be said to be pending before the learned Judge of the Allahabad High Court. It was for that reason that the learned Judge, disagreeing with his own earlier view in Sawanmal v. Union of India, 1970 All LJ 938, held that in view of the express prohibition contained in S.80, CPC; the suit could not be entertained and, therefore, the temporary injunction prayed for could not be granted. We are in full agreement with the view exressed by the learned Judge of the Allahabad High Court. An injunction can only be granted in proceedings properly initiated, under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and from this point of view, we have no doubt that injunction can be granted in pending proceedings only, but such proceedings need not be a suit. In our opinion, such miscellaneous proceedings can be initiated even by filing of the petition specifically for the purpose. 12. The learned Single Judge mainly relied on the observations in Hubli Electrical Co. v. Government of Bombay, AIR 1945 Bom. 370, where a temporary injunction was sought in exercise of inherent powers in view of the urgency and there was no sufficient time to give a statutory notice as per S.80, CPC. The matter came up before Blagden, J, who dismissed the petition holding that the petition was rather unusual and he did not think that that was a proper form of proceeding. The counsel in that case for the petitioner invoked the inherent jurisdiction of the Court, The learned Judge negatived that contention and said that Proceedings could not be initiated by resort to inherent powers of the Court. We may, observe that so far as that observation is concerned, it is perfectly correct that proceedings cannot be initiated in exercise of inherent powers. But proceeding can be initiated only in accordance with the procedural law, namely, the Code of Civil Procedure. We may, observe that so far as that observation is concerned, it is perfectly correct that proceedings cannot be initiated in exercise of inherent powers. But proceeding can be initiated only in accordance with the procedural law, namely, the Code of Civil Procedure. It is only in exercise of inherent powers that a particular relief can be given by the Court in proceedings properly initiated under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. To that extent we would certainly agree with the view expressed by Blagden, J. in the said case. But further we are unable to agree with his view that such miscellaneous Proceedings cannot be initiated in order to obtain a temporary relief. In our opinion, such a procedure is not prohibited by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and moreover, the Code of Civil Procedure itself does not provide for an independent application for such a relief. It is, therefore, all the more necessary that in order to prevent the miscarriage of justice or in order to prevent an abuse of the process of the Court, the procedure of allowing miscellaneous application to be filed for such a relief should be held permissible. Otherwise in most of the cases refusal to register such miscellaneous petitions as miscellaneous civil will defeat the ends of justice and the provision of statutory notice will be a weapon in the hands of the Government or in the hands of a statutory Corporation like the Municipal Corporation or Municipal Committee to defeat the just right of a citizen and taking advantage of it, the Government or the Municipal Corporation would be able to demolish a standing structure altogether within the statutory period of a notice prescribed by the statute before a party could file a suit in a Court of law. Such an interpretation, in our opinion, will not only be improper, but it would amount to suffering miscarriage of justice with open eyes and no law Court can permit that to be done with open eyes and it is for that reason that we feel that the law Courts are free to devise a procedure for the two purposes mentioned in S.151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 13. We may next consider the instances where a resort to inherent power has been made by law Courts. 13. We may next consider the instances where a resort to inherent power has been made by law Courts. One patent instance is the case of Manohar lal Chopra v. R.B.R.R. Seth Hiralal (supra), wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Court have laid down that an injunction in exercise of inherent powers can be granted even apart from the provisions of Order 39, rules 1 and 2 CPC. Of course, we are cognigent of the limitations laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the said cases mentioned above laying down the limitations for exercise of inherent powers. Therefore, keeping all these limitations in view, we are of the opinion that a resort to inherent powers becomes necessary in some types of cases and law Courts. if they claim to be the courts of Justice and not instruments for perpetration of injustice, cannot accept the view that no resort to inherent power can be made or a resort to a new procedure not prohibited by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be made even for the ends of justice or to prevent an abuse of the Court of law. We may consider some instances where a resort to inherent powers has been considered necessary. 14. We may then cite another case, namely, Sheolal v. Jgalkishore, 25 MPLC 252= ILR 1940 Nag 538, wherein Stone, C.J. and Bose, J. (as he then was) laid down that even apart from the provisions of Order 41, rule 23 and Order 41, rule 25, C.P.C., the appellate Court can remand a case in exercise of inherent powers in order to meet a peculiar situation where the procedure followed by the Court below or Courts below is so radically defective so as to turn it into a no trial. A case may not be decided by the Court on a preliminary issue. To such a case Order 41, rule 23, C.P.C. evidently cannot apply. Therefore, if the case has been decided on merits, there may be a situation where the appellate Court may think it necessary to call for a finding from the Court below under Order 41, rule 25. C.P.C. in that event the Court retains the seisin of the case and merely calls for a finding or calls for additional evidence. Therefore, if the case has been decided on merits, there may be a situation where the appellate Court may think it necessary to call for a finding from the Court below under Order 41, rule 25. C.P.C. in that event the Court retains the seisin of the case and merely calls for a finding or calls for additional evidence. But there may be a situation where the trial of the case has been so radically defective, that the appellate Court thinks it proper to have a fresh trial right from the stage of pleadings and if such a course were not to be adopted, it might result in miscarriage of justice. Can it not be said that the appellate Court has the inherent power to remand a case for a fresh trial in such a situation. We may observe that the principle laid down by the Division Bench in the said case still stands good and the same cannot be said to have been over-ruled by any pronouncement of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in any of the cases mentioned above. 15. Of course, as a ready indicated by us earlier, such a resort to inherent powers ought to be by way of an exception and not as a general rule and care should be taken to take notice of the limitations for the exercise of such power, as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the cases mentioned above. Subject to these two precautions, we do not see any reason as to why resort to inherent powers ought not to be made by the Court to meet the situations which are not exactly covered by the specific provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, but where a resort to such inherent power would be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent an abuse of the process of the Court. 16. Next we may refer to the observations of Hidayatullah, C.J. (as he then was), who delivering the judgment on behalf of the Division Bench in Manohar Prasad v. Chandulal, 1958 JLJ 315 = 1958 MPLJ 156 , laid down that the Procedure adopted by the Court ought not to be allowed to harm the litigant. 16. Next we may refer to the observations of Hidayatullah, C.J. (as he then was), who delivering the judgment on behalf of the Division Bench in Manohar Prasad v. Chandulal, 1958 JLJ 315 = 1958 MPLJ 156 , laid down that the Procedure adopted by the Court ought not to be allowed to harm the litigant. It was further laid down that it is not only the law but the duty of every Court to see that its procedure, if it is found to be defective does not harm the litigant. In that view, even inspite of contrary order passed by the Division Bench on earlier occasions, the Division Bench set aside its wrong order which had arisen on account of a misapprehension. Under those circumstances, a resort to inherent powers was made. It was also observed that Order 32, rule 12, C.P.C. itself does not prescribe the procedure as to who is to apply when a minor becomes a major. In that case the respondent who was a minor had become major. The appellant had unnecessarily taken upon himself to apply for showing the respondent as a major and for that default, the appeal came to be dismissed by passing a peremptory order. The Division Bench set aside that peremptory order of dismissal and restored the appeal to file holding that the appellant was under no obligation to show the respondent as a major, but it was for the minor himself to come forward and apply for discharging his guardian and for being permitted to contest the appeal as a major. Thus, there being no specific provision as to who should apply in such a situation, the Division Bench devised a procedure laying down that it was for the minor himself to take such steps & if the appellant did not take such steps, the appeal could not have been dismissed for default. In that very case procedure was devised by the Division Bench in respect of such a matter which although governed by Order 32, rule 12, and there being no guidance from the said provision, a procedure not prohibited by the provisions of the Code, was devised by the Division Bench. 17. In that very case procedure was devised by the Division Bench in respect of such a matter which although governed by Order 32, rule 12, and there being no guidance from the said provision, a procedure not prohibited by the provisions of the Code, was devised by the Division Bench. 17. We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that if the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are not exhaustive and if it be necessary to devise a procedure, which is not prohibited by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is open to the Court not only to devise such a procedure, but also after resorting to such procedure, it is open to the Court to exercise inherent powers for the ends of justice or to prevent an abuse of the process of the Court. In our opinion, the present situation is eminently one where devising of a procedure not prohibited by the provisions of the Code and resort to inherent powers would be absolutely necessary. As already observed by us earlier, law Courts are Courts of justice and they cannot be converted into instruments for perpetration of injustice by legal by perquibbling and from this point of view, we endorse the view as expressed by Raina, J. in State of M.P. v. Caltex (India) Ltd. & Ors. (supra). On the other hand we feel that not adopting that view will in most cases result in perpetration of injustice with open eyes. In our opinion, the law Courts in any case cannot feel themselves so helpless. Otherwise as pointed out by us earlier, the Government or the statutory Corporations would be able to non-suit a plaintiff within the period of the statutory notice prescribed by the statute and filing of a suit thereafter would be rendered infructuous on account of the action taken by the Government or the statutory Corporation. Similarly, we may observe that in the Civil Courts or in the High Court, Civil appeals are not permitted to be filed during summer vacations. But such appeals can be filed on the reopening day after the summer vacation. Similarly, we may observe that in the Civil Courts or in the High Court, Civil appeals are not permitted to be filed during summer vacations. But such appeals can be filed on the reopening day after the summer vacation. Therefore, if a party on account of urgency wants some temporary relief, he is permitted to file a miscellaneous application in the High Court for such a relief and such a case is registered as a miscellaneous Civil case and is dealt with accordingly by the Vacation Judge and such an order passed by the Vacation Judge is operative till such time as the party concerned is able to file an appeal in the High Court and is able to obtain an order from the Court on an application for a temporary relief. Such a procedure has been devised in this High Court. We may observe that it is not prohibited either by the Code of Civil Procedure or even by the rules framed by the High Court governing its own procedure. If we may say so, the same analogy can be applied to subordinate Courts where such a procedure 'may have to be devised and a resort to inherent powers might become necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent an abuse of the process of the Court. 18. As a result of the discussion aforesaid, we answer the two questions as under:- (1) Where the period of notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure has not expired, an intending plaintiff can file a substantive application praying for grant of a temporary injunction. Such an application is not one under section 151, C.P.C., but it is necessarily one under the Code of Civil Procedure, wherein inherent powers of the Court are invoked for grant of a temporary injunction. Such an order will only be operative till the party concerned is able to file a suit and is able to obtain a temporary injunction from the Court in the suit itself. (2) The Court acting on such an application can grant a temporary injunction having resort to the inherent powers saved by section 151, C.P.C. 19. Let the case be sent back to the learned Single Judge to decide it in accordance with the opinion given by this Division Bench. However, we order that there shall be no order as to costs of this reference.