Order.- The first of these petitions under section 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code, is to quash the entire proceedings conducted by respondents 1 and 2 (the Inspector, Puthur Circle and the Sub-Inspector, Vittal Police station, Carnataka State) by their search, seizure and transport of 10,976 Kilograms of sandal wood out of the premises of the petitioners factory in Chemnad village of the Kerala State holding their conduct as highhanded, incompetent and unenforcible in the absence of any prima facie case against them either under section 379 or 411 of the Indian Penal Code. The other petition is to re-deliver the entire stock of sandal wood so seized at the instance of respondents 1 and 2 to the petitioners. 2. The petitioners are a partnership concern of which accuseds 1 and 2 are partners. The first accused is the Managing Partner. The third accused is the Manager of the Concern. The petitioners’ factory is located in Chemnad village of the Kasaragod taluk in the Kerala State. Their main business is extraction of oil from sandal wood. They conduct oil extraction from sandal wood under a licence issued by the Joint Director of Industries and Commerce, Government of Kerala. They have been making purchase of sandal wood required for extraction of oil from accredited timber dealers. However, for the purchase of less than 10 kilograms of sandal wood, no permit is required. They made a purchase of 8,732.500 kilograms of sandal wood from Abdulla Kunhi. He was a registered owner of a valid property mark seal. The Divisional Forest Officer, Tellicherry, permitted 263 sandal wood trees (made up of 3015 pieces of roots, 1976 pieces of stem and 3501 pieces of branch) to be cut and removed out of survey Nos. 675-1A and 643/2 of Cheruthazam village and transport the same to the petitioners’ factory on the basis of Exhibit P-1 permit dated 6th March, 1972, which was issued to Abdulla Kunhi for the aforesaid purpose. The intimation of the issue of the permit was given not only to the subordinate forest officers but also to the Income-tax and Sales-tax officers. On the basis of Exhibit P-1, a pass had also been issued to Abdulla Kunhi to transport the identical quantity of sandal wood to the petitioners’ factory to be completed before 9th March, 1972. Exhibit P-2 was the pass issued for that purpose. On the basis of Exhibit P-1, a pass had also been issued to Abdulla Kunhi to transport the identical quantity of sandal wood to the petitioners’ factory to be completed before 9th March, 1972. Exhibit P-2 was the pass issued for that purpose. The petitioners had also got registered C.E.O. property mark under Sandal Wood Transport Rules. On the basis of that property mark which was valid upto 31st March, 1973, the identical consignment of 8,732.500 kilograms of sandal wood were permitted to be stored in the factory. Exhibit P-3 was the order by which the property mark of the petitioners was registered. They were directed to keep an account of the sandal wood they purchased and stored in the factory with further direction to intimate the District Forest Officer if fresh stock arrived at their premises. Exhibit P-6 affidavit was sworn to by Abdulla Kunhi that he transported the identical consignment of sandal wood to the petitioners’ factory. The petitioners claim exclusive right and possession over the sandal wood which they stocked under Exhibits P-1 to P-3 permits. 3. While so, respondents 1 and 2 visited the factory premises on 31st August, 1972. They were alleged to have visited the premises on suspicion that the sandal wood trees belonging to the Government forest in Carnataka had been stolen and stored in the factory premises. They took action on the basis of Exhibit P-4 letter dated 21st August, 1972 from the Divisional Forest Officer, Mangalore, Carnataka, wherein he alleged that some theft of sandal wood standing trees was reported from their forest in Veerakambha and Kolajimale and, that, therefore, the police shall be more vigilant on the border area between Kerala and Carnataka and seize the illicit transport of sandal wood. However, the second respondent recorded Exhibit P-4 as first information in the case and registered a crime as crime No. 139 of 1972 of the Vittal Police Station. The petitioners alleged that respondents 1 and 2 took action on the basis of a false report made by the third respondent, who was their rival in the business without any manner of right or bona fide and, therefore they searched the premises of the petitioners on 31st August, 1972 on the basis of which they seized 5746 kilograms of sandal wood on 1st September, 1972. After the seizure, they carried away the sandal wood to Mangalore. After the seizure, they carried away the sandal wood to Mangalore. While so the petitioners filed O.S. No. 285 of 1972 in the Munsiff’s Court, Kasaragod on 1st September, 1972 for a perpertual injunction restraining respondents 1 and 2 from seizing the remaining stock of sandal wood they had in their custody. The Munsiff passed a temporary injunction. During the pendency of the suit, one Harippa Bhatt, was appointed as an Advocate-Commissioner. He visited the premises of the petitioners under the orders of the Court and prepared Exhibit P-5 report. Exhibit P-5 gave details of the stock the petitioners had in their possession as well as the account in support of the stock. The remaining stock of sandal wood was found sealed with property mark seal of the petitioners. The Commissioner also found that they had 7104 kilograms of sandal wood in stock in the premises of the factory. However, the temporary injunction was vacated and, therefore, respondents 1 and 2 came to the factory over again on 22nd September, 1972 and seized 5230 kilograms of sandal wood more in spite of the protest by the petitioners. According to the petitioners, the entire stock they had in the factory belonged to them and that the respondents 1 and 2 had no manner of right to seize the stock on hand. 4. Pending the above petitions for enquiry, the respondents 1 and 2 wanted to complete the investigation in the case. So they were permitted by an order of this Court dated 10th August, 1973 tocomplete the investigation with the direction to file a report of the charge under section 173, Criminal Procedure Code. However, they were further directed that during the pendency of those petitions, the accused persons shall not be arrested or seized the remaining stock of sandal wood which were in the possession of the petitioners. The conditional order was passed as the search and seizure were in dispute between the parties. On the basis of the above order the police filed a charge-sheet under section 173, Criminal Procedure Code, at the Munsiff-Magistrate’s Court, Bandwall, Carnataka, against the three accused persons. During the investigation, they questioned the relevant witnesses and on completion of the investigation subject to the above conditions, charges under sections 379 and 411, Indian Penal Cole, were laid against them. 5. During the investigation, they questioned the relevant witnesses and on completion of the investigation subject to the above conditions, charges under sections 379 and 411, Indian Penal Cole, were laid against them. 5. The question for consideration in this case is whether from the materials placed on record, the prosecution could sustain a prima facie case either under section 379 or 411, Indian Penal Code, against the accused persons. The first respondent pending these petitions has fled a counteraffidavit alleging that the search and seizure were made bona fide and in exercise of the right with the help of the Kerala Police. 6. In the absence of any material on record from direct eye-witnesses, there could be no scope for holding that the accused persons in this case committed theft of sandal wood from the Carnataka forest or that they received the sandal wood in their possession as stolen property. So in a case like this, the prosecution has to rely upon the presumption which is covered by the illustration (a) of section 114 of the Evidence Act. Under that section, it is permissible to presume that a person in possession of stolen property soon after the theft is either the thief or a receiver of stolen property. But if the explanation of the accused of his possession is plausible, no such presumption could be allowed. The presumption that arises under illustration (a) is one of fact and whether a Court ought to draw it or not must depend on the circumstances of each case. But the onus on the prosecution to prove the guilt does not change. 7. Before we consider the materials placed in this case to prove a prima facie (case) against the accused persons, it is necessary to point out that it is a well settled position that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in appropriate cases either to prevent the abuse of the process of any Count or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily, a proceeding instituted against an accused person must be tried by a competent court under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In such cases, the High Court will not be justified to interfere with the proceeding especially when the charge is laid by the police after the investigation. Ordinarily, a proceeding instituted against an accused person must be tried by a competent court under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In such cases, the High Court will not be justified to interfere with the proceeding especially when the charge is laid by the police after the investigation. And the Supreme Court in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab1, stated: "It is not possible, desirable or expedidient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction". 8. Even as early as in Emperor v. Nazir Ahmed2, Lord Porter in affirming the decision of the Madras High Court in Chidambaram Chettiar v. Shanmugam Pillai3, stated: "No doubt if no cognizable offence is disclosed, and still more if no offence of any kind is disclosed the police would have no authority to undertake an investigation and if they do so the High Court may interfere under section 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code." 9. In Chidambaram Chettiar v. Shanmugkam Pillai3, the proposition laid down is as follows: "The High Court has inherent jurisdiction under section 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code to pass any order necessary to prevent abuse of the. process of any Court". The Privy Council made it clear that the power under section 561-A Criminal Procedure Code is exercisable when there is misuse of the power by the police, and when the High Court if it considers necessary to exercise its inherent power, can do so to secure the ends of justice. 10. The decision relied on in State of West Bengal v. S.N. Basak4, does not run counter to the decision reported in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab5. The former was a case where the police investigation was quashed by the High Court of Calcutta on the ground that the prosecution was incompetent. The police was not given an opportunity to file their charge-sheet against the accused person who was said to have appeared in Court after the first information was lodged in respect of a charge under section 420 of the Indian Penal Code against him and then filed a petition under section 561-A to quash the investigat on by the police. It was in that connection the Supreme Court said: "There was no case pending at the time excepting that the respondent had appeared before the Court, had surrendered and had been admitted to bail. It was in that connection the Supreme Court said: "There was no case pending at the time excepting that the respondent had appeared before the Court, had surrendered and had been admitted to bail. The powers of investigation into cognizable offences are contained in Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 154 which is in that Chapter deals with information in cognizable offences and section 156 with investigation into such offences and under these sections the police has the statutory right to investigate into the circumstances of any alleged cognizable offence without authority from a Magistrate and this statutory power of the police to investigate cannot be interfered with by the exercise of power under section 439 or under the inherent power of the Court under section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code. The facts are different in this case. The police filed a report under section 173 Criminal Procedure Code on completion of the investigation except the arrest of the accused persons and the recovery of the remaining stock of sandal wood in their possession in respect of which the question is in dispute between the parties. 11.Ram Narain v. Mool Chand1, has also been relied upon but that decision did not lay down any new law beyond the pronouncement made by the Supreme Court in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab2, referred to above. Yet the Allahabad High Court restricted the scope and application of section 561-A to the fulfilment of three conditions: (1) the injustice which comes to light should be of a great character and not of a trival character. (2) injustice which is noted is of a clear and palpable character and not of a doubtful character and (3) there exists no other provision of law by which the party aggrieved could have sought relief. These conditions are derogatory to the observations of the Supreme Court though they may be useful as a guide in general with reference to facts and circumstances of a particular case. The Supreme Court has stated that- “It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction”. 13. On facts also, it cannot be said that the question involved in the instant case is trivial so far as the petitioners are concerned. The Supreme Court has stated that- “It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction”. 13. On facts also, it cannot be said that the question involved in the instant case is trivial so far as the petitioners are concerned. There was also no room for doubt as to the petitioners right or possession of the goods in question. There was also no other provision of law by which the petitioners could get their grievance redressed. There was, therefore, no bar for the application of section 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code in the instant case. 13. In the light of these observations, it Can be said that under section 561-A, if the allegations made in the first information statement and the case diary statement of the witnesses during the investigation under section 161, Criminal Procedure Code as well as the charge laid by the police under section 173, Criminal Procedure Code do not disclose any offence against the accused, the High Court can interfere at any stage of the proceeding. Interference to quash proceedings,however, can(be had)recourse to only on two conditions: (1) if the prosecution allegations even when accepted as true do not establish any offence against the accused and where an offence against the accused is established if the allegations are believed but there is no evidence at all to support the allegation. It is always open to the High Court to interfere where the facts are preposterous that the High Court feels satisfied that on the admitted facts, there is no case against the accused and when the High Court is clearly of the opinion that further prolongation of the proceeding would amount to harassment, it is in the interest of justice that the High Court should interfere. It is undoubted, law that the High Court, with a view to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice can in the exercise of its inherent power, quash any criminal proceedings pending before any Court. This power can be exercised in any case where the complaint or the police-charge sheet, is the case may be, disclose no offence at all against the accused. 14. This power can be exercised in any case where the complaint or the police-charge sheet, is the case may be, disclose no offence at all against the accused. 14. In the Supreme Court ruling already referred to reported in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab2, the interference of the High Court under section 561-A, Crimnal Procedure Code is made applicable to three categories of cases. One such category was the nature of the allegations made against the accused persons without constituting an offence and where there is either no legal evidence in support of the case or evidence clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. On an examination of the facts of the case in hand, it is clearly established that the petitioners are the owners of the stock of sandal wood kept in their premises on the date of seizure first on 1st September, 1972 and the other on 22nd September, 1972. The stock was well maintained in their ledger and stock register vide Exhibit P-5, the report of the commissioner. They came into possession of the stock of sandal wood through legitimate purchases vide Exhibits P-1 to P-3 and P-6. It would be idle to suggest that the cut end of the logs seized in this case would be same in size and circumference to that of the stumps of the trees left in the forest even if the logs had been dressed upon proper form after they were cut and removed and that, therefore, the identification of logs as Government property could easily be made. In that case such identification will be possible in respect of any other trees which could be cut and removed from non-reserved forests. If that argument is allowed to prevail, no one will be able to cut and remove trees from private forests. There was no direct evidence to connect the accused persons either with theft of sandal wood or with the receipt of the sandal wood as stolen property. 15. It would be seen from the case diary that the theft of the standing trees out of Veerakambha forest was on 27th February, 1972 and that of Kolanjimale forest was on 25th April, 1972. Yet until Exhibit P-4 dated 21st August, 1972 no step was taken to trace out the thief. 15. It would be seen from the case diary that the theft of the standing trees out of Veerakambha forest was on 27th February, 1972 and that of Kolanjimale forest was on 25th April, 1972. Yet until Exhibit P-4 dated 21st August, 1972 no step was taken to trace out the thief. It was not known how the police happened to suspect the petitioners who were not directly or indirectly connected with the theft of either on 27th February, 1972 or on 25th Apri1, 1972. After the purchase of the stack, the petitioners had their seal affixed on them. Now it would be difficult for any one to suggest that the petitioners stock of sandal wood looks like the sandal would extracted from the Carnataka Government. There is no scope for any presumption that they are thieves or receiver of stolen property. 16. In the light of these conclusions, the proceedings undertaken by respondents 1 and 2 in searching and seizing the sandal wood from the premises of the petitioners are illegal and unenforcible. Respondents 1 and 2 had no right whatsoever to cross over to Kerala and seize the sandal wood in question without any manner of right. The search and the seizure effected on 1st September, 1972 and 22nd September, 1972 are both set aside. The petitioners shall apply to the concerned Court where the charge is laid and get back the sandal wood which were seized from them. No further action shall be taken against the petitioners in respect of the stock of sandal wood found to be in their possession on 1st September, 1972 and 22nd September, 1972. The petitions are allowed. 17. A carbon copy of this order may be issued to the State Prosecutor as well as to the petitioners.