Judgment :- NATARAJAN, J:— 1. The second and the third defendants in O.S. No, 9 of 1965 on the file of the court of the Subordinate Judge, Sivaganga, are the respective appellants in these two appeals and the memorandum of cross objections has been preferred by the plaintiff therein. 2. The suit property, which the plaintiff conceded before the trial court to be 14534 sq. ft. in extent and not 16800 sq. ft. as set out in the plaint, was purchased by the plaintiff under two sale deeds, Ex. A-9 and A-10. On the plaintiff being approached during September-October 1959 by the President and the Executive Officer of the Sivaganga Panchayat, the first defendant in the suit, for parting with the site to enable the Panchayat to erect its water works thereon and on being promised of proper compensation therefor as fixed by the Government, the plaintiff delivered possession of the suit site in May-June 1960 to the first defendant and the first defendant constructed its water works on the site by December 1961. When the plaintiff demanded the compensation amount, promised to him, the first defendant sent a reply stating that the Tahsildar had declared the suit site to be a Government poramboke and that as such, the plaintiff was not entitled to any compensation. It was, thereafter, the plaintiff came forward with the suit for a declaration that she had title to the suit property and that she should be paid compensation for the site taken over by the first defendant at the rate of Rs. 1 per sq. ft. 3. Besides the first defendant, the plaintiff impleaded the State of Madras, as the second defendant and the Sivaganga Municipality which has succeeded the Sivaganga Panchayat as the third defendant. 4. The defence set up by the first defendant and adopted by the third defendant was that the plaintiff and her predecessor-in-interest had no title to the suit property, that the first defendant never admitted the title of the plaintiff nor committed itself at any time to pay compensation for the transfer of the site, that the site had been declared to be a poramboke site and that, in any event, the compensation claimed was excessive. 5. 5. The second defendant raised the defence that a portion of the suit site formed part of S. No. 48 and was a road poramboke, that the remaining portion of the site forming part of S. No. 74 was a natham poramboke, that S. No. 48 had been taken over under the Inam Abolition Act, 26 of 1963, that S. No. 74 is a T.D. minor inam which vested with the State Government under the Minor Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act 30 of 1963, that the plaintiff ought to agitate her remedies in the proper forum constituted tinder the said Act, that toe civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and that, in any event, the compensation claimed was excessive. 6. On these pleadings, the learned Subordinate Judge framed the following issues for trial:— 1. Whether the plaintiff has title to the suit property? 2. Whether the first defendant is estopped front denying the title of the plaintiff? 3. What compensation is the plaintiff entitled to? 4. Whether the suit is not maintainable because of the provisions of Madras Act 26 of 1963 and Madras Act 30 of 1963? 5. To what relief is the plaintiff entitled? After a careful consideration of the evidence adduced by the parties, the learned Subordinate Judge held that the plaintiff had title to the suit property, that the defendant was estopped from denying the title of the plaintiff, that the civil court had jurisdiction to maintain the suit and that the plaintiff was entitled to compensation for the site taken over from her. As regards the quantum of compensation, the learned Subordinate Judge held that the rate of 25 paise per sq. ft. would be a reasonable one, and consequently, gave a decree for Rs. 3,633 together with interest and proportionate costs. 7. The second and the third defendants have filed their respective appeals to assail the findings of the learned Subordinate Judge while the plaintiff has filed the memorandum of cross objections to claim enhanced compensation. 8. The three questions that fall for our consideration before us in these proceedings are—(1) whether the plaintiff had title to the suit property? (2) whether the civil court bad no jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiffs suit? and (3) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to enhanced compensation? 9. It is not in dispute that the suit site measuring 14534 sq. ft. The three questions that fall for our consideration before us in these proceedings are—(1) whether the plaintiff had title to the suit property? (2) whether the civil court bad no jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiffs suit? and (3) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to enhanced compensation? 9. It is not in dispute that the suit site measuring 14534 sq. ft. is comprised in two survey numbers, viz., S. No. 48 and S. 74. The site as well as the land adjacent to it were originally owned by one Velusami Thevar. The sons of Velusami Thevar conveyed the suit site under Ex. A.6 dated 1st August 1925 to one D.S. Srinivasa Iyengar and the latter, in turn, sold the same under Ex. A. 7, dated 14th February 1930 to one Palaniappa Chettiar. The plainitiff purchased the southern half of the site from Palaniappa Chettiar under Ex. A. 9, dated 23th October 1956. The other extent of the site was purchased by the plaintiff from one Muthukaliammal under Ex. A.10, dated 9th June 1957, the said Muthukaliammal herself having derived title to the same by means of a sale deed, Ex. A.8. executed in her favour by Palaniappa Chettiar. The consideration for Ex. A.9 and A.10 are respectively Rs. 1,500 and Rs. 500, thus making the total cost of the suit site to be Rs. 2,000. 10. From the evidence adduced by the plaintiff in the Case, it is incontrovertibly proved that P.W. 8, the then President of the Sivaganga Panchayat, with the assistance of P.W. 1, a respectable mediator, induced the plaintiff to band over the site to the first defendant on the assurance that the first defendant would pay compensation for the suit site at fee rate fixed by Government. The documentary and oral evidence, to which reference has been made above, should normally be considered adequate to uphold the claim of the plaintiff. However, the contention of the defendant is that such portion of the suit site as lies within S. No. 48 is a road poramboke and such remaining portion of it as lies in S. No. 74 is a natham poramboke and that as such, the plaintiff is not entitled to any reliefs in the suit. However, the contention of the defendant is that such portion of the suit site as lies within S. No. 48 is a road poramboke and such remaining portion of it as lies in S. No. 74 is a natham poramboke and that as such, the plaintiff is not entitled to any reliefs in the suit. Though the entire site is said to be comprised in poramboke land, the grounds on which the plaintiff is sought to be non-suited in respect of each of the porambokes are different and we shall therefore deal with those objections accordingly. So far as a portion of the suit site forming part of the road poramboke in S. No. 48, is concerned, the defendants, would contend that Survey operations were conducted in 1919 and in such survey operations, S No. 48 had been demarcated by the survey authorities as a road poramboke. Except for expounding such a contention, the defendants have not placed any material before the court to show that survey operations were conducted in 1919, that in such survey operations S. No. 48 was demarcated as road poramboke and further more, that the then owner of the site was given notice of the demarcation effected by the survey authorities. Neither the publication effected by the survey authorities of the proposed survey nor the order of Government publishing the result of the survey, nor the copy of any notice served on the owner of the suit site, has been filed before the trial court. Without placing any of these clinching materials before the court, the defendants could place reliance on Ex. B.4, a sketch of survey No. 48 in the Field Measurement book and upon the evidence of D.W. 3, the village karnam, to contend that survey operations were duly effected in 1919 and that S. No. 48 was demarcated as road poramboke during such operations. D.W. 3 has no personal knowledge of the survey operations and his evidence, therefore, cannot carry any weight. In the absence of more clinching materials, to which reference has been made above, Ex. B.4, which is nothing more than a sketch of survey No. 48 in the Field measurement book cannot form the basis for a judicial verdict in favour of the defendants regarding S. No. 48. In the absence of more clinching materials, to which reference has been made above, Ex. B.4, which is nothing more than a sketch of survey No. 48 in the Field measurement book cannot form the basis for a judicial verdict in favour of the defendants regarding S. No. 48. Even assuming for arguments sake that survey operations were conducted in 1919 and those operations resulted in S. No. 48 being labelled road poramboke, such actions cannot affect the plaintiff in any manner unless the defendants establish that the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff was given due notice of the result of the survey and the latter acquiesced in the correctness of the operations. In Kandasami Nadar v. Province of Madras (1952) 1 M.L.J. 804 ; 65 L.W. 787, this court has categorically stated that a party concerned by an adverse survey, to whom no notice was given of the survey, is not bound to file a suit within three years to set aside the order of the survey Officer because he had no notice of the survey and the orders on it cannot be said to be correctly passed under S. 13 of the Madras Survey and Boundaries Act and binding on that party. On these grounds themselves, the defendants case that the plaintiff cannot claim title to that portion of the, suit site which is comprised in S. No. 48 should fail. Additional evidence, however, is not wanting in this case to further militate the case of the defendants. As early as in 1925, there was litigation between the Union Board of Sivaganga on the one hand and the owners of the areas adjoining the suit site on the other on the question as to whether S. No. 48, formed part of the road poramboke. The proceedings which culminated in S.A. No. 204 etc of 1929 in this court went against the contention of the Union Board of Sivaganga, that the suit locality formed part of road poramboke. There is, thus, abundant material in the case to dispel the defence contention that the plaintiff could not have validly owned that portion of the suit site which is referable to S. No. 48. There is, thus, abundant material in the case to dispel the defence contention that the plaintiff could not have validly owned that portion of the suit site which is referable to S. No. 48. The learned Additional Government Pleader placed reliance upon S. 2(1) of the Tamil Nadu Land Encroachment Act, III of 1905, to contend that all public roads, streets, lanes and paths etc, have been declared under the said Act to be the property of Government and that as such, the contention of the defendants regarding S. No. 48 should be upheld. This argument, in our opinion, merely begs the question. As we have stated earlier, unless the second defendant places reliable and acceptable materials before the court to warrant the inference that survey operations in observance of all rules and regulations were effected during 1919 and that such operations had binding force on the predecessors-in-interest of the plaintiff, the defendants cannot have recourse to and avail the provisions of Act III of 1905. 11. That takes us on to the contentions of the defendants regarding that portion of the site which is comprised in S. No. 74. As S. No. 74 is a natham poramboke and has been declared as minor inam the defendants contend that the land bad vested with the Government under Act 30 of 1963 and as such, the plaintiff can seek her remedies, if any, available to her, only in the forums constituted under the said Act. S. 3(b) of the Madras Minor Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) lays down that with effect on and from the appointed day and save as otherwise expressly provided in the Act, every minor including all communal lands and porambokes, waste lands, etc, shall stand transferred to the Government and vest in them free of all encumbrances The argument, therefore, is that the trial court ought not to have entertained the suit, but should have directed the plaintiff to seek her remedies through the machinery provided under the Act. To lend weight to this argument the learned Additional Government Pleader places reliance on the pronouncement of this court in State of Madras v. Kamakshia Pillai 72 L.W. 770; 1959 M.W.N. 688 . To lend weight to this argument the learned Additional Government Pleader places reliance on the pronouncement of this court in State of Madras v. Kamakshia Pillai 72 L.W. 770; 1959 M.W.N. 688 . That was a case where certain ryots claimed fishery right in a tank situated in the zamin village of Kulamangalam and which village was notified and taken over under Madras Act XXVI of 1948. They based their action upon customary right and also on acquisition of the right to purchase in public auction held by the Official Receiver. The contention of the ryots therein was that Ss. 11 to 15 of Act XXVI of 1948, which provided for ryots and landholders applying for grant of pattas, did not make any provision for an application being made for a patta for their fishery rights; and since the rights they claimed were not the creation of the landholders, they cannot get any real benefit by way of compensation or otherwise under the provisions of the Act XXVI of 1948, and that as such their case must be held to fall under the Madras I and Encroachment Act III of 1905 which recognised customary rights, and that, therefore, the civil court was competent to maintain their suit and recognised declare such rights. The Bench of this Court held that the declaration under Act III of 1905 was not a vesting declaration, but only a property declaration and that as such the Act bad already exhausted itself in its scope and application as to the character of the lands when once the declaration was made and all lands barring the excepted lands had become vested in the Government. The Bench further held that the estate of Kulamangilam vested in the Government only on and from the notified date under Act XXVI of 1948, that the application of Act III of 1905 to the said estate will commence only after the estate had vested in the Government and that as such, the plaintiffs therein cannot be heard to say that their customary fishing rights, the like of which have been exempted from the properly declaration contained in S. 2(1) of Act III of 1905, were capable of recognition even before the estate had vested in the Government and were available for enforcement after the estate had been notified under Act XXVI of 1948 and taken over. It was in those circumstances the Bench held that the customary right claimed by the plaintiffs was devastitive so far as the landlord is concerned and investitive so far as the ryots are concerned, that the entire estate including the customary fishery rights claimed by the plaintiffs vested in the Government by reason of S. 3(b) of Act XXVI of 1948 and that as such, the aggrieved plaintiffs should resort to the same remedies as are open to the ryotwari ryots under Act XXVI of 1948. We are clearly of opinion that the ratio decidendi of that case cannot have any application to the facts of the present case. Before proceeding to give our reasons for our conclusion in this behalf, we wish to advert to another factor which will repel the application of the provisions of Act 30 of 1963 to the suit property and the plaintiffs action for enforcement of her rights. 12. As we have stated earlier, the plaintiff in deference to the request of the President of the Panchayat banded over the suit site to the first defendant in 1960 itself and the un-controverted evidence is that the first defendant also installed its water works on the suit site before the end of 1961. Act 30 of 1963 received the assent of the President only on 28th January 1964 and came into force still later. Such being the case, there is hardly any force in the contention of the defendants that the minor inam comprised in S. No. 74 vested in the Government by reason of Act 30 of 1963 and as such the plaintiff would seek her remedies only through the machinery provided under the Act. Under the provisions of the Act, the plaintiff can only ask for the grant of a ryotwari patta in respect of the suit site. When the plaintiff had parted with the possession of the site and the first defendant had also built its water, works thereon, we are unable to understand the logic of the contention of the second defendant that the plaintiff should seek her remedies only through the forums provided under the Act. From the moment the plaintiff delivered the suit site to the first defendant for the construction of of its water works, the plaintiff became entitled to get compensation for the suit site. From the moment the plaintiff delivered the suit site to the first defendant for the construction of of its water works, the plaintiff became entitled to get compensation for the suit site. It is not, and it can never be, the contention of the second defendant that this right of the plaintiff, viz., to recover compensation, also vested in the Government on the introduction of Act 30 of 1963. It is needless to say that the rights of parties have got to be determined as on the date the cause of action arose, and viewed in that perspective, the supervening event, viz., the introduction of Act 31 of 1963, cannot abridge or modify the right of the plaintiff as against the first defendant. Be that as it may, even assuming that Act 30 of 1963 must be held to have enmeshed the anterior rights of the plaintiff, the question for consideration is whether the plaintiff is not entitled to maintain her action for compensation and whether the civil court is no entitled to maintain the action. 13. In as much as survey No. 74 is a natham poramboke, such portion of the suit site which is comprised therein must be held to be a house site and the possession of which the plaintiff is entitled to cling to and resist all invasion. Such a right of the plaintiff can never be held to have been extinguished or curtailed by reason of Act 30 of 1963. It must also be stated with equal force that any interference or invasion with the said right of the plaintiff is always challengeable in appropriate proceedings before the civil court. A case similar to the one on hand arose under Act XXVI of 1948, viz., Rangaraja Iyengar v. Achikannu Ammal 1959 2 M.L.J. 513; 72 L.W. 767 and Subramanyam, J. decided the case thus: “In order that a land may properly be described as house sites within the meaning of S. 2 of the Madras Land Encroachment Act 1905, it is not necessary that there should be a residential building actually constructed and standing on the site. Lands which are within the limits of the Gramanatham and on which buildings or sheds may be put up when necessary should also be house sites within the meaning of the section whether such buildings are constructed or not The provisions as to vesting of lands under S. 3(b) of the Act (XXVI of 1948) should be read so as to be in conformance with the provisions regarding the applicability of the enactments relating to ryotwari areas. House sites in gramanathams, therefore, could not stand vested in the Government under S. 3(b) of the Estates Abolition Act.” We are of opinion that this decision states the correct position of law and that what applies to house sites in gramanatham in estates taken over under Act XXVI of 1948 should mutatis mutandis apply to minor inams taken over by under Act 30 of 1963. 14. We may also usefully refer to some other decisions which hold that the statutory machinery provided under Act XXVI of 1948 or Act 30 of 1963 as the case may be can have jurisdiction only in respect of those matters, such as the grant of ryotwati patta, provided under the Act and that such machinery, being the creatures of the statute, cannot deal with a civil right, the determination of which can be done only by a civil court. In State of Madras v. Umayal Achi L.P A. 106 of 1959 it was held that the civil court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit for a mere injunction restraining the Government from arbitrarily and oppressively applying the provisions of the Land Encroachments Act to persons like the” plaintiff who have been in occupation of lands in a notified estate even prior to the date of the notification. In the State of Madras v. Parisutha Nadar 1961 2 M.L.J. 285; 74 L.W. 338 it has been held that it is not open to the Government in the course of the proceedings to put forward its own title to the property sought to be acquired so as to defeat the rights of the persons entitled to the compensation. In State of Madras v. Ramalingasami Madani 1969 2 M.L.J. 281 a Bench of this court held as follows: “It is clear from the provisions of the Act. In State of Madras v. Ramalingasami Madani 1969 2 M.L.J. 281 a Bench of this court held as follows: “It is clear from the provisions of the Act. Act XXVI of 1948) that what really vests in the Government in respect of a ryoti or private land is merely title and there is no vesting of possession, which is protected under the proviso to S. 3(d) of the Act. So long as the possession of the land continues to vest in the ryot, be would be entitled to protect his rights in respect of the same, by resorting to civil courts.” Though there is a long catena of decisions in this behalf, we have adverted to a few only as it is unnecessary to make reference to ail of them in view of the fact that the law is now well settled that the statutory machinery created by either Act XXVI of 1948 or Act 30 of 1963 can exercise jurisdiction only in respect of those matters which are specified in the enactments and cannot pervade the field of civil litigation which is exclusively that of the civil court. The learned Additional Government Pleader invited our attention to a Bench decision of this court in In re Raja of Vizianagaram (1953) 1 M.L.J. 289 ; 66 L.W. 84, which, according to him, has a bearing on the case. A scrutiny of the judgment, however, reveals that the ratio decidendi in that case has no application whatever to the controversy raised for decision in the appeal. In the above said case, the Rajah of Vizianagaram contended that certain house sites, though forming part of the estate of Vizianagaram, must be held to be sites given free to the zamindar without any additional assessment and that therefore, the vacant sites must be held to fall outside the scope of the permanent settlement. Rajamannar, C.J. and Venkatarama Iyyar, J. (as he then was) if we may say with great respect, rightly held that the contention was fallacious, because, what happened to the zamindar under the Sannad was not confined to the lands on which peishkush was calculated and that the fact that in 1802, no income accrued to the zamindar in the housesites did not really affect the question. It is also significant to note that the Bench, notwithstanding such a pronouncement, held that “the right of the Government to take over the house sites also along with the estate, was however, subject to the claim of the zamindar, if any, under S. 12 and similar provisions of Act XXVI of 1948 to be granted ryotwari patta”. 15. The facts of this case which have already been expatiated by us have reference to a house site owned by a person who is not an estate holder and the owner of the site, apart from being entitled to the grant of a patta, is equally conferred by law a right to defend his possession and enjoyment. If instead of her action for compensation, the plaintiff were to sue for an injunction based on her right of possession, her right to maintain the civil action can never be questioned. In like manner, when the plaintiff sues for compensation for the deprivation of the possession of her land, she is no way, worse off than when maintaining her action for retention of possession. Therefore, the second contention of the defendants to non-suit the plaintiff is a futile one, and has therefore, been rightly, rejected by the trial court. Consequently, the first defendant, now succeeded by the third defendant, cannot escape its liability to pay compensation to the plaintiff for the suit site and the appeals by the second and third defendants have, therefore, to fail. 16. Turning our attention to the memorandum of cross objections, the plaintiff feels aggrieved that as against her claim for compensation at the rate of Re. 1 per sq. ft., the learned Subordinate Judge has granted only 25 paise per sq. ft. [The discussion of the evidence is omitted-Ed] On consideration of the report of the Commissioner about the location of the suit site, we are of opinion that a compensation at the rate of 40 paise per sq. ft. would be a just and reasonable compensation to be awarded to the plaintiff. We therefore revise the compensation of Rs. 3633 granted to the plaintiff by the trial court to a sum of Rs. 5813-60 at the rate of 40 paise per sq. ft. Consequently, the interest which the trial court has awarded to the plaintiff at the rate of 6 percent per annum from the date of demand under Ex. B.34 will also stand revised. 3633 granted to the plaintiff by the trial court to a sum of Rs. 5813-60 at the rate of 40 paise per sq. ft. Consequently, the interest which the trial court has awarded to the plaintiff at the rate of 6 percent per annum from the date of demand under Ex. B.34 will also stand revised. The plaintiff will be entitled to interest on the amount of compensation awarded till the date of realisation and proportionate costs in the suit to the extent the compensation amount is revised, the memorandum of cross objections will stand allowed. 17. In the result, both the appeals will stand dismissed without costs. The memorandum of cross objections will stand partly allowed with proportionate costs.