Aravapalli Kotiratnam v. State, represented by the S. I. Vigilance Cell, Guntur — 1973 DIGILAW 597 (MAD)

*Order: The petitioner is a partner of a registered firm called Sri Venkateswara Dhal Company, which was having a licence under the Andhra Pradesh Foodgrains Dealers Licensing Order, 1964, hereinafter referred to as ‘the order. The SubInspector of Police, Vigilance Cell, Guntur, visited the shop of the registered firm mentioned above and inspected the stock available in the godowns and found a stock of 20 quintals, 41 kgs. of redgram dhal and 5 quintals of broken redgram dhal in door No. 16-2-91 and in godown Nos. 16-2-86, 16-2-87 and 16-2-88. But the registers maintained by the dealer showed a stock of 26 quintals 6kgs. of redgram. On the ground that there was a deficit of 5 quintals 37 kgs. of redgram dhal and an excess of 5 quintals of broken redgram dhall, which were not brought into account and therefore there was a contravention of the conditions of the licence issued to the firm, the SubInspector of Police seized the stocks found in the godowns and submitted a report to the Collector for taking action under section 6-A of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. On receipt of the report notice was issued to the petitioner, who was one of the partners if the firm and in whose presence the inspection was made by the Police, to show cause why confiscation of the goods seized cannot be ordered as provided under section 6-A. The petitioner submitted a written explanation. Not satisfied with the explanation of the petitioner, the District Revenue Officer, ordered confiscation of the stocks seized by the Sub-Inspector of Police, Vigilance Cell, Guntur. On appeal preferred by the petitioner to the Sessions Court, Guntur the order of confiscation was confirmed.. Aggrieved by the order of confiscation made by the District Revenue Officer, Guntur, and as confirmed by the Sessions Court Guntur, this revision case is filed. 2. Sri K. Venkataramaiah, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, while arguing that there was no contravention of any of the conditions of the licence has also submitted placing reliance on a Bench judgment of this Court (by Sri A.D.V. Reddy, J., and myself) in Crl. R.C. Nos. 2. Sri K. Venkataramaiah, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, while arguing that there was no contravention of any of the conditions of the licence has also submitted placing reliance on a Bench judgment of this Court (by Sri A.D.V. Reddy, J., and myself) in Crl. R.C. Nos. 585, 679 and 874 of 1969 dated 17th July, 1970, that contravention of the conditions of the licence does not tantamount to contravention of the Licensing Order itself and therefore even assuming that there was contravention of 1 he conditions of the licence, it does not attract the penal provisions of section 6-A of the Essential: Commodities Act. It is true that this Court in the Bench decision referred to above has held so purporting to follow two Supreme Court decisions in Boothalinga Agencies v. V.T.C. Periaswami Nadar1, and East India Commercial Co., Ltd., Calcutta v. The Collector of Custom, Calcutta2. No doubt the above two decisions of the Supreme Court are an authority for the proposition that a mere infringement of the conditions of a licence will not tantamount to infringement of the Order itself under which it is issued. * 14th August, 1973. But having regard to the provisions of the Order itself any violation of the conditions of the licence issued thereunder may amount to violation of the Order itself. Both in this case and in the Bench judgment referred to above, we are concerned with the Andhra Pradesh Foodgrains Dealers Licensing Order, 1964. Clause 3 (1) of that Order is in the following terms: "No person shall carry on business as a dealer except under and in accordance with terms and conditions of a licence issued in this behalf by the licensing authority." 3. Under this clause, carrying on business except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of a licence issued under the Order is prohibited. Therefore, if any business is carried on in contravention of the terras and conditions of a licence issued under this Order, it would be in contravention of clause 3 (1) itself which means in contravention of the Order itself. Therefore, in this case as well as in the case before the Bench, the contravention of the terms and conditions of the licence amounted to contravention of the Order itself, in which case all the penal consequences provided under the Eessential Commodities Act would follow. Therefore, in this case as well as in the case before the Bench, the contravention of the terms and conditions of the licence amounted to contravention of the Order itself, in which case all the penal consequences provided under the Eessential Commodities Act would follow. The two Supreme Court decisions referred to above did not go to the extent of saying that even if having regard to the terms of a particular Order, any contravention of the conditions of the licence issued in that behalf also amounts to contravention of the Order itself it would not amount to contravention of the Order and even them it can only be taken as contravention of the terms and conditions of the licence only’ As a matter of fact, in the later Supreme Court decision the contrary was held. In that case the facts are: The appellant before the Supreme Court carries on business in the manufacture and sale of coffee powder. He was for this purpose importing chicory under actual user’s licence issued by the Government of India. He received a consignment of chicory in December, 1955 and they were cleared on 20th December, 1955. The case of the respondent, in that case, was that the appellant agreed to sell the consignment to him under an agreement dated 26th. November, 1955, after taking an advance of Rs. 7,500. The respondent paid another sum of Rs. 20,000 on 23rd December, 1955, after the goods arrived and were cleared on the representation that delivery would be given in one month. When the appellant committed default the suit was filed. The suit was contested on the ground that the contract was illegal and therefore void. The question considered by the Supreme Court in that appeal was whether the contract was in violation of the restrictions placed by the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 and the notifications issued thereunder and in conseqeunce whether it was void and illegal and a claim. for breach of such a contract was maintainable. 4. The licence was granted by virtue of a statutory notification dated 6th March, 1948, issued under the Defence of India Rules and later deemed to have been issued under the Imports and Exports (Control) Act (XVIII of 1947). The notification authorised the licensing officer to impose one or more conditions prescribed by that Order. 4. The licence was granted by virtue of a statutory notification dated 6th March, 1948, issued under the Defence of India Rules and later deemed to have been issued under the Imports and Exports (Control) Act (XVIII of 1947). The notification authorised the licensing officer to impose one or more conditions prescribed by that Order. There was nothing in that notification from which to infer that any violation of the conditions to be prescribed by the licensing officer would be a violation of the notification itself Therefore, the Supreme Court held that if the licensee merely contravenes the conditions of the licence issue by the licensing officer, it is difficult to hold that it is not merely a contravention of the conditions of a licence but there is contravention of the terms of the notification and so the penal provisions of section 5 of the Act (XVIII of 1947), are attracted. But what happened was that by the time the imported chicory arrived at Madras on 13th December, 1955, the Imports (Control) Order, 1955, came into force on 7th December, 1955. It was provided under clause 5 (1) of that Order that the licensing officer issuing the licence under the Order may issue the same subject to one or more of the conditions stated therein and it was provided under sub-clause (4) of Clause 5 that the licensee shall comply with all the conditions imposed or deemed to be imposed under that clause. In the licence issued on 29th September, 1955, to the appellant one of the conditions imposed was that "the goods will be utilised only for consumption as rawmaterial or accessories in the licence holder’s factory and that no portion thereof will be sold to any party". In the proviso to rule 12 by which the previous orders were repealed, provision is made for anything done or any action taken under the repealed orders shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provision of that Order. In the proviso to rule 12 by which the previous orders were repealed, provision is made for anything done or any action taken under the repealed orders shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provision of that Order. Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court held that the sale of imported goods to the respondent in contravention of the condition of the licence referred to above would be a direct contravention of clause 5 (4) of the Order and under section 5 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947, any contravention, of the Act or any order made or deemed to have been made under the Act is punishable with imprisonment up to one year or fine or both. In consequence, the Supreme Court held that even though the contract was enforceable on 26th November, 1955, when it was entered into; the performance of the contract became impossible or unlawful after 7th December, 1955, and so the contract became void under section 56 of the India. Contract Act after the coming into force of the Imports (Control) Order, 1955. Therefore, from the above, it is clear that in that decision the Supreme Court was of the view that when it is mentioned in the Order itself that the licensee shall comply with all the conditions imposed, any contravention of the conditions of the licence would be contravention of the Order itself. Thus, it appears clear that the Bench of this Court misread the judgment of the Supreme Court when it said purporting to follow that decision that the contravention of the conditions of the licence issued under the Andhra Pradesh Foodgrain Dealers Licensing Order, 1964, would not amount to contravention of the Order itself and therefore cannot attract the penal consequences as provided in the Essential Commodities Act in spite of what is provided under clause 3 of the Order that no person shall carry on business as a dealer except under and in accordance with the terras and conditions of the licence issued in that behalf by the licensing authority. 5. Under these circumstances, I think the Bench decision of this Court referred to above requires reconsidereation by referring the matter to a Full Bench. Sri Chinnappa Reddy, J., in his judgment dated 28th July, 1971, in Crl. A. No. 514 of 1970 also felt that the Bench decision requires reconsideration. 5. Under these circumstances, I think the Bench decision of this Court referred to above requires reconsidereation by referring the matter to a Full Bench. Sri Chinnappa Reddy, J., in his judgment dated 28th July, 1971, in Crl. A. No. 514 of 1970 also felt that the Bench decision requires reconsideration. This is a matter which very often comes up for consideration in cases relating to contravention of the Control Orders issued under the Essential Commodities Act. 6. Therefore, the papers:nay be placed before the Honourable the Chief Justice for necessary order. 7. In pursuance of the said order of the High Court dated 14th August, 1973 and made in Crl.R.C. No. 5o8 of 1972 referring the same to a Full Bench, the said case came on for hearing before a Division Bench, Sambasiva Rao and Ramachandra Raju, JJ. K. Venkataramaiah, for Petitioner. The Public Prosecutor on behalf of the State. The Order of the Bench ‘was made by *Sambasiva Rao, J.- The principal question, if not the only Question, that falls for decision in this criminal revision case is whether contravention of the conditions of the licence is tantamount to contravention of the Licensing Order itself. It may be noted here that the order with which we are concerned in this case is the Andhra Pradesh Foodgrains Dealers’ Licensing Order. 1964. One of us (Ramachandra Raju, J.) while dealing with this revision case, expressed the of opinion in his order, dated 14th August, 1973 that this is a matter which very often comes up for consideration in cases relating to contraventions of the Control Orders issued under the Essential Commodities Act. The learned Judge expressed a doubt whether the decision of the Division Bench (consisting of A.D.V. Reddy, J. and himself in Criminal Revision Cases Nos. 585, 679 and 874 of 1969 dated 17th July, 1970 is good law, particularly in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Boothalinga Agencies v. V.T.G. Periaswami Nadar1. Notice was also taken of a similar doubt expressed by Chinnappa Reddy, J., in his judgment dated 28th of July, 1971 in Criminal Appeal No. 514 of 1970. *13th December, 1973. 9. Now that the correctness of a Division Bench decision is in question, we think that it should be decided by a Full Bench. We accordingly refer this criminal revision case to a Full Bench. *13th December, 1973. 9. Now that the correctness of a Division Bench decision is in question, we think that it should be decided by a Full Bench. We accordingly refer this criminal revision case to a Full Bench. We direct the papers to be placed before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice for necessary orders. 10. Pursuant to the said order of the High Court, dated 13th December, 1973 and made in Crl.R.C. 508 of 1972, the said revision case came on for hearing before a Full Bench (Sambasiva Rao, Ramachandra Raju and Venkatrama Sastri, JJ.) K. Venkatramaiah, for the Petitioner, The Public Prosecutor on behalf of the State. The Judgment; of the Full Bench was delivered by *Sambasiva Rao,J.- Is contravention of the conditions of a licence issued under the Andhra Pradesh Foodgrains Dealers’ Licensing Order, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the Order) contravention of the Order itself, so that it becomes punishable under the penal provisions of the Essential Commodities Act? We have to answer this question now. 12. A.D.V. Reddy and Ramachandra Raju, JJ. answered this question in the negative in their judgment dated 17th July, 1970 in Criminal Revision Cases Nos. 585, 679 and 874 of 1969. When this revision case came up before Ramachandra Raju, J., he felt a doubt about the correctness of the view taken by A.D.V. Reddy, J., and himself. He accordingly directed the matter to be posted before a Full Bench. It was however, referred to a Division Bench of Sambasiva Rao and Ramachandra Raju, JJ. and they by their order dated 13th December, 1973, referred it to a Full Bench. It may be noted that Chinnappa Reddy, J., also doubted the correctness of the opinion of the Division Bench in Criminal Appeal No. 514 of 1970 (dated 28th of July, 1971). 13. The petitioner is a partner in an enterprise which does business in dhals and other cereals in the name of Sri Venkateswara Dhal Company. It does its business in Narasaraopet town in Guntur District. A Sub-Inspector of Police belonging to the Vigilance cell inspected the godowns of the company and verified its stocks on 27th November, 1971. He found out not only larger stocks of dhal than those mentioned in the accounts but also that they were stocked in unauthorised godowns. Thereupon, he seized the stocks. A Sub-Inspector of Police belonging to the Vigilance cell inspected the godowns of the company and verified its stocks on 27th November, 1971. He found out not only larger stocks of dhal than those mentioned in the accounts but also that they were stocked in unauthorised godowns. Thereupon, he seized the stocks. He submitted a report to the Collector for action under section 6-A of the Essential Commodities Act. The District Revenue Officer, who is authorised to deal with these matters called for an explanation under section 6-B of the Act from the petitioner and after examining the explanation found that the petitioner was stocking foodgrains in unauthorised godowns in violation of the conditions of the licence and so directed confiscation of the stocks. An appeal to the Sessions Judge, Guntur, who is the judicial authority appointed by the State Government under section 6-C of the Act for hearing the appeals was unsuccessful. This revision case is against the dismissal of the said appeal. 14. The only legal point that is raised and argued in support of the revision case is the one we have stated at the outset. It is argued by Sri K. Venkatramayya, for the petitioner, that conditions of a. licence are not part and parcel of the order. They are separate and distinct from the provisions of the actual order. Therefore, contravention of the conditions of the licence cannot be said to be contravention of the provisions of the order. 15. We find that the material portions of the order itself furnish a conclusive answer to this question. We will begin with clause 3 which enjoins that no person shall carry on business as a dealer except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of the licence issued in this behalf by the licensing authority. Thus, the importance of a licence and the obligations of a dealer to do his business according to its terms and conditions are proclaimed in unequivocal terms. A licence is thus made an integral and essential part of the control system postulated by the order. Indeed it is difficult to conceive how control of foodgrains could be implemented without a licence prescribing the terms and conditions of the manner in which business should be *24th December. 1973. carried on. Clause 3 does this in no uncertain terms. A licence is thus made an integral and essential part of the control system postulated by the order. Indeed it is difficult to conceive how control of foodgrains could be implemented without a licence prescribing the terms and conditions of the manner in which business should be *24th December. 1973. carried on. Clause 3 does this in no uncertain terms. Once again the same importance is assigned to a licence under clause 4. The form of an application for a licence and also the form of the licence issued, reissued or renewed are also clearly prescribed. The application should be made in Form A and the licence should be issued in Form B. This requirement not only emphasises the importance of a licence, but what is more significant in the present context is it makes the licence and its terms and conditions as stated in form B as an essential part of the order. It is very pertinent to note that the two forms are given in Schedule II to the order. Schedule I enumerates the foodgrains, as defined in clause 2 (b) and to which the order applies. It is immediately seen that without Schedule I the order itself becomes wholly incomplete and ineffective. Likewise, without Schedule II which contains the form of the licence with its terms and conditions, the order cannot be enforced. The form of the licence its terms and conditions are therefore, treated by the order as one of its crucial parts. It would also be pertinent to note that form B purports to have been made in consonance with clause 4 (3). In fact all the important aspects of the order centre round the licence, what a person should do to obtain a licence and what requirements he should comply with. Clause 6 requires a dealer to make a deposit of security when he applies for a licence. Clause 7 confers power on the licensing authority to refuse licences in certain circumstances. In clauses 7-A, 7-B, 7-C and 7-D, the the duties and responsibilities of a licence holder are stated. Then clause 8 declares that no holder of a licence shall contravene any of the terms or conditions of the licence and if he does so, his licence may be cancelled or suspended, that too, without prejudice to any other action that may be taken against him. Then clause 8 declares that no holder of a licence shall contravene any of the terms or conditions of the licence and if he does so, his licence may be cancelled or suspended, that too, without prejudice to any other action that may be taken against him. Likewise, clause 9 authorises the licensing authority to direct forfeiture of the security deposit made by a dealer if that authority is satisfied that the licensee has contravened any of the conditions of the licence. Sub-clause (d) of clause 11 (1) empowers the licensing authority or any other officer authorised by the State Government to seize and remove stocks of foodgrains and other vehicles etc. used in carrying on the business in foodgrains, if there is a contravention of not only the provisions of the order but also of the conditions of the licence. Contravention of the conditions of a licence is thus put on par with contravention of the other provisions of the order and is subjected to penalties, which could not have been the case had the conditions of the licence not been considered as part and parcel of the order. It is thus manifest from these provisions of the order that a licence with its terms and Conditions is an essential part of the order and also that their contravention is subjected to penalties of more than one type. Even if it be considered for argument’s sake that a licence is not part of the order, its contravention will become punishable nonetheless under the provisions of the order. 16. We will now refer to a few material provisions of the Essentia] Commodities Act of 1955 which lead to the same result. The Act is the basic source of power for the order and similar control orders relating to essential commodities. Section 3 which confers power to control production, supply, distribution etc. of essential commodities and to issue orders for those purposes, specifies in sub-section (2) the guidelines, according to which such orders can be made. Clause (a) refers to regulation by licenses, permits or otherwise of the production or manufacture of any essential commodity. Clause (d) deals with regulation by licences, permits or otherwise the storage,, transport, distribution, disposal, acquisition, use or consumption of any essential commodity. Clauses (i) and (ii) provide for the grant or issue of licences, permits etc., and the requirements like deposits, security deposits etc. Clause (d) deals with regulation by licences, permits or otherwise the storage,, transport, distribution, disposal, acquisition, use or consumption of any essential commodity. Clauses (i) and (ii) provide for the grant or issue of licences, permits etc., and the requirements like deposits, security deposits etc. Clause (j) enables an order issued under section 3 to contain provisions for entry, search etc., of business premises. Section 6-A prescribes the procedure for confiscation of foodgrains etc., while section 6-B lays down that a show cause notice should be issued before confiscation of foodgrains and section 6-C provides for appeal against orders of confiscation. Then comes section 7, relating to penalties. It is no doubt true that penalties are imposed under it for contravention of an order made section 3 only. What we have stated above would unmistakably show that licences, with their terms and conditions, are components of the order and contraventions thereof are made punishable under the said order. 17. It is thus seen that the Essential Commodities Act itself postulates lincences being integral parts of control orders and laying conditions thereunder regulating search, transport, distribution, disposal, acquisition, use or consumption of any controlled essential commodity. In the light of those provisions, it is futile of contend that a licence issued under the order is not a part of it and contravention of its terms and conditions is not contravention of the control order. 18. Despite this indisputable position, the doubt relating to the question arose out of the decision of A.D.V. Reddy and Ramachandra Raju, JJ. in Criminal Revision Case Nos. 585, 679 and 874 of 1969 taking the contrary view. While reaching this conclusion, the learned Judges only followed certain observations made by the Supreme Court in East India Commercial Company Ltd. v. The Collector of Custom, Calcutta1, and Boothalinga Agencies v. Poraiswami Nadar2, It may be noted here that in Crl.R.C. Nos. 121 and 122 of 1969, Sharfuddin Ahmed, J. by his order, dated 14th April, 1970 held that violation of a condition of the licence of a control order was not punishable under section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, as that section contemplates punishment only in cases of violation of any order made under section 3 of the Act. The learned Judge following the latter Supreme Court decision which we have referred to above. The learned Judge following the latter Supreme Court decision which we have referred to above. We will, therefore consider to what extent the observations of the Supreme Court would support the said conclusion. 19. It in no doubt true that there are certain observations in both the decisions of the Supreme Court, which taken out of their context and read without the aid of the facts in those cases, would lead to such a conclusion. In the first of the two cases, the appellant company applied for the grant of a licence to import some Floursescent tubes and fixtures. The application mentioned that the goods were required for the company’s own use. On that basis a licence was issued with the condition that the goods were to be used only for the consumption as raw material or accessories in the licencee’s factory and that no portion thereof should be sold to any party. The Chief Controller of Imports directed the seizure of the goods on information that they had been sold to various parties by the licence. A criminal prosecution was also launched against the Director of the Company under section 5 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947. The prosecution failed and the High Court in a revision against the discharge of the accused held that the section penalised only a contravention of an order made or deemed to have been made under the said Act, but did not penalise contravention of the conditions of licence issued under the Act or issued under a statutory order made under the Act and dismissed the revision. The Collector of Customs then called upon the appellant to show cause why the proceeds realised by the sale of the seized goods should not be confiscated. Once again the ground stated for the proposed confiscation was the appellant-company had sold the goods contrary to the conditions of the licence. The company challenged this in a writ petition which was dismissed by the High Court. It was this order that was taken to the Supreme Court in appeal. Once again the ground stated for the proposed confiscation was the appellant-company had sold the goods contrary to the conditions of the licence. The company challenged this in a writ petition which was dismissed by the High Court. It was this order that was taken to the Supreme Court in appeal. While reversing the view of the High Court that the writ petition was not maintainable, the Supreme Court further held that inasmuch as the notification dated 1st July, 1943, did not impose a condition in the matter of issuing a licence under the specified rule, there was no infringment of the order issued under section 3 of the Imports and Exports Control Order, 1947, but there was merely a violation of the condition of the licence. This conclusion was rested on the ground that the notification did not provide for a condition in the licence that subsequent to the import the goods should not be sold. Further, the notification empowered the licensing authority to impose conditions from an administrative point of view. Consequently the condition against alienation included in the licence could not be called a condition imposed from an administrative point of view, as it clearly affected the rights of the licensee. 20. The facts stated above which form the background for the decision of the Supreme Court have no similarity at all with the circumstances of the present case. There the basic order, which authorised issuance of licences did not contain or specify any conditions to be imposed in the licence. It was left to the licensing authority as to what conditions were to be imposed. That was why the order contained in the notification empowered the concerned authority to impose conditions from an administrative point of view. Since the condition imposed was neither an administrative one nor the consequences of the main order itself, Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) delivering the majority view of the Supreme Court held that “infringement of a condition in the licence not to sell the goods imported to third parties is not an infringement of the order and, therefore, the said infringement does not attract section 167 (8) of the Sea Customs Act”. In the instant case, the terms and conditions of the licence are in so many words prescribed in Form B of Schedule II to the order and so the rule stated in the above ease does not apply here. 21. Now coming to the later decision of the Supreme Court, viz., Boothalinga Agencies case1, it was also under the Imports and Exports Control Act, 1947. The appellant was importing Chicory for purpose of his business of manufacturing and sale of coffee, under actual users licence issued by the Government. There was an agreement of sale between the licensee-appellant and the respondent, under which the respondent claimed to have paid some amounts. A suit was filed on the basis of this contract and one of the principal defences to it was that the contract was illegal and void for the reason that sale of imported goods was repugnant to the terms of the licence and was consequently a contravention of the notification itself within the meaning of section 5 of the Imports and Exports Control Act. 22. While dealing with this petition, the Supreme Court noted the amendment of section 5. The unamended section penalised the contravention of any order made or deemed to have been made under the Act. The notification issued under the Act authorised the licensing officer to impose one or more conditions prescribed by that order. It is thus manifest that the licensing officer could impose those conditions in the licence which he thought necessary in the circumstances of the case. Then, if the licensee contravenes the conditions imposed under the licence, the Supreme Court held that it was difficult to hold that it was not merely a contravention of the conditions of the licence but also there was a contravention of the terms of the notification and the provisions of section 5. The date of the breach of the condition of the licence was material and that was before the amendment of section 5. While expressing this view, the Supreme Court followed its earlier decision in East India Commercial Company Ltd. v. The Collector of Customs, Calcutta2. It is easily seen that the relevant orders under consideration before the Supreme Court did not specify the terms and conditions necessarily to be imposed in the licence, while in the case before us those terms and conditions are prescribed by the order itself. 23. It is easily seen that the relevant orders under consideration before the Supreme Court did not specify the terms and conditions necessarily to be imposed in the licence, while in the case before us those terms and conditions are prescribed by the order itself. 23. At the same time, it is very essential to note another part of the same decision which considered the contention put forward on behalf of the appellant that in any event the Imports Control Order, 1955, had come into force on 7th December, 1955, and the performance of the contract became illegal after that date. This argument was upheld as well founded. As the disposed imported chicory arrived in the Madras port on 13th December, 1955, it was governed by the provisions of the Imports Control Order, 1955, which came into force on 7th December, 1955. There was an amendment in 1960 to certain provisions of the Imports and Exports Control Act, 1947, whereunder by section 4 of the Amending Act, the words “or any condition of a licence granted under any such order” were introduced after the clause “any order made or deemed to have been made under this Act”, Clause 3 of the Imports Control Order, 1955, prohibited import of goods except in accordance with a licence issued by specified authorities. Clause 5 authorised imposition of conditions under which goods could be imported. The said clause (iii) specifically provided that certain conditions stated therein should be deemed to be conditions of every licence. Sub-clause (iv) enjoined upon the licensee to comply with all the conditions imposed or deemed to be imposed under the said clause. In the light of this sub-clause the Supreme Court held that the sale of the imported goods would be a direct contravention, even though the contract was enforceable on 26th of November, 1955, when it was entered into. Its performance however, became impossible or unlawful after 7th December, 1955, on which day the control order came into force. There is, therefore, no doubt that if the provisions of the order impose certain terms and conditions while granting a licence and the licence has been issued in accordance therewith, any breach of those conditions would be contravention of the order itself. The second decision thus is no authority for the proposition which is sought to be emphasised before us by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. 24. The second decision thus is no authority for the proposition which is sought to be emphasised before us by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. 24. The Division Bench in Crl.R.C. Nos. 585, 679 and 874 of 1969 merely took into account the observations of the Supreme Court and did not consider them in the light of the circumstances of those cases. We must, therefore, hold that the rule stated by the Division Bench is not correct. In the light of the specific provisions of the order in question and the admitted fact that the licence issued to the petitioner is fully in accordance with Form B in Schedule II of the order, it is unmistakable that contravention of any of these terms and conditions in contravention of the order itself and is liable to be punished under the order and the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. 25. We may here notice a decision of a single Judge of the Mysore High Court in S.Kariappa v. State1, which has expressed the same view after distinguishing the two Supreme Court decisions. 26. In the result, we answer the question in the affirmative, and over-rule to this extent, the decision of A.D.V. Reddy and Ramachandra Raju, JJ. in Crl.R.C. Nos. 585, 679 and 874 of 1969 and that of Sharfuddin Ahmed, J. in Crl.R.C. Nos. 121 and 122 of 1969. 27. Now, the Criminal Revision Case will go before a learned single Judge for disposal on its merits.