JUDGMENT : B.K. Ray, J. - This appeal is directed against an order dated 25-7-1969 of the learned District Judge, Berhampur dismissing T.A. No. 27 of 1969 as barred by limitation. 2. It appears that the date of the decree of the trial Court against which the aforesaid title appeal was filed is 21-3-1969 and the time available for obtaining certified copy of the decree is 15 days u/s 12 of the Indian Limitation Act. The prescribed time for filing an appeal against the aforesaid decree of the trial Court is 30 days. Therefore, an appeal against the said decree would be in time if filed on or before 5-5-69. As a matter of fact, however, the aforesaid appeal was filed on 22-4-1969, and so, was within time. The learned District Judge, without applying his mind, dismissed the title appeal as barred by limitation by his order referred to above. 3. Mr. N.V. Ramdas, learned Counsel for Respondents also concedes that the title appeal was wrongly dismissed as barred by limitation. This being the position, this appeal has to be allowed and the order under the appeal has to be set aside. 4. Mr. S.C. Mohapatra, learned Counsel for Appellant, however, urges that u/s 13 of the Court Fees Act, the Appellant is entitled to refund of the Court-fee paid on the memorandum of the present appeal. He relies upon Section 13 of the Court Fees Act. According to him, since the case is to be remanded to the lower appellate Court, this Court has to grant a certificate to the Appellant authorising him to receive back from the Collector the full amount of Court-fee paid on the memorandum of appeal. 5. I have no doubt in my mind that the words 'shall grant' used in Section 13 of the Court Fees Act are mandatory and not discretionary. Therefore, when a remand order satisfies the requirements of Section 13 of the Court Fees Act, the Court is bound to grant a certificate for refund of the court-fee. A reference may be made in this connection to a decision reported in Muiyalamma v. Krishnaamma AIR 1945 Mad. 851. Therefore, when a remand order satisfies the requirements of Section 13 of the Court Fees Act, the Court is bound to grant a certificate for refund of the court-fee. A reference may be made in this connection to a decision reported in Muiyalamma v. Krishnaamma AIR 1945 Mad. 851. The relevant portion of the judgment from the aforesaid decision may be quoted as follows: Thus reading Section 13, Court Fees Act, with Order 41, Rule 23 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the appellate Court has no discretion and is bound to refund the Court-fee paid on the appeal memorandum when it remands the suit to the trial Court for taking fresh evidence and disposal The refusal on the part of the Court to grant a certificate is either an illegality or irregularity-see Bhausing v. Chagarziram Hurchand ILR 42 Bom. 363. In that case, the lower appellate Court remanded a case under Order 41, Rule 23, Code of Civil Procedure, but declined to order refund of Court-fees paid on the memorandum of appeal. The Appellant therefore filed an application before the High Court against the aforesaid order of the lower appellate Court. While allowing the application, their Lordships observed that the lower appellate Court in refusing to pass the order had acted with illegality or with material irregularity. 6. Section 13 of the Court Fees Act being a provision in a fiscal State should be interpreted in favour of the subject. For this proposition, I am supported by the decision reported in Charles Johns Vs. Emperor, . 7. It may be said that Section 13 of the Court Fees Act uses the word 'suit'. This word 'suit' must be deemed to include an appeal. Necessarily, therefore, when the High Court remands a case to the lower appellate Court, the Appellant is entitled to refund of the Court-fee paid on the memorandum of appeal. In the decision reported in L. Shantilal Vs. Agha Dost Mohammad Khan and Others it has been clearly laid down that the proceedings in first appeal and in second appeal are merely successive stages of the suit and the suit does not terminate so long as any appeal is pending. In the decision reported in L. Shantilal Vs. Agha Dost Mohammad Khan and Others it has been clearly laid down that the proceedings in first appeal and in second appeal are merely successive stages of the suit and the suit does not terminate so long as any appeal is pending. Consequently, where the Court of Second Appeal remands the case to the lower appellate Court on any of the grounds mentioned in Order 41, Rule 23, a suit is remanded within Court Fees Act, Section 13 and the Appellant is entitled u/s 13 to a refund of Court-fees paid on the memorandum of appeal. 8. In the result therefore, I hold that T.A. No. 27 of 1969 was filed in the Court of the District Judge, Berhampur, within time and the said appeal was wrongly dismissed as barred by limitation. I, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the order dated 25-7-1969 in T.A. No. 27 of 1969 passed by the District Judge, Berhampur, and remand the case to the lower appellate Court with a direction to hear the said appeal on merits and to dispose of the same according to law. I also hereby grant a certificate to the Appellant authorising him to receive back from the Collector, Ganjam, the full amount of Court-fee paid on the memorandum of appeal in this Court. As the Respondents are not responsible for dismissal of T.A. No. 27 of 1969 in the lower appellate Court, I direct that the parties shall bear their own costs of this Court.