JUDGMENT-All these three matters were heard together being disposed of by common judgment which involve only one affecting the merits in each of the cases. 2. Briefly stated, the matters in controversy relate to the recovery, or terminal tax which Town Municipal Council, Amravati, the applicant in two revisions and the appellant in the first appeal, recovered from the respondents in these matters. The notification at the foot of which these recoveries were made was of October 3, 1959, i.e. a post-Constitutional notification purporting to be made with due approval of the State Government under the provisions of section 66 (1) (o) of the C. P. and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922 (hereinafter called the Act). It is no more in dispute that by this notification the earlier notifications which were in vogue imposing terminal taxes were superseded. Those notifications were in existence since about 1916. The first notification that was referred to at the Bar was of August 10, 1916 modified by a notification of July 9, 1935, and further modified by a notification of November 13, 1942. When the Constitution was ushered in and applied, the notification of 1942 was holding the sway as far as the terminal tax in the area of the Town Municipal Committee, Amravati. That notification was expressly saved by the Constitution under Article 277 and inspite of the Constitutional provision reserving the right to levy that tax with Union Government, it is conceded, that the Municipal Council could have levied and collected taxes in the nature of terminal taxes on the goods as those notifications were expressly saved. 3. However, as the legal history of the present imposition is concerned, in the very same year, i.e. in the year 1959, this municipal Council purported to issue a notification of December 1, 1959, adding new items of levy for the purpose of terminal tax in the earlier list and also effected increase in the rates of levy. That notification was the subject-matter of litigation which went upto the Supreme Court in the case reported in Town Municipal Committee, Amravati v. Ramchandra Wasudeo Chimote and another1. Their Lordships held that the notification was invalid in view of the provisions of the Constitution. It was further found that what was saved was only the existing notifications having continued the levy because of Article 277. Their Lordships held that the notification was invalid in view of the provisions of the Constitution. It was further found that what was saved was only the existing notifications having continued the levy because of Article 277. For application of that Article, three conditions were indicated-(1) the tax must be one which was lawfully levied by local Government for the purpose of a local area, (2) the identity of the body that collects the tax, the area for whose benefit the tax is to be utilised and the purposes for which the utilization is to take place continue to be the same, and (3) the rate of the tax is not enhanced nor its incidence in any manner altered, so that it continues to be the same tax. In other words only if these three conditions could be satisfied, then and then, earlier imposition of the terminal tax could be continued to be levied and collected. This position is crystal clear under the constitutional contemplation. 4. The plaintiffs in all these suits claim that the notification issued on October 3, 1959, -did not conform with the conditions laid down by the decision of the Supreme Court and, therefore, was void and inoperative. Consequently, there was no authority in the Municipal Council to collect any tax. It is the case of the plaintiff that the October 1959 notification having superseded all earlier notifications, after October 1959, there was no authoritative power in the Municipal Council either to levy or collect terminal tax. This was on the footing that the October I ~59 Notification was unconstitutional and invalid. 5. On the trial of several issues in all these matters, the trial Court held that the notification published under No. VVMA-(M), 245-A, dated 3-10-1959, was ultra vires and illegal. It further recorded a finding that the suit for refund of the levy collected under that Notification was tenable. As the suits were filed sometimes in 1964, the trial Court accordingly passed the decree for an amount recovered within a period of three years prior to the filing of the suit. 6. It may be mentioned that in Civil Revision Application No. 300 of 1967, an amount of Rs. 140.01 has been decreed, in Civil Revision Application No. 308 of 1967 an amount of Rs. 331.68 is decreed and in First Appeal No. 45 of 1967 an amount of Rs. 6,744.24 is decreed. 6. It may be mentioned that in Civil Revision Application No. 300 of 1967, an amount of Rs. 140.01 has been decreed, in Civil Revision Application No. 308 of 1967 an amount of Rs. 331.68 is decreed and in First Appeal No. 45 of 1967 an amount of Rs. 6,744.24 is decreed. These decrees are challenged by the Municipal Council, Amravati, in these three proceedings on the common question as indicated earlier. 7. The Notification on the basis of which some argument was advanced in these matters, viz., No. VMA-M-2457-A, dated 3-10-1959 is in the following terms: - "In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section 5 of section 67 of the Central Provinces and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922, and in super-session of all previous notifications regarding the imposition of terminal tax under clause (o) of sub-section (J) of section 66 of the said Act, Government hereby sanction the following Rules made by Amravati Town Municipal Committee in the Amravati District for the imposition of terminal tax on the articles imported into, or exported from the limits of Amravati Town Municipal Committee by Rail or Road subject to the following rules." (Emphasis supplied) Then follow the list of articles and the value and the rates of terminal tax. It is ample to state that upon plain reading of this Notification, all other previous notifications regarding the imposition of terminal tax under clause (o) of sub-section (1) of section 66 of the C. P. and Berar Municipalities Act have been completely done away with and for all intent and purpose this notification was put in field. 8. Now, in this Court, having due regard to what has been said by the Supreme Court in the decision in Town Municipal Committee, Amravati v. Ramchandra cited above, the learned counsel argues that though the present notification may be invalid, that would not necessarily mean that the entire levy is bad. According to the learned counsel, the Notification was incompetent and in that sense it will have no effect at all. In law, the learned counsel submits, it is as if non est and as if it was not made at all. That would keep alive the earlier notification, thereby meaning, the notification that was in force when the Constitution was applied, and the articles would be subject to the levy that was competently continued by the Constitution. In law, the learned counsel submits, it is as if non est and as if it was not made at all. That would keep alive the earlier notification, thereby meaning, the notification that was in force when the Constitution was applied, and the articles would be subject to the levy that was competently continued by the Constitution. The Municipal Council would be able to recover this tax under at least 1942 notification. The learned counsel submits that, that is the effect of Article 277 of the Constitution. The 1942 Notification was very much valid. The rates and articles were properly brought in the net of taxation. That being the position, the Constitution permitted the levy to be continued until, the Union Government makes a law on the same said subject. In other words, he submits that only because the 1959 Notification has been found to be invalid, the liability to pay tax under the pre-constitutional notification would not cease and at least the plaintiff was not entitled to get decree in its entirety, as is done by the learned trial Court. Under the old notification, according to the learned counsel the plaintiff in Civil Revision Application No. 300 of 1967 was liable to pay Rs. 19.39, in Civil Revision Application No. 308 of 1967, Rs. Rs. 172.75 and and in the First Appeal 45/67, Rs. 937.82. To that extent, there could not be any decree according to the learned counsel. 9. Now to accept all these submissions of the learned counsel for the Town Municipal Council, Amravati, would mean to accept that inspite of the 1959 Notification which superseded the earlier notification of 1935 as modified by 1942, these latter were good, valid and alive notifications and as such applicable. Whenever a new notification is made under the provisions of section 66 (1) (o), with which we are concerned, such a construction would mean that if for any reason the new notification is bad, the old notification still holds the field. Under the scheme for the purpose of imposing taxes either on articles or on persons, such a construction is inherently impossible. Whenever there is an article or a thing which is the subject of a tax, it has to be chosen every time the power is exercised for the purpose of levy or imposition. Every time the new notification is made, it is an independent imposition of the tax. Whenever there is an article or a thing which is the subject of a tax, it has to be chosen every time the power is exercised for the purpose of levy or imposition. Every time the new notification is made, it is an independent imposition of the tax. 10. The provisions of section 66 clearly indicate that it is a power enabling the Municipal Council to choose the things or items for the purpose of imposition of tax for raising municipal revenue. Sub· clauses (a) to (p) are several kinds upon which this power operates. Sub-section (2) directs that Provincial Government has to make rules for regulating the imposition of taxes under the section. Sub-section (3) speaks of previous sanction of the Provincial Government. Sub-section (4) relates to the power to abolish the tax as is enumerated in sub-clauses (a) to (m) as well as the variation in rates. Subsection (5) deals with how abolition of any tax in clauses (n), (o), (p) and its variation is to be made. Section 67 deals with the procedure for imposing tax and section 68 for abolishing or varying taxes. Section 69 of the Act contemplates suspension or exemption from taxes. This is the complete Code with respect to the powers as can be exercised by the Municipal Council while imposing, abolishing, varying, suspending or exempting either objects or things in the matters of taxes. All these powers are enabling and whenever that power is exercised in place of the old notification, it is logical and reasonable to infer that the old notification no more holds the field. If this conclusion is not reached, the result would be riddled with varying complexities. 11. None of the provisions of section 66, 67 or 68 permit a process of levy by revival of the old taxes under old notifications properly abolished as a method or means enabling the Municipal Council to collect the same from persons. The Municipal Council can only levy and collect taxes strictly following the procedure provided by these three sections. Any other mode is clearly impermissible. If there is no notification as contemplated by these provisions, there cannot be any levy. It is only if the power is exercised under section 69 then the Committee is made competent to suspend or provide for exemptions from taxes in the manner indicated in that section. Any other mode is clearly impermissible. If there is no notification as contemplated by these provisions, there cannot be any levy. It is only if the power is exercised under section 69 then the Committee is made competent to suspend or provide for exemptions from taxes in the manner indicated in that section. Power to suspend or exempt can operate on live notifications and cannot be equated or resorted to have revival of the dead. 12. The matter can be looked at from another angle so as to gather the intention attendant upon the impugned notification itself. The notification in clear terms used a phraseology by saying; "in super-session of all previous notifications regarding the imposition of terminal tax" the present notification was being made. The crucial word appears to be super-session". Though it is not necessary in the scheme of taxes to consider the intention but the mere effect and its incidents, it may be pointed out that the language employed is shouting and leaves not even a trace of doubt. The word "supersede” would mean in common dictionary parlance "to take the place of to make useless; to come or to be in the room of; to replace, to displace, to render unnecessary". Therefore, whenever the process of supersession is contemplated, it is really a process of substitution. It does away with the old and substitutes the new. In effect it is a composite process. 13. The word "supersede" has been legally understood in the same manner and a useful reference be made to Corpus Juris Secondum where this word has been considered with reference to several decisions of the American Courts. The word "supersede" in those Courts is understood to mean to make wide, to make useless, to make inefficacious, either by superior power or by coming in the place of. It has also the shed to mean "to set aside; to annul; to repeal; to overrule; to obliterate". The word has also been understood to mean "to replace" or "to take the place of". It is, therefore, clear that whenever there is a recourse either in a legislative or in a delegated field of this well-known doctrine of superseding the earlier laws or notifications or rules, nothing is left of the old. The word has also been understood to mean "to replace" or "to take the place of". It is, therefore, clear that whenever there is a recourse either in a legislative or in a delegated field of this well-known doctrine of superseding the earlier laws or notifications or rules, nothing is left of the old. Logically therefore if the thing which is substituted does not survive, it cannot by any juridical principle have the effect to revive which was expressly replaced. 14. A reference was made to the Full Bench decision of this Court in Central Provinces Manganese Ore Co. Ltd, Nagpur v. State of Maharashtra2. That case is of no assistance and the matter really appears to be concluded as far as the terminal taxes are concerned by the decision of the Supreme Court alluded to in the very body of that judgment in paragraph 22, in Municipal Council, Achalpur City v. Nandkishore3 which dealt ·with such similar notification. There it has been observed: "Again, the earlier notifications having been expressly superseded the right to levy terminal tax under the notifications superseded could not be revived, merely because the notification dated May 11, 1962, was in so far as it sanctions imposition of terminal tax declared invalid". The effect of this observation clearly is that such superseding notifications if ultimately found to be invalid or void would not as a result revive the earlier notifications and as such no tax could be collected under the old notifications which were no more in existence. That is really enough to negative the contentions of the learned counsel appearing for the Municipal Council. 15. The Full Bench decision of this Court was really dealing with the problem that arose under the provisions of the Sales Tax Act, 1947. By Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1949, clause (g) of section 2 was amended. Section 2 of the Amending Act substituted an Explanation and the question arose what was the process resorted to by this Amending Act and its effect. This substituted Explanation was held to be ultra vires by the Nagpur High Court in Shriram Gulabdas v. Board of Revenue4. In another case the Supreme Court upheld the decision relating to the invalidity of the substituted Explanation on the ground mainly of being violative of Article 286(1)(a) and other provisions of the Constitution [ (1954)5 S.T.C. 115 ]. This substituted Explanation was held to be ultra vires by the Nagpur High Court in Shriram Gulabdas v. Board of Revenue4. In another case the Supreme Court upheld the decision relating to the invalidity of the substituted Explanation on the ground mainly of being violative of Article 286(1)(a) and other provisions of the Constitution [ (1954)5 S.T.C. 115 ]. The Full Bench considered the effect of this declaration upon the Explanation which was introduced by section 2 of the Amending Act, 1949 and after considering the history with respect to this Explanation which was declared invalid, the Full Bench recorded that "the present case is distinguishable upon the facts from the two cases which were before the Supreme Court in Firm Mehtab Majid and Co. v. State of Madras5 and B. N. Tewari v. Union of India6". That is how the Full Bench answered the reference by pointing out that old Explanation (II) continued to operate after the new Explanation (II) was held unconstitutional. 16. In the present controversy, however, the matter is clearly governed by the decisions of the Supreme Court, one being Municipal Council, Achalpur City v. Nandkishore referred to supra and the other being Firm A. T. B. Mehtab Majid and Co. v. State of Madras and another. Both of these are high authorities for the principle as to the effect of the process of supersession by which the old legislative imposition is wiped out and the new one is declared invalid. In Firm A. T. B. Mehtab Majids case the Supreme Court was dealing with a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, by the dealers in hides and skins in the State of Madras. Rule 16 of the Madras General Sales Tax Rules was challenged being violative of Article 304-A of the Constitution. The Court found that the said rule discriminated against the import of hides or skin which had been purchased or tanned outside and was thus unconstitutional. It was contended before the Supreme Court that if the impugned rule be held to be invalid, old rule 16 gets revived and the tax assessed on the petitioner would still be valid. The Court repelled that submission by observing as under :- "It has been urged for the respondent that the impugned rule be held to be invalid, old rule 16 gets revived and that the tax assessed on the petitioner would be good. The Court repelled that submission by observing as under :- "It has been urged for the respondent that the impugned rule be held to be invalid, old rule 16 gets revived and that the tax assessed on the petitioner would be good. We do not agree. Once the old rule has been substituted by the new rule, it ceases to exist and it does not automatically get revived when the new rule is held to be invalid." (Emphasis provided.) Following this decision, Municipal Council, Achalpur Citys case was decided by the Supreme Court and that too when the Municipal Council was claiming certain rights under the old notifications relating to terminal taxes. 17. These are ample authorities to negative the contentions raised on behalf of the present Municipal Council. Once 1959 Notification was found to be invalid for Municipal Council was incompetent to levy and collect terminal tax, there was no other notification holding the field or authorising the imposition of any such tax. The claim of the Municipal Council, therefore, under the old notification which was no more in force cannot be upheld. 18. In the sum, the suits were rightly decreed and there is no merit in any of these matters. The revision applications as well as the First Appeal would, therefore, stand dismissed with costs. Revision applications and Appeal dismissed.