JUDGMENT Madan Mohan Prasad, J. This is an application directed against an order passed under section 117 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, hereinafter referred to as 'the Code'. 2. It appears that Some information was lodged with the pq1ice as a result where of, it is said, there was a report made by the Police, on the basis of which the Sub-divisional Magistrate of Monghyr drew up a proceeding under section 107 of the Code against the petitioners and the opposite party on the 6th of October, 1971. They were asked to show cause as to why they should not be ordered to execute bonds of Rs. 1,000/- each with two sureties each of the like amount for keeping the peace for a period of one year. They were asked to show cause on the next date which was fixed as the 5th of November 1971. It appears that five of these petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and they were ordered to execute bail bonds which they did. One more petitioner appeared thereafter and so did the remaining petitioner after certain processes had been taken against them. It appears, however, that in connection with the proceeding no important steps were taken, the first party being absent on almost every date fixed. The case was then transferred to another Magistrate by an order dated the 7th of January, 1972. After several dates, the first party-opposite party here filed an application on the 16th March, 1972, for action against the petitioners under section 117 (3) of the Code. The Magistrate directed a report from the police to be called for. Again, nothing important was done on the next various dates fixed in the case. Meanwhile, the case was again transferred to another Magistrate on the 13th of May, 1972. Before this Magistrate again, similar petition was filed by the opposite party for action under section 117 (3) of the Code on the 30th May, 1972. Again, this Magistrate asked for a police report which was received on the 10th of June, 1972. By an order dated the 14th June, 1972, the Magistrate asked the petitioners to show cause as to why they should not be bound down for the interim period. Then, show cause petition was filed by the petitioners on the 8th of July, 1972, the date fixed therefore. By an order dated the 14th June, 1972, the Magistrate asked the petitioners to show cause as to why they should not be bound down for the interim period. Then, show cause petition was filed by the petitioners on the 8th of July, 1972, the date fixed therefore. On that very date, the learned Magistrate passed the order against which the petitioners have come up to this Court. 3. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has raised the point that in this case the stage had not reached when the learned Magistrate could pass an order under section 117(3) of the Code, because the learned Magistrate had not proceeded to examine the truth of the accusations made against the petitioners as envisaged under section 117 (1) of the Code. He has relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Madhu Limaye and another V. Ved Murti and others A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2481. The contention of learned Counsel must be upheld. 4. It is quite obvious from a reading of the various orders passed by the learned Magistrate that after he came to be in seisin of the case, he had taken no steps whatsoever for satisfying himself that prima facie accusations made against the petitioners were true and that the circumstances of the case were such as to make it necessary to pass an order under section 117(3) of the Code. It appears that the petitioners had not even filed their petition showing cause against the initial order passed against them under section 107 of the Code. The learned Magistrate had not heard the First party or any of his witnesses in support of the allegations against the petitioners. Learned Counsel for the opposite party has pointed out in this connection that on one date fixed in the case before the earlier Magistrate, namely, 30th March, 1972, haziri for two witnesses had been filed on their behalf. The ,mere filing of the haziri before the Magistrate who was in seisin of the case earlier has no importance so far as the question, namely, whether the Magistrate proceeded to enquire into, the truth of the allegation, is concerned. There is, thus, no escape from the conclusion that the Magistrate had not proceeded to enquire into the truth of the accusations made against the petitioners. 5. There is, thus, no escape from the conclusion that the Magistrate had not proceeded to enquire into the truth of the accusations made against the petitioners. 5. The question which arises next is as to whether at this stage it was within the jurisdiction of the learned Magistrate to pass the order under section 117(3) of the Code. The point has been set at rest by the decision of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case. Their Lordships have clearly laid down as follows :- “The Magistrate could only ask for an interim bond if he could not complete the enquiry and ‘during the completion of the enquiry’ postulates a commencement of the enquiry, which means commencing of a trial according to the summons procedure. It was not given to the Magistrate to postpone the case and hear nobody and yet ask the petitioners to furnish a bond for good conduct.” There can be the least doubt that the Supreme Court has clearly laid down the law in this connection by declaring that the powers under section 117(3) of the Code cannot be exercised without the Magistrate proceeding to enquire into the truth of the accusation and finding a prima facie case after starting the enquiry under section 117 (1) of the Code. Learned Counsel for the opposite party has contended that as soon as the persons complained against appeared before the Magistrate, the enquiry must be deemed to have commenced and it was, open to the Magistrate, and within his jurisdiction, to pass an order under section 117 (3) of the Code without doing anything more by way of enquiring into the truth of the accusations. In view of the Supreme Court decision, I cannot, accept this contention. 6. It has also been pointed out by learned Counsel for the opposite party that in this case a police report had been called for in connection with the petition for taking action under section 117 (3) of the Code and that the petitioners had shown cause against the order under section 117 (3) of the Code proposed to be passed against them and this should be deemed to constitute the necessary enquiry envisaged under section 117 of the Code. I am unable to accept this contention. I am unable to accept this contention. What section 117 (1) of the Code envisages is not an enquiry in respect of the matter of ad-interim order under sub-section (3) of that section, but it relates to the enquiry in respect of the accusations made against the persons complained against. The scheme of the Code, quite clearly, shows that at the initial stage a Magistrate acts on ex parte information and satisfies himself on that basis for the purpose of drawing up a proceeding under section 107 of the Code. The stage of proof of the accusations arises at a subsequent stage after the stage envisaged in section 112 or section 114 of the Code is over. When he embarks upon an enquiry, the enquiry has necessarily to be directed towards the accusations made which have formed the basis of the initial proceeding. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have also clearly observed that it is not the purpose of sub-section (3) of section 117 to lay down the holding of 'an enquiry within an enquiry. The Magistrate is, therefore, not required to hold a separate enquiry with regard to the matter of an order under section 117 (3) of the Code. The police report and the show cause petition in the present case were both only relating to the question of an order under section 117 (3) being passed. In other words, both related to the narrower circle of enquiry. They cannot be said to be a part of the enquiry envisaged under section 117 (1) of the Code, and, so long as the Magistrate did not proceed to enquire into the truth of the allegations in accordance with section 117 (l) of the Code, he had no jurisdiction to pass the order under sub-section (3) of that section. 7. In the result, I find that the order passed by the learned Magistrate in the present case under section 117 (3) of the Code is premature and without jurisdiction. It is, accordingly set aside. Application allowed.