Prem Lata Agarwala v. Kamla Kant — 1973 DIGILAW 68 (ALL)

ORDER D.S. Mathur, A.C.J. 1. The Taxing officer has, u/s 5 of the Court Fees Act, referred the following question, which has come Up for hearing before me as Taxing Judge: Whether the court-fee payable in appeal against the judgment and decree of the Special Judge on an application u/s 4 of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act in respect of unsecured debt, is to be on the amount of the decree passed by the Special Judge or on the amount reduceable under the provisions of Section 9 read with Schedule II of the U.P. Zamindars Debt Reduction Act, 1952? 2. The material facts of the case are that the predecessor-in-interest of the present Appellant, Sm. Trent Lata Agarwal (sic) bad along with others made an apply Section 4 of the U.P. Encumbrance (sic) 1934 U.P. Act No. XXV of the (sic) Special Judge passed a decree (sic) 31, 1968 and transmitted fop execution. u/s (sic) that the debts in question (sic) debts, the Special Judge (sic) reduce the amount of the (sic) made suggestions that this may (sic) by the Collector himself during the liquidation proceedings. The material part of the observations is as below: A question was raised before the court that the debts should be reduced in accordance with the provisions of the U.P. Zamindars Debt Redaction Act. But to my mind all the debts being unsecured no reduction can be made at this stage by this Court.... Hence the provisions of Section 9 of the U.P. Zamindars' Debt Reduction Act, are attracted to this case. The Collector will, therefore, reduce the amount of the debts aforesaid in accordance with the formula given in Schedule II of the U.P. Zamindars Debt Reduction Act. The amount of future interest at the aforesaid rate of 3% would be calculated on the amounts if so reduced. 3. The Special Judge has wrongly understood the meaning of Section 9 of the U.P. Zamindaras' Debt Reduction Act. Therein, the Collector does not reduce the amount of the decree, but records satisfaction in accordance with the formula given in Schedule II. Therefore, there was no necessity to give the additional direction that-- The Collector will; therefore, reduce the amount of the debts aforesaid in accordance with' the formula given in Schedule II of the U.P. Zamindars' Debt Reduction Act. Therefore, there was no necessity to give the additional direction that-- The Collector will; therefore, reduce the amount of the debts aforesaid in accordance with' the formula given in Schedule II of the U.P. Zamindars' Debt Reduction Act. The amount of future interest at the aforesaid rate of 3% would be calculated on the amounts if so reduced. 4. Smt. Prem Lata Agarwala alone preferred an appeal as F.A.F.O., but it has since been converted into a regular appeal. While ordering conversion of the First Appeal From Order into a regular appeal, a Division Bench of this Court directed that the question of valuation shall thereafter be considered by the Tasting Officer. 5. As the decree under appeal is a money decree, ad-valorem court-fee is payable u/s 7(i) of the Court Fees Act. Hence the dispute, in substance, relates to the valuation (sic) appeal. Once the (sic) of the appeal is she has to be (sic) amount of (sic). 6. (sic) for the (sic) points: firstly, (sic) payable only on (sic) could be (sic) amount which of (sic) and had to be (sic) satisfied, on the basis of the stained in Schedule II of the U.P. zamindars' Debt Reduction Act, was (sic) be considered while determining the valuation of the appeal; and secondly, that the valuation being in dispute the reference u/s 5 was incompetent and the Taxing Judge has no jurisdiction to express an opinion on the question of valuation. 7. Sections 5 and 12 of the Court Fees Act are material on the latter question concerning the competence of the present reference u/s 5. They run as below: 5. When any difference arises between the officer whose duty it is to see that any fee is paid under this chapter and any suiter or attorney, as to the necessity of paying of fee or the amount thereof, the question shall, when the difference arises in any of the said High Courts be referred to the taxing officer, whose decision thereon shall be final, except when the question is, in his opinion, one of general importance, in which case he shall refer it to the final decision of the Chief Justice of such High Court, or of such Judge of the High Court as the Chief Justice shall appoint either generally or specially in this behalf.... 12. 12. (i) Every question relating to valuation for the purpose of determining the amount of any fee chargeable under this Chapter on a plaint or memorandum of appeal shall be decided by the Court in which such plaint or memorandum, as the case may be, is filed and such decision shall be final as between the parties to the suit. 8. It is because the court fee is dependent upon valuation and in substance, the valuation of the appeal is in dispute, it is contended that Section 12 and not Section 5, is attracted and therefore the valuation of the appeal was to be determined by the Bench hearing the appeal and not by the Taxing Judge u/s 5 of the Court Fees Act. 9. It shall be found that Section 5 of the Court Fees Act is in Ch. II bearing the heading "Fees in the High Courts and in the Courts of Small Causes at the Presidency Towns", while Section 12 is in Ch. III bearing the heading "Fees in other Courts and in public offices". Considering that certain provisions contained in Ch. III are also applicable to the Chartered High Courts, what can be laid down is that the provisions of Ch. II are applicable exclusively to the Chartered High Courts and to the Presidency Courts of Small Causes, while the provisions of Ch. III are ordinarily applicable to other Courts though where the intention of the legislature is to the contrary some of those provisions shall also apply to the Chartered High Courts. The provisions of Sections 5 and 12 of the Court Fees Act must, therefore, be considered in this light. 10. Section 5 of the Court Fees Act refers to the existence of difference as to the court fee payable. It being a larger question shall include valuation and the section or Article under which court fee is payable. When in the case of Chartered High Courts exclusive jurisdiction to determine the amount of court fee payable is vested in the Taxing Judge, he shall possess all the powers failing which the main question shall remain undecided. In other words, where ad-valorem court-fee is payable, he shall be competent to determine the valuation of the appeal for purposes of court-fee. 11. The difference in the wording of Sections 5 and 12 of the Court Fees Act was noticed in Nemi Chand and Another Vs. In other words, where ad-valorem court-fee is payable, he shall be competent to determine the valuation of the appeal for purposes of court-fee. 11. The difference in the wording of Sections 5 and 12 of the Court Fees Act was noticed in Nemi Chand and Another Vs. The Edward Mills Co. Ltd. and Another, AIR 1953 SC 28 and the material observations are as below: The difference in the phraseology employed in Sections 5 and 12, Court-Fees Act, indicates that the scope of Section 12 is narrower than that of Section 5. Section 5 which declares decisions on questions of court fee whenever they arise in the chartered High Courts as final makes a decision as to the necessity of paying a fee or the amount thereof final. Whereas Sec, 12 make a decision on every question relating to valuation for the purpose of determining the amount of any fee payable u/Ch. 3 on a plaint or memorandum of appeal final.... When the two sections in the same Act relating to the same subject-matter hive been drafted in different language, it is not unreasonable to infer that they were enacted with a different intention and that in one case the intention was to give finality to all decisions of the taking officer or the taxing judge, as the case may be, while in the other case, it was only intended to give finality to question of fact that are decided by a Court but not to questions of Jaw. Whether a case falls under one particular, section of this Act or another is a pure question of lay and does not directly determine the valuation of the suit for purposes of court-fee. 12. These observations make it clear that the decision, of the Taxing Officer or of the Taxing Judge is final not only on, questions of fact but also on questions of law and the finality attaches not only to the fee payable but lo the valuation for purposes of court-fee as determined by him. In other words, Section 5 will apply irrespective of whether the dispute chiefly pertains to the valuation of the appeal or pertains to both valuation and the rate or merely relates to rate at which court-fee is chargeable. 13. The opinion can be expressed in a different manned also, viz. In other words, Section 5 will apply irrespective of whether the dispute chiefly pertains to the valuation of the appeal or pertains to both valuation and the rate or merely relates to rate at which court-fee is chargeable. 13. The opinion can be expressed in a different manned also, viz. that whenever there exists a dispute as to court-fee payable on any document filed before the High Court, the provisions of Section 5 are attracted and all the questions connected with the court-fee payable fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Taxing Officer and in the case of reference, of the Taxing Judge while such disputes with reference to documents filed before the subordinate courts are to be heard and decided by the Bench hearing the case. The dispute in the instant case, relates to the memorandum of appeal preferred before the High Court and therefore, the amount of fee payable and also the valuation of the appeal can be determined only by the Taxing Officer or the Taxing Judge. 14. None of the decisions of the Allahabad High Court brought to my notice are material on the question raised in this reference. There can be no dispute in that, as laid down in Sri Krishna Chandra v. Mahabir Prasad (1933) 2 AWR 186 a fiscal enactment must be construed strictly and in favour of the subject. But this rule of interpretation is applicable only when two views at possible and not where from the enactment no inference other than one as to the court fee, chargeable is possible. 15. Bishan Swarup v. Musa Mal 1935 AWR 896 supports the view expressed above though it must be noted that such an observation was made by one Judge only. 16. In Chunni Lal and Others Vs. L. Gurdial Prasad and Others, AIR 1957 All 63 the applicability of Section 5 and Section 12 was not considered. That was a case where the court-fee payable on a document filed before the subordinate court--a document which was not to be used or relied upon in appeal before the High Court--was in question, ft was for this reason that the provisions of Section 5 of the Court Fees Act were not at all referred to. That was a case where the court-fee payable on a document filed before the subordinate court--a document which was not to be used or relied upon in appeal before the High Court--was in question, ft was for this reason that the provisions of Section 5 of the Court Fees Act were not at all referred to. Paragraph 10 of the report merely reproduces and clarifies the scope of Section 12 and therefore, these remarks cannot be utilized in understanding the meaning of Section 5 of the Court Fees Act. 17. When the wording of Section 5 is general and can cover disputes on valuation of the appeal for purposes of Court fee, Section 12 will not apply to Chartered High Courts and all disputes, concerning the court-fee payable shall be determined under the provisions of Section 5 by the Taxing Officer and in, case of reference, by the Taxing Judge. The Taxing judge, therefore, has the jurisdiction to finally determine the valuation and also the amount of fee payable on the memorandum of appeal. 18. It was in the special circumstances of the present case that the Taxing Officer did not refer the question of court-fee generally but wanted the opinion of the Taxing Judge on the point in issue, viz., how was the valuation of the appeal to be determined. The provisions of Section 5, already quoted above, contemplate a reference of the dispute on court-fee and therefore to strictly conform with these provisions, the Taxing Officer should invariably refer the question of court-fee payable, though in the referring order, he can indicate points which, in his opinion, are in issue and require decision of the Taxing Judge. In that manner the Taxing Judge shall know which legal questions are in issue and the reference shall, at the same time, be in a strict legal form. 19. The Court hearing a reference has the power to suitably modify the question or the point referred to it. In exercise of this power the reference is deemed to be for determination of court-fee payable and not merely for determination of valuation. It is, therefore, a valid reference u/s 5 of the Court Fees Act. 20. As already indicated above, the material question for determination is what is the proper valuation of the appeal for purposes of court-fee? In exercise of this power the reference is deemed to be for determination of court-fee payable and not merely for determination of valuation. It is, therefore, a valid reference u/s 5 of the Court Fees Act. 20. As already indicated above, the material question for determination is what is the proper valuation of the appeal for purposes of court-fee? An opinion shall have to be expressed on this point on a consideration of the provisions of the U.P. Zamindars' Debt Reduction Act and of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act. 21. It shall be noticed that Sections 3 and 4 of the U.P. Zamindars' Debt Reduction Act apply to secured debts or to a decree relating to a secured debt. Thereunder a decree for a reduced amount is passed or the amount of decree is reduced. No such reduction can be in the case of an unsecured debt, nor can the amount of a decree relating to an unsecured debt be reduced. u/s 8 a decree relating to a secured debt in respect of a mortgaged estate can be executed only to the extent of 3/4th the amount of the compensation or rehabilitation grant payable to the judgment-debtor. Such a restriction does not apply to decree relating to unsecured loan though u/Ch. V of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act the Collector has to execute the decree first of all by attachment and sale of the compensation and rehabilitation grant bonds and thereafter against other properties of the judgment-debtor. 22. Though there, exists no provision for the reduction of the amount of decree relating to an Unsecured debt, Section 9 of the U.P. Zamindars Debt Reduction Act provides that once a decree not relating to a secured debt is executed by attachment and sale of the bonds granted to the judgment-debtor on account of compensation of rehabilitation grant, the Court executing the decree shall enter satisfaction in accordance with the formula given in Schedule II. Considering that u/Ch. V of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act the Collector has First to proceed by attachment and sale of the remaining compensation and rehabilitation grant bonds, the satisfaction of the decree relating to an unsecured debt shall, in each and every case, be in accordance with Section 9, even though the judgment-debtor may be possessed of other properties and the decree-holder wishes to execute the decree against such properties only. 23. 23. Reference may now be made to the provisions of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act. A decree' passed u/s 14(7) is transmitted to the Collector u/s 19 for execution in accordance with the provisions of Ch. V thereof. The Special Judge has, at the same time, to communicate other information, as detailed in Section 19, to the Collector. In the case of unsecured debt he has to communicate to the Collector the order in which he has ranked the debts for priority and the nature and extent of property mentioned in the notice u/s 11 which is liable to attachment and sale in satisfaction of the debts of the Applicant. 24. U/Ch. V the, Collector first gives an opportunity to the Applicant to pay the debts as decreed by the Special Judge and on his failure to do so action as provided in Section 23-A onwards is taken. u/s 23-A the Collector shall require the Compensation Officer or the Rehabilitation Grants Officer to place at his disposal the amount of compensation money and rehabilitation grant payable to the landlord in respect of the proprietary rights in land reported to be liable to attachment or sale u/s 19(2). Sub-section (1) of Section 23-A applies to secured debt while Sub-section (2) to other debts. Under Sub-section (2) the balance of compensation or rehabilitation grant received by the Collector in pursuance of the requisition u/s 23-A has to be utilised in discharging the other debts, in the order of priority indicated by the Special Judge. Thereafter action can be taken u/s 24 against other properties of the judgment-debtor. The effect of Section 23-B(2), therefore, is that in respect of a decree foil unsecured debt there shall always be satisfaction, usually partial of the decree for a larger amount in accordance with Schedule II of the U.P. Zamindars' Debt Reduction Act, but it is not known at the time of the passing of the decree to what extent it shall eventually stand satisfied. Such satisfaction can be, recorded only after the sale of the bonds--See Bhawani Shanker v. Govind Dass, 1962 AWR 18. 25. Section 14(7) of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Apt makes it clear that a decree, passed in respect of the claim of a creditor is a simple money decree, which Under Sub-section (B) is deemed, to be a decree of a court of competent jurisdiction. 25. Section 14(7) of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Apt makes it clear that a decree, passed in respect of the claim of a creditor is a simple money decree, which Under Sub-section (B) is deemed, to be a decree of a court of competent jurisdiction. Section 7(i) of the Court Fees Act applies to suits for money and court-fee payable is ad-valorem Recording to the amount claimed Consequently, court-fee on memorandum of appeal challenging a decree for money shall also be governed by this clause, with the difference that for purposes of appeal the amount claimed shall be the amount which is under challenge in, the appeal. See Kr. Jagdish Pratap Bahadur Singh v. Raj Kumar Udai Pratap Bahadur Singh 1938 AWR 22 FB. Similarly where the claim was decreed against some of the Defendants and the plain jiff preferred an appeal to obtain a joint decree against the other Defendants also, ad-valorem court-fee on the amount claimed was held to be payable on the appeal. In Ramasami v. Subbusami ILR 13 Mad 508, Anna Narayan Pavgi v. Madhyama Sthititila Paraspara Sahakari Mandali ILR 46 Bom 840 and Amir Chand v. Kanhaya Ram (1912) 16 Indian Cases 777 the relief sought for was not regarded as for declaration, but for payment of money claimed by the Plaintiff. Allah Newaz Sheikh Vs. Mt. Raqiya Bibi and Others, AIR 1949 All 270 is a case where the success off the appeal depended upon whether the Appellant or the daughters were the heirs of the deceased creditor. In this case also the real question for decision was regarded to be the claim for the amount due to the deceased, though it was dependent upon who was the heir. 26. It is thus the settled law that in money suits where there is a claim for a specified amount and in appeals arising therefrom ad-valorem court-fee is payable as prescribed in Section 7(i) of the Court Fees Act even though the decision in the case solely depends, upon a question which could be raised in a declaratory suit. Even if the suit could be regarded as one for declaration, it would be declaration with consequential relief namely the recovery of the amount I claimed. It is true that Section 7(iv) permits the party to give his own valuation, but he cannot evade payment of due court-fee. Even if the suit could be regarded as one for declaration, it would be declaration with consequential relief namely the recovery of the amount I claimed. It is true that Section 7(iv) permits the party to give his own valuation, but he cannot evade payment of due court-fee. Where can be no controversy as to the valuation, that is, the amount claimed, he must give that valuation. It is when that the valuation cannot be precisely calculated that he has the option to give his own valuation. See T.E.K. Muhammad Amiruddin v. T.E. Muhammad Ibrahim AIR 1957 Mad 667 . On this point in S.Rm.Ar.S.Sp. Sathappa Chettiar Vs. S.Rm.Ar.Rm. Ramanathan Chettiar, AIR 1958 SC 245 . their Lordships of the Supreme Court did no consider whether the Plaintiff had been given an absolute right or option to place any valuation whatever on his relief; but the underlying principle of Section 7(iv) was indicated as below: The theoretical basis of this provision appears to be that in cases in which the Plaintiff is given the option to value his claim, it is really difficult to value the claim with any precession or definiteness. The question of court-fee is always considered in the light of the allegations made in the plaint and this decision cannot be influenced either by the pleas in the written statement or by the Final decision of the suit on merits, but where the allegations of the plaint clearly give out the valuation of the relief, that must be held to be the valuation of the suit and a party cannot evade payment of court-fee by reducing the valuation where such valuation can be ascertained with precision. 27. This leads us to the consideration whether the above rule cap bf applied to a case where a joint money decree has been passed and the Defendant prefers an appeal on the ground that there should hot have been a joint decree but apportionment thereof. The learned Advocate for the Appellant placed reliance upon the above Supreme Court decision in S. Rm. Ar. S. Sp. Sathappa Chettiar v. S. Rm. Ar. Rm. Ramanathan Chettiar (Supra). That was a suit for the partition of the joint family assets and for accounts. Prior to the partition a party has an undivided share in the joint family property and by making a claim for partition he asks the. Ar. S. Sp. Sathappa Chettiar v. S. Rm. Ar. Rm. Ramanathan Chettiar (Supra). That was a suit for the partition of the joint family assets and for accounts. Prior to the partition a party has an undivided share in the joint family property and by making a claim for partition he asks the. Court to give him certain specified properties separately and absolutely on his own account for his share in lieu of his undivided share in the whole property. Such conversion of the Plaintiff's alleged undivided share in the joint family property into his separate share was held not capable of valuation in terms of rupees with any precession or definiteness and for that reason valuation of the claim made by the Plaintiff for payment of court-fee was accepted. The same cannot be said in respect, of a joint decree. Where a decree is passed against the Defendants jointly and severally, it means that the decree-holder can recover the total decretal amount from one party. He can seek execution against one judgment-debtor only or he may take steps for recovery against all. In so far as the judgment-debtors are concerned, each judgment-debtor is liable for payment of the total decretal amount. Where he pleads that he is liable to pay a part of that amount and not the whole in other words, there should not be a joint decree, but a decree specifying the amounts payable by the various Defendants, the amount being challenged or the amount of the claim in appeal in so far as he is concerned, is the difference between the total claim and the claim which, according to him, could be decreed against him. Even though the request is for apportionment of the claim, what he desires is a definite money decree against him, not for the total amount. This difference between the joint liability and the exclusive liability can easily be ascertained in terms of rupees. There is no vagueness about it and consequently, it does not stand in the same category as conversion of an undivided share in a joint Hindu family into exclusive right to hold certain specified properties separately and absolutely on his own account. 28. There is no vagueness about it and consequently, it does not stand in the same category as conversion of an undivided share in a joint Hindu family into exclusive right to hold certain specified properties separately and absolutely on his own account. 28. When the legislature has made a clear provision in respect of money suits, where there is a claim for money, court-fee shall be payable on the basis of the claim and not what is being pleaded. The point determining the court-fee is the amount of the claim and not what is being pleaded by the Appellant by way of defence. In other words, in so far as the appeal is concerned it is the main relief sought for by the Appellant (i.e. money decree) which shall determine the court-fee payable and not the questions in issue, decisions whereof would determine what decree could be passed in the case. 29. It is only when a fiscal enactment is capable of more than one interpretation that the one which is beneficial to the subject is adopted. It means that where there exists a provision in clear words, no departure can be made on the supposed intention of the legislature, nor on grounds of equity--See The Gape Brandy Syndicate v. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue (2921) 12 Tax Cases 358, R.A. Goodsir and Co., Madras v. Commissioner of Excess Profits Tax, Madras (1948) XVI ITR 367 and Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Veeriah Reddiar, (1969) 73 ITR 162 . 30. Our attention was also invited to the case of M.A. Jabbar v. State of Andhra Pradesh, as summarized at page 1135 column 2, in the Yearly Digest, 1969 of Indian and Select English Cases published by M.L.J. Office. The observation relied upon is as below: The relief sought by the Plaintiff has to be valued on the basis of the advantage he would gain or the injury or loss he would avoid. One cannot know at the time of the passing of the decree to what extent the decree may eventually stand satisfied without any additional payment having been made. Consequently, to ascertain the injury or loss which the Appellant would suffer under the decree, one must look into the conditions as in existence on the date of decree: the amount entered in the decree must, therefore, determine the injury or loss that party wishes to avoid. 31. Consequently, to ascertain the injury or loss which the Appellant would suffer under the decree, one must look into the conditions as in existence on the date of decree: the amount entered in the decree must, therefore, determine the injury or loss that party wishes to avoid. 31. A joint money decree has been passed against the Appellant and others and being a money decree it must be governed by Section 7(i) of the Court Fees Act and the valuation of the claim can, as already indicated above, be easily determined. In the circumstances, ad-valorem court-fee is payable even though the party merely wishes to avoid a joint decree and wants a decree to be passed against him for a lesser amount after apportionment of debts. 32. It is further contended that the above view that ad-valorem court-fee is payable would be repugnant to the object of the U.P. Zamindars' Debt Reduction Act, as the ex-Zamindar shall be compelled to pay higher court-fee and there shall be no scaling down of his debts. Question of court-fee payable in appeal is a matter distinct from the scaling down of the debts. The purpose of the U.P. Zamindars' Debt Reduction Act shall stand fulfilled when there is discharge of the decree to a larger extent on the decree being executed against the balance of the compensation and rehabilitation grant. This shall be done even if the joint decree is maintained. When the purpose of imposition of court-fee is distinct and cannot frustrate the effect of the U.P. Zamindars' Debt Reduction Act, a lenient view cannot be taken simply because the debtor will have to pay a larger court-fee to secure apportionment of the joint debt. In this connection it may also be observed that an important feature of the Court Fees Act is that the same rule applies to all the parties, irrespective of whether he is the Plaintiff or Defendant, Appellant or Respondent. Where a joint decree is not passed or no decree is passed against the Defendant, the Plaintiff has to pay ad-valorem court-fee and when the Defendant geeks a similar remedy, he must pay court-fee on the same lines. 33. On 17-5-1971 tm application was moved to permit the reduction of the valuation of the appeal from Rs. 1,51,000/- to Rs. 5,000/-. 33. On 17-5-1971 tm application was moved to permit the reduction of the valuation of the appeal from Rs. 1,51,000/- to Rs. 5,000/-. This matter came up before a Bunch of this Court who expressed the opinion that the Appellant was entitled to put his own valuation on the appeal relating to the plea of apportionment. As Ground No. 3 as to the liability the Appellant to the promotes was also being pressed, it was ordered that the matter shall be listed on Monday next to enable the Appellant to value tie appeal in respect of this ground. It was contended that when a Bench of this Court had accepted the contention in respect of the valuation relating to the plea of apportionment, court-fee must be recovered on the basis of that order, though additional court-fee could be recovered in respect of Ground No. 3. The order was not passed by the Bench as a Taxing Judge. It is a settled law that valuation in money suits is of based on the points pleaded but depend upon the amount claimed. In support of the claim, whether in the suit or in appeal many grounds can be raised and court-fee payable shall depend upon the amount claimed and not on the pleas. One can raise pleas to support or to challenge a claim, but no separate court-fee is payable for each ground so raised. In these circumstances, Court's order dated 26-7-1971 cannot be treated as a final order on the court-fee payable even though observations were made on one of the pleas raised by the Appellant. The question of court-fee is by virtue of Section 5 of the Court Fees Act within the jurisdiction of the Taxing Judge and he has to pass an order in accordance with the law, that is in money suits on the basis of the amount claimed Various pleas raised can be taken into consideration to determine the amount claimed, but each point cannot determine the court-fee payable on the plaint. 34. There can be no dispute in that the present case falls in the category of suits for money and any relief sought for must be interpreted keeping this aspect in mind. 34. There can be no dispute in that the present case falls in the category of suits for money and any relief sought for must be interpreted keeping this aspect in mind. The relief sought for in the memorandum of appeal is "to allow the appeal, modify the decree of the court below and apportion the liability of the Applicant." A money decree can; be modified in so far as a judgment-debtor is concerned by reduction of its amount. In case of a joint decree, the amount can be recovered from any of the judgment-debtors, but if there is decree for specified amounts against the various judgment-debtors, it is the amount specified in the decree which can be recovered from a particular judgment-debtor. Consequently, when there is a modification of a joint decree, the liability of a judgment-debtor is reduced. It is this reduction of the decree which will determine the amount of the claim on which ad-valorem court fee shall be payable. The liability of the various judgment-debtors can be determined by various modes, one of which is by apportionment. The relief sought for therefore, is for reduction of the amount of decree in so far as the Appellant is concerned and it is this redaction sought for which will determine the valuation of the appeal for purposes of court-fee. 35. In the end, it is contended that the decree under appeal is; fin substance, for a reduced amount and as the decree has not been challenged by any other party, it should be deemed to be for the reduced amount and court-fee be chargeable only on such amount and not the total amount of the decree. The material part of the decree has already been reproduced in the earlier part of this order. The Special Judge had indicated that the Collector will reduce the amount of the debts in accordance with the formula given in Schedule II of the U.P. Zamindars' Debt Reduction Act. This is a mere observation and cannot be treated as a direction. What the Special Judge had done was to indicate what the provisions of Section 9 are. Thereunder the Collector has to record satisfaction of a large amount in accordance with Behalf. On account of the Special Judge using the word "reduce" in place of "satisfaction" it cannot be inferred that the Special Judge was giving additional direction to the Collector. What the Special Judge had done was to indicate what the provisions of Section 9 are. Thereunder the Collector has to record satisfaction of a large amount in accordance with Behalf. On account of the Special Judge using the word "reduce" in place of "satisfaction" it cannot be inferred that the Special Judge was giving additional direction to the Collector. The Special Judge, at the same time, directed that the amount of future interest would be calculated on the amounts, if so reduced. The words "if so reduced" make it clear that the observation made earlier had no binding effect in the sense that the Collector must reduce the amount of the decree. 36. It is optional for the Special Judge to allow future interest. In special circumstances, future interest can be disallowed. Consequently, it cannot be said that the direction in respect of future interest had the effect of reducing the amount decreed. 37. It does appear inequitable that a party challenging the decree must pay court-fee on the total amount decreed, even though by virtue of the provisions of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act, the whole of that amount cannot be recovered from him. Equity cannot override the provisions of law contained in Section 7(i) of the Court Fees Act which are, as already mentioned above, unambiguous and not capable of more than one interpretation. 38. It is not necessary for the Taxing Judge to indicate the actual amount of court-fee payable. The Taxing Judge can lay down the law and calculations can be made by the Stamp Reporter. If there exists any controversy on the mode of calculation, that question can be decided by the Taxing Officer and if need be, the matter can be referred again to the Taxing Judge. 39. It is hereby ordered that the valuation of the appeal for purposes of court-fee shall be the difference between the amount which can, under the decree, be recovered from the Appellant, irrespective of whether the liability is joint or personal and the amount, which, according to him, can be so recovered from him and that ad-valorem court-fee u/s 7(i) of the Court Fees Act shall be chargeable on this valuation. The' Stamp Reporter shall now determine the amount of court-fee chargeable from the Appellant, but in order that the matter may be decided without much controversy one month is granted to the contesting parties to give their own calculations of the valuation and the court-fee chargeable on the memorandum of Appeal. Thereafter, the question of court-fee payable shall be decided in accordance with the law laid down above.