ORDER:- The tenant is the petitioner, and the revision petition is against the older of the Authorised Officer, holding that the tenant committed default in the payment of rent and that the respondents-landlords were entitled to resume the lands for personal cultivation. Regarding the finding of the Authorised Officer, that the tenant was in arrears, it was contended by Mr. T. V. Subramanian, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, that the arrears claimed were for the years 1966-67, 1967-68 and 1968-69, for which a decree was obtained, and for the year 1969-70. A decree for a sum of Rs. 1,320 was obtained by the landlords against the tenant towards arrears of rent for the years 1966-67 to 1968-69. Out of this sum a sum of Rs. 835 was paid, leaving a balance of Rs. 485. Under the Special Provisions Act (XVI of 1968) the tenant was enabled to pay the arrears upto April, 1968, which was Rs. 880 in four equal instalments, the instalments, being payable in April, 1969, April, 1970, April, 1971 and April, 1972. Towards these instalments the tenant had paid Rs. 835. Giving credit to the amounts already paid, there would be arrears of Rs. 285. But, as contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, as the Special Provisions Act enabled him to pay in four equal instalments, and the last two instalments not having become due on the date of the petition, he could not be held to have defaulted in the payment of the last two instalments. This contention will have to be accepted. Apart from this, regarding the rent for the year 1969-7C, there were disputes between the parties, which led the tenant to file a suit, O. S. No. 755 of 1969, praying for an injunction restraining the landlords from interfering with his possession. The tenant (plaintiff) succeeded in that suit, pending the suit, in response to an order made by the Court, the tenant deposited a sum of Rs. 400 in Court which was withdrawn by the landlords. There can be no doubt that this was with reference to the rent for the year .1969-70. Giving credit to this amount also, the tenant would not have been in arrears on the date when the petition was filed. Therefore, the view of the Authorised Officer that the tenant was in arrears of rent cannot be upheld. 2. There can be no doubt that this was with reference to the rent for the year .1969-70. Giving credit to this amount also, the tenant would not have been in arrears on the date when the petition was filed. Therefore, the view of the Authorised Officer that the tenant was in arrears of rent cannot be upheld. 2. The Authorised Officer also allowed the petition filed by the landlords for resumption with regard to half the extent of the lands purchased by them. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that under section 4-A (4) of the Cultivating Tenants Protection Act the landlords were not entitled to resume the lands for their own cultivation and that, therefore, the Authorised Officer ought to have dismissed the petition. Mr. T. V. Subramanian, the learned Counsel for petitioner submitted that under Act XIV of 1956 section 4-A Was introduced and that under section 4-A (4) a person, who on the date when the Amendment Act of 1956 came into force, owned lands exceeding 131/3 acres of wet land or had been assessed to any sales tax, profession tax or Income-tax under the laws relating to the levy of such taxes during 1954-1955 or 1955-56, would not be entitled to resume possession of land as owner from the tenant. Section 4-A (5) is also relied on as disqualifying any person who acquired land after the Act came into force from resuming possession of the land in the possession of the tenant. Section 4-A (5) runs as follows: "No person who is not entitled to resume possession under this section on the day the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection (Amendment) Act 1956, comes into force, shall be deemed to be so entitled by reason of any subsequent change in his circumstances." 3. On behalf of the respondent, it was contended that section 4-A (1) conferred a right on the landlord to resume possession of the land for personal cultivation. The definition of the word " landlord" in relation to a holding is a person entitled to evict the cultivating tenant from such holding. On behalf of the respondent, it was contended that section 4-A (1) conferred a right on the landlord to resume possession of the land for personal cultivation. The definition of the word " landlord" in relation to a holding is a person entitled to evict the cultivating tenant from such holding. Applying the definition to section 4-A , any person who is entitled to evict a cultivating tenant, whether on the date when the Amendment Act came into force or subsequently, would have the benefit of sub-section (1) of section 4-A. This right is subject to section 4-A (4) and (5); which may be said to be in the nature of provisos. Section 4-A (4), as already stated, disqualifies a person, who on the date when the Amendment Act came into force ,owned lands exceeding 13 1/3 acres of land or had been assessed to sales tax, profession tax or Income-tax etc., during the year 1954-1956. If a landlord is not so subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in section 4-A (4), he could avail himself of the benefit of section 4-A (1). So also a person, who was under a disqualification under section 4-A (4) by getting rid of the disqualification subsequently, could not be entitled to avail himself of the benefits of section 4-A (1). Giving the natural meaning to section 4-A (5), the sub-section contemplates resumption on a date after the Act came into force and a specific disqualification of the landlord, who was disqualified under section 4-A (4), but subsequently got rid of his disqualification, from applying for resumption of possession. Sub-sections (4) and (5) being in the nature of restrictions on the power of resumption granted under section 4-A (1), on a reading of sections 4-A (1), 4-A (4) and 4-A (5), it would appear that the intention of the Legislature was to enable landlords, whether it was before the Amendment Act or after it, who satisfied the definition of "landlord", to resume lands, unless such resumption was barred under sub-sections (4) and (5). Under section 4-A (4) the prohibition is against landlords, who on the date when the Amendment Act came into force, owned lands exceeding 13 1/3 acres or had been assessed to the taxes mentioned and for the period specified therein. Under section 4-A (4) the prohibition is against landlords, who on the date when the Amendment Act came into force, owned lands exceeding 13 1/3 acres or had been assessed to the taxes mentioned and for the period specified therein. Under section 4-A (5) the disqualification mentioned in section 4-A (4) which affected persons, continued, even though those persons so disqualified under section 4-A (4) became free from such disqualifications. 4. The two sub-sections, thus understood, would not debar a person who subsequently became a landlord by purchase. The purchase may be from a person who was disqualified from applying for resumption under section 4-A (4) or (5) or it may be from a person who was not under any such disqualification. It was submitted that the disqualification mentioned in section 4-A (4) and 4-A (5) was as regards persons who were under disqualifications on the date when the Amendment Act came into force and those persons who were without those disqualifications subsequently and that the disqualifications could not be extended to purchasers from persons so disqualified or from persons without any such disqualification subsequent to the date when the Amendment Act came into force. On a construction of the provisions of section 4-A and its sub-sections, this submission has considerable force. 5. On behalf of the petitioner reliance was placed on the decision in Natesa-Pillai v. Mahalinga. Padayachi1. There the learned Judge construed that the disqualification under section 4-A (5) would extend to purchasers after the Act came into force, for the words any subsequent change in his circumstances would also include a subsequent purchase. With respect, I find myself unable to agree with this view, for the disqualification contemplated in section 4-A (5) attaches to a person who was not entitled to resume possession under section 4-A (4) and not to a landlord, which is made clear by the sub-section itself that no person who is not entitled to resume possession should be deemed to do so by reason of any subsequent change in his circumstances. The words ‘ ‘no person " and " subsequent change in his circumstances" would indicate that the sub-section refers to persons who were disqualified under section 4-A (4) and not to landlords, who became purchasers subsequent to the coming into force of the Amendment Act, as such purchasers will be landlords under the definition, and there is no disqualification for them from applying for resumption as purchasers subsequent to the date when the Amendment Act came into force. In this view, the two sub-sections do not in any way disqualify a landlord, who had purchased the land from any of the persons disqualified under section 4-A (4) and 4-A (5). But in Kothanda Pillai v. Devaraja Reddy2, it was held that, if the vendor from whom the petitioner in that case purchased, owned lands exceeding 13 1/3 acres or was paying taxes on the date when the Amendment Act came into force, the purchaser had no right of resumption. A strict reading of the section may not justify the construction placed on it in that decision. As the respondents are persons who admittedly purchased the property after the Amendment Act came into force, the question whether they are entitled to resume the land or rot falls to be decided. As I am of the view that the decisions referred to above require reconsideration, the matter will be posted before a Bench along with C.R.P. No. 2529 of 1970. 6. The petitioner has not succeeded in proving that the respondents by themselves suffer any disqualification, in that they are paying any of the taxes mentioned in section 4-A (4). Whether he is entitled to continue on the land on payment of the rent as stipulated in section 4-A (3) is a question which can be dealt with only after the right of the respondent to resume the land is decided. Accordingly the petition came before a Bench consisting of K. Veeraswami, C J., and V. V. Raghavan, J , along with C.R.P. No. 2529 of 1970. Petition under section 6 (1) of Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act (XXV of 1955) praying the High Court to revise the order of the Authorised Officer (L.R.) Tirunelveli 2 in T. P. No. 108 of 1970 dated 24th November, 1970. S. Palaniswamy and 7. V. Subramaniam, for Petitioner. B. Chandramouli, for T. R. Rajagopalan, T. Viswanatha Rao and P. P. Ramachandran, for Respondent. S. Palaniswamy and 7. V. Subramaniam, for Petitioner. B. Chandramouli, for T. R. Rajagopalan, T. Viswanatha Rao and P. P. Ramachandran, for Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Veeraswami, C. J.-These civil revision petitions are placed before us because Kailasam, J., was unable to agree with the view in Natesa Pillai v. Mahalingam Padayachi1, as to the scope of sub-section (5) of section 4-A of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955. The petitioner in each of the petitions is a tenant and seeks to revise the order of the concerned Authorised Officer for resumption of land from the relative cultivating tenant. The question turns on whether a purchaser from a landlord subsequent to the date mentioned in. sub-section (4) of section 4-A will not be hit by the inhibition imposed by sub-section (5). This precise matter was considered by one of us in Kothanda Pillai v. Devaraja Reddy2. It was there held that subsection (5) fixed not merely a ceiling in respect of the extent with reference to which right to resume for personal cultivation was given, but also drew a line on time so that any change subsequent thereto in the circumstances of the landlord was made ineffective to disturb the protection afforded to the cultivating tenant. In expressing that view, support was derived from two earlier cases, Natesan Pillai v. Mahalinga Padayachi1 and Rajadurai v. Kunjuramu Varniar2. 8. Kailasam, J., in stating that he found himself unable to agree with the view in Natesan Pillai v. Mahalinga Padayachi1, observed: “With respect, I find myself unable to agree with this view, for the disqualification ontemplated in section 4-A (5) attaches to a person who was not entitled to resume possession under section 4-A (4) and not to a landlord, which is made clear by the sub-section itself that no person who is not entitled to resume possession should be deemed to do so by reason of any subsequent change in his circumstances. The words ‘no person ‘and ‘subsequent change in his circumstances, ‘would indicate that the sub-section refers to persons who were disqualified under section 4-A (4) and not to landlords, who became purchasers subsequent to the coming into force of the Amendment Act, as such purchasers will be landlords under the definition, and there is no disqualification for them from applying for resumption as purchasers subsequent to the date when the Amendment Act came into force.” We regret our inability to share this view. Sub-section (5) is the only one among the sub-sections of section 4-A which uses the word ‘person’ and this has been done by the Legislature deliberately. The object is clear. A landlord who suffers from the disability under sub-section (4) should be unable to defeat the inhibition by transferring a part of his land reducing his holding at or below the ceiling level, and then enabling the purchaser to claim resumption. The word ‘person in sub-section (5), therefore, seems to cover not only a landlord who was not entitled to resume possession under the section on the date the the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection (Amendment) Act, 1956, came into force but also a person who, not owning land on that date, but by purchase comes to own land thereafter, will suffer from the same disability. He was not a person entitled to resume on the relevant date and by subsequent change of circumstances, in this case as a purchaser, he could not clothe himself with the righ to resume. Where a landlord did not suffer from the disability under sub-section (4), but transferred a part of his holding to another, the transferee not being a person entitled to resume on the relevant date could not be in a better position because of his purchase. This seems to be literally the effect of subsection (5). No doubt this may work hardship, but it is not for us to depart from the actual language employed. The Act was looking at the matter from the point of view of the cultivating tenant and the protection to be afforded to him. The protection sought to be afforded was as on the date the Amendment Act of 1956 came into force. That being so, these petitions are allowed. No costs. S.J. ------------ Petitions allowed.