JUDGMENT : B.K. Patra, J. - In both the cases, a common question of law as to whether, sanction is necessary for the prosecution of the accused arises for determination. The accused persons are common to both the cases and they are the Executive Officer, the Chairman, the Vice Chairman and the councilors of the Notified Area council, Koraput. The Petitioners in both the cases are persons who had their wooden cabins on municipal land within the jurisdiction of the Notified Area Council, Koraput. It is not disputed that they had been permitted temporarily by the N.A.C. authorities, to have their cabins on municipal land and that after expiry of the period of license, they were asked to remove the cabins which they failed to do, but challenged the orders issued to them in suits filed by them against the accused persons in the Court of the Munsif, Jeypore. The Munsif appears to have issued an ex parte and interim injunction restraining the accused persons from removing the cabins by force. But the orders of injunction had subsequently been vacated. It is alleged that on 19-3-1969 in one case (Cr. Rev, 699 71) and on 20-3-1969 in the other case (Cr. Rev, 702 71), the accused persons forcibly removed all the articles from the cabins, auctioned some of them and took away the sale proceeds of the auctioned articles. On these allegations, the two complaint petitions were filed against them in Court under Sections 399, 448 406, 34, Indian Penal Code. The complaint petitions were sent for inquiry u/s 20, Code of Criminal Procedure to a local Magistrate who reported that the allegations made in the complaint petitions were substantially true. After considering the report, the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Koraput took cognisance only u/s 427, Indian Penal Code. According to him, no case had been made out for prosecution of the accused persons under Sections 379 or 448 or 406, Indian Penal Code. 2. After the accused persons appeared in Court, they contended that their prosecution without obtaining the necessary sanction u/s 376 of the Orissa Municipal Act is bad and that they should be discharged. The S.D.M. having rejected their contention, they moved the Sessions Judge in revision, but being unsuccessful they have filed these revision applications. 3. The only contention advanced on their behalf is that their prosecution without necessary sanction is bad in law. 4. The S.D.M. having rejected their contention, they moved the Sessions Judge in revision, but being unsuccessful they have filed these revision applications. 3. The only contention advanced on their behalf is that their prosecution without necessary sanction is bad in law. 4. Section 376 of the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950 (Act 23 of 1950)(hereinafter referred to as the Act) reads thus: 376. When the Chairman, Vice-Chairman or any councilor of a municipal councilor any officer of Government whose services are lent to the Council is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction of the State Government. Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in so far as is relevant runs thus: 197(1) x x x x, or when any public servant who is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of a State Government or the Central Government, is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction. xx xx xx The language of Section 376 of the Act is almost identical with that of Section 197, Code of Criminal Procedure so far as it relates to the circumstances under which sanction for prosecution is necessary. 5. The law on the subject is well established. It is not every offence committed by a public servant that, require sanction for prosecution u/s 197(1). Code of Criminal Procedure or u/s 376 of the Act as the case may be; nor even every act done by him while he was actually engaged in the performance of his official duties. But if the act complained of was directly concerned with his official duties so that if questioned it could be claimed to have been done by virtue of the office then sanction would be necessary and that would be so irrespective of whether it was in fact a proper discharge of his duties or not because, that would really be a matter of defence on merits which would have to be investigated into at the trial and should not arise at the stage of grant of sanction. Sanction would be necessary even if the Act exceeds what is necessary for the discharge of the duty. What the Court must find out at this stage is whether the act and the official duty were so inter-related that one could postulate reasonably that it was done by the accused in the performance of the official duty though possibly in excess of the needs and requirements of the situation. See Prabhakar V. Sinari Vs. Shanker Anant Verlekar, . 6. Sub-section (2) of Section 255 of the Act provides that the Executive officer may grant a license, subject to such conditions and restrictions as he may think fit for the temporary erection of (sic) and other structure in a public road vested in the councilor in any other public place the control of which is vested in the council. Sub-section (6) thereof provides that on the expiry of any period for which a licence is granted the Executive Officer may, without notice, cause any projection or construction put up under Sub-section (1) or (2) to be removed and recover the costs of so doing as a tax. It is clear from the aforesaid provisions that after the expiry of the period of licence the Executive Officer is authorised to remove the temporary structure. It is manifest that in these two cases, the Executive Officer did not proceed straightway to remove the structures after the expiry of toe period for which licence was granted. But notice was issued to toe opposite parties to remove the same and it is only after they failed to comply with the order that the Executive officer and other functionaries of the Notified Area council proceeded to remove-the same. The Act of removing the wooden cabins by the accused persons is therefore done in the discharge of their official duties. It may be that in proceeding to discharge such duty, they did something in excess of the needs and requirements of the situation as is alleged in the complaint petitions. But this circumstances cannot take the cases out of the purview of Section 376 of the Act. I am, therefore, of the view that the accused persons cannot be prosecuted without the previous sanction of the State Government as required by Section 376 of the Act. 7. But this circumstances cannot take the cases out of the purview of Section 376 of the Act. I am, therefore, of the view that the accused persons cannot be prosecuted without the previous sanction of the State Government as required by Section 376 of the Act. 7. I would accordingly allow these applications and quash the proceedings initiated against the Petitioners in I.C.C. 12 of 1969 and I.C.C. 13 of 1969 in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Koraput.