JUDGMENT G.C. Mathur, J. - The petitioner was a confirmed Collector Amdin. In the year 1963 four complaints of embezzlement were received against him. By an order dated April 18, 1963, he was suspended. The very next day, i.e., on April 19,1963, a first information report was lodged against him. After enquiry the case was sent, to court and ultimately on September 18,1964, the petitioner was committed to the court of sessions to stand his trial. It may be mentioned that two cases were committed, one in respect of three charges and the other in respect of two. In the meantime the departmental proceedings were also started against the petitioner. On May 8, 1963, a charge sheet was served on him and after enquiry the Enquiry Officer by his report dated May 30, 1964, held him guilty of the charges. Thereupon, the Deputy Commissioner on August 11, 1964, served a notice on the petitioner to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service. After considering the petitioner's explanation the Deputy Commissioner by an order dated September 30, 1964, dismissed the petitioner from service. Against the order of dismissal the petitioner preferred an appeal, which was dismissed on December 14, 1965. The petitioner then preferred a revision to the Board of Revenue. During the pendency of the revision the two sessions trials against the petitioner started. By two judgements dated March 23,1966 and March 31, 1966, the petitioner was acquitted in both the trials. Thereupon the petitioner applied to the Board of Revenue to consider his revision in the light of the judgement of the Session Judge acquitting him of the same charges. By a communication dated August 8, 1967, the petitioner was informed:- "The order of the Deputy Commissioner, Gonda, dated 30.9.1964 dismissing him from service has been deposited by the Board and the Deputy Commissioner, Gonda, has been asked to review the dismissal order. he should, therefore, contact Deputy Commissioner, Gonda in the matter." There is no dispute that by this order the revision was allowed, the dismissal order was set aside and the Deputy Commissioner was asked to reconsider the matter. 2. It appears that the Deputy Commissioner referred the matter to the Assistant Sub-divisional Officer, Balrampur. he should, therefore, contact Deputy Commissioner, Gonda in the matter." There is no dispute that by this order the revision was allowed, the dismissal order was set aside and the Deputy Commissioner was asked to reconsider the matter. 2. It appears that the Deputy Commissioner referred the matter to the Assistant Sub-divisional Officer, Balrampur. The Assistant Sub Divisional Officer on December 28, 1967, without hearing the petitioner, recommended that in view of the petitioner's acquittal by the Sessions Court no action was needed against the petitioner. The matter was then considered by the Deputy commissioner and by his order dated February 6,1968, he awarded the punishment or removal from service to the petitioner. The petitioner preferred an appeal, but the appeal was withheld on January 31,1969, by the Commissioner, as it was addressed to the State Government. The petitioner then made a representation, but nothing seems to have come out of it. He then filed this writ petition. 3. Having heard Counsel for the parties at length I am of the opinion that this writ petition must succeed on two grounds. 4. The charges on which the petitioner was tried by the court of sessions are identical to the charges in the departmental proceedings. As already stated, the petitioner has been acquitted of the charges by the court of sessions. In both the sessions trials the Sessions Judge has observed:- "I have very carefully gone through the entire evidence on record and defence of the accused in this case. it appears to me that some interested person has made manipulations in the receipts and on that basis the accused has been falsely implicated in this case. Therefore, the accused has to be acquitted of the charges against him." It will thus, be seen that the petitioner was honourably acquitted by the Sessions Judge in both the cases and not merely giving the benefit of doubt. When a person has been honourably acquitted by the criminal court, then departmental proceedings on the identical charges are not permissible. In R.P. Kapur v. Union of India, AIR 1964 SC 787 the Supreme Court has observed as follows:- "if the trial of the criminal charge results in conviction, disciplinary proceedings are bound to follow against the public servant so convicted, even in case of acquittal proceedings may follow where the acquittal is other than honourable. In R.P. Kapur v. Union of India, AIR 1964 SC 787 the Supreme Court has observed as follows:- "if the trial of the criminal charge results in conviction, disciplinary proceedings are bound to follow against the public servant so convicted, even in case of acquittal proceedings may follow where the acquittal is other than honourable. The usual practice is that where a public servant is being tried on a criminal charge, the Government postpones holding a departmental enquiry and awaits the result of the criminal trial and departmental proceedings follow on the result of the criminal trial." Following this decision a learned Single Judge of the Madras high court has observed in K. Rangarajan v. The State of Madras, LIO 1968, 63:- "The two decisions above cited make it clear that it cannot be said that in the case of an acquittal by a criminal court the departmental proceedings cannot be initiated on the same facts. Even in the case of acquittals the departmental proceedings may follow when the acquittal is other than honourable. A similar question arose earlier before the Madras High Court in respect of proceedings before the Road Transport Tribunal in Jeromo D'Silya v. The Regional Transport Authority, South Karana, AIR 1952 Madras 853. A Division Bench of that Court observed:- "If there is a conviction by a competent criminal court, that would furnish conclusive ground for any penal action by the Transport authorities. Equally, if the criminal prosecution ended in a discharge of acquittal of the accused and that event happened before the order of any Road Transport Tribunal, then such Tribunal would not have the power to go behind the final order of a competent criminal court. It, thus, appears that if a person has been honourably acquitted by the criminal court, then departmental proceedings on the basis of the same charges are not competent. The findings of the Sessions Judge have been quoted above. They clearly show that the petitioner was honourably acquitted of the charges levelled against him. On these very charges no departmental proceedings could be taken against the petitioner. The findings of the Sessions Judge have been quoted above. They clearly show that the petitioner was honourably acquitted of the charges levelled against him. On these very charges no departmental proceedings could be taken against the petitioner. There is no doubt that the charges in the criminal cases are identical with the charges in the departmental enquiry against the petitioner, Therefore, in my opinion, the Deputy Commissioner, when he was considering the question afresh in the light of the decisions of the court of sessions, he was bound by the findings in criminal cases and he was not entitled to go behind the findings of the Session Judge. That being so, the Deputy Commissioner was not entitled to hold that the petitioner was guilty of those very charges and to remove him from service. 5. There is another ground which deserves consideration. After the revision had been allowed by the Board of Revenue and the Deputy Commissioner had been directed to reconsider the matter, the case was sent to the Assistant Sub Divisional Officer, but the petitioner was not informed of this fact. However, the Assistant Sub Divisional Officer gave a report in favour of the petitioner. Thereafter, the matter was considered by the Deputy Commissioner. Though, there is no specific allegation by the petitioner that he was not heard by the Deputy Commissioner, it is manifest from the record that the petitioner was not given an opportunity of hearing at this stage. This was a very vital stage in the case where the Deputy Commissioner was required to reconsider the findings of the Enquiry Officer in the light of the findings of the Sessions Judge and this could not be done without giving the petitioner an opportunity of being heard. In passing the impugned order without hearing the petitioner the Deputy Commissioner violated the principles of natural Justice and also deprived the petitioner of a reasonable opportunity of being heard before the action was taken against him. 6. For these two reasons I am of the opinion that the impugned order is illegal and must be quashed. The writ petition is, accordingly, allowed with costs and the order of removal dated February 6, 1968, is quashed.