JUDGMENT B.D. Singh J. 1. In these two criminal miscellaneous cases and three criminal revisions a common question of law has arisen and therefore, they were heard together and this judgment will govern all the five cases. 2. In order to appreciate it will be necessary to state briefly the facts. On the 12th of November, 1965 one Ram Naresh Rai, Supply Inspector, inspected the business premises of the firm styled as M/s. Kheyaliram Kedarnath, having their place of business also at Banka although their head office was in the town of Bhagalpur, dealing with various commodities including kerosene oil. He found various irregularities in the then existing stock and the stock registers maintained by the firm regarding kerosene oil. He, therefore, submitted a report to the Assistant District Supply Officer. The latter issued notice of show cause to the firm. The show cause was shown by the firm which was not accepted. On 6.11.1968 a report in writing was filed by Shri B.K. Sharan, Block Development Officer, Banka before the Sub-divisional Magistrate on the basis of which a complaint case bearing No. 437/C of 1968 was registered against the various petitioners in the five applications. On 8.11.1968 cognizance was taken against them by the Sub-divisional Magistrate. The petitioners in the two criminal miscellaneous cases have come against the order dated 8.11.1968 passed by the Sub-divisional Magistrate taking cognizance. The case, however proceeded and on 6.1.1971 the transferee court framed charge under section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') against all the petitioners in the three criminal revision cases except that against the petitioners of Criminal Revision No. 506 of 1971. Charges were also framed under section 465 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The petitioners of all the three criminal revision cases have, therefore, come to this Court against the order dated 6. I. 1971 framing charges against them. 3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in the five cases have raised only one point for consideration in this Court, viz. the requirements contained under section 10 of the Act have not been followed as it appears from the complaint dated 6. 11. 1968 filed by Shri B.K. Sharan. I. 1971 framing charges against them. 3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in the five cases have raised only one point for consideration in this Court, viz. the requirements contained under section 10 of the Act have not been followed as it appears from the complaint dated 6. 11. 1968 filed by Shri B.K. Sharan. How drew my attention to the provisions contained in section 10 of the Act which reads as:– "10 (1) If the person contravening an order made under section 3 is a company, every person who, at the time the contravention was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the contravention and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly:– Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to any punishment if he proves that the contravention took place without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent such contravention. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub section (1), where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly," He also referred to the complaint which was filed by Mr. Sharan. The relevant portion of the complaint is to be found in paragraphs 1 and 2 which reads as:– "1. That there is a firm known as Kheyaliram Kedarnath having its Head Office at Bhagalpur and this firm has been carrying on the business of purchase, sale and .storage of kerosene oil at Banka since several years and it had wholesale licence under the Bihar Kerosene Dealers' Licensing Order 1965 during the years 1965 and 1966 for carrying on the business aforesaid at its gaddi near Banka Bazar Chauk. The licence was renewed for the years 1967 and 1968 also. 2. That the accused persons bearing serial Nos. The licence was renewed for the years 1967 and 1968 also. 2. That the accused persons bearing serial Nos. 1 to 6 are the proprietors and partners of the firm and the other two accused persons are employees and agents of the firm for its aforesaid business at Banka." Learned counsel submitted that no where in the complaint the complainant has alleged that any of the petitioners was incharge or responsible on behalf of the firm or in any way responsible for the offence alleged in the complaint. In that view of the matter the cognizance would not have been taken against the petitioners nor the charges could have been framed against them on the basis of the said complaint. In order to find support to his contention learned counsel relied on a Bench decision of this Court in Rabindra Nath Dutta vs. State of Bihar, 1971 B.L.J.R 1005 where M.P. Verma and A.N. Mukharji, JJ. while dealing with the provisions contained under section 10 of the Act observed that it must be shown in the complaint petition that the person complained against was in charge of and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company. The allegation was wanting in the complaint petition. The allegation in the complaint petition ought to have been that the offence in question was committed with the consent or connivance of, or was attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager etc. That allegation was also wanting in the complaint petition. A vague and general allegation that all the Managing Directors were responsible for the offence could not be accepted. Moreover, when there were a number of Managing Directors, as alleged it was natural that only some of them must be in charge of payment of the price of sugarcane etc. So that allegation was vague in that respect also, and in the absence of any such specific allegation, all the Directors could not be proceeded against. Therefore, their Lordships quashed the order taking cognizance against the petitioners of that case. 4. Learned counsel submitted that the same principle has been followed also in the case of firm. So that allegation was vague in that respect also, and in the absence of any such specific allegation, all the Directors could not be proceeded against. Therefore, their Lordships quashed the order taking cognizance against the petitioners of that case. 4. Learned counsel submitted that the same principle has been followed also in the case of firm. In order to substantiate this contention he relied on another judgment of this Court in Chhangi Ram Agarwalla and other vs. State of Bihar, 1970 P.L.J.R. 234, where M.P. Verma, while considering the case of a firm in similar circumstances observed that by merely giving the names of the partners of the firm, a criminal proceeding for the violation of the provisions of the Act or the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act could not proceed. The complainant must show that a certain partner was the managing partner or manager or entrusted with the business of the firm and was responsible to the firm for the conduct of business. If that description was missing from the complaint, then all the partners could not be proceeded against for any such violation of the Rules. Hence his Lordship quashed the impugned order. 5. In my opinion, the contention of learned counsel for the petitioners in the instant case with the exception of the case of the petitioners in Criminal Revision 506 of 1971 is well founded. The cognizance as well as the charge framed against those petitioners are quashed. 6. Now I turn to the case of the petitioners in Criminal Revision 506 of 1971. It requires separate treatment because the two petitioners in addition to the provisions contained under section 7 of the Act are also proceeded against under section 465 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. No doubt, on the same principles which I have discussed above, the cognizance as well as the charge against these two petitioners of Criminal Revision 506 of 1971 under section 7 of the Act shall be quashed, but the principle laid down by their Lordships in the above cases referred to would not apply in cases where the petitioners are also being proceeded under section 465 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Therefore, the application of the petitioners in Criminal Revision 506 of 1971 is partly allowed. Therefore, the application of the petitioners in Criminal Revision 506 of 1971 is partly allowed. The court below will proceed against the two petitioners of Criminal Revision 506 of 1971 under section 465 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code in accordance with law. 7. In the result, the applications of the .petitioners other than Criminal Revision 506 of 1971 are allowed in full and the cognizance as well as charge framed against them are quashed, whereas in the case of petitioners in Criminal Revision 506 of 1971 the cognizance and charge framed against them under section 7 of the Act are quashed but the orders taking cognizance and framing charge against them under section 465 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code are affirmed. Application allowed.