Judgment S.N.P. Singh, J. The petitioner is a Government of India undertaking and it carried on the business of mining and proceeding of uranium ore. In this application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India the Petitioner has made two alternative prayers. The first prayer made by the petitioner is that the reference made by the Central Government under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"), be quashed. In the alternative, the petitioner has made a prayer for issuance of an appropriate writ directing the Presiding officer of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal (No.2), Dhanbad to decide by a separate order the preliminary issue raised in the application filed by the petitioner. 2. The relevant facts for the disposal of this application may briefly be stated as follows: The Government of India in the Department of Labour and Employment, on the 10th of November, 1971, issued a notification by which a dispute between the management of Jaduguda Uraniun Mines of the petitioner and their workmen was referred under clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section 10 of the Act for adjudication to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal (No.2), Dhanbad. The reference was made in these terms:- "Where the demands of workmen of Jaduguda Mines of Messrs. Uranium Corporation of India Limited, Post Office Jaduguda Mines, District Singhbum in respect of the following are justified? If so, to what relief are they entitled? (i) Grant of Medical benefits; (ii) Regularisation of Casual workmen." On receipt of the reference, the Central Government Industrial Tribunal (No.2), Dhanbad (hereinafter referred to as the "Tribunal") registered it as Reference No. 60 of 1971 on the 22nd of November, 1971. On the 13th of March, 1972, the written statement on behalf of the employers was received by the Tribunal. The written statement on behalf of the workmen was received on the 28th of March, 1972. Subsequently, a rejoinder to the written statement was filed on behalf of the management. On the 10th of July, 1972 an additional written statement was filed by the Advocate appearing on behalf of the management, in which a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the reference was taken. Subsequently, a rejoinder to the written statement was filed on behalf of the management. On the 10th of July, 1972 an additional written statement was filed by the Advocate appearing on behalf of the management, in which a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the reference was taken. It was alleged on behalf of the management that the reference was bad in law because the two issues referred to the Tribunal for adjudication had already been covered by two settlements entered into between the employers and their workmen represented by the Jaduguda Labour Union concerned on the 11th of Sept., 1969 and the 17th of April, 1970. It was also alleged that copies of the settlement had been forwarded to the authorities concerned under rule 58 of the In. dustrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 by joint letters addressed by the employers and the union on the l2/l5th of September, 1969 and the 17th of April, 1970; as both the settlements were in operation and binding on the date of reference, the reference was incompetent and bad in law. A rejoinder was filed on behalf of the workmen on the 22nd of August, 1972 to the petition filed on behalf of the employers on the 10th of July, 1972. In the rejoinder the workmen alleged that the management had raised the objection with the intention of delaying the proceedings. The workmen, in their rejoinder, further submitted that, in the ends of justice and for a fair adjudication, it was desirable that the preliminary objection of the employers be decided after hearing the parties both on the point of preliminary objection as well as on the merits of the reference. Four documents were filed on behalf of the management in support of the preliminary objection and they were marked as Exts. M/1 to M/4. Three documents were filed on behalf of the workmen and they were marked as Exts. W/1 to W/3. On the 11th of January, 1973, the Presiding Officer of the Tribunal heard• some arguments advanced on behalf of the employers with regard to the preliminary objection. On the 17th and the 18th of January, 1973, the Presiding Officer heard arguments of both the parties on the preliminary objection raised by the employers. W/1 to W/3. On the 11th of January, 1973, the Presiding Officer of the Tribunal heard• some arguments advanced on behalf of the employers with regard to the preliminary objection. On the 17th and the 18th of January, 1973, the Presiding Officer heard arguments of both the parties on the preliminary objection raised by the employers. On the 25th of January, 1973, the Presiding Officer of the Tribunal passed the following order:- "Workmen are represented by Shri P.K. Bose, Advocate, and the employers by Shri D. Narsingh, Advocate. Having filed their written statement on 2.2.1972 and rejoinder on 28.4.1972, the employers filed an application on 10.7.72 raising preliminary objections against "maintainability of the Reference. In para 2 & 11 (a) of the rejoinder it is stated that in regard to item 2 of the Schedule of Reference there was no dispute between the management and the workmen. In the application dated 10.7.1972 it was stated that the Reference is bad in law because the two issues referred for adjudication had already been covered by settlements dated 11-9-1969 and 17-4-1970. Having heard arguments of parties at length and having gone through the admitted documents, Exts. M 1 to M 4 and W 1 to W 3, I feel that the objections raised involved in them questions of facts and law and can be better disposed of after receiving evidence, documentary and oral, of parties on the merits of the dispute also. Hence, for further documents of parties, if any, finally call on 15-2-73 at 11 A.M." The petitioner, being aggrieved by the above order has filed this writ application. 3. Mr. K.D. Chatterjee, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, raised a contention that the Presiding Officer of the Tribunal erred in law in not deciding the preliminary objections regarding the maintainability of the reference separately and in passing the impugned order. According to learned Counsel, if a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of a reference is raised before-an Industrial Tribunal, the Tribunal must decide the preliminary objection as a separate issue, before considering the reference on merits. The main question, therefore, which falls for consideration is, whether the Presiding Officer of the Tribunal has erred in law in not deciding the preliminary objections, which were raised by the petitioner, as a separate issue by a separate order. 4. The main question, therefore, which falls for consideration is, whether the Presiding Officer of the Tribunal has erred in law in not deciding the preliminary objections, which were raised by the petitioner, as a separate issue by a separate order. 4. In the rules framed under the Act there is no specific provision relating to the decision of a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of a reference. It is well settled that, if a preliminary objection is raised challenging the jurisdiction of a Tribunal to deal with the merits of the dispute, the Tribunal must decide the preliminary issue before embarking on the decision on merits. The question which falls for consideration, therefore, is whether it is within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to defer the consideration of the preliminary issue and to decide the same along with the merits of the case. 5. In order to decide this question, it is necessary to refer to some of the decisions of this Court, and of the Supreme Court. The first case of this Court, to which our attention was drawn, is that of the Associated Cement Companies Ltd. V. Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Dhanbad. In that case an objection had been raised on behalf of the management that the dispute mentioned in the order of reference was an individual dispute, and not an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act, and further that the two concerned workers were not 'workmen' as defined in the Act. The Tribunal declined to decide the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the management and fixed a date for hearing the whole reference on merits. Thereupon, the management filed a writ application in this Court, which was numbered as M.J.C. No. 936 of 1956. A Bench of this Court, by its judgment and order, dated the 6th of September, 1957, gave a direction to the Tribunal to hear and determine the preliminary objections raised by the petitioner in their written statement, and, after determining the preliminary objections to proceed to hear the reference on its merits and to dispose it of in accordance with law. The Tribunal, thereupon, considered the preliminary objections raised on behalf of the management and overruled them. The Tribunal held that the reference was •valid and it had jurisdiction to entertain the same. The Tribunal, thereupon, considered the preliminary objections raised on behalf of the management and overruled them. The Tribunal held that the reference was •valid and it had jurisdiction to entertain the same. Being aggrieved by the laid order of the Tribunal, the management again filed a writ application n this Court, which was numbered as M.J.C. No. 565 of 1958. A Bench of this Court set aside the order of the Tribunal and held that the reference of the dispute by the Central Government was illegal and without jurisdiction. 6. The next case to which a reference may be made is that of Rohtas Industries Ltd. V. Jagarnath Sahai Verma. That was a case under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. The Sub-divisional Officer had framed six issues for decision in that case. The management raised a preliminary objection to the effect that the Payment of Wages Act was not applicable to the case. The Sub-divisional Officer rejected the preliminary objection, though in the issue, framed by him he made it clear that the point would be duly considered at the time of the hearing of the petition. The management thereupon, came up to this Court and filed writ application challenging the order of the Sub-divisional Officer rejecting the prayer to hold a separate hearing on the question of the preliminary issue. This Court rejected the application filed on behalf of the management. In that case it was held by this Court that the question whether a preliminary issue as regards the maintainability of an application should be tried separately in the first instance or else whether it should be tried along with the other issues, will depend au the facts and circumstances of each case and no uniform rule could be laid down. It was further observed as follows:- "But normally it will not be proper for a Court whose orders are subject to appeal or control by a superior Court to split up the several issues arising out of a proceeding and try separately a preliminary issue regarding the maintainability of the petition. The danger of trying such a preliminary issue separately, is that, if the view taken by the trial court is reversed by superior Courts, the whole case will have to be remanded for trial of other issues and there would be much harassment, delay and expense to all concerned. The danger of trying such a preliminary issue separately, is that, if the view taken by the trial court is reversed by superior Courts, the whole case will have to be remanded for trial of other issues and there would be much harassment, delay and expense to all concerned. Hence, generally Courts of the first instance are required to try all the issues, including the preliminary issue as regards the maintainability of the application, so that whatever view may be taken by the, superior Court on the question of maintainability there will be no necessity for remand and the litigation can be finally closed. Even in ordinary civil suits, regulated by the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, it is now well settled, notwithstanding the provisions of Order 14, rule 2, that, in appeal-able cases the trial Court should' pronounce its opinion on all the issues so as to avoid a remand if the appellate Court differs from the trial Court on the preliminary issue." In this case, a reference to the decision of the Supreme Court in Raj Krushna Bose V. Binod Kanungo was made. 7. In C.W.J.C. No. 1583 of 1969 (Suresh Sahu V. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ranchi) decided on the 2nd September, 1971, a Bench of this Court, of which I was a member, directed to the Labour Court to decide the question regarding the maintainability of the two applications filed under section 26 (2) of the Bihar Shops and Establishments Act, 1953 along with the main issues in the two cases. It was held in that case that piecemeal decision on the question regarding the maintainability of the applications was not desirable on the facts and in the circumstances of that case. 8. In the Management of the Muzoffarpur Electric Supply Company Ltd. V. The Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal Bihar (C.W.J.C. No. 1270 of 1968, decided on the 15th January, 1970), a Bench of this Court, of which I was a member, after hearing the arguments of the parties, allowed the writ application to be withdrawn with the following observations. "After this case was argued for some time, learned Counsel for the petitioner prayed for our permission to withdraw this application. Learned Counsel for the workmen, respondent no. 2 do not object to the granting of the prayer. "After this case was argued for some time, learned Counsel for the petitioner prayed for our permission to withdraw this application. Learned Counsel for the workmen, respondent no. 2 do not object to the granting of the prayer. We allow the application to be withdrawn, the result of which will be that the preliminary objections raised on behalf of the petitioner before the Industrial Tribunal, Bihar, will be considered and decided by the Tribunal while deciding the reference (No. 55 of 1968) on merits. In other words, the preliminary points raised by the petitioner will not be taken up and decided separately. They will be considered and decided while deciding the whole matter in the reference. Subject to this observation, the application is dismissed, as withdrawn. There will be no order as to costs." It may be stated here that in that case also the preliminary objection was to the effect that one of the terms of reference was covered by a previous settlement which was in force and binding upon the parties. 9. The next case to which a reference may be made is that of Management of Transport Corporation of India (P) Ltd. V. State of Bihar (C.W.J.C. No. 1322 of 1972, decided on the 12th January, 1973). In that case also three preliminary objections' had been raised before the Tribunal. The Tribunal, however, did not record any finding with regard to one of the preliminary objections raised before it. This court set aside the order of the Tribunal and directed that the Tribunal should decide the preliminary points along with the whole reference. In that case, a Bench of this Court observed as follows. "5. The question which, however, arises is whether we should direct the Tribunal to decide the preliminary points before deciding the whole reference. About two years have elapsed since the making of the reference by the notification (annexure 2). If a direction is given to the Tribunal to decide the preliminary points again then the party aggrieved by the fresh decision on the preliminary points will, in all probability, come to this Court again to challenge the decision of the Tribunal. And, that would further delay the disposal of the whole reference finally. On the facts and in the circumstances of this case, therefore, we have felt persuaded to make an order of the kind as indicated hereafter in this judgment." 10. And, that would further delay the disposal of the whole reference finally. On the facts and in the circumstances of this case, therefore, we have felt persuaded to make an order of the kind as indicated hereafter in this judgment." 10. From the various decisions, which have been referred to above, it would appear that in some cases this Court directed the Tribunal to, decide the preliminary issue as a separate issue by a separate order and in some cases took the view that the preliminary question should be decided along with the merits of the case. In no case it had been held that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to decide the preliminary objections along with the merits of the case. Mr. Chatterji learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner referred to certain decisions of the Supreme Court in support of his contention that the view taken by this Court in the cases referred to above that the 'preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of a reference should be decided along with the merits of the case was not correct. 11. The first case to which reference was made by Mr. Chatterji is the case of Kirloskar Brothers Ltd. V. Its workmen. In that case the Tribunal had given an award concerning certain Press employees. It was held in that case that the award of the Tribunal, in so far as it concerned the Press employees, could not be considered to have been properly arrived at in the absence of a prior decision of the preliminary question whether the Press was an independent business, distinct and separate from the factory, or not. It was observed in that ca5e as follows:- "The proper course for industrial adjudication to follow in cases where an issue of this kind is raised is to decide this issue first and then to consider and decide the demands on the basis of that finding." 12. The next case relied upon by Mr. Chatterji is that of Management of Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd. Madras V. The workers. In that case the question was whether the action taken by the employer was a 'lockout' or a 'closure'. In the High Court, the management had prayed for decision of the preliminary issue as it involved jurisdictional fact. The High Court declined to decide the preliminary issue. In that case the question was whether the action taken by the employer was a 'lockout' or a 'closure'. In the High Court, the management had prayed for decision of the preliminary issue as it involved jurisdictional fact. The High Court declined to decide the preliminary issue. Being aggrieved by the order or the High Court, the management filed an appeal in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court upheld the order of the High Court and dismissed the appeal. In that case it was observed in paragraph 12 of the judgment as follows:- "(12) It is also true that even if the dispute is tried by the Industrial Tribunal, at the very commencement the Industrial Tribunal will have to examine as a preliminary issue the question as to whether the dispute referred to it is an industrial dispute or not, and the decision of this question would inevitably depend upon the view which the Industrial Tribunal may take as to whether the action taken by the appellant is a closure or a lockout. The finding which the Industrial Tribunal may record on this preliminary issue will decide whether it has jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the dispute or not. If the finding is that the action of the appellant amounts to a closure, there would be an end to the proceedings before the Tribunal so far as the main dispute is concerned. If, on the other hand the "finding is that the action of the appellant amounts to a lockout, which has been disguised as a closure, then the Tribunal will be entitled to deal with the reference. The finding which the Tribunal may make on this preliminary issue is a finding on a jurisdictional fact and it is only when the jurisdictional fact is found against the appellant that the Industrial Tribunal would have jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the dispute. This position is also not in dispute." 13. In none of the decision of the Supreme Court relied upon by the learned Counsel it has been held that, irrespective of the nature of the preliminary objections regarding the maintainability of the reference, the preliminary objections must be decided as a separate issue by a separate order. On the contrary, the decision in the case of Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. V. D.R. Singh", supports the contention raised by Mr. On the contrary, the decision in the case of Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. V. D.R. Singh", supports the contention raised by Mr. Ranen Roy, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent, that a preliminary issue may be considered with the main industrial dispute. In that case the Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd. had filed an application under section 33 (2) (b) of the Act before the Industrial Tribunal asking for its approval of the action which the Company proposed to take against its employee. The application was made, as certain industrial disputes between the management and its employees were pending at the relevant time. The concerned employee, in his written statement, opposed the application. At the hearing, the management urged before the Tribunal that, though it had made the application as a matter of abundant caution, its case was that it was not necessary to apply under section 33 (2) (b) because the employee was not concerned with the pending industrial disputes between the management and its employees' in the reference to the Tribunal. The Tribunal took the view that such a contention could not be raised by the management and held that, if the management thought that section 33 had no application, it should withdraw application and take the consequences. The Tribunal refused to entertain the plea of the management and proceeded to deal with the merits of the application. The matter went to the Supreme Court in appeal and their Lordships of the Supreme Court took the view that the Tribunal Committed an error in not considering the preliminary point. It was observed by Gajendragadkar, C.J. who spoke for the Court, as follows:- "Therefore, we must hold that the Tribunal was in error in not considering the preliminary point raised by the appellant that the respondent was not a workman concerned with the main industrial disputes and as such the application made by it was unnecessary." From the above observation of the Supreme Court in that case it is clear that a preliminary issue about the jurisdiction of the Tribunal may be considered along with the main industrial dispute. In my considered opinion, therefore, it is not incumbent on the Tribunal in all cases to decide the preliminary objections as a separate issue by a separate order. In my considered opinion, therefore, it is not incumbent on the Tribunal in all cases to decide the preliminary objections as a separate issue by a separate order. No doubt it is incumbent upon the Tribunal to examine the preliminary objections regarding the maintainability of the reference first and then to embark upon the consideration of the main industrial dispute. If the Tribunal arrives at the finding, on the preliminary objections, that it has no jurisdiction to proceed with the reference, it would not be necessary for it to decide the main dispute in the reference. It will depend upon the facts and the circumstances of each case whether the preliminary objections regarding the maintainability of the reference should be determined separately in the first instance or whether it should be determined along with the other issues I, therefore hold that the Tribunal in the instant case has not committed any illegality in passing the impugned order. 14. The next point which falls for consideration is, whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the instant case, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the preliminary objections would be better disposed of after receiving evidence on the merits of the dispute. As I have already stated, only some documents, including the alleged memoranda of settlements, were filed on behalf of the parties. The petitioner mainly relied on certain terms incorporated in the two memoranda of settlements, copies where of have been made annexure 1' and 2' to the writ application, Mr. Chatterji, learned Counsel for the petitioner, in course of his arguments, referred to paragraph 2 of the memorandum of settlement (Annexure 1') and paragraph 11 of the memorandum of settlement (Annexure 2') to show that there was a settlement between the management and the employees on the issue regarding medical benefits. Learned Counsel referred to paragraph 9 of the memorandum of settlement (annexure 2') to show that there was a settlement with regard to service conditions of causal workmen. Mr. Ranen Roy, on the other hand, drew our attention to paragraph 1 of the memorandum of settlement (Annexure 2') and submitted that the settlement was applicable only to regular workmen of the Corporation and it had no application to casual workmen. Learned Counsel further raised the contention that the memoranda of settlement were not binding as they were not signed by the office-bearers of the union. Learned Counsel further raised the contention that the memoranda of settlement were not binding as they were not signed by the office-bearers of the union. Learned Counsel also raised the contention that there was non-compliance with sub-rule (4) of rule 58 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957. Certain other contentions were also raised on behalf of the workmen. Thus, the questions involved are complex and complicated questions of fact. It was really difficult for the Tribunal to give a decision on the preliminary question raised by the petitioner regarding the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to deal with the reference merely on the documents filed by the parties. I am therefore, of the view that the Tribunal was not unjustified in passing the impugned order. 15. Mr. Chatterjee also made a submission to the effect that this Court should itself decide the preliminary objections about the maintainability of the reference. Learned Counsel referred to the decision in Bata Shoe Co. Ltd. v. Ali Hasan to support his contention that this Court is competent to decide the question of jurisdictional facts in a writ application. No. 1 doubt this Court, in a writ application, can decide the jurisdictional facts if it could be effectively decided on affidavits filed by the parties. In the instant case, however, the materials placed before this Court by the parties are not sufficient to enable it to decide complicated questions of fact involved in this case. In this connection I would refer to a passage from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Management of Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd. Madras v. The workers, already referred to. In that case it was observed in paragraph 15 as follows: "(15) The High Court undoubtedly has jurisdiction to ask the Industrial Tribunal to stay its hands and to embark upon the preliminary enquiry itself. The jurisdiction of the High Court to adopt this course cannot be, and is indeed not disputed. But would it be proper for the High Court to adopt such a course unless the ends of justice seem to make it necessary to do so? Normally, the questions of fact, though they maybe jurisdictional facts, the decision of which depends upon the appreciation of evidence, should be left to be tried by the Special Tribunals constituted for that purpose. Normally, the questions of fact, though they maybe jurisdictional facts, the decision of which depends upon the appreciation of evidence, should be left to be tried by the Special Tribunals constituted for that purpose. If and after the Special Tribunals try the preliminary issue in respect of such jurisdictional facts, it would be open to the aggrieved party to take that matter before the High Court by a writ petition and ask for an appropriate writ. Speaking generally, it would not be proper or appropriate that the initial jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal to deal with these jurisdictional facts should be circumvented and the decision of such a "preliminary issue brought before a High Court in its writ jurisdiction. We wish to point out that in making these observations we do not propose to lay down any fixed or inflexible rule whether or not even the preliminary facts should be tried by a High Court in a writ petition must naturally depend upon the circumstances of each case and upon the nature of the preliminary issue raised between the parties." On the facts and in the circumstances of the instant case, I am of the view that it would not be proper or appropriate for this Court to itself decide the preliminary questions. 16. There is another aspect of the matter which is relevant in connection with the first question. The management, though it had filed its main written statement on the 13th of March, 1972, had not raised the preliminary objections regarding the maintainability of the reference on the ground that there had been settlement between the management and the workmen on the two issues involved in the reference. A belated additional written statement was filed on the 10th of July, 1972, in which the preliminary objections were taken. There has already been a delay in the disposal of the reference because of the preliminary objections taken by the management. If a direction is given by this Court to the Tribunal to decide the preliminary objections by a separate order, it will cause further delay in the disposal of the reference. It is, therefore, desirable that the preliminary objections, which involve complicated questions of fact, should be considered by the Tribunal along with the main industrial dispute. 17. For the foregoing reasons, I find no merit in this application and it is, accordingly, dismissed. It is, therefore, desirable that the preliminary objections, which involve complicated questions of fact, should be considered by the Tribunal along with the main industrial dispute. 17. For the foregoing reasons, I find no merit in this application and it is, accordingly, dismissed. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Shiveshwar Prasad Sinha, J. 18. I entirely agree with my learned brother that the writ petition has no merit and it should be dismissed. I would, however, add that a preliminary objection to the jurisdiction of a Court or a Tribunal to try a cause may be on a ground unrelated to the merits of the cause, e.g. where the preliminary objection relates to the want of territorial jurisdiction of the Court, or relates to some invalidity regarding the appointment of the Presiding Officer of a Tribunal. The preliminary objection may, again be related to the cause for trial before the Court or Tribunal e.g., the one in the instant case, where the jurisdiction of the Tribunal has been questioned on the ground that the reference under section 10 of the Act itself was invalid. In my opinion, where the objection is of the first' nature, namely, where it is unrelated to the cause for trial, it may be desirable, though not necessary, to try the preliminary objection in isolation or separately to the main case. Where, however, the preliminary objection is of the second type, namely, where it is related to the cause for trial, it may be difficult, though not impossible, to decide the preliminary issue separately. It all depends, as has been observed by my learned brother, upon the facts and the circumstances of each case. On the facts and in the circumstances of the instant case, the Tribunal was justified in postponing the decision on the preliminary issues until it had more evidence before it.