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1973 DIGILAW 75 (BOM)

ROGHUVIR NARAYAN LOTLIKAR v. CAETANO FIGUEIREDO

1973-06-30

TITO MENEZES

body1973
ORDER The Additional Sessions Judge has made this reference and has recommended that the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Margao, dated 16-5-1970 passed under Section 145, Criminal P.C. be set aside. 2. The said order reads as follows :- "Whereas it has been made to appear to me that there is likelihood of breach of peace between both the parties regarding the dispute of actual possession of mine named "Banda Dongor" of Verelem bearing title No. 15 situated at Sangem taluka. I do hereby order that both the parties should appear in this Court on 30-5-1970 at 11 a.m. to put in written statements of their respective claims as regards the fact of actual possession of mine and further to put in such documents or adduce by putting affidavits the evidence of such persons as they rely upon if so necessary. Given under my hand and seal of the Court this 16th day of May, 1970." The order is attacked by Shri Kakodkar, on behalf of the applicants, on the ground that it was passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate without his being satisfied that there was a likelihood of breach of the peace. 3. The short point for my determination is whether the Magistrate passed the said order in breach of the provisions of Section 145(1), Criminal P.C. and has therefore acted without jurisdiction. 4. On reading the order I find that the learned Magistrate has neither mentioned on what material he has been satisfied nor has he specifically stated that he was satisfied that there was likelihood of breach of the peace. The only words in the order which have some bearing on its legality read. "Whereas it has been made to appear to me that there is likelihood of breach of the peace". The learned Magistrate does not make any reference to the material on which he was satisfied that there was likelihood of breach of the peace and, what is more, he does not even state that he himself was satisfied about such breach. What he states is that "it has been made to appear to him (me) that there is likelihood of breach of the peace". 5. What he states is that "it has been made to appear to him (me) that there is likelihood of breach of the peace". 5. I agree with Shri Cardozo that according to the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in 'R. H. Bhutani v. Miss Mani J. Desai, AIR 1968 SC 1444 = (1969 Cri LJ 13) it is not necessary, notwithstanding the words "shall give reasons" appearing in sub-section (1), for the Magistrate to specify the reasons for his satisfaction, but the bare minimum that is required is that :- (i) the Magistrate should state in unambiguous terms that he himself was satisfied as to the likelihood of breach of the peace and (ii) that such satisfaction is based on some material, whatever that material might be. If these two conditions are fulfilled, it is not open to a revisional Court to go into the material to find out whether the material was sufficient for the satisfaction, or not. The facts in Bhutani's case can easily be distinguished from the present one inasmuch as in the order passed by the Magistrate in that case the Magistrate has stated in unmistaken terms that he was himself satisfied. In the present case the learned Magistrate states that it was made to appear to him. By the use of these ambiguous words the Magistrate leaves room for the interpretation that he acted on the satisfaction arrived at by the Police or by someone else. Whereas in Bhutani's case the Magistrate stated in clear terms that he was relying on some particular material existing on record, in the present case there is a total omission on the part of the Magistrate to make such mention. The lack of a clear statement regarding his own satisfaction and of a reference to the material must be taken together, and if so taken, the effect of it is that the impugned order does not comply with the mandatory requirements of sub-section (1) of Section 145. 6. It is possible that on the examination of the material on record the Learned Magistrate found that the material was such as to permit two conclusions, one that the likelihood of breach of the peace existed and the other that it did not exist. The learned Magistrate might not have been clearly satisfied that there was a likelihood of breach of the peace. The learned Magistrate might not have been clearly satisfied that there was a likelihood of breach of the peace. The "satisfaction" of the Magistrate within the meaning of sub-sec. (1) must be clear and unambiguous. Nothing short of that can give him jurisdiction under Section 145, Criminal P.C. He cannot, if he is in doubt as to the likelihood of breach of the peace assume jurisdiction under Section 145. The language of the section is clear on this point. 7. It follows from this that the impugned order does not comply with the provisions of sub-section (1) of Sec. 145 and that the learned Magistrate has acted without jurisdiction. ORDER The reference is accepted. Reference accepted.