JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS petition is directed against the order dated 4-12-1972, passed by the Member Judge, Industrial Court in Reference No. 16/m. P. I. R. /1970. ( 2. ) THE respondent No. 3, a representative Union, has referred an Industrial Dispute between the petitioner and the representative Union for arbitration to the Industrial Court, under section 52 of the M. P. Industrial Relations Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). The dispute relates to the pay scales and grades of various categories of employees. During the pendency of the dispute, the representative Union submitted an application under section 107 of the Act, to grant interim increment of Rs. 30 per month by way of interim relief. This application was opposed by the petitioner. After hearing the parties, the Industrial Court, by its order dated 4-12-1972 directed that the employees of the petitioner be granted an interim relief of Rs. 10 per month. The Court also made it clear that in case it was ultimately found that the employees of the petitioner were not entitled to any increase in their wages, the amount of interim relief obtained by them would be recovered from their salaries, Aggrieved by this direction, the petitioner has filed this petition. ( 3. ) MR. Kohli, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that the impugned order is styled as interim Award and the Industrial Court has no power, under the provisions of the Act, to pass an interim award. The contention has no force. It is true that the heading of the order is interim Award but by that order the Industrial Court has not decided any part of the dispute referred to it for arbitration under section 52 of the Act. Moreover, the operative portion of the order makes it very clear that the Industrial Court was granting interim relief. As the Court has not passed any interim award, the question as to whether the Court has power to do so need not be considered in this case. ( 4. ) IT was then contended on behalf of the petitioner that the powers of industrial Court under section 107 of the Act, are analogous to the powers of the Civil Court under Order 39, rules 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Code. ( 4. ) IT was then contended on behalf of the petitioner that the powers of industrial Court under section 107 of the Act, are analogous to the powers of the Civil Court under Order 39, rules 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Code. It was, therefore, urged that the Industrial Court has no power to grant interim increment by way of interim relief. This contention was not urged before the industrial Court. The prayer of respondent No. 3 for grant of interim increment was not opposed by the petitioner on the ground that the Industrial court had no jurisdiction under section 107 of the Act, to grant interim increment by way of interim relief. Moreover, in view of the clear language of section 107 of the Act, which empowers the Industrial Court to pass such interim orders including the prohibitory order or a stay order as it may consider just and proper, the contention that the Industrial Court can only pass an order of injunction under section 107 of the Act, is untenable. ( 5. ) IT was next contended on behalf of the petitioner that the impugned order was "capricious" as it was not based on any material on record. We have perused the order and we do not find that it has been passed on impulse. The petitioner had objected to the grant of interim relief on three grounds. All these objections were considered and the Court came to the conclusion that in view of the huge profits earned by the petitioner, the grant of interim relief would not impose excessive financial burden on the petitioner. Therefore, the discretion exercised by the Industrial Court cannot be said to have been based on any impulse or on some fanciful idea of benevolence or sympathy. The contention advanced by the petitioner in this behalf is, therefore, devoid of any merit. ( 6. ) LASTLY it was urged that the Industrial Court has erred in ordering payment of interim relief to the employees without ordering that the increment could be drawn by the employees only on furnishing security to the satisfaction of the Industrial Court to safeguard the interest of the petitioner. Reliance in this behalf was placed on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in The Works Manager, Bihar State Superphosphate Factory Sindri v. Sri C. P. Singh and others. Reliance in this behalf was placed on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in The Works Manager, Bihar State Superphosphate Factory Sindri v. Sri C. P. Singh and others. ( AIR 1973 SC 273 .) The facts of the case before the Supreme Court are entirely distinguishable. In that case, the workmen had filed applications before the tribunal under section 33-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, on the ground that the employer had committed a breach of the provisions of section 33 of that Act, inasmuch as the orders of dismissal had been passed in violation of the said provisions. On applications before the Tribunal filed by the workmen for directing the employer to pay them full wages during the pendency of the adjudication of their complaints under section 33-A, the Tribunal passed interim awards directing the employer to give half wages to the dismissed workers. When these interim awards were challenged before the Supreme court, the interim awards were modified by the Supreme Court by directing that the amounts ordered to be paid to the dismissed workmen could be drawn by them only on their furnishing security to the satisfaction of the Industrial tribunal concerned. In the present case, however, the interim relief is not being granted to dismissed workmen but to those employees who are in the pay-roll of the petitioner. Moreover, the petitioner does not appear to have made any request to the Industrial Court at the time of grant of interim relief that the employees should be permitted to draw the interim increments only on furnishing security to safeguard the interest of the employer. Shri Deo, learned counsel for the representative Union, very fairly gave an assurance before us, on behalf of the representative Union, that the Union would abide by any final order of the Industrial Court that may ultimately be passed in this behalf. The amount of interim increment granted by the Industrial Court cannot also be said to be excessive. We, therefore, see no reason, in the present case, to modify the direction regarding interim relief given by the Industrial Court. ( 7. ) FOR all these reasons, the petition is without any force and is dismissed accordingly. Counsels fee Rs. 100 if certified. The outstanding amount of security deposit, if any, shall be refunded to the petitioner after deduction of costs.