Order:- This petition (C.R.P. No. 1762 of 1968) coming on for heaing before the Honourable Mr. Justice G. Ramanujam, on Wednesday 28th April, 1971 upon perusing the petition, the order of the lower Court, the material papers and upon hearing the arguments Mr. P. S. Ramachandran for G. S. Rajappa, Advocate, for Petitioner and of Mr. V. Janakiram, Advocate, for the first respondent, and second respondent not appearing in person or by Advocate, and having stood over for consideration till 30th April, 1971 the Court made the following order on 3rd April, 1971. The only question that arises for consideration in this revision is as to Whether the petitioner-plaintiff who has prayed for cancellation of a deed of settlement executed by her on the ground of fraud, is liable to pay court-fee on the market value of the properties or on the value of the properties as given in the settlement deed. I find there are two directly conflicting decisions on the point. One has been rendered by Kailasam, J., in Arunachalammal v. Sudalamuthu Pillai1wherein it has been held that the Court-fee payable for cancellation of a document under section 40 (1) of the Madras Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955 should be computed on the value for which the document was executed. The other has been rendered by Sadasivam, J., in Sengoda Nadar v. Doraiswami Goundar1, following the decision in Kutumba Sastri v. Sundaramma2, wherein it has been ruled that in a suit for cancellation of a sale deed executed by the plaintiff on the ground that the document has been secured while the executant was under the influence of liquor should be valued according, to the market value of the property on the date of the suit. In the latter case the decision of Kailasam, J.has been considered and it has been expressed therein that the Full Bench decision in Kutumba Sastri v. Sundaramma3, which dealt with a similar position under the earlier Act has not been properly understood or appreciated. In view of the above two conflicting views expressed, I consider that the matter may be properly considered by a Division Bench and an authoritative ruling given. I therefore direct the papers to be placed before my Lord the Chief Justice for orders. I also direct notice to the Government Pleader as the matter relates to Court-fee. V . In view of the above two conflicting views expressed, I consider that the matter may be properly considered by a Division Bench and an authoritative ruling given. I therefore direct the papers to be placed before my Lord the Chief Justice for orders. I also direct notice to the Government Pleader as the matter relates to Court-fee. V . Syamalam, for C.S. Rajappa, M. A. Sathar Sayeed, P. Gururamachandran, for Petitioners. V. Gajapathy, A. Ibrahim Khan, Manicka K. Ramalingam, for Respondents. The Judgement of the Court was delivered by Veeraswami, C.J.-This reference relates to court-fee and is made on the view that there is a conflict of decisions on the interpretation of section 40 (1) of the Madras Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955. In Arunachalammal v. Sudalamuthu Pillai4, Kailasam, J., held that Court-fee should be assessed on the value for which the document was executed and not on the market value. In Sengoda Nadar v. Doraiswami Goundar2, which was concerned with a suit for cancellation of a sale deed Sadasivam, J., considered that, in view of Kutumba Sastri v. Sundaramma1, a Full Bench decision, fee Was exigible on the market value of the property covered by the document sought to be set aside. The instant case is of a plaint seeking to set aside a final decree in a partition suit, in which the property forming the security of the mortgage in favour of the petitioner was not allotted to the mortgagor, but to another sharer. The petitioner is set ex parte at the final decree proceedings. On the view We are inclined to take as to the scope and effect of the plaint and the relief claimed therein, it may not be necessary to resolve the conflict between Arunachalammal v. Sudalamuthu, Pillai2, and Sengoda Nadar v. Doraiswami Goundar3. But, since arguments have been heard by us, it seems that the view, namely, that Court-fee should be paid on the market value of the subject-matter of the suit covered by a decree or document which prevailed in Kutumba Sastri v. Sundarammal1, is the correct one. The language of section 7 (iv-A) of the earlier Court-fees Act is in pari materia with that in section 40 (1) of the 1955 Act. The first part of the sub-section presents no difficulty,beca-use it speaks of the value of the subject-matter of the suit which clearly means the market value. The language of section 7 (iv-A) of the earlier Court-fees Act is in pari materia with that in section 40 (1) of the 1955 Act. The first part of the sub-section presents no difficulty,beca-use it speaks of the value of the subject-matter of the suit which clearly means the market value. But the sub-section proceeds to say that the value of the subject-matter of the suit should be deemed to be so and so. If what is sought to be cancelled is the whole of the decree or document, the basis for " assessment of Court-fee is the amount or value of the property for which the decree was passed or such document was executed. But, if a part of the decree or the document is sought to be cancelled, Court-fee is to be paid on such part of the amount or value of the property. The language so employed is intended to meet different situations where decree and documents of diverse character may be involved. Where the subject-matter of the decree is property equally it is easy, because in such cases it is the amount for Which the document was executed. Prima facie it would appear that the basis for assessment of Court-fee is the amount that has been mentioned in the document. But, on a closer scrutiny of the entire section, its intention is quite clear, especially in the light of the language "if a part of the decree or other document is sought to be cancelled, such part of the amount or value of the property"; It will be illogical to hold that, if a part of the document is asked to be set aside the market value should be the basis. But, if the whole of the document is to be set aside, the amount which is mentioned in the document, is the value. The crux of the matter lies really in the first part of the sub-section, namely, the value of the subject-matter of the suit being the basis for assessment of the Court-fee. The deeming contemplated by it is not to convert the value into something different from the market value. The words "for which the decree was passed or other document was executed" will have to be understood only in the sense of the value of the subject-matter being the basis for assessment of Court-fee which is the market value. The deeming contemplated by it is not to convert the value into something different from the market value. The words "for which the decree was passed or other document was executed" will have to be understood only in the sense of the value of the subject-matter being the basis for assessment of Court-fee which is the market value. That apparently Was the view of Venkatasubba Rao, J., in Bali Reddi v. Abdul Sattar1, which was accepted as the correct view by the Full Bench in Kutumba Sastri v. Sundaramma2. 2. In the instant case, however, it seems to us that the subject-matter is neither the property for Which the mortgage Was executed nor the mortgage itself. The petitioner, as a mortgagee, is not asking for the property. Nor does it relate to the mortgage. His grievance appears to be against the allotment of the property mortgaged to him to a person other than the mortgagor. That being the limited relief that the petitioner is interested in the suit, the subject-matter, namely, his grievance against the particular allotment, is not capable of market value. It follows that Court-fee is notpayable under section 40 (1) The provisions that Will be applicable is section 50. The Court-fee paid by the petitioners in C.R.P. Nos. 1762of 1968 and 1615 of 1969appears, to be correct. The petitioner in C.R.P. No. 2019 of 1971 will have two months’ time to pay the deficit Court-fee. There will be an order accordingly. No costs in any of the petitions. S.J. --------------------- Court-fee paid correct.