Judgment :- 1. This Petition coming on for hearing before the Honble Mr. Justice, Kailasam, on Tuesday the 5th and Wednesday the 6th October, 1971 in the Presence of Mr. V.K. Thiruvenkatachari for U.N.R. Rao and M. Gopinathan, Advocates for the petitioners and Mr. A.C. Muthanna, for I. Subramaniam and P.M. Cole Advocates for the respondent, the court made the following Order of reference to Bench: The question that is raised in this civil revision petition is whether the principle of constructive res judicata is applicable to proceedings under Madras Act XVIII of 1960. In the previous proceedings the question whether the building was used for a purpose other than for which it was leased, namely, the letting by the principal company to its sister concern, was not factually raised and decided. But on behalf of the respondent it is submitted that this point ought to have been raised and as such is covered by the principle of constructive res judicata. On the other hand, the petitioners contention is that S. 19 of the Act is not wide enough to include the principle of constructive res judicata, As this point is of considerable importance and is not covered by any authority, the petition will be placed before a Bench for decision. This case coming on for hearing on this day pursuant to the above order of reference, the court delivered the following Judgment:— (The Judgment of the Court was delivered by the Honble the Chief Justice.) 1. The question in this petition is whether the issue, whether the premises have been used for a purpose not authorised, as a ground of eviction under S. 10(2)(ii)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, is concluded by the principle of constructive res judicata. In the earlier proceedings, the ground for eviction was thus stated; “5(a) The lessees have sublet a portion of the demised premises namely, the portion in the ground floor shaded yellow in Plan No. I to Premier Automobiles Limited. The consent of the petitioners was not asked for or given for such subletting. (b) The lessees have converted and used a portion of the demised premises, namely, the entire portion in the first floor of the buildings (Plan No. II) for the residence of the friend of their Branch Manager Mr. The consent of the petitioners was not asked for or given for such subletting. (b) The lessees have converted and used a portion of the demised premises, namely, the entire portion in the first floor of the buildings (Plan No. II) for the residence of the friend of their Branch Manager Mr. V.B. Menon.” Then in the penultimate paragraph of the petition it was stated that the petitioners therefore submit that the respondents were liable under S. 10(2)(ii)(a) and (b) of the Act to be evicted from the demised premises. The petition stood eventually dismissed. When it came up to this Court, Ananthanarayanan, C.J., found that no sub-letting was proved as there was no evidence of payment of rent. He also concluded that Cl. 9 in the lease deed had not been transgressed. Cl. 9 runs: “The lessee shall use the demised premises only for the purpose of the administrative office of their business and for no other purpose.” In the present petition out of which the civil revision arises the ground of eviction based on Cl. 9 aforesaid is thus stated: “Cl. 9 of the lease specifically provides that the lessee should use the demised premises only for the purpose of administrative office of their business and for no other purpose. Contrary to the covenant, the respondents gave the use of a portion of the leased premises to one Premier Automobiles Limited, Bombay, and their local Resident representive ran his office in the leased premises.” The Courts below have held that this ground is no longer open to the landlord on the view that it should be deemed to have been decided finally in the earlier proceedings. 2. We are unable to accept this as the correct view. Cls. (a) and (b) of S. 10(2)(ii) appear to be different clauses of action. Cl. (a) involves contractual relationship. It may be that, in certain circumstances, it may in addition reflect unauthorised user. But the empasis under Cl. (a) as a ground for eviction is the unauthorised subletting, that is to say, putting somebody in possession as a result of a contract and in consideration of payment of rent. But Cl. (b) as a ground of eviction has nothing to do with any contractual relationship. It is merely unauthorised user. It is, therefore, a different cause of action. We are unable to accede to Mr. But Cl. (b) as a ground of eviction has nothing to do with any contractual relationship. It is merely unauthorised user. It is, therefore, a different cause of action. We are unable to accede to Mr. Muthannas contention that once the ground under Cl. (a) is rejected, it automatically means that it is a decision against a ground under Cl. (b) as well. Though, to a certain extent, common facts may prove either of those grounds, beyond that point, different facts are required for purposes of establishing the ground under Cl. (a). They are not the same grounds, and therefore, the issues related to each of those grounds cannot be the same. Reference was made to Anantanarayanan, C.J.s view that the unauthorised user was not established and this will constitute as res judicata . But, we find by reference to the pleadings, which we have already referred to, that the present petition is based on not the same facts as urged, but on different facts, namely, that this time Premier Automobiles Limited, Bombay, are allowed to use the premises, contrary to Cl. 9 in the lease deed. That was not a matter which was decided earlier. 3. The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure will not apply except to the extent by the Act itself. S. 11 is not one of them. The Act, by S. 19 makes certain decisions arrived at by the Tribunals under the Act final. It says that the Controller shall reject an application summarily if it raised between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claimed, substantially the same issues as had been finally decided or as purported to have been finally decided, in a former proceeding under the Act. As we said, the issues under Cl. (a) and (b) are not the same, but different, and the present petition is not hit by S. 19, or by any principle of constructive res Judicata. 4. The petition is therefore, allowed. The result is the Rent Controller will list the petition on his file for fresh and expeditious disposal. He will dispose of the petition within three months from to-date. No costs.