Judgment :- 1. This is a petition by the appellant to review the judgment in the second appeal. The second appeal was dismissed on two grounds. One is that the appellant is not entitled to revaluation of the building for which compensation was determined before the decree because of S.5 (3) of the Kerala Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act, 1958 (Act 29 of 1958) and the second ground is that the appellant is not entitled to fixity of tenure. 2. The ground for the review petition is that the view taken by this Court on the first ground is vitiated by an error apparent on the face of the record. The first ground was disposed of by this Court thus: "That S.5 (3) of Act 29 of 1958 will not enable the execution court to re-value a building for which compensation has been fixed under the decree of the court has been the view taken in a series of decisions of this Court". 3. It Is contended by counsel for the petitioner that the impression in the mind of the Court at the time the appeal was disposed of, that the interpretation of S.5 (3) of Act 29 of 1958 has been concluded by series of decisions of this Court, is not correct and it will constitute an error apparent on the face of the record. 4. As was pointed out by the Supreme Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque and Others AIR. 1955 SC. 233, what is an error apparent on the face of the record cannot be defined precisely or exhaustively there being an element of indefiniteness inherent in its very nature, and it must be left to be determined judicially on the facts of each case. It will be legitimate to assume that at the time when the second appeal was disposed of, it was assumed that the decisions are to the effect that for purposes of revaluation of a building S.5 (3) of the Act cannot apply. But no exact decision of this Court has been brought to my notice taking that view. I, therefore, hold that there is an error apparent on the face of the record in respect of the decision on the first ground and I reopen the same. But no exact decision of this Court has been brought to my notice taking that view. I, therefore, hold that there is an error apparent on the face of the record in respect of the decision on the first ground and I reopen the same. But I heard counsel on both sides on the claim of the appellant for a revaluation of the building both under S.5 (3) of Act 29 of 1958 and also under S.51 of the T.P. Act. 5. The second appeal arises out of an order in execution of the decree. The decree is for recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property after setting aside the sale deed executed by some of the members of a Marumakkathayam tarwad. The trial court's decree was passed on 8-7-1957 and the value of the building was determined at Rs. 16,000/- and odd in the decree of the trial court on the basis of the commissioner's report dated 27-6-1966. It is the admitted case that the value of improvements fixed by the decree was not deposited within a reasonable time of the decree. There was an appeal by the plaintiff against the decree of the trial court objecting to the claim for value of improvements which was pending for some years. Finally the decree of the trial court was confirmed and the appeal was dismissed. 6. It was thereafter that the plaintiff filed the petition for execution and deposited the compensation for improvements fixed under the trial court's decree. In the meanwhile, the defendant's interest in the building was sold in court auction and the court-auction-purchaser assigned it to the appellant who claimed enhancement of compensation in the execution court because of the rise in prices of materials. No compensation for trees is involved in this case. 7. In pursuance to the claim for enhancement of compensation a commission was issued by the execution court to assess the value of the building and the commissioner filed his report. It is seen therefrom that the appellant will be entitled to about 11/2 times more than what has been awarded by the decree. The claim was overruled both by the execution court as well as by the lower appellate court. The claim was founded only on S.5(3) of Act 2 of 1958 in the courts below. S.51 of the T. P. Act was not invoked to sustain the claim. The claim was overruled both by the execution court as well as by the lower appellate court. The claim was founded only on S.5(3) of Act 2 of 1958 in the courts below. S.51 of the T. P. Act was not invoked to sustain the claim. I do not want to shut out the arguments based on S.51 of the T. P. Act merely for the reason that it was not raised in the lower court. 8. In applying S.51 of the Transfer of Property Act or S.5(3) of Act 29 of 1958 it should not be forgotten that the present claim arises in execution of the decree. It is a fundamental principle of law that it is not the function of the execution court to go behind the decree or to decide matters which have already been concluded between the parties over again. The fact that the compensation in respect of the building was fixed as early as 8-7-1957 and in view of the deposit after a long number of years the appellant is deprived of the present value of the building are not matters that can confer jurisdiction on the execution court to go behind the terms of the decree. This point should have been raised by the appellant's predecessor-in¬interest in the appeal filed by the plaintiff against the trial court's decree, or the matter should have been left open by the trial court to be decided by the execution court. 9. S.51 of the T. P. Act as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Narayana Rao v. Basavanjappa (AIR. 1956 SC. 727) can only help the appellant to snow that the date of ascertainment of the compensation for improvements should be as near the date of eviction as possible. That cannot afford any help to the appellant in this case. If the trial court has done a wrong thing in not doing so or in not issuing such directions to the execution court to implement S.31 of the T. P. Act in the way in which it has been interpreted by the supreme Court, the appellant has to thank himself. That will not in any way confer power upon the execution court to decide the matter over again. That will not in any way confer power upon the execution court to decide the matter over again. No benefit can therefore, accrue to the appellant on the basis of S.51 of the T P. Act The plea that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court interpreting S.51 of the Transfer of Property Act every decree should be deemed to contain a clause by implication empowering the execution court to reopen the claim for improvements to satisfy the terms of S.51 of the T. P. Act does not appeal to me. 10. Counsel on behalf of the respondent contended relying on the decision in Nagendrabala v. Panchanan Mourie (AIR. 1934 Cal. 290) that the appellant being a transferee from the vendee who is the defendant, cannot claim the benefit of S.51 of the T. P. Act. This decision has no application at this stage when the claim for improvements has already been upheld by the decree. The present claim is only for a revaluation of the building for which it has already been found that the assignor of the appellants is entitled to the value. Prima facie it looks to me that Nagendrabala v, Panchanan Mourie (AIR. 1934 Cal. 290) has no application to this case. "S. 5 (3) of Act 29 of 1958 reads: "The amount of compensation for improvements made subsequent to the date up to which compensation for improvements has been adjudged in the decree and the re-valuation of an improvement, for which compensation has been so adjudged, when and in so far as such re-valuation may be necessary with reference to the condition of such improvement at the time of eviction as well as any sum of money accruing due to the plaintiff subsequent to the said date for rent, or otherwise in respect of the tenancy, shall be determined by order of the court executing the decree and the decree shall be varied in accordance with such order". It is no doubt correct that the effect of S.5 (3) of Act 29 of 1958 is to set at naught the finality of a decree fixing compensation in respect of certain matters; but it is only to such extent and no more. 11. Then the question is whether S.5 (3) is satisfied in this case, and will enable the appellant to get the building in respect of which the compensation is claimed re-valued. 11. Then the question is whether S.5 (3) is satisfied in this case, and will enable the appellant to get the building in respect of which the compensation is claimed re-valued. According to the Section, re-valuation is possible and can be claimed only when and in so far as such re-valuation may be necessary with reference to the condition of such improvement at the time of eviction. The words "condition of such Improvement at the time of eviction" were discussed to a considerable extent at the Bar. Counsel on behalf of the appellant relying on the decision in Narayana Rao v. Basavarajappa (AIR. 1956 SC. 727) interpreted those words as meaning as including even changes in the marketable conditions of improvement. The decision in Narayana Rao v. Basavarajappa (AIR. 1956 SC. 727) cannot support counsel for the appellant in such an interpretation. "With reference to the condition of such improvement" in S.5 (3) can only mean a change in the nature and quality of improvement. If a building which is 25 years old, is valued today on the basis of the prevailing prices, depreciation for the age will have to be reduced to ascertain the compensation for improvement. I have, therefore, no doubt in saying that S.5 (3) cannot apply. 12. I, therefore hold that neither S.51 of the T.P. Act nor S.5 (3) or Act 29 of 1958 can help the appellant. I, therefore confirm the decision in the second appeal and dismiss the petition. No costs. Dismissed.