ORDER P.K. Tare, C.J. This is a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India by a motor operator against the order dated 301-1965 (Petitioner's Annexure-B), passed by the Tax Officer and Regional Transport Officer, Bilaspur, directing the petitioner to deposit arrears of passenger-tax amounting to Rs. 1,21,660.55 paise for the period from 7-5 1962 to 31-12-1964. The Regional Transport Officer observed that the petitioner was a constant defaulter and in spite of oral assurance given from time to time, it had not paid the arrears of passenger tax. Therefore, a penalty of Rs. 30,665.14 paise was imposed on him. The petitioner was directed to deposit arrears of tax along with the penalty imposed. Hence this writ petition. The demand notice in pursuance of this levy, however, was not issued for a long time. Ultimately it was issued on 16-11-1971 (Petitioner's Annexure-C) after the petitioner had paid most of the arrears leaving a balance of Rs. 1,994.78 paise as arrears. The said demand notice required the petitioner to deposit arrears along with the penalty of Rs. 31,483.05 paise. The learned counsel for the respondents raised a preliminary objection that the writ petition is unduly delayed inasmuch as the penalty was imposed on 30-1-1965, while the present writ petition was filed on 13-12-1971. It is true that the original order of penalty was imposed on 30-1-1965. But no appeal is provided against an order imposing penalty. Section 12 of the M. P. Motor Vehicles (Taxation of Passengers) Act, 1959, provides an appeal against a notice of demand. It is true that section 9 of the Act provides for penalty for non-payment of tax. But if the petitioner had no remedy against the order imposing a penalty but his remedy was only against a demand notice, we do not think that the petitioner should be expected to take any action against the order of penalty itself. In the Income-Tax Act, 1961, as also in the M. P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958, there are clear provisions providing an appeal against the order of penalty. But, no such provision is there in the present Act. Consequently, we are of opinion that any period prior to the issuance of notice of demand should not be counted against the petitioner. But, no such provision is there in the present Act. Consequently, we are of opinion that any period prior to the issuance of notice of demand should not be counted against the petitioner. At any rate, it would be a fit case where the delay might be excused on account of the special provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Motor Vehicles (Taxation of Passengers) Act, 1959. We may further observe that the rule of undue delay is not an inflexible one and despite the delay this Court can issue Writs in suitable cases where a question of principle is involved or where the impugned order is on the face of it illegal, causing injury to a party. A Writ cannot be refused merely on the ground of delay and the rule of limitation cannot be introduced, as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Chandra Bhushan v. Dy. Director, Consolidation. U. P. A I R 1967 S C 1272 and in Kamini Kumar Das Choudhary v. State of West Bengal A I R 1972 S C 2060. As a result, we overrule the preliminary objection and hold that if the petitioner is able to make out a special case showing some patent illegality, we would not hesitate in exercising our prerogative powers in the matter of granting relief to the petitioner. The learned counsel for the petitioner raised only two points. One was that the notice of demand in pursuance of the levy of penalty ought to have been issued within one year from the time of discovery of the default and consequently, the notice, dated 16-11-1971 (Petitioner's Annexure-C) should be held to be barred by time. We may observe that the learned counsel is trying to import the ingredients of section 8 of the Act into section 9, which evidently cannot be permitted. Section 9 itself does not provide for any limitation whatsoever. On the other hand, section 8, which is in respect of escaped assessment does provide for a limitation. For the sake of convenience we may reproduce both the Sections, which are as follows: Section 8.-Fares escaping assessment. Section 9 itself does not provide for any limitation whatsoever. On the other hand, section 8, which is in respect of escaped assessment does provide for a limitation. For the sake of convenience we may reproduce both the Sections, which are as follows: Section 8.-Fares escaping assessment. If, for any reason, the whole or any portion of the tax livable under this Act, for any month has escaped assessment, the Tax Officer may, at any time within, but not beyond, one year from the expiry of that month, assess the tax which has escaped assessment, after issuing a notice to the operator and making such inquiry as the officer may consider necessary. The Section prohibits re-assessment in case of escaped assessment beyond the period of one year from the expiry of the month and the Section also provides for a notice to the operator and inquiry as the officer may consider necessary. On the other hand, section 9 of the Act reads as under: Section 9.-Penalty for non-payment of tax where the whole or any portion of the tax payable to the State Government in respect of any stage carriage for any month or portion thereon in pursuance of sections 6, 7 and 8 has not been paid to it in time, the Tax Officer may, in his discretion, levy in addition to the tax so payable, a penalty not exceeding 25 per cent, of the maximum tax which would have been payable to the State Government if the stage carriage had carried its full complement to passengers during such month or portion thereof. The wording of the Section clearly indicates that there is no limitation fixed for imposition of penalty for non-payment of tax. The suggestion of the learned counsel for the petitioner that as section 8 had been mentioned in this Section, the ingredients of section 8 should be imported into this Section. In our opinion, such an argument is absolutely fallacious. In addition to section 8, section 6 and section 7 also have been mentioned in section 9. Therefore, the ingredients of sections 6 and 7 cannot be allowed to be imported into section 9. What section 9 of the Act provides is only penalty for non-payment of tax as may be due as assessed under section 6 or section 7 or re-assessment under section 8 of the Act. Therefore, the ingredients of sections 6 and 7 cannot be allowed to be imported into section 9. What section 9 of the Act provides is only penalty for non-payment of tax as may be due as assessed under section 6 or section 7 or re-assessment under section 8 of the Act. Therefore, we are unable to accept this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the ingredients of section 8 of the Act providing for limitation should be imported into section 9 of the Act. Such a penalty, in our opinion, can be imposed at any time when the fact of non-payment comes to the notice of the Taxing Authority. The other point raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the penalty has been imposed without any notice to the petitioner and without any hearing to be granted to him As observed by us earlier, the Income Tax Act, 1961, and the M. P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958, do provide for notice to the assessee in the matter of imposition of penalty as also hearing. Although section 8 of the M.P. Motor Vehicles (Taxation of Passengers) Act, 1959, contemplates a notice to the operator and an inquiry as the Officer may consider necessary, it is rather queer that in the matter of imposition of penalty, section 9 does not contemplate either notice or any hearing. There may be cases where the non-payment maybe for a sufficient cause and this blanket power given to the Taxing authority regarding imposition of penalty would, in our opinion, be very oppressive. The M. P. Motor Vehicles (Taxation of Passengers) Rules, 1959, also do not provide for any notice or any hearing. Rule 8 of the said Rules provides for a notice in cases referred to in section 7 and rule 9 provides for a notice of demand to be issued under subsection (1) of section 10 in a particular form. Making no provision for a notice and without any hearing to be given to the operator-assessee would, in our opinion, violate the very salient principle of natural justice, namely, audi alteram partem, which is a very fundamental principle of jurisprudence. Previously it was thought that before a penalty could be levied it was necessary for a Tax Officer to pass an order of assessment or re-assessment before issuing the notice of demand. Previously it was thought that before a penalty could be levied it was necessary for a Tax Officer to pass an order of assessment or re-assessment before issuing the notice of demand. That was the view expressed by a Division Bench of this Court in Anand ransport Co. (P) Ltd. v. M. P. Singh, Dy. Transport Commissioner, M. P. M. P. No. 303 of 1966, decided on the 15th December 1966. However, the matter was taken up before the Supreme Court in M. P. Singh, Deputy Transport Commissioner, M. P. v. Anand Transport Co. (P) Ltd. 1971 M P L J 971 (S C) : A I R 1971 S C 2127. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court, while reversing the view of the High Court, laid down as follows: We are unable to accede to the contention which prevailed with the High Court that even where the returns had been submitted but the tax had not been paid, the Tax Officer is bound to make an order before serving a notice of demand even though the demand is strictly in accordance with the returns which have been submitted. Section 7 rules out any such course to be followed by the Tax Officer. It is only when the returns have not been submitted or when returns submitted are found to be incorrect and incomplete that the Tax Officer has to make an inquiry and determine the sum payable by the operator by way of tax. Similarly if there has been escapement of tax, proceedings have to be taken under section 8 and an order has to be made after an enquiry. The position would be same if penalty is sought to be levied under section 9. But where returns have been accepted as correct, nothing more need be done except to recover the tax due which has not been paid and no assessment order need be passed in view of the express language of section 7. It is clear from the pronouncement of their Lordships of the Supreme Court that their Lordships contemplated a notice and an inquiry regarding the penalty to be imposed under section 9 of the Act. Evidently, the Section itself does not make any such provision. But, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have laid down that dictum having in view the principles of natural justice. Evidently, the Section itself does not make any such provision. But, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have laid down that dictum having in view the principles of natural justice. It is true that ordinarily the law Courts do not indulge in judicial legislation, but in our opinion, the law declared by their Lordships of the Supreme Court becomes the law of the land by virtue of Article 141 of the Constitution of India, and, therefore on the strength of the pronouncement of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the said case, we are clearly of the opinion that before a penalty under section 9 of the M. P. Motor Vehicles (Taxation of Passengers) Act, 1959, is imposed, the same procedure ought to be followed by the Taxing authority as provided for in section 8 of the Act. By no stretch of imagination can we get over that pronouncement of their Lordships which, in our opinion, is a binding dictum based on the salutary principle of audi alteram partem. Applying the said dictum to the present case, we find that the Taxing authority imposed the penalty on 30-1-1965 and the notice of demand was issued on 16-11-1971. For all this delay not only the petitioner, but also the Taxing authority was responsible. The order of penalty was not given effect to by issuing a notice of demand immediately, but the petitioner was granted time for payment and he had made most of the payment leaving a balance of Rs. 1,994.78 paise only on the date the notice of demand, dated 16-11-1971 was issued. No subsequent order of penalty was ever passed by the Taxing authority. Therefore, it is not possible to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that the petitioner alone should be held responsible for all this delay. The notice of demand made all calculations upto date of arrears of passengers tax, taking into consideration the payments made by the petitioner. Under the circumstances the first respondent had condoned the defaults by giving time to the petitioner to make payments and as such, the imposition of a very heavy penalty was not justified even assuming that the petitioner was a habitual defaulter. The learned counsel for the respondents, however, urged that section 9 of the M. P. Motor Vehicles (Taxation of Passengers) Act, 1959, does not provide for any notice of any hearing. The learned counsel for the respondents, however, urged that section 9 of the M. P. Motor Vehicles (Taxation of Passengers) Act, 1959, does not provide for any notice of any hearing. We have already dealt with this aspect earlier and for the reasons aforesaid, we would reject the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents. In our opinion issuing a notice about levying a penalty and a hearing to be given to the assessee are absolutely necessary and in the absence of such an opportunity, the order of penalty cannot be sustained in law. Another objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondents was that the petitioner had already exhausted his remedy of appeal as provided by section 12 of the Act. He invited attention to the respondents' Annexure-R/11. The Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal on the ground that the amount of penalty had not been deposited by the assessee. We may observe that the appeal itself was incompetent. There can be no appeal against an order imposing penalty. Section 12 of the Act clearly provides for an appeal against a notice of demand. In this view the so called appeal filed by the petitioner before the Appellate Authority was incompetent and it was bound to be rejected on that ground. As such, the appellate order is of no legal effect inasmuch as it was passed in an appeal, which was incompetent. In this connection see the case of Rajnandgaon Roadways Private Ltd. v. Tax Officer-cum-Regional Transport Officer, Raipur 1972 M P L J. The appellate order was passed on 4-1-1966. On this ground also the learned counsel for the respondents urged that there was too much delay in the filing of the present Writ petition. We may observe that the appeal itself was incompetent and the petitioner could have taken no action against the order imposing penalty. Under the circumstances the question of delay or want of due diligence loses all significance and we have already given reasons for exercising our prerogative powers in view of the special circumstances established in the present case. Therefore, we overrule this objection of the learned counsel for the respondents also. Under the circumstances the question of delay or want of due diligence loses all significance and we have already given reasons for exercising our prerogative powers in view of the special circumstances established in the present case. Therefore, we overrule this objection of the learned counsel for the respondents also. The fact that an alternative remedy may be available would be no bar to the exercise of prerogative powers as laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in K. S. Rashid and Son v. Income Tax Investigation Commission A I R 1954 S C 207. However, where the statutory rights are concerned, the discretion vests in the High Court whether to grant the relief or to refuse the relief in the face of an alternative remedy. In our opinion, it would be the sound judicial discretion to grant the relief where an order may be prima facie illegal on the face of it causing injury to a party or where there are special circumstances established why a party should not be driven to the ordinary remedy under the law. As a result of the discussion aforesaid, it is obvious that the order imposing the penalty passed on 30-1-1963 (Petitioner's Annexure-B) cannot be sustained in law, as it would violate the most salutary principle of jurisprudence, namely, that it was passed without a notice and without a hearing to be given to the petitioner. Consequently, we quash that order with a direction that the first respondent shall decide the question of penalty afresh taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the present case. However, we direct that there shall be no order as to costs as the petitioner was partly to blame for this state of affairs. Therefore, the costs shall be borne as incurred. The outstanding amount of security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioner.