( 1 ) THIS petition, under S. 50 of the Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961, is by the landlord. It is directed against an Order made by the District Judge, bidar, in CMA. 11/1966 whereby he affirmed the order made by the Munsiff, bidar, in CS. No. 155/1 of 1966. By the said Order, the learned Munsiff refused to grant a decree for eviction in favour of the petitioner. ( 2 ) THE petition was filed on the ground set out in Sec. 21 (1) (h) of the rent Control Act. The premises in question is a commercial one. The orignial lease was from year to year, i. e. , from Deepavali to Deepavali, on an annual rent of Rs. 200. It would appear that the term stipulated at the commencement of the tenancy was one year. Before the end of the first year of the tenancy, the landlord is purported to have issued a notice terminating the tenancy two days prior to the succeeding Deepavali. It is conceded that only 25 days' time had been allowed to the tenant to so vacate. He however, filed the petition soon thereafter. ( 3 ) ON behalf of the tenant, it was contended that the notice to quit was invalid and that the requirement of the landlord was neither reasonable nor bona fide. The trial Court, however, proceeded to frame only one issue relative to the question of reasonableness and bona fides. However, in the course of the trial and the arguments, the question of notice to quit was pressed on behalf of the tenant. ( 4 ) THE learned Munsiff came to the conclusion that the notice to quit, was invalid and the landlord had established his bona fides. He dismissed the petition, on account of his finding on the question of notice to quit. On appeal, the learned District Judge, reversed the finding relative to notice to quit and affirmed the one relative to bona fides, thus decreed the eviction. The tenant thereafter preferred CRP. No. 131/70 before this Court. This Court, i. e. , myself, set aside the Order of evicition and remanded the matter to the appellate Court for a fresh consideration of the appeal. In so doing, it was observed that the learned District Judge had not reviewed the evidence relative to the bona fides. The question of notice, however, was not considered. This Court, i. e. , myself, set aside the Order of evicition and remanded the matter to the appellate Court for a fresh consideration of the appeal. In so doing, it was observed that the learned District Judge had not reviewed the evidence relative to the bona fides. The question of notice, however, was not considered. After remand, the learned District Judge affirmed the finding relative to bona fides, but reversed the earlier finding relative to the validity of the notice. He held that the notice to quit was invalid and, therefore, refused eviction. Hence, the landlord has approached this Court in the present revision. ( 5 ) ON behalf of the petitioner, two contentions were urged: (1) that it was not open to the learned District Judge to have interfered with the earlier finding as to the validity of the notice to quit; and (2) that in any event, no notice to quit was necessary as the tenancy came to an end by efflux of time and therefore, the tenant was merely a statutory tenant entitled to the protection of the Rent Control Act. I am in agreement with the second of these contentions and not with the first. ( 6 ) WHEN this Court remanded the matter in CRP. No. 131/70, it proceeded on a short ground that evidence had not been considered by the appellate court, as it was required to do as a first appellate Court of facts. If the order of eviction was set aside on one of the grounds considered by this court, it would not necessarily follow that the other conclusion of the appellate Court stood affirmed, in the absence of express observations to that effect. In short a remand as the one made in the present case would have the effect of leaving all questions at large before the appellate Court. ( 7 ) IN this view, it is open to the lower appellate Court to come to a conclusion contrary to the one earlier arrived at. I, therefore, reject this contention. As regards the other contention, it is clear that the tenancy, which was for one year, on the facts of this case, came to an end by Deepavali of the year 1966. I, therefore, reject this contention. As regards the other contention, it is clear that the tenancy, which was for one year, on the facts of this case, came to an end by Deepavali of the year 1966. That being so, unless there is a fresh contract, express or implied, the tenant would be entitled to the protection of the provisions of the Rent Control Act in cases of eviction by the landlord. In other words, the tenancy is in the nature of a statutory tenancy. It is well settled that in the case of such statutory tenancy no notice to quit is necessary before a landlord sues for eviction, provided he satisfies one or the other of the grounds enumerated in S. 21 (1) of the Rent Control Act. But, it is argued on behalf of the respondent that as notice to quit had been issued during the subsistence of the contract, it would not be open to the landlord to go behind it. I am unable to accept this contention. The fact that the notice to quit, which was subsequently found to be invalid, was issued by the landlord would not make any difference to the principle as to want of notice in a case of statutory tenancy. The learned District Judge was in error, therefore, in concluding that the petitioner had not made out a case based on statutory tenancy. The Order, therefore, is clearly unsustainable. ( 8 ) IN the result, this petition succeeds and is allowed. In substitution of the decree of the Courts below, there will be a decree for eviction in favour of the landlord. But, having regard to the circumstances present in this case, i think it proper to grant the respondent sufficient time to look for an alternative accommodation. The business premises is a commercial one and the tenant had been there for quite sometime, thus acquiring sufficient goodwill. If he is ordered to vacate by next Deepavali, he would be seriously prejudiced. He is, therefore, granted time to vacate the premises, in compliance with the decree till the commencement of the Deepavali in in the year 1974. In the circumstances, the parties will bear their own costs. --- *** --- .