JUDGMENT 1. A learned single Judge of this court, by an order dated July 13, 1971, allowed a writ petition tiled by Shri Mahabir Prasad Srivastava and quashed the order of the Deputy Chief Accounts Officer, dated July 21, 1969, removing him from service. Aggrieved by this order. Union of India and other officers of Northern Railway have filed this appeal. 2. The petitioner was appointed as a shroff in the Northern Railway in the year 1962 and in due course was confirmed in that post. Subsequently he was promoted to officiate as junior pay clerk and in the year 1967, was posted at Lucknow. On 4. 7. 1967 he was served with a charge sheet signed by the Assistant Chief Cashier and Pay Master/Deputy Financial Adviser and Chief Accounts Officer. It was alleged that in the course of his duties he misappropriated a sum of Rs. 465-70 from the railway funds- In due course, the Assistant Divisional Accounts Officer was appointed to make an enquiry against the petitioner. The enquiring officer found the petitioner guilty of the charges framed against him and submitted a report to the Deputy Chief Accounts Officer. The Deputy Chief Accounts Officer agreed with the findings of the enquiring officer and came to the conclusion that the petitioner was not a fit person to be retained in service. Accordingly, he issued a memorandum calling upon the petitioner to show cause why he should not be removed from service. After considering the representation made by the petitioner, the Deputy Chief Accounts Officer passed an order dated July 21, 1969, removing him from service. Shri Mahabir Prasad then filed a petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution, before this Court and impugned the order removing him from service on three grounds :- (1) The Deputy Chief Accounts Officer was not competent to remove the petitioner from service as he is subordinate to the authority which appointed him, namely, the Financial Adviser and Chief Accounts Officer., (2) The enquiry was vitiated as the Chief Cashier and Pay Master was not competent to appoint the Divisional Accounts Officer as the enquiring officer; and (3) That the Deputy Chief Accounts Officer accepted the findings of the enquiring officer without myself recording the findings as required by rule 1713 of the Railway Establishment Code. 3. 3. So far as the first ground is concerned, the case of the petitioner Is that he was appointed as a shroff by the Financial Adviser and Chief Accounts Officer. The order removing h'm from service has been passed by the Deputy Chief Accounts Officer who is subordinate to the authority which appointed him. The order of removal, therefore, is invalid Case of the Railway Administration on the other hand is that the petitioner has been appointed by the Deputy Chief Accounts Officer who is fully competent to make an order removing him from service. As neither side produced the appointment order, learned single Judge did not feel satisfied that the petitioner had been removed from service by an authority subordinate to that which appointed him. He, however, found force in the second and the third grounds raised on behalf of the petitioner. He found that the enquiring officer had been appointed by the Chief Cashier and Pay Master, who was not competent to mike the appointment The impugned order was vitiated inasmuch as it was passed on the report of an enquiring officer who had not been validly appointed. He further found that the impugned order was vitiated as there had been non-compliance with the provisions of rule 1713 of the Railway Establishment Code. He, accordingly, allowed the petition and quashed the order removing the petitioner from service. Being aggrieved by this decision. Union of India and others have filed the present special appeal. 4. When the appeal came up for hearing, Shri Lalji Sinha, learned counsel for the railway administration, contended that ground no. 2 urged on behalf of the petitioner was not specifically taken by him in the writ petition anil therefore, the railway administration omitted to explain the document which gave an impression that the enquiring officer had been appointed by the Chief Cashier. In fact the enquiring officer was appointed under the orders of the Deputy Chief Accounts Officer, who was fully competent to make the appointment. He also moved an application praying that the appellants be permitted to produce before the Court original records showing that the enquiring officer had been appointed by a competent authority. In fact the enquiring officer was appointed under the orders of the Deputy Chief Accounts Officer, who was fully competent to make the appointment. He also moved an application praying that the appellants be permitted to produce before the Court original records showing that the enquiring officer had been appointed by a competent authority. Learned counsel for the petitioner did not object to the request made by the appellants but urged that as the railway administration wanted to produce the records for meeting one of the grounds on which the decision of the learned single Judge had gone against the appellant, it should also produce the record showing petitioner's appointing authority so that full justice may be done in the case. We allowed the application moved on behalf of the railway administration and directed it to file a supplementary affidavit annexing thereto copies of the orders appointing the enquiring officer and also the appointment letter issued to the petitioner. 5. Railway administration then filed an affidavit conceding that the enquiring officer was in fact appointed by the Chief Cashier and Pay Master and not by the Deputy Chief Accounts Officer. It took up the stand that the appointment of enquiry officer, by the Chief Cashier and Pay Master, was in accordance with Rules. It further filed a copy of an order dated September 29, 1962, which according to it is the petitioner's appointment order made by the Deputy Chief Accounts Officer, Northern Railway. At a latter stage the railway administration filed another supplementary affidavit annexing to it copies of certain documents and claimed that they also indicated that petitioner's appointing authority was the Deputy Chief Accounts Officer. 6. Shri S. C. Agrawal, learned counsel for the petitioner supported the ultimate order passed in the writ petition not only on the grounds on which the petition was allowed but also on the ground which the learned single Judge had decided against him. We will, therefore, proceed to consider each of the three grounds urged on behalf of Shri Mahabir Pd. Srivastava. 7. We will, therefore, proceed to consider each of the three grounds urged on behalf of Shri Mahabir Pd. Srivastava. 7. So far as the question about the authority which appointed the petitioner is concerned, we find that by a letter dated September 29, 1962 (Annexure) 'A' to the affidavit in special Appeal) signed by the Deputy Chief Accounts Officer, the petitioner was informed that a result of selection held by the Railway Service Commission he had been selected for being considered for appointment to a temporary post of Shroff. On appointment the petitioner was to make certain declarations and to sign some certificates. He was further informed that in case he was willing to take up the appointment on the terms mentioned in the letter, he should report to the Divisional Medical Officer for medical examination and then to the office. The petitioner appeared before the Medical officer and after obtaining the medical certificate reported to the Assistant Accounts Officer. The Assistant Accounts Officer then addressed a letter dated 17th October, 1962, to the Chief cashier and Pay Master stating that after the petitioner had been declared medically fit he had been appointed as Shroff and that he had been directed to report to him for further orders. It appears that the petitioner took over as Shroff on 20th October, 1962, and there after the Chief Cashier and Pay Master issued a staff Order No. 80, dated 9th November, 1962, stating that Shri Mahabir Prasad, the newly recruited shroff having deposited the security of Rs. 750/ - had been appointed as shroff with effect from 20th October, 1962. Another Staff order No. 706 dated November, 30, 1962, was issued by the Assistant Accounts Officer, New Delhi stating that the Deputy Chief Accounts Officer had approved the appointment of the petitioner who had been selected by the Railway Public Service Commission for the temporary post of Shroff in the office of the Chief Cashier and Pay Master on being declared medically fit with effect from 20th October, 1962. According to the appellants, the order dated 29th September 1962 (Annexure A) to the supplementary affidavit filed in special appeal) is the appointment order made by the Dy. Chief Accounts Officer and that no other appointment order was issued to the petitioner. All such appointment orders were being issued in that very term. According to the appellants, the order dated 29th September 1962 (Annexure A) to the supplementary affidavit filed in special appeal) is the appointment order made by the Dy. Chief Accounts Officer and that no other appointment order was issued to the petitioner. All such appointment orders were being issued in that very term. The petitioner has not placed any material before us, in support of his contention that be was appointed by the Chief Accounts Officer. Shri S. C. Aggarwal did not dispute that the correspondence as stated on behalf of the railway administration was entered into in connection with his appointment as Shroff. He, however, vehemently urged that the order dated September 29, 1962 was not the appointment order. According to him it was merely an intimation to the petitioners that he has been selected for being considered for appointment to a temporary post of Shroff and that he was to be appointed if he fulfilled the requirements and the conditions mentioned therein. He contended that the appointment order should have been couched and worded in the form in which the letter dated 17th October 1962, addressed by the Assistant Accounts officer to the Chief Cashier and Pay Master, was worded. He relied upon the following sentence appearing in that letter. " After being declared medically fit Sarvasri Mahabir Prasad, Jagat Narain Sahu and Parmatma Saran Sharma are appointed as Shroff at Rs. 110/ - plus the usual allowance........... He, however, made it clear that it was not his contention that the letter dated 17th October 1962 was petitioner's letter of appointment." 8. We have given our anxious consideration to this aspect of the case and have no reason to doubt the correctness of the procedure for making the appointment of Shroff, described in the affidavits filed on behalf of the appellants. Even if it be taken that the order dated 29th September, 1962 is not the actual appointment order, it is clear that no other formal letter of appointment has been issued to the petitioner in order to find the authority which appointed the petitioner as a Shroff, we have to look into the circumstances in which the petitioner was so appointed. Staff order dated 30th November 1962, clearly mentions that the petitioner's appointment had been approved by the Deputy Chief Accounts Officer. Staff order dated 30th November 1962, clearly mentions that the petitioner's appointment had been approved by the Deputy Chief Accounts Officer. It is possible to read the expression "has been appointed with the approval of the Deputy Chief Accounts Officer" used in the letter as meaning that the petitioner had been appointed as a Shroff by the Deputy Chief Accounts Officer. Even if the expression is interpreted in its literal sense, it becomes obvious that petitioner had been appointed as a Shroff by an authority lower in rank to that of the Deputy Chief Accounts Officer, and not by an authority which was higher in rank to him. It is not possible to imagine that the Deputy Chief Accounts Officer could approve an appointment made by a superior authority. In the circumstances, even if a formal appointment letter is not available, the record makes it absolutely clear that the petitioner was appointed as a Shroff either by the Deputy Chief Accounts Officer himself as alleged in the supplementary affidavit, or by an authority which was lower in rank to him. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that as the actual letter of appointment is not forthcoming, it is not possible to find his appointing authority. In the circumstances, his case should have been dealt with by the General Manager Northern Railways, as laid down in Circular 52-E/0/31 (E) D. and A) dated August 21, 1964. The relevant portion of the circular runs thus "In supersession of instructions issued vide this office circular No . 2-E/O-VI (E)-D and A) dated 5-1-1960 regarding determination of the appointing authority for staff in class III and IV category as also semi skilled, skilled and artisan staff where the records or appointment letters to show actual appointing authority,of such staff are not available it has been decided that all such staff whether directly recruited or promoted from lower categories, the General Manager should be treated as the appointing authority. Accordingly, the punishment of dismissal, removal and compulsory retirement from service cannot be inflicted on such stiff, whose appointing authority is not available, by an authority lower than the General Manner. Accordingly, the punishment of dismissal, removal and compulsory retirement from service cannot be inflicted on such stiff, whose appointing authority is not available, by an authority lower than the General Manner. In the circumstances all disciplinary cases pertaining to dismissal removal/compulsory retirement of such staff should be submitted to the head quarters (as is being done at present in respect of class III staff whose appointing authority is not available for being processed under the personal orders of General Manager. According to this circular, the matter has to be referred to General Manager only when neither the records nor the appointment letter of an employee is available to indicate the actual appointing authority If the record indicates the appointing authority, action can be taken by that authority. The circular order is not intend-d to confer any legal right on the employee concerned. It is an administrative circular issued in order to avoid a situation where it may become difficult for the administration to establish that and other punishing an employee with dismissal removal or reduction in rank, had been passed by an authority not lower in rank to the appointing authority Even if the letter of appointment is not available it will not be possible to interfere with 1 he order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank In case the record indicates that the employee concerned has been so punished by an authority competent to impose that punishment In the instant case, even if petitioner's letter of appointment is not available' it was not necessary to refer the matter to the General Manager as the record indicated that he had been appointed either by the Deputy Chief Accounts Officer or by an officer inferior in rank to him. In no case could it be said that he had been appointed by the Financial Adviser and the Chief Accounts Officer. In the circumstances, if the Deputy Chief accounts officer proceeded to punish the petitioner, it cannot be said that he has been punished in contravention of Art. 311 of the Constitution, by an authority inferior in rank to the authority which appointed him. There is thus no force in the first argument raised on behalf of the petitioner, which in our opinion was rightly rejected by the learned single Judge. 9. There is thus no force in the first argument raised on behalf of the petitioner, which in our opinion was rightly rejected by the learned single Judge. 9. So far as the second ground on which the validity of the order of removal is being challenged is concerned, the contention of the petitioner is that the procedure for imposition of major penalties including that of removal from service has been laid down in rules 1708 to 1715 of the Railway Establishment Code. According to rule 1710, the disciplinary authority has to appoint an enquiring officer. Rule 1702 defines the disciplinary authority in relation to punishment of "removal from service." as the appointing authority. In the circumstances, it was only the Dy. Chief Accounts Officer who was competent to appoint an enquiring officer The appointment of Enquiring Officer by Chief Cashier and Pay Master was, therefore, illegal. 10. We are unable to accept this submission. The expression disciplinary authority has been defined in rule 1702 (ii) of the Railway Establishment Code, which runs as follows: - "In this chapter unless the context otherwise requires. (i)....................................................................... (ii) Disciplinary authority in relation to the procedure for imposition of penalty on a railway servant means the authority competent to impose on him that penalty, provided that for imposing penalties of compulsory retirement, removal or dismissal that authority shall be appointing authority provided further that - (a) Disciplinary authority in relation to the issue of charge sheets etc. under rule 1709 to 1712 and issue of charge sheet under rule 1716 means so far as cases of gazetted officers are concerned any authority competent to impose any of the penalties specified in rule 1707. (b) Disciplinary authority in relation to the issue of charge sheet under rule 1709 to 1716, and permission to inspect official records under rule 1711 in respect of non gazetted staff means any authority competent to impose any of the penalties specified in rule 1707. (c) Disciplinary authority in relation to consideration of written statement of defence in reply to the charge sheet and appointment of Board of Enquiry or enquiring officer etc. (c) Disciplinary authority in relation to consideration of written statement of defence in reply to the charge sheet and appointment of Board of Enquiry or enquiring officer etc. under rule 1710 and 1712 means so far as the cases of non-gazetted staff are concerned the authority competent to impose the last of the major penalties specified in clauses IV to VII of sub-rule (1) of rule 1707 provided that such authority shall not be lower in status than........................." A perusal of this rule shows that the expression 'disciplinary authority will have different meaning in different rules in that chapter, depending upon the function which a disciplinary authority has to perform. Although, in the rules which deal with the making of order imposing penalty of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, the expression disciplinary authority means the appointing authority, according to rule 1702 (ii) (c), that expressions in rules 1710-1712 which concern the consideration of written statement of defence, reply to charge sheet and appointment of enquiring officer, etc. it means the authority competent to impose lowest of the major penalties in clauses (iv) to (vii) of Sub-rule (1) of rule 1707. It is, therefore, clear that any authority which is competent to impose any of the punishments described in sub clause (iv) to (vii) of rule 1707, even though it may not be an appointing authority of the railway servant concerned, can appoint an enquiring officer. It is clearly stated in the supplementary affidavit filed before us that the Chief Cashier and Pay Master who appointed the Enquiry officer was competent to impose the lowest of the major penalties specified in clause (iv) to (vii)sub rule (I) of rule 1707-viz reduction to a lower time scale or to a lower stage in the same time scale. In our opinion, therefore, the order passed by the Chief Cashier and Pay Master, appointing the enquiring officer to look into the charges levelled against the petitioner, was in order and the disciplinary proceedings were not vitiated on that account. The view expressed by us is fully supported by a decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Hari Das Sardar v. Union of India 1969 Calcutta weekly Notes 656 and another decision of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Sundershan Bajaj v. S. P Agarawal A.I.R. 1966 Rajasthan 37. 11. The view expressed by us is fully supported by a decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Hari Das Sardar v. Union of India 1969 Calcutta weekly Notes 656 and another decision of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Sundershan Bajaj v. S. P Agarawal A.I.R. 1966 Rajasthan 37. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon a decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in writ petition No. 663 of 1969 M. M. Kundu v. General Manager, decided on 24th September, 1972 (Lucknow Bench),. In that case one M. M. Kundu, employed as Pay clerk, was compulsorily retired from service by way of punishment. Two contentions were raised before this Court. (1) Shri Kundu's appointing authority being the Financial Adviser and Chief Accounts officer he could not be compulsorily retired by the Deputy Financial Adviser and Chief Accounts Officer. (2) The enquiring officer had been appointed by the Divisional Accounts Officer who was not competent to make the appointment. Regarding first contention, this Court observed that Shri Kundu's appointing authority was the Deputy Financial Adviser and Chief Account Officer and that the impugned order was not defective on this account So far as the second ground was concerned, it was held that the appointment of the enquiring officer, by the Divisional Accounts Officer, was not in order as the Divisional Accounts Officer was not the disciplinary authority. In that case, it was not urged on behalf of the railway administration that the Divisional Accounts Officer, who appointed the enquiring Officer could be considered to be a 'disciplinary authority'. as he was competent to impose upon Shri Kundu the lowest of the major penalties specified in clauses (iv) to (vii) of sub-rule (1) of rule 1707 as provided in rule 1702 (ii) (c). The decision given in that case does not, therefore, help the petitioner in any manner. 12. Last ground urged on behalf of the petitioner is that after the report was submitted by the enquiring officer, the disciplinary authority, viz. the Deputy Chief Accounts Officer, did not comply with the provisions of rule 1713 which runs as follows :- "The disciplinary authority shall, if it is not the enquiring authority, consider the record of the enquiry and record its finding on each charge." 13. Learned counsel for the Railways brought it to our notice that on 22nd August 1968. the Deputy Chief Accounts Officer, did not comply with the provisions of rule 1713 which runs as follows :- "The disciplinary authority shall, if it is not the enquiring authority, consider the record of the enquiry and record its finding on each charge." 13. Learned counsel for the Railways brought it to our notice that on 22nd August 1968. the President of India, framed rules under Article 309 of the Constitution, known as the Railway servants Discipline and Appeal Rules 1968. Rule 29 provides that the Discipline and Appeal Rules for Railway servants, other than those employed in the Railway Protection Force, in force with effect from the 1st August, 1961 and any orders issued thereunder in so far as they are inconsistent with the,e rules, stand repealed. Proviso (a) to rule 29 (I) provides that such repeal does not affect the previous operation of the repealed rules or any order made, or anything done, or any action taken, thereunder. Further proviso (b) provides that any proceedings under the repealed rules pending at the commencement of these rules are to be continued and disposed of, as far as may be, in accordance with the provisions of these rules as if such proceedings were proceedings under these rules. In the case before us, the disciplinary proceedings against Shri M.P Srivastava were started on 4th of July 1967. After the report of the Inquiring Officer was received by the disciplinary authority it issued a notice, dated 22nd of March 1969, to the petitioner requiring him to show cause why he should not be removed from service. It is, therefore, obvious that by the time the report was submitted by the Enquiring Officer and action was taken by the disciplinary authority, the Railway Servants Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1968 were enforced (these rules came into force with effect from 1st of October, 1968) and accordingly further action on the basis of the report had to be continued in accordance with these rule. 14. 14. According to rule 9 (i), after the inquiring officer has concluded the inquiry he has to prepare a report which is to contain : (a) the articles of charge and the statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour ; (b) the defence of the railway servant in respect of each article of charge ; (c) an assessment of the evidence in respect of each article of charge ; (d) the findings on each article of charge and the reasons therefor. The rule further requires the inquiring authority to forward to the disciplinary authority the records of inquiry, which is to include : - (a) the report prepared by it under clause (i) ; (b) the written statement of defence, if any, submitted by the railway servant ; (c) the oral and documentary evidence produced in the course of the inquiry ; (d) written briefs, if any, filed by the Presenting Officer, if any, or the railway servant or both during the course of the inquiry : and (e) the orders, if any, made by the disciplinary authority and the inquiring authority in regard to the inquiry. After the report and the record as mentioned in Rule 9 (i) has been received by the disciplinary authority, rule 10 (1) requires that the disciplinary authority, having regard to its decision on all or any of the findings of the inquiring authority is of the opinion that the penalty warranted is such as is within its competence it may act on the evidence on the record. Rule 10(5) (i) then provides as follows :- "If the disciplinary authority, having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charge, is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in clause (v) to (ix) of sub rule (1) of rule 6 should be imposed on the railway servant, it shall : - (a) furnish to the railway servant a copy of the report of the inquiry held by it and its findings on each article of charge, or where the inquiry has been held by an inquiring authority and a statement of its findings on each article of charge together with brief reasons for its disagreement, if any, with the findings of the inquiring authority ; (b) give the railway servant a notice stating the penalty proposed to be imposed on him and calling upon him to submit within a specified time ordinarily not exceeding fifteen days from the date of the receipt of the notice subject to a minimum of seven days, such representation as he may to wish make on the proposed penalty on the basis of the evidence adduced during inquiry held under rule 9." 15. According to this rule, in a case where the disciplinary authority, having regard to its decision on all or any of the findings of the enquiring authority, is of the opinion that the penalty warranted is such as is within its competence and it proposes to impose penalty specified in clauses (v) to (ix) of sub-rule (1) of rule 6, it has to forward to the railway servant concerned a copy of the report of the inquiring authority and require him to show cause against the proposed penalty on the basis of the evidence adduced during the inquiry held under rule 9. he has to state reasons or record his findings only if at that stage he disagrees with some of the findings recorded by the inquiring authority, in which event, he has to give to the railway servant concerned not only the report of the inquiring officer, but also the statement of its findings on each article of charge together with brief reasons for its disagreement, if any, with the findings of the inquiring authority. Rule 10 (5)(1)(b) clearly show that when such a notice is given to the railway servant concerned, he is given an opportunity to make such representation as the may wish to make on the proposed penalty on the basis of the evidence adduced during the inquiry. In other words, it is at that stage that he is again afforded an opportunity to have his full say and criticise the findings arrived at by the inquiring officer or the tentative finding arrived at by the disciplinary authority on the basis of the evidence adduced during the inquiry. The question, therefore, that arises for consideration in this case is whether while issuing the show cause notice on 22nd of March, 1969, the disciplinary authority committed any breach of rule 10 of the Railway Servant Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1968. In this case there is nothing to show that on any of the findings recorded by the inquiring authority, the disciplinary authority took a different view of the matter. Accordingly, under rule 10(5) (a) it was merely required to furnish to the railway servant concerned a copy of the report of the inquiry held by the Inquiring officer and under rule 10(5) (b) to give to the railway servant, a notice stating the penalty proposed to be imposed on him and calling upon him to submit within a specified time, such representation as he may wish to make to make on the proposed penalty on the basis of the evidence adduced during the inquiry held under rule 9. ALl these things have been done in this case and as such it cannot be said that there is any non-compliance of the provisions of Rule 10(5). It is no body's case that the record of the case which included the report of the Inquiring Officer as well as the evidence produced in the case together with the statement of the charge and the defence put up the railway servant, were not forwarded to the disciplinary authority. Merely because there is no mention of the fact that the disciplinary authority had looked into the evidence produced in the case before coming to a conclusion that the charge levelled against the petitioner had been proved, it does not mean that the disciplinary authority did not look into the record before arriving at its own conclusions. Merely because there is no mention of the fact that the disciplinary authority had looked into the evidence produced in the case before coming to a conclusion that the charge levelled against the petitioner had been proved, it does not mean that the disciplinary authority did not look into the record before arriving at its own conclusions. As stated above, in a case where it agreed with the findings of the inquiring authority it was not required to state any reason for arriving at its conclusion. In his writ petition, the petitioner did not take the plea that the notice to show cause is bad as the disciplinary authority issued the same without perusing the record and applying its mind to the oral and documentary evidence produced in the case. This plea concerns a factual position which the respondents had no opportunity to meet. The petitioner, therefore, cannot be allowed to raise this controversy at this stage. 16. It may further be noticed that after the show cause notice was issued to the petitioner, he submitted a very detailed reply commenting upon the findings of the inquiring officer as also the evidence produced in the case. According to paragraph 36 of the counter affidavit, he prayed for, and the disciplinary authority granted an oral hearing to him and to his counsel after issuing the show cause notice and before passing the final order in the case. Thus, the petitioner was afforded full opportunity to bring to the notice of the disciplinary authority all the oral and documentary evidence produced in the case and to comment upon it. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the disciplinary authority decided to punish the petitioner without considering the oral and documentary evidence produced in the case, merely because it did not pass the order after making a reference to the oral and documentary evidence produced in the case. Learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to bring to our notice any provisions in the Railway servants Discipline and Appeal Rules-1968 which requires the disciplinary authority to discuss in detail the oral and documentary evidence produced in the case before passing an order punishing a railway servant. Learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to bring to our notice any provisions in the Railway servants Discipline and Appeal Rules-1968 which requires the disciplinary authority to discuss in detail the oral and documentary evidence produced in the case before passing an order punishing a railway servant. When the petitioner appeared personally before the disciplinary authority and placed and commented upon the oral and documentary evidence produced as also on the report submitted by the inquiring officer, it cannot be said he has been prejudiced in any manner. In our opinion the impugned order cannot be said to be defective for non-compliance of the rules contained in the Railway Servants Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1968 Moreover, as observed by the Supreme Court in connection with Rule 1713 of the Railway Establishment Code, in the case of Union of India v. Rajappa, (A I.R. 1970 S.C. 748), that such rules are to be read not a pedantic manner but in a practical and reasonable way and that a substantial compliance with them is sufficient. In our opinion, Railway Servants Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1968 have in any case been substantially complied with and the petitioner has not been prejudiced by the procedure adopted by the disciplinary authority. 17. We are, accordingly, of the opinion that action taken against Shri Mahavir Prasad Srivastava is not vitiated and that the petition filed by him should not have been allowed. 18. In the result the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The order dated 13th of July, 1971 passed by the learned Single Judge is set aside. The writ petition filed by Shri Mahavir Prasad Srivastva is dismissed but in the circumstances of this case we direct the parties to bear their own costs.