A. A. DAVE, J. ( 1 ) [the Honble Court after narrating the facts of the case observed:] ( 2 ) THE plaintiff had based her relief for possession on two grounds. One was for bona fide and reasonable requirement which. I have already considered at great length and another on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent exceeding six months by the defendant on the date of the suit. It is not disputed that the defendant was in arrears of rent from 1. 9 Thus on the date of the suit he was in arrears of rent for 8 months. On the date of notice also the defendant was in arrears of rent exceeding six months. The learned Advocate for the opponent however invited my attention to the reply given by the defendant to the notice received by him wherein he had raised a dispute about the standard rent. He therefore urged that once there was a dispute about the standard rent between the parties even if the defendant had not paid arrears of rent within one month from the receipt of notice by him his case would not be covered by clause (a) of sub-sec. (3) of sec. 12 of the Act if he had raised a dispute within one month from the receipt of notice by him. In such a case Mr. Bhatt urged that the defendants case would be governed by sec. 12 (3) (b) of the Act and as the defendant had paid all arrears of rent before the decree was passed by the court of first instance and also had paid all arrears of rent during the pendency of the appeal the defendant could be said to have sufficiently complied with the provisions of sec. 12 (3) (b) of the Act. It is true that the defendant had taken a plea in his reply to the notice received by him from the petitioner that the rent charged by the petitioner was in excess of the standard rent. However if the evidence of the defendant is read it would be clear that the dispute raised by him was not bona fide. The only explanation offered by him for raising this dispute was that in view of his income the rent charged from him was excessive. Now the standard rent of the premises does not depend on the income earned by a tenant. The only explanation offered by him for raising this dispute was that in view of his income the rent charged from him was excessive. Now the standard rent of the premises does not depend on the income earned by a tenant. What is standard rent is already defined in the Rent Control Act and I need not refer to the same here. It is not the case of the defendant that the petitioner had let the suit premises at lesser rent before it was taken on rent by him. Thus if the defendant merely in order to avoid his liability to pay the arrears of rent exceeding six months raised a dispute of standard rent which he cannot substantiate could it be said that his case would be excluded from the operation of sec. 12 (3) (a) of the Act ? In my opinion merely raising a dispute of standard rent which cannot be substantiated would not be enough to take out the case from the purview of sec. 12 (3) (a) of the Act. If the defendant failed to pay the arrears of rent within one month from the date of receipt of notice by him and if it is found from evidence on record that the dispute about the standard rent raised by him in reply to the notice was not bona fide it cannot be said that the defendant was ready and willing to pay the rent and in such a case the defendant would not be protected by sec. 12 (1) of the Rent Act. In such a case a decree for eviction is bound to follow even if after the suit is filed he pays all the arrears of rent. In the case of Shah Dhansukhlal Chhaganlal v. Dalichand Virchand Shroff A. I. R. 1968 Supreme Court 1109 it was observed"where a suit for eviction is filed on the ground that the tenant was in arrears for a period of more than 6 months and the tenant although raising a dispute as to the standard rent or permitted increases recoverable under the Act makes no application in terms of sec. 11 (3) he cannot claim the protection of sec. 12 (1) by merely offering to pay or even paying all arrears due from him when the court is about to pass a decree against him. To be within the protection of sub-sec. 11 (3) he cannot claim the protection of sec. 12 (1) by merely offering to pay or even paying all arrears due from him when the court is about to pass a decree against him. To be within the protection of sub-sec. (1) where he raises a dispute about the standard rent payable he must make an application to the court under sub-sec. (3) of sec. 11 and thereafter pay or tender the amount of rent and permitted increases if any specified in the order made by the court. If he does not approach the court under sec. 11 (3) it is not open to him thereafter to claim the protection of sec. 12 (1)". In the instant case the defendant was in arrears of rent for nearly 8 months on the date of the suit. On the date of notice also he was in arrears of rent for a period of six moths. He did not pay the arrears within one month from the receipt of notice. He did not file any application under sec. 11 (3) of the Act for fixing the standard rent as provided thereunder. Under the circumstances merely because he raised a dispute about the standard rent in his reply to the notice he cannot be saved from the operation of sec. 12 (3) (a)of the Act. However assuming for the sake of argument that the defendant was protected by merely raising a dispute of standard rent in his reply to the notice from the operation of sec. 12 (1) of the Act and also under sac. 12 (3) (a) thereof the question remains whether he can claim protection of sec. 12 (3) (b) of the Act if he hat not complied with the provisions thereof by depositing all arrears of rent on the first date of hearing of the suit and thereafter paying rent every month as and when it became due. Admittedly in the instant case the defendant did not deposit any arrears of rent in court on the first date of hearing of the suit. The defendant paid all arrears of rent after the court under its judgment gave him time to. deposit the amount found due against him. The court fixed the standard rent at Rs. 18. 50 paise per month which was the standard rent according to the petitioner also. The appellate court did not increase the said standard rent. The defendant paid all arrears of rent after the court under its judgment gave him time to. deposit the amount found due against him. The court fixed the standard rent at Rs. 18. 50 paise per month which was the standard rent according to the petitioner also. The appellate court did not increase the said standard rent. Therefore no question arose for making any payment of the excess amount In the appellate court. Thus there was no dispute about standard rent in the appellate court. It was therefore incumbent on the defendant to go on depositing rent every month in court as and when it became due because the appeal was a continuation of the suit. In this connection it will be worthwhile to refer to the following observations of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ratilal Balabhai Nazar v. Ranchhodbhai Shankerbhai Patel and others 9 G. L. R. 48:the expression till the suit is finally decided refers to the decision of the suit in appeal by the appellate court when therefore an appeal is preferred by the land lord against a decree passed by the trial court dismissing his suit and the question arises before the appellate court whether the tenant is entitled to the protection of sec. 12 (3) (b) the appellate court would have to consider whether the tenant has after paying or tendering in court the arrears of standard rent and permitted increases on the first day of hearing of the suit or on or before such other date as might have been fixed by the court continued to pay or tender in court regularly the standard rent and permitted increases till the decision of the appeal. It will therefore be seen that during the pendency of the appeal also it was incumbent on the defendant to pay or tender in court the rent which became due every month till the appeal was finally decided. There was no justification for the defendant in the present case to wait till the decision of the court was given because no dispute about the standard rent was in question in the appellate stage. The trial court had already fixed the standard rent of Rs. 18. 50 paise. The defendant however did not go on paying the rent every month as and when it became due. The trial court had already fixed the standard rent of Rs. 18. 50 paise. The defendant however did not go on paying the rent every month as and when it became due. The defendant therefore cannot be said to have sufficiently complied with the requirement of sec. 12 (3) (b) of the Act. ( 3 ) MR. Bhatt however invited my attention to the observations of my learned brother T. U. Mehta J. in Civil Revision Application No. 1215 of 1968 decided on 2nd March 1973 (Hussainbhai v. Abdulgafar Mahmed) wherein he held that :"therefore the directions of the court would be necessary in order to enable the tenant who disputes the amount of standard rent and permitted increases to make a proper payment or tender thereof in court on the first day of hearing. This is one very important reason why the words as directed by the court which appear at the end of the clause (b) should govern the whole of this clause. If it is found that these words cover only the payment of costs as is contended by Shri Shah and if it is believed that it is for the tenant to decide what standard rent and permitted increases he would pay or tender in the court on the first day of hearing then obviously the provisions of clause (b) would be rendered meaningless. Relying on these observations Mr. Bhatt urged that unless the court directed the defendant to pay in court the amount of standard rent and permitted increases it was not obligatory on him to deposit the same in court in order to get protection of sec. 12 (3) (b) of the Act. He therefore urged that even if the defendant had not deposited the rent every month in court as and when it became due he could be protected under sec. 12 (3) (b) of the Act as he had paid the full arrears of rent before the appeal was decided. With respect to my learned brother I am unable to agree with the view taken by him. I have already expressed a dissenting view in Civil Revision Application No. 959 of 1968 decided on April 27 1973 (Lalchand Gematmal v. Nanathai Ranchhoddas ). With respect to my learned brother I am unable to agree with the view taken by him. I have already expressed a dissenting view in Civil Revision Application No. 959 of 1968 decided on April 27 1973 (Lalchand Gematmal v. Nanathai Ranchhoddas ). Obviously the view taken by T. U. Mehta J. is contrary to the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of Vora Abbasbhai Alimahomed v. Haji Gulamnabi Safibhai 5 G. L. R. 55 wherein it was observed. "what the tenant has to pay or tender in court to comply with the conditions of sec. 12 (3) (b) is standard rent and permitted increases and the court has under clause (b) sub-sec. (1) merely the power to fix the date of payment or tender and not the rate at which the standard rent is to be paid. Power to fix the standard rent of premises is exercisable under sec. 11 (1) alone. To bring his claim within sec. 12 (3) (b) the tenant must pay or tender the standard rent and permitted increases on or before the first day of hearing or on or before such other date as the court fixes and also costs of the suit as may be directed by the court. The statute imposes upon the tenant obligation to pay or deposit the amount of costs if the court so directs and not otherwise". Thus direction of the court would only be necessary with regard to the payment of costs and not with regard to the payment of arrears of rent and permitted increases or with regard to other provisions of the section viz. payment of rent regularly as and when it became due till the suit was finally decided. This is clear from the wording of the section itself. Sub-clause 3 (b) of section 12 says in any other case no decree; for eviction shall be passed in any such suit if on the first day of hearing of the suit or on or before such other date as the court may fix the tenant pays or tenders in court the standard rent and permitted increases then due and thereafter continues to pay or tender in court regularly such rent and permitted increases till the suit is finally decided and also pays costs of the suit as directed by the court. Thus in order to claim protection under sub-clause (b) of sec. 12 (3) of the Act the tenant (1) has to deposit the standard rent and permitted increases then due in court on the first day of the hearing of the suit or on or before such other day as the court may fix and (2) thereafter continues to pay or tenders in court regularly such rent and permitted increases till the suit is finally decided and (3) also pays the costs of the suit as directed by the court. It will therefore be seen that irrespective of any direction of the court the tenant has to deposit in court the standard rent and permitted increases then due and thereafter has to continue to pay or tender in court regularly such rent and permitted increases till the suit is finally decided The courts direction will be necessary with regard to payment of the costs of the suit only. The tenant is not bound to deposit costs of the suit in the absence of any direction from the court with greatest respect therefore to my learned brother T. U. Mehta J. I am unable to agree with him that the words `as directed by the court would also govern other portion of sub-clause (b ). If the legislature had intended that the words `as directed by the court governed the whole sub-clause (b) the words found also after the words `the suit is finally decided would not have found a place therein. In my opinion the use of the words and also separates the last portion from the previous portion of sub-clause (b ). There was no necessity of using the word `also if the words as directed by the court was to govern the whole sub-clause (b ). The use of the word also clearly explains the mind of the legislature indicating that the direction of the court will be necessary only in relation to the payment of costs and not in relation to payment of standard rent and permitted increases. The words and also clearly go to show that no direction of the court was necessary with regard to the payment of standard rent and permitted increases but it was necessary only with regard to the payment of costs of the suit. The words and also clearly makes a distinction between the different provisions of sub-clause (b ). The words and also clearly go to show that no direction of the court was necessary with regard to the payment of standard rent and permitted increases but it was necessary only with regard to the payment of costs of the suit. The words and also clearly makes a distinction between the different provisions of sub-clause (b ). Sub clause (b) is very clear that without any direction of the court the tenant had to deposit in court the standard rent and permitted increases then due and thereafter he had to continue to pay or tender in court regularly such rent and permitted increases till the suit was finally decided. Only with regard to the payment of costs the direction of the court was necessary. The statute imposed no liability on the defendant-tenant to deposit costs of the suit if there was no direction from the court to that effect. But sub-clause (b) does not state that if in the absence of any direction. from the court the defendant failed to pay the arrears of rent on the first day he can get protection of sec. 12 (3) (b) of the Act. In my opinion if the defendant failed to deposit the arrears of rent on the first date of hearing of the suit and thereafter failed to pay the same as and when it became due he cannot get any protection under sec. 12 (3) (b) of the Act. However I need not further dilate on the matter in view of the fact that I have already held that the plaintiff required the suit premises bona fide and reasonably for her personal use and that greater hardship would be caused to the plaintiff if a decree for eviction was not passed. Had the matter solely rested on the plea about the interpretation of sec. 12 (3) (b) it would have referred the matter to a larger bench in view of the different view taken by my learned brother T. U. Mehta J. ( 4 ) IN the result the revision application succeeds. The judgment and decree of the trial court and confirmed by the first appellate court are hereby set aside and the plaintiffs suit for eviction is decreed. Application allowed. .