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1973 DIGILAW 91 (KAR)

RAJAMMA v. MAHANT P. KRISHNANANDAGIRI GOSWAMY`

1973-06-12

K.VENKATASWAMI, VENKATACHALAIAH

body1973
VENKATARAMIAH, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is filed against the decree passed in the suit O. S. No. 27 of 1957 on the file of the Civil Judge, Mysore. The said suit was filed for the recovery of Rs. 50,000 and interest due thereon which had been advanced under an equitable mortgage created by defendant 1 on 12-11-1965, by sale of the suit property which had been offered as security thereunder, and if necessary by making a personal decree against the other assets of defendant 1. Since the suit property had been subsequently sold by defendant 1 in favour of defendant 2, defendant 2 was also impleaded as a party to the suit. Defendant 1 died during the pendency of the suit and his legal representatves have been brought on record. ( 2 ) THE case of the plaintiff can be briefly summarised as follows. That on 5-11-1965 defendant-1 approached the plaintiff with a request for a loan of Rs. 50,000 on the security of his property which had been mortgaged in favour of a third party earlier and promised to effect an equitable mortgage on the said property after securing the title deeds from the earlier mortgagee. The request was contained in a letter dated 5-11-1965 {ex. P-1 ). Accordingly on 10-11-1965 the plaintiff advanced a sum of Rs. 50,000 under two promissory notes (Exs. P-2 and P-3 ). That with intent to create an equitable mortgage in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the suit property for securing the said loan of Rs. 50,000, defendant-1 deposited the title deeds of the suit property with the plaintiff as stated in his letter dated 12-11- 1965 (Ex. P-11 ). The plaintiff alleged that defendant-1 had paid interest at fifteen per cent per annum till 10-12-66 although the stipulated interest was eighteen per cent per annum. The plaintiff, therefore, filed the suit for recovery of Rs. 50,000 and interest at fifteen per cent per annum from 10-12- 1966 till date of suit. Defendants i (a) and 1 (b) who were brought on record as the legal representatives of defendant-1 merely denied the contents of the plaint and put the plaintiff to proof of the same. ( 3 ) DEFENDANT-2 raised two principal objections in the written statement, namely, that the mortgage was not supported by consideration and that it was not enforceable for want of registration. ( 3 ) DEFENDANT-2 raised two principal objections in the written statement, namely, that the mortgage was not supported by consideration and that it was not enforceable for want of registration. The lower Court passed a preliminary decree as prayed for. Aggrieved by the said decree, defendant-2 has filed this appeal. In this appeal Sri B. S. Keshava lyengar, learned counsel for defendant-2, urged that the plaintiff had not proved that the mortgage was supported by consideration and that the mortgage was unenforceable as. Ext. P-11 the letter dated 12-11-65 relied on by the plaintiff had not been registered. We shall deal with the contentions in the order in which they were urged. The plaintiff has examined in all three witnesses including himself in support of his case. The defendants have not examined any witnesses on their behalf. ( 4 ) WE are of opinion that the evidence adduced by the plaintiff is sufficient to hold that he had advanced the sum of Rs. 50,000 to defendant-1 on 10-11-1965 and that Exts. P-2 and P-3 were executed on that day by defendant-1 in favour of the plaintiff. The next question is whether the plaintiiff is entitled to enforce the mortgage against the suit property. Sri B. S. Keshava lyengar contended that Ex. P-11 was intended by the parties to contain all the terms of the bargain and that they intended to rely on Ext,p-11 as the sole repository of the said terms. Hence it was urged that Ext. P-11 which was an unregistered document could not be admitted in evidence and no other evidence also was admissible in proof of the mortgage. The court below considered the question of admissibility of Ext. P-11 at the time of recording of evidence in the suit and by its order dated 20-7-1968 held that it was admissible. In c. R. P. No. 988/68 filed against the said order, while dismissing the civil revision petition this Court held that the correctness of the order dated 20-7-1968 could be questioned. in the appeal filed against the decree passed in the suit. Ext. P-11 reads as follows: - "k. V. MOTOR SERVICE. Mail Contractors: Mysore-Kollegal, clock Tower Square. Proprietor, Mysore, k. V. Sathyanarayana Setty. Dt. 12-11-65. To Sri Sri Mahant P. Krishnananda Gir Goswamy, asoka Road, Mysore. May it please respected Swamiji. in the appeal filed against the decree passed in the suit. Ext. P-11 reads as follows: - "k. V. MOTOR SERVICE. Mail Contractors: Mysore-Kollegal, clock Tower Square. Proprietor, Mysore, k. V. Sathyanarayana Setty. Dt. 12-11-65. To Sri Sri Mahant P. Krishnananda Gir Goswamy, asoka Road, Mysore. May it please respected Swamiji. I am indebted to you in respect of a loan of rupees fifty thousand (Rs. 50,000) and interest thereon at 18% per annum on the basis of two On demand Pronotes executed by me in your favour on 10-11-65. With an intention to create an equitable mortgage on my house situated in Nazarahad Mohalla, Zoo Garden Road, Mysore, bearing No. 42/6, I have deposited with you today in the City of Mysore the following title deeds relating to my house property. The property is not subject to any encumbrance. DESCRIPTION OF THE TITLE DEEDS. (details omitted) all the 7 deeds are lodged With you today in the City of Mysore with an intention that the deeds shall be security for the debt as mentioned already sd|- K. V. Sathyanarayana Setty, 12-11-65". Before considering the question of admissibilitiy of Ext. PI 1, it would be useful to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in United Bank of india Ltd. v. Lekharam Sonatam, AIR. 1965 SC. 1597 in which a similar question arose for consideration. The Supreme Court observed:"when the debtor deposits with the creditor title deeds of his property with an intent to a create security, the law implies a contract between the parties to create a mortgage and no registered instrument is required under S. 59 as in other classes of mortgage. It is essential to bear in mind that the essence of a mortgage by deposit of title deeds is the actual handing over by a borrower to the lender of documents of title to immovable property with the intention that those documents shall constitutive a security which will enable the creditor ultimately to recover the money which he has lent. But if the parties choose to reduce the contract to writing, this implication of law is excluded by their express bargain, and the document will be the sole evidence of its terms. In such a case the deposit and the document both form integral parts of the transaction and are essential ingredents in the creation of the mortgage. But if the parties choose to reduce the contract to writing, this implication of law is excluded by their express bargain, and the document will be the sole evidence of its terms. In such a case the deposit and the document both form integral parts of the transaction and are essential ingredents in the creation of the mortgage. It follows that in such a case the document which constitutes the bargain regarding security requires registration under S. 17 of the Indian Registration Act, le08, as a non-testamentary instrument creating an interest in immoveable property, where the value of such property is one hundred rupees and upwards. If a document of this character is not registered it cannot be used in the evidence at all and the transaction itself cannot be proved by oral evidence either. " ( 5 ) APPLYING the above test laid down by the Supreme Court to the case, we feel that the contention of defendant 2 is not tenable. It is clear from ext. P11 the letter dt. 5-11-1965 that defendant I offered to create a mortgage by deposit of title deeds. It was not the intention of the parties that the terms should be reduced into writing. Ext. P11 is only a letter which was handed over along with the title deeds and it contains a mere record of the f event. It is not shown to contain the terms of the transaction. The fact that it was handed over along with the deed is not of much consequence. The essential question to be considered is whether the parties really intended that the document alone should constitute the evidence of the transaction. The document Ext. P11 merely refers to the existence of the ronotes and that the title deeds had been depostied with intent to create an equitable mortgage. The document is largely similar to the one which was considered by the Supreme Court 'in the United Bank of India's case (1) It is seen that in Deb Dutt Seal v. Ramanlel Phumra, AIR. 1970 SC. 659 and V. G. Ran v. Andhra Bank Ltd. , AIR. 1971 SC. 1613, the Supreme Court has taken the same view. The document is largely similar to the one which was considered by the Supreme Court 'in the United Bank of India's case (1) It is seen that in Deb Dutt Seal v. Ramanlel Phumra, AIR. 1970 SC. 659 and V. G. Ran v. Andhra Bank Ltd. , AIR. 1971 SC. 1613, the Supreme Court has taken the same view. ( 6 ) SRI B. S. Keshava lyengar however relied upon the decision of the privy Council in Sir Hari Shanker Paul v. Kedarnath Sahu, AIR 1939 PC 167, and contended that the writing was of such a character that it required registration. We are of the opinion that the said case is clearly distinguishable from the present one. In that case it was clear from the memorandum dt. 24th July 1924 that the parties contemplated from the outset that a document should be executed evidencing the deposit of title deeds, and embodying the terms and conditions of the loan. The subsequent memrandum dt. 2nd August 1924 was found to contain all the essentials of a mortgage transaction. It stated that it was thereby agreed and declared that in consideration of the sums advanced the title deeds should be held as security. It then referred to all the details of the transaction such as conferment of the power to sell the property in the event of default in repayment of the loan. The language of the document did not refer to a completed transaction but the document was operative on its own force. It was contractual in form. Similar characteristics are not to be found in exhibit P-11. ( 7 ) IN Obla Sundarachariar v. Narayana Ajitar, AIR. 1931 PC. 36, a signed memorandum which was delivered to the creditor along with the title deeds stating " As agreed upon in person, I "have delivered to you the under mentioned documents as security" and containing the list of documents so deposited was held to be no more than a mere record of the particulars of the deeds and did not require registration. On a careful consideration of the matter, we feel that the circumstances in which Ext. PI 1 was written and. delivered and its contents, do not lead to the conclusion that the parties intended that the said document shruld be considered as the sole evidence of the transaction. We hold that Ext. Pll did not require to be registered. On a careful consideration of the matter, we feel that the circumstances in which Ext. PI 1 was written and. delivered and its contents, do not lead to the conclusion that the parties intended that the said document shruld be considered as the sole evidence of the transaction. We hold that Ext. Pll did not require to be registered. It, therefore, f611ows that the mortgage was completed by the deposit of title deeds Exts. P4 to P10 with the plaintiff on 12-11-1965. We hold that the plaintiff has proved the mortgage. ( 8 ) IN the result, we confirm the decree passed by the Court below and dismiss the appeal with costs of the plaintiff-respondent 1 only. --- *** --- .