JUDGMENT : C. N. Tiwary, J. This petition is directed against the order of the Sun Divisional Magistrate, Buxar, dated 20.1.1972 starting a proceeding under section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, herein-after to be referred as the Code/in respect of plot Nos. 160 and 168 of Khata no. 82 in village Mishraulia, P, S. Buxar. 2. The petitioner is the first party and Opposite Party Nos. 1 to 3 are the Second Party in the proceeding. The relevant facts leading to the initiation of the proceeding under section 145 of the Code are these. The petitioner auction purchased the land in question on 8.6.1971 in execution of a money decree obtained against Opposite Party No. 3. Opposite Party Nos. 1 and 2 are sons of Opposite Party No. 3. The petitioner obtained delivery of possession over the plots in question through civil court on 7.7.72. It is said that having obtained delivery of possession the petitioner grew paddy crops in the lands. On 17.11.72 the petitioner filed a petition before Sub Divisional Magistrate, Buxar stating that the members of the Opposite Party along with others were threatening that they would harvest the paddy crops forcibly. The petitioner, therefore, requested the Sub Divisional Magistrate to issue directions to the police to help her in harvesting the paddy crops. She was prepared to deposit the cost of the armed Police. The Sub Divisional Magistrate passed the following order on her petition :- “Local Police will carefully assess the situation and try to prevent any breach of the peace at the time of harvesting of the crop. If the petitioner feels insecure, let him apply for the deputation of Home Guards at his own cost. The local police can only give a general sort of protection because they have to look after the whole P. S. The better course is definitely the deputation of H. Guards. Let him indicate the no. of H. Gs he wants and the no. of days for which they will be deputed, accordingly he will have to pay expenses.” 3. Another petition was filed before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate on 21. 11. 72 on behalf of the petitioner stating that when the petitioner went to the land after the order, dated 17. 11. 72, had been passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, she found the members of the Opposite party harvesting the crops in haste. Another petition was filed before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate on 21. 11. 72 on behalf of the petitioner stating that when the petitioner went to the land after the order, dated 17. 11. 72, had been passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, she found the members of the Opposite party harvesting the crops in haste. She immediately informed the Buxar Police about it. It was further stated in that petition that police visited the spot and seized 185 bundles of harvested paddy in the field and 34 bundles of harvested paddy in the Khalihan of the opposite party. Paddy crops were still standing in more than two bighas and according to the petitioner, they were under the protection of the Police. 4. On the same date (21-11-1972) a petition was filed before the Sub Divisional Magistrate on behalf of Opposite party No. 3 stating that he was in peaceful possession of the two plots in question; that he had grown paddy crops it, both the fields and that he had already harvested the paddy crops from plot No. 160. When the paddy crops standing in plot No. 168 were about to be harvested the police reached there and drove out his labourers. According to the .opposite party the act of the Police was unwarranted. The Sub Divisional Magistrate was, therefore, requested to prevent the Police action in order to maintain the peace. 5. In the meantime, a report dated 19-11-72 from the Buxar Police, submitted in pursuance of the Sub Divisional Magistrate's Order, dated 17-11-72, was also received. The Police report was to the effect that by the time the police reached the spot, opposite party had already harvested paddy from one of the plots. The Police seized 219 bundles of harvested paddy, out of which 185 bundles were lying in the field and 25 bundles were kept in the Kllalihan of opposite party No.3. Constables were deputed to watch the standing crops in order to maintain peace. 6. The petitions filed on behalf of the parties and the police report were placed before the Sub Divisional Magistrate on 22-11-72. Constables were deputed to watch the standing crops in order to maintain peace. 6. The petitions filed on behalf of the parties and the police report were placed before the Sub Divisional Magistrate on 22-11-72. Raving heard the learned lawyers of both the parties the Sub Divisional Magistrate made an order directing his office to put up on the following day draft of the proceeding to be drawn up under section 144 of the Code directing the parties not to go over the land until further orders and show cause, if any, by 27-11-72. 7. In pursuance of that order of the learned Sub Divisional Magistrate notice was issued to the parties. A copy of the notice is on the record of the court below. It is stated in the notice that it transpired from the police report that a dispute had arisen with regard to the possession of the land, which was likely to cause breach of the peace and therefore, the parties were restrained from going over the land until further orders and to show cause, if any, by 27-11-1972, 8. Both the parties showed cause. In the show cause petition filed on behalf of the petitioner it was stated inter alia that the members of the opposite party got the paddy crops grown by her, harvested and that when she and her men protested, they did not listen and that the timely arrival of the police could save the situation. It was further stated that the members of the opposite party are lathials and have formed a group of Lathials and undesirable elements and have no regard for law and order. The petitioner, therefore, requested that the bundles of paddy crops which had been seized by the police should be made over to her and the order should be made absolute against the members of the opposite Party. 9. In the show cause petition filed on behalf of the opposite party it is stated inter alia that the opposite party No. 2 filed a petition for setting aside the auction sale, at which the petitioner auction purchased the land in question. His appeal arising out of that petition is still pending before the District Judge, Arrah. 9. In the show cause petition filed on behalf of the opposite party it is stated inter alia that the opposite party No. 2 filed a petition for setting aside the auction sale, at which the petitioner auction purchased the land in question. His appeal arising out of that petition is still pending before the District Judge, Arrah. It is further said that delivery of possession obtained by the petitioner is a mere paper transaction without notice to the opposite party and that the opposite party No.3 is still in possession of the land and grew paddy crops. He was getting paddy crops harvested when he was prevented to do so by the police. According to him, he had grown also catch crops like Khesari, Tisi and Masuri sin the land. It was further said that the only proper Course was to return the bundles of paddy crops to opposite party no. 3 and discharge the rule against the members of the opposite party and make it absolute against the members of the Opposite Party and make it absolute against the petitioner. 10. Having perused the petitions of show cause filed by the parties and having heard their lawyers, the learned Sub Divisional Magistrate passed the impugned order, dated 20-1- 73, the relevant portion of which runs thus; "On 22-11-72 Shri R. E. Roy, Magistrate, 1st. Class, Buxar, doing the Sawalkhani on that day, ordered for drawing up a proceeding under section 144 Cr. P. C. against both the parties after having perused the police report dated 19-11-1972 and being satisfied that there was an immediate apprehension of the breach of peace between the parties over the harvesting of the standing crop and for the possession of the harvested paddy crop...... From the brief resume of the claims of the party with regard to the land in dispute, I am satisfied that there is genuine land dispute which requires a thorough probe under a proceeding under section 145 Cr. P. C. The instant proceeding is therefore, converted into one under section 145 Cr P. C. and the land in dispute is attached under section 145 Cr. P. C. pending the decision of the proceeding. The parties are directed to put in their written statements, affidavits and documents in support of their claims of possession before this Court on 6-2-1973". 11. P. C. pending the decision of the proceeding. The parties are directed to put in their written statements, affidavits and documents in support of their claims of possession before this Court on 6-2-1973". 11. It is against this order that this petition in revision has been filed. 12. It is contended by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that the impugned order does not indicate that the learned Magistrate was satisfied that the dispute between the parties was likely to cause breach of the peace and therefore, the learned Sub Divisional Magistrate had no jurisdiction to draw up proceeding under section 145 of the Code. There is no substance in this contention. As pointed out above, originally a proceeding under section 144 of the Code was started by the order of the acting Sub Divisional Magistrate (Shri R. E. Roy), dated 22-11-1972. It is evident from that order that a direction was given to the office to put on the following day draft of the proceeding to be drawn under section 144 of the Code. In pursuance of that order a draft of the notice to be served on the parties was placed before the Sub Divisional Magistrate. The acting Sub Divisional Magistrate, having approved it, put down his signature thereon. Therefore, the contents of the notice must form part of the order, dated 22.11.1973 of the learned acting Sub Divisional Magistrate. The notice is to the effect that on receipt of the police report the acting Sub Divisional Magistrate was satisfied that there was a dispute between the parties, which was likely to cause a breach of the peace. The learned Sub Divisional Magistrate has stated in the impugned order, as pointed out above, that Sri R.E. Roy, Magistrate 1st. Class, who was doing Sawalkhani on that day, passed orders for the drawing up of the proceeding under section 144 Cr. P.C. on being satisfied that there was apprehension of breach of the peace over the harvesting of the standing crops and for the possession of the harvested paddy crops. Therefore, the mere fact that in the operative portion of the impugned order passed under section 145 of the Code, which was in continuation of the proceeding under section 144 Cr. P.C. on being satisfied that there was apprehension of breach of the peace over the harvesting of the standing crops and for the possession of the harvested paddy crops. Therefore, the mere fact that in the operative portion of the impugned order passed under section 145 of the Code, which was in continuation of the proceeding under section 144 Cr. P.C., the learned Sub Divisional Magistrate did not state that there was an apprehension of breach of the peace, can not, in the circumstances stated above, oust his jurisdiction. It is quite evident from the circumstances stated above that the learned Sub Divisional Magistrate was satisfied about the existence of apprehension of a breach of the peace. 13. The learned 90unsel for the petitioner has relied on decision of B. D. Singh, J. in Mohammad Abbas and another Versus Mohammad Mustaqim and others1 in support of his contention. In that case the initial order under section 145 of the Code did not mention that there was any apprehension of the breach of the peace. It was, therefore, held that the order was bad in the absence of the findings by the Magistrate that the dispute was likely to cause breach of the peace. That case is distinguishable. What had happened in that case was that not only in the impugned order under section 145 but also in the initial order section 144 of the Code the Magistrate had omitted to mention that there was apprehension of a breach of the peace. But as pointed out above, that is not so in the instant proceeding, which is in continuation of a proceeding under section 144 of the Code. In the instant case it' can not be said that the contents of the notice under section 144 of the Code or -the contents of the notice under section 145 of the Code were result of ministerial Act. 14. In the instant case it' can not be said that the contents of the notice under section 144 of the Code or -the contents of the notice under section 145 of the Code were result of ministerial Act. 14. In deciding that case his Lordship relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in R. H. Bhutani Versus Miss Mani J, Desai2 wherein their Lord-ships, while dealing with section 145 of the Code observed thus :- "The object of Section 145, no doubt is to prevent breach of peace and for that end to provide a speedy remedy by bringing the parties before the Court and ascertaining who of them was in actual possession and to maintain status quo until their rights are determined by a competent Court. The section requires that the Magistrate must De satisfied before initiating proceedings that a dispute regarding an immovable property exists and that such dispute is likely to cause breach of peace. But once he is satisfied of these two conditions,' the section requires him to pass a preliminary order under sub-section (1) and thereafter to make an enquiry under sub-section (4) and pass a final order under sub-section (6) …..." 15. It seems that in the case before B D. Singh, J. there was not only no material on the basis of which the Sub-Divisional Magistrate could have been satisfied about the existence of apprehension of breach of the peace; but there were materials, which undoubtedly showed that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate could not have felt satisfied about apprehension of a breach of the peace. It was admitted case of the parties that the dispute related to one-third share of the entire land. But the entire land had been attached under sub• section (4) of section 145 of the Code. Thus, the subject matter of the dispute had not been clearly defined in the initial order and the Sub-divisional Magistrate had taken action in the case of a dispute about an undivided share In such circumstances, omission on the part of the Magistrate to state that he was satisfied that there was an apprehension of a breach of the peace, was fatal to the case. 16. It is in this way the case reported in A. I. R. 1970 Patna 3321 is distinguishable from the instant case. 17. 16. It is in this way the case reported in A. I. R. 1970 Patna 3321 is distinguishable from the instant case. 17. Another case relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is Alauddin Mian versus Hafiz Mian3. This case was decided by M.P. Verma, J. on 20th May, 1970. It was held in that case that when the Magistrate has not indicated that there was an apprehension of a breach of the peace, he has no jurisdiction to start proceeding under section 145 of the Code. That was a Revision against final order passed under section 145 of the Code. In that case also the impugned order was vague. The dispute was in respect of a portion of a plot, so far plot no. 731 was concerned, wit bout specifying the boundary or without stating which portion of the plot was in dispute. That defect was sufficient to make the order of the Sub Divisional Magistrate initiating proceeding under section 145 of the Code unsustainable. It was not known to his Lordship whether there were sufficient materials before the Sub Divisional Magistrate to come to a decision that there was apprehension of a breach of the peace. In the instant case there was materials to show that there was an apprehension of a breach of the peace. Therefore, this case is also clearly distinguishable. 18. Moreover, the same learned Judge (M. P. Verma, J.) in another case Ram Padarath Sharma Versus Jageshwar Mahto,4 held that a mere non-mention of the two ingredients of section 145 (1) of the Code to the effect that there was a bonafide land dispute and that the dispute was likely to cause a breach of the peace in his order should not be taken to oust his jurisdiction completely. 19. The learned counsel appearing for the opposite party has relied upon a decision of G. N. Prasad, J. in Rampravesh Barai and others versus Jugeshwar Tripathi.5 His Lordship referred to the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner in that case thus;- "The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners before me is that this order is entirely without jurisdiction, in as much as the learned Sub Divisional Magistrate has recorded it without complying with the provisions of sub-sec. (1) of section 145, which require that the Magistrate should be satisfied from a police report or other information that a dispute exists concerning any land etc. within the local limits of his jurisdiction and that such a dispute is likely to cause a breach of the peace. Learned counsel contends that in the impugned order, the Sub divisional Magistrate does not say that the dispute which led to the institution of the proceeding under section 144 of the Code was still in existence on the 23rd November, 1968, nor that a breach of the peace was apprehended between the parties on that account, and nor that he was satisfied from any material that a dispute of this nature existed between the parties." His Lordship rejected the contention and observed :- "It will thus appear that the order of the Sub Divisional Magistrate can not be struck down as without jurisdiction merely because he has omitted to specify in his order the grounds upon which he has felt satisfied that a dispute is in existence concerning immoveable property, and that by reason thereof, there is an apprehension of breach of the peace between the parties, because this requirement falls within the procedural part of subsection (1). And it is well known that mere irregularity in the procedure does not affect "the jurisdiction of the Magistrate and may be inconsequential unless it has caused prejudice to the parties concerned. To affect the Jurisdiction of the Magistrate, it must be shown that he had no material before him on the basis of which he could possibly have felt satisfied that there was a dispute in existence in connection with possession of immovable property and that there was an apprehension of breach of the peace on that account. I would not, therefore, quash the proceeding on the mere ground that the learned Sub Divisional Magistrate has not incorporated in his order in so many words "the grounds to his being so satisfied". I might set aside his order it. I find that by reason of such an omission prejudice has been caused to the petitioners or any of the parties concerned in the dispute....." 20. It has not been urged before me that by reason of the omission to state in the operative portion' of the impugned order that there was apprehension of breach of the peace, the petitioner has been prejudiced. It has not been urged before me that by reason of the omission to state in the operative portion' of the impugned order that there was apprehension of breach of the peace, the petitioner has been prejudiced. As a matter of fact, this has not been pleaded as a ground for setting aside the impugned order in the petition of this Criminal Miscellaneous case. The learned Counsel was, however, permitted to advance arguments on this point as it is a point of law. 21. Another case relied upon by the learned Counsel for the opposite party is a Bench Decision of this Court in Jiut Dvsadh and others versus Ashraf Hussain and others' The leading judgment of the Bench was delivered by G. N. Prasad, J. In that case the Sub-Divisional Magistrate passed the following order under section 145 of the Code asking the members of both the parties to appear before him on 25. 8. 67 and file their written statements on facts of possession and' also file affidavits of possession and adduce oral and documentary evidence in support of their claim :- "Draw up proceeding under section 145 Cr. P. C. asking the members of both parties to appear before me on 25. 8. 67 and file their W. S. on facts of possession and also file affidavits of witnesses and adduce oral and documentary evidence in support of their claim. The land in dispute is attached under section 145 (4) of Cr. P. C. till the disposal of proceeding". 22. Subsequently some amendment was made and the proceeding was drawn up in the following terms :- "Whereas from perusal of petition of 1st. Party and hearing of the lawyers and also amendment petition filed on 16. 11. 67, it appears that this case requires to be converted into 145 Cr. P. C. as it also appears that there is still an apprehension of breach of the peace and bona-fide land dispute in between the parties. As such the matter requires decision once for all and so it is converted in 145 Cr. P. C. I, therefore, draw up proceeding under Section 145 Cr. P.C. against the members of the both parties asking them to appear on 25.8.67 and to file their written statements, affidavits of witnesses and also adduce oral and documentary evidence in support of their respective claims over the disputed land. P. C. I, therefore, draw up proceeding under Section 145 Cr. P.C. against the members of the both parties asking them to appear on 25.8.67 and to file their written statements, affidavits of witnesses and also adduce oral and documentary evidence in support of their respective claims over the disputed land. The land under dispute is attached under section 145 (4) Cr. P. C." G. N. Prasad, J. observed thus:- "But where the magistrate has omitted to state the grounds of his satisfaction in his initial order a duty is cast upon the revisional court to examine the records with a view to satisfy itself whether there are materials on the record on the basis of which the magistrate was or could be satisfied about both the matters to enable him to assume jurisdiction. If upon examination of the record, the revisional court finds that there were materials on the basis of which the magistrate could have been satisfied with respect to both the relevant matters, then the revisional court will not interfere on the mere ground that the initial order does not contain the grounds of the Magistrate's satisfaction. If, however, upon such examination, the revisional court finds that there are materials on the record on the basis of which no such satisfaction could have been reached, by the learned Magistrate, then it would be open to it to set aside the proceeding as without jurisdiction." 23. In the instant case the learned Magistrate has passed almost similar order as in the case before G. N. Prasad, J. From what has been stated above, it is evident that in the instant case there are materials on the record, on the basis of which the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate could be satisfied that there is a dispute regarding possession between the parties and that it is likely to cause apprehension of breach of the peace. Therefore, the Magistrate had jurisdiction to start proceeding under section 145 of the Code. 24. Another point urged on behalf of the petitioner is that there is no bona-fide dispute between the parties and therefore, the learned Magistrate had no jurisdiction to start proceeding under section 145 of the Code. It is submitted that the petitioner auction purchased the land and obtained delivery of possession through court on 7. 7. 24. Another point urged on behalf of the petitioner is that there is no bona-fide dispute between the parties and therefore, the learned Magistrate had no jurisdiction to start proceeding under section 145 of the Code. It is submitted that the petitioner auction purchased the land and obtained delivery of possession through court on 7. 7. 72 in execution of her money decree and that the Magistrate should have respected the delivery of possession given to the petitioner by the Civil Court and should have maintained it. The case of the petitioner, as stated in her petition dated 17. 11. 72 is that having obtained delivery of possession on 7.7.72 she grew paddy but opposite party no. 3 was threatening to harvest the paddy. In her petition dated 21. 11. 72 filed before the Sub Divisional Magistrate the petitioner said that Opposite Party no, 3 with his men was getting paddy crops harvested. The Police visited the spot and found the Opposite Party No.3 had already got paddy crops harvested from one of the disputed plots and was about to get paddy crops harvested from the other plot. This happened more that four months after the date when the petitioner is said to have obtained deli very of possession through Court. Had this happened within two months from the date when the possession is said to have been delivered to the petitioner, a different consideration might have arisen. In is stated in the show cause petition filed on behalf of the opposite party that the appeal of opposite party no. 3 arising out of his application for setting aside the auction sale, at which the petitioner is said to have purchased the land in question, is still pending before the District Judge, Arrah and that the delivery of possession was taken without notice to the opposite party after the records of the case had been called for by the District Judge, Arrah in the said appeal. According to the Opposite Party, the delivery of possession said to have been obtained by the petitioner is a paper transaction having no basis of the actual delivery of possession. It is in these circumstances, that the Sub Divisional Magistrate started a proceeding under section 145 of the Code. According to the Opposite Party, the delivery of possession said to have been obtained by the petitioner is a paper transaction having no basis of the actual delivery of possession. It is in these circumstances, that the Sub Divisional Magistrate started a proceeding under section 145 of the Code. It will thus, tie evident that decision in Mathura Singh versus Ramakant Misra7 relied upto by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner does not apply to the facts of the instant case. 25. The learned Counsel for the Opposite Party has relied on a Bench decision of this Court in Sheo Narayan Singh and others versus Bharath Singh and others8. Narayan J. who delivered the leading judgment of the Bench observed :- The question of possession that has to be determined in a proceeding under section 145 is the question of actual possession with regard to the property in dispute. Actual possession certainly means actual physical possession, that is, the possession of the person who is cultivating the land or growing cross on it irrespective of whether he has any right to the land or the title to possess it. The words "actual possession" as used in Section 145 (1) mean actual physical possession even though wrongful. In other words, a magistrate has complete jurisdiction to interefere even if he finds that a recent trespasser is in actual possession at the time of drawing up proceedings under section 145. What concerns the Magistrate is not the right to possess the subject matter of dispute but the actual possession thereof on the date when he makes the order under sub-section (1) of section 145. The view that once there has been a delivery of possession by the Civil Court the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to take action under section 145 is no more sustainable. In spite of a recent delivery of possession, the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to interfere under section 145 is not ousted but the Magistrate has to give due weight to the recent delivery of possession while disposing of the proceeding under section 145. If, the judgment-debtor contend that the peon's report is not correct and that there was no dakhaldehani on the spot, then certainly that is a question which has to be investigated, and it is within the province of the magistrate to investigate this question in the proceeding under section 145. If, the judgment-debtor contend that the peon's report is not correct and that there was no dakhaldehani on the spot, then certainly that is a question which has to be investigated, and it is within the province of the magistrate to investigate this question in the proceeding under section 145. It is another thing that after the delivery of possession is proved the magistrate has to respect the delivery of possession, but so long as the delivery of possession is not proved, it is absolutely within the competence of the Magistrate to draw up a proceeding under section 145 in the event of an apprehension of a breach of peace and to investigate whether a dakhal dehani was actually affected on the spot or not. A fraudulent service of process is not an unknown thing in this part of the country, and when the judgment-debtors were contending that actually there had been no delivery of possession; this question had to be investigated.” 26. In the instant case the learned Magistrate may give proper weight to the dakhaldehani said to have been taken by the petitioner in deciding the proceeding. But in the circumstances of the case, it can not be said that the learned Magistrate has no jurisdiction to initiate proceeding under section 145 of the Code. 27. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that' the decision in Sheo Narayan Singh and others versus Bharat Singh and others8 has been distinguised in Mahendra Bhagat and others versus Bachha Pandey and others9: It appears the decision in A. I. R. 1954 Patna, 182 was distinguished on three grounds. Firstly, the subordinate Judge in the case reported in 1954 Patna, 182 had left undecided the question whether the delivery of possession had, in fact, been mace. But it was not known in the case reported in 1959 P. L. R 21 whether the court, under whose orders delivery of possession made was moved and whether it was contended before it that delivery of possession had not been made. But in the instant case, the appeal arising out of the petition of the Opposite Party for setting aside the auction sale, at which the petitioner purchased the land in dispute, is still pending before the District Judge, Arrah. The facts of the instant case are similar to the facts of the case reported in 1954 Patna, 182. But in the instant case, the appeal arising out of the petition of the Opposite Party for setting aside the auction sale, at which the petitioner purchased the land in dispute, is still pending before the District Judge, Arrah. The facts of the instant case are similar to the facts of the case reported in 1954 Patna, 182. Another ground, on which that decision was distinguished, was that in the case reported in 1954 Patna, 182 the mortgagee was admittedly in possession on the date on which the delivery of possession was made. But, in the case reported in 1959 P. L. R., 21 there was no such admission. In the instant case Opposite Party no. 3 was admittedly in possession on the date when the delivery of possession is said to have been obtained. The facts of the instant case are similar to the facts reported in 1954 Patna, 182. The third ground was that some of the members of the Opposite Party in the case reported in 1954 Patna, 182 had not been impleaded as party in the title suit. No such contention has been raised in the instant case in the circumstances, the decision reported in A. I. R. 1954 Patna, 182 is applicable to the facts of the instant case. 28. Therefore, it must be held that there is a bona-fide dispute relating to possession between the parties. 29. In the result, I do not find merit in the petition. The petition is accordingly dismissed. 30 The learned Counsel appearing foe the Opposite Party drew my attention to petition, dated 28.3.73 filed on behalf of the opposite party. It is said that the further proceeding in the court below was stayed by this Court by order dated 22.2.73. Therefore, the harvested paddy can not be auction sold and the catch crops etc. which have not been harvested are still standing in the land. Therefore, a prayer has been made in the petition for a direction to the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate for making suitable arrangement so that the standing crops may be harvested and the crops may be auction sold and the sale proceeds may be deposited in Treasury to be ultimately made over to the party in whose favoure the final order is passed in the proceeding under section 145 of the Code. The learned Sub Divisional Magistrate will certainly do it. Application dismissed.