VENKATARAMIAH, J. ( 1 ) THESE two appeals arise out of a suit instituted in O. S. No. 53 of 1959 on the file of the District Judge, Bangalore.- The said suit was transferred to the file of the Civil Judge, Bangalore, and registered as O. S. No. 69 of 1964 on the coming into force of the Mysore Civil Courts Act, 1964. ( 2 ) THE plaintiffs instituted the above suit for recovery of possession of a piece of land situated in Bangalore City along with the buildings standing thereon on the following allegations: the suit land belongs to the plaintiffs. A portion of the said land was leased out in favour of the 1st defendant under a registered lease deed dated 31-8-1939 for a term of twenty years on a monthly rent of Rs. 20. Later on the remaining portion of the suit land was also given under lease to the 1st defendant on the same terms and conditions subject to payment of a sum of Rs. 15 per mensem by way of additional rent payable in that behalf. The plaintiffs allege that under one of the terms and conditions of the said lease the 1st defendant was liable to construct a building of the value of not less than Rs. 15,000, and that at the expiry of the stipulated term, the building so constructed should become the property of the plaintiffs. It is further alleged that the lessee was liable to hand over possession of the land along with the buildings on the termination of the tenancy. After the expiry of the period of lease, the plaintiffs called upon the 1st defendant to deliver possession of the suitproperty in accordance with the terms of the lease. It should be mentioned here that by the time the suit was instituted defendant No. 2 who was no other than the younger brother of the 1st defendant had acquired the leasehold rights as an assignee, and that defendant Nos. 3 and 4 had become the mortgagees of the said lease-hold rights. Defendants Nos. 2, 3 and 4 were therefore impleaded by the plaintiffs to the suit. The plaintiffs instituted the above suit for recovery of possession of the suit properties as their demand for possession was not complied with by any of the defendants. In the written statements filed by defendant Nos. Defendants Nos. 2, 3 and 4 were therefore impleaded by the plaintiffs to the suit. The plaintiffs instituted the above suit for recovery of possession of the suit properties as their demand for possession was not complied with by any of the defendants. In the written statements filed by defendant Nos. 1 and 2, it was pleaded among other grounds that the suit was not maintainable in view of the provisions of the Mysore House Rent and Accommodation Control Act, 1951, and that in any event, the plaintiffs were not entitled to get possession of the suit property without paying defendant No. 2 a sum of Rs. 1,50,000 which had been invested on the suit property over and above what had been stipulated in the lease. ( 3 ) THE trial court after recording the evidence in the case and hearing the parties passed a decree as prayed for after negativing all the contentions urged on behalf of the defendants. Aggrieved by the said decree, defendant No. 2 filed an appeal before the learned District Judge in R. A. No. 88 of 1970 and RFA. No. 86 of 1970 on the file of this Court. The appeal filed before the District Judge was heard and dismissed on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to entertain the same. Aggrieved by the decree passed in R. A. No. 88 of 1970 on the file of the District Judge, bangalore, the 2nd defendant has filed R. S. A. No. 108 of 1972. Since common questions of law and facts arise in both these cases, we propose to dispose of both these appeals by this common judgment. ( 4 ) WE shall first take up for consideration RSA. No. 108 of 1972. It was argued by Mr. Sequeira, the learned counsel for defendant No. 2 that the rent reserved in respect of the land in question being Rs. 35 per mensem, the value of the suit while computed in accordance with the provisions of sub-sec. (2) of S. 41 of the Mysore Court Fees and Suits valuation Act could not have been more than Rs. 420 in so far as the relief of possession was concerned. The plaintiffs claim by way of past mesne profits a sum of Rs. 210 in the plaint. According to Mr. Sequeira, the value of the suit was Rs. 630 and the same being less than Rs. 420 in so far as the relief of possession was concerned. The plaintiffs claim by way of past mesne profits a sum of Rs. 210 in the plaint. According to Mr. Sequeira, the value of the suit was Rs. 630 and the same being less than Rs. 20,000, an appeal lay from the judgment and decree of the Civil Judge to the Court of the district Judge. He further argued that among the reliefs claimed in the plaint, there was a relief in respect of the buildings and structures standing on the vacant land that had been demised in favour of the 1st defendant. The buildings and structures should be treated as having become part of the demised estate and therefore, they could not be independently valued as had been done by the plaintiffs for purposes of court fee and jurisdiction. Sri M. R. Janardanam, the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs and Sri N. Venkatachala. the Additional Government Advocate, placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in Dr. K. A. Dhairyawan v. J. R. Thakur, AIR 1958 SC 789 . and contended that in the facts and circumstances of this case, the buildings and other structures put up on the vacant land which was originally demised could not be considered as part of the land demised. In the case relied on by Mr. Janardanam and the Additional government Advocate, the Supreme Court observed that in the case of a least where originally a piece of vacant land alone was demised with the option to the lessee to put up buildings thereon during the currency of the lease subject to a condition that the said buildings should become the property of the lessor on the termination of the lease, the buildings so constructed could not become part of the lease-hold for the reason that under the agreement between the parties, the said properties would become the properties of the lessor only on the expiry of the lease. In any event, the Supreme Court was of the opinion that it would not form part of the lease. In any event, the Supreme Court was of the opinion that it would not form part of the lease. In that view of the matter, although the Supreme Court was of the opinion that in the case of the vacant land which was situated in bombay governed by the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates control Act no decree could be passed, it made a decree declaring that the lessors had become the owners of the buildings and were entitled to recover the rents in respect of the said buildings from the tenants occupying the same. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court, we feel that the plaintiffs were right in valuing the vacant land for purposes of Court fee and jurisdiction in accordance with sub-sec. (2) of S. 41 of the Mysore court Fees Act, and the buildings on the basis that it was a suit for possession of the buildings. The plaintiffs have valued the buildings at Rs. 50,000. According to the defendants, the value of the buildings was much more than Rs. 50,000. It is therefore, clear that the value of the suit for purposes of jurisdiction could not be less than Rs. 20,000. Hence, an appeal against the decree passed by the Civil Judge in the suit could not lie to the District Court. The learned District Judge was therefore right in holding that the appeal was not maintainable. The second appeal filed against the decree of the District Judge therefore fails and it is dismissed without any order as to costs. ( 5 ) BY an order passed by this Court on 12-1-1972, the 2nd defendant was directed to pay court fee on the Appeal Memo in the second appeal as was paid in the trial court reserving liberty to the appellant to urge his contentions regarding the adequacy of the court fee paid: Since the second appeal had been filed by the 2nd defendant on the basis that the first appeal lay to the District Judge and he was liable to pay court fee only on the basis of a sum of Rs. 630, the proper court fee which could be levied would be on the basis that the value of the second appeal was Rs. 680. 630, the proper court fee which could be levied would be on the basis that the value of the second appeal was Rs. 680. The 2nd defendant has paid court fee on the Memorandum of Second appeal as ordered by this court as was paid before the trial court. In the circumstances, we feel that the excess court fee of Rs. 1723 paid by the 2nd defendant on the Memorandum of Appeal in RSA. 108 of 1972 should be directed to be refunded to him. It is ordered accordingly. ( 6 ) WE shall now proceed to eonsider RFA. No. 86 of 1970. The first contention urged by Mr. Sequeira in this appeal is that the plaintiffs were only entitled to get possession of the vacant-land which had been leased out in favour of 1st defendant along with the buildings and structures of the value of Rs. 15,000, and that they were not entitled to the possession of the remaining buildings. He alternatively contended that if the plaintiffs wanted to get possession of the remaining buildings also, they should pay the value of the same to Defendant No. 2. He further contended that if the plaintiffs did not want to have the remaining buildings, the 2nd defendant should be permitted to remove the said buildings before handing over possession of the vacant land and the buildings of the value of rs. 15,000. The court below has rejected a similar contention which was urged before it on the basis of the terms of lease. Ex. P-1 is the lease-deed dated 31-8-1939. One of the lessors was a minor on the date of the lease and hit interests were represented by a court guardian. The lease consists of two parts. The first part refers to the circumstances necessitating the creation of a leasa for a period of twenty years in favour of the 1st defendant. It was necessary to refer to those circumstances, because one of the lessors was a minor. The second part of the lease refers to the terms of the lease. In the first part we find reference to the buildings which the lessee had to construct on the vacant land after the lease djeed was executed, at two places. The relevant portions read as follows:1) ". . . . . . whereas the proposal for raising a construction at a tost of not less than Rs. In the first part we find reference to the buildings which the lessee had to construct on the vacant land after the lease djeed was executed, at two places. The relevant portions read as follows:1) ". . . . . . whereas the proposal for raising a construction at a tost of not less than Rs. 15,000 to enjoy the same either by himself his heirs, executors and assigns for a period of 20 years from the date hereof and to hand over the land with the construction so raised by him to the second member of the first part or his legal representatives and assigns without asking for or claiming any compensation. . . ". 2) Whereas the offer made, by the party of the second part is decidedly to the advantage of the party of the first part and is most beneficial to the interest of the minor in as much as a valuable construction worth Rs. 15,000 will accrue to his estate and for his sole benefit without his having to spend anything therefor. . . . " in the latter part of the lease deed dealing with the terms of the lease we have the following terms: - 1) "that the party of the second part shall be entitled to raise a construction valued at not less than Rs. 15,000 on the premises more particularly mentioned in the schedule attached hereunto and be in enjoyment and possession thereof for a period of twenty years from the date of execution of this agreement. 2) That after the stipulated period of twenty years, the party of the second part shall leave the schedule premises with the construction so raised by him to the second member of the first party or his legal representatives or assigns absolutely and for ever and after the said period, the party of the second part shall have no manner of right, title or interest in or upon the premises or the construction raised thereon". 7) "that it shall be lawful for the party of the second part to alter the nature, design, extent and mode of construction and the use to which the same could be put within the stipulated period. " it was argued by Mr. Sequeira, the learned counsel for defendant No. 2 that having regard to the rent reserved in respect of tha vacant land at Rs. " it was argued by Mr. Sequeira, the learned counsel for defendant No. 2 that having regard to the rent reserved in respect of tha vacant land at Rs. 20 per mensem after a period of five years from the commencement of the date of lease, it should not reasonably be expected that the parties to the lease intended that the lessor should be benefited to an extent of more than Rs. 15,000 at the expiry of a period of twenty years. It was further argued by him that the land in question was being used as 'cart stand' before it was leased out in favour of the 1st defendant and the income that the lessors were realising therefrom was negligible. In this connection he drew our attention to the second clause appearing in the first part of the lease extracted above, in which it was stated that the minor was likely to be benefited by the lease to an extent of Rs. 15,000. In the circumstances, he urged, that it would be unjust to hold as the lower court has done in this case that the lessors were entitled to recover all the buildings standing on the vacant land which were worth not less than Rs. 1,50,000. We find it difficult to agree with the submission made by Mr. Sequeira. The operative terms of the lease are those contained in clauses (1) and (2) appearing in the latter part of the lease. Clause (1) requires the lessee to put up buildings on the vacant land of the value of not less than Rs. 15,000. The relevant clause on which emphasis has been rightly placed by the court below states that after the stipulated period of twenty years, the lessen should surrender the premises leased under the deed aloag with the buildings so raised. It further states that in respect of the buildings put up on the demised land, the lessee would have no right, title or interest at the expiry of the term of the lease. In view of the plain and unambiguous language of clause (2), which according to us, is the crucial clause governing the dispute before us, we find it difficult to agree with Mr. Sequeira's contention that all that the parties intended at the time they concluded the bargain was that the lessor should be handed over a building worth Rs. In view of the plain and unambiguous language of clause (2), which according to us, is the crucial clause governing the dispute before us, we find it difficult to agree with Mr. Sequeira's contention that all that the parties intended at the time they concluded the bargain was that the lessor should be handed over a building worth Rs. 15,000 only at the expiry of the period and that the lessee was entitled to remove all other structures which had been constructed by him. We therefore, reject the contention of the appellant in this behalf. ( 7 ) THE next conetntion urged by Mr. Sequeira relates to the plaint schedule land consisting of two parts, (1) a piece of land which was leased under the lease deed Ex. P-1, and (2) another piece of land which was occupied by the 1st defendant subsequently. With regard to the title of these two bits of land there is no dispute. Both of them belong to the plaintiffs. What was however, contended by Mr. Sequeira was that the buildings or structures that had been constructed on that portion of the land which was taken possession of by the 1st defendant subsequent to the date of Ex. P-1 were not governed by clause (2) of the lease deed, which entitled the plaintiffs to get possession of all the buildings on the lands situated on the subject matter of Ex. P-1. It is seen that such a contention has not been raised either in the written statement or in the course of arguments before the court below. The lower court has not referred to the said contention. The above contention is raised before us for the first time in the course of arguments in this appeal. In paragraphs 3 and 7 of the plaint, the plaintiffs have clearly averred that the additional bit of land which was handed over to the possession of the 1st defendant had been treated as part of the entire lease-hold and was governed by the terms and conditions of the leasa. In the written statement of the 1st defendant, it is stated that he got into possession of the said land with the permission of muddamma who was managing the estate at the relevant point of time. The second defendant has not raised any plea in this behalf in his written statement. In the written statement of the 1st defendant, it is stated that he got into possession of the said land with the permission of muddamma who was managing the estate at the relevant point of time. The second defendant has not raised any plea in this behalf in his written statement. In these circumstances, it has to be held that the 2nd defendant is not entitled to urge the above contention. We therefore hold that the plaintiffs are entitled to possession of all the buildings and structures standing on the entire suit land. ( 8 ) IT was lastly urged by Mr. Sequeira that the plainitffs were not entitled to any moveables situated inside the suit building and that the 2nd defendant should be entitled to remove them before possession of the suit building is handed over to the plaintiffs. Sri M. R. . Janardanam has no objection for clarifying the above position. We therefore, direct that the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for possession of the suit land and buildings thereon and not to any moveables situated on the suit property. In the result, RFA. 86 of 1970 is dismissed with costs subject to the above clarification regarding moveables. --- *** --- .