Ramaswami, J.- These four civil miscellaneous appeals arise out of two claim petitions before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Chingleput. The said Tribunal disposed of three claim petitionsby a common judgment, the claims in all these three petitions arising out of one and the same accident. The accident in question occurred on 11th May, 1967 at about 8.30 a.m., near Ambattur in Avadi Madras Road. The vehicle involved in the accident is the bus bearing registration No. MDF 1376 owned by the 1st respondent in all the three petitions before the Claims Tribunal. Minor Ravi (by his next friend) is the petitioner in M.O.P. No. 60 of 1967. Meyyappan is the petitioner in M.O.P. No. 61 of 1967 and Annamalai is the petitioner in M.O.P. No. 64 of 1967. Out of these three petitioners, the first two viz., minor Ravi and Meyyappan, were passengers in the bus concerned. The 2nd respondent in all these petitions was the driver of the vehicle and the 3rd respondent is the insurer of the vehicle. 2. Admittedly the bus MDF 1376 which had been engaged by a group of persons, was returning from Tirupati. When the bus was proceeding towards Madras on the morning of 11th May, 1967, it capsized. Minor Ravi, aged 5 years, who was one of the passengers in the bus, got serious injuries or. his right forearm and the evidence discloses that this limb has been permanently impaired. Meyyappan, the petitioner in M.O.P. No. 61 of 1967, also received some injuries, though they are not so serious. 3. Annamalai, the petitioner in M.O.P. No. 64 of 1967, was said to be passing on the road on a cycle and he claimed that the bus in question actually knocked him down before it capsized and thereby he sustained injuries. The compensation claimed by minor Ravi in M.O.P. No. 60 of 1967 is Rs. 27,100, made up of Rs. 25,000 towards general, damages and Rs. 2,100 towards special damages. Meyyappan, the petitioner in M.O.P. No. 61 of 1967, claimed a total: sum of Rs. 5,900. Rs. 5,000 towards general damages and Rs. 900 towards special damages. Annamalai, the petitioner in M.O.P. No. 64 of 1967, claimed a total compensation of Rs. 15,000. The case of the petitioners is that the accident was brought about due to rash and negligent driving of the bus in question. 5,900. Rs. 5,000 towards general damages and Rs. 900 towards special damages. Annamalai, the petitioner in M.O.P. No. 64 of 1967, claimed a total compensation of Rs. 15,000. The case of the petitioners is that the accident was brought about due to rash and negligent driving of the bus in question. The owner of the bus and the insurer thereof, viz., respondents 1 and 3 respectively in the three petitions, contested the petitions. Their main contention has been that there was neither negligence nor rashness on the part of the driver of the bus and therefore the petitioners were not entitled to any compensation. The Tribunal below held that Annamalai, the petitioner in M.O.P. No. 64 of 1967, had not been knocked down by the bus in question, that he should have been knocked down by a lorry which was going ahead of the bus and that therefore he was not entitled to claim any compensation against the respondents. The said petition was dismissed by the Tribunal and there is no appeal by Annamalai, the petitioner therein, against that decision. So in these appeals we are concerned only with the two petitioners, viz., the petitioners in M.O.P. Nos. 60 and 61 of 1967. The Tribunal below awarded the entire sum of Rs. 27,100 claimed by the petitioner in M.O.P. No. 60 of 1967. In M.O.P. No. 61 of 1967, the Tribunal awarded a total sum of Rs. 2,950 (though the claim was for a total sum of Rs. 5,900). The Tribunal was of the view that the liability of the Insurance company was not limited to a sum of Rs. 2,000 for an injured passenger of the bus and, in the words of the Tribunal, “.......... the liability of the 3rd respondent is fixed in the proportion which Rs. 20,000 would bear to the compensation awarded to both the petitioners, and to the remaining amount petitioners will be entitled from the 1st respondent. My findings on point 2 in M.O.P. Nos. 60 and 61 of 1967 are accordingly.” 4. C.M.A. No. 158 of 1968 is filed by the owner of the bus (1st respondent) challenging the decision of the Tribunal below in M.O.P. No. 60 of 1967. C.M.A. No. 330 of 1970 is also against the decision in the said O.P. but this is filed by the Insurance company. 60 and 61 of 1967 are accordingly.” 4. C.M.A. No. 158 of 1968 is filed by the owner of the bus (1st respondent) challenging the decision of the Tribunal below in M.O.P. No. 60 of 1967. C.M.A. No. 330 of 1970 is also against the decision in the said O.P. but this is filed by the Insurance company. C.M.A. No. 159 of 1968 is the appeal filed by the owner of the bus against the decision of the Tribunal in M.O.P. No. 61 of 1967 and C.M.A. No. 48 of 1973 is that filed by the Insrance company in the said O.P. 5. The first question that arises for consideration in all these four civil miscellaneous appeals is whether the accident was due to rash or negligent driving of the bus in question. The witnesses who spoke about the accident are Kandayya (P.W. 3), Ramaswami (P.W. 6) and Meyyappan, the petitioner in M.O.P. No. 61 of 1967 (P.W. 7), who were all persons travelling in the bus when it capsized. Apart from these three witnesses, Annamalai, the petitioner in M.O.P. No. 64 of 1967, gave evidence as P.W. 9 and he examined one Narayanaswami as P.W. 8 to support his version of the accident. Arumugam, the driver of the bus, who has been impleaded as the 2nd respondent in all these petitions, is the only witness examined on behalf of the respondents. 6. We might completely eschew the evidence of P.Ws. 8 and 9 because they put forward a version which was different from that of P.Ws. 3, 6 and 7 and R.W. 1, the driver of the bus, and the same has been disbelieved by the Tribunal below and that part of the Tribunal’s finding is not in question before us. As we said earlier, Annamalai, the petitioner in M.O.P. No. 64 of 1967, has not filed any appeal against the dismissal of his petition. Therefore we have to examine the evidence of P.Ws. 3, 6 and 7 and R.W. 1. 7. The consistent version of P.Ws. 3, 6 and 7 is that the driver of the bus drove the vehicle at high speed in a reckless manner and was trying to overtake the lorry which was going ahead of the bus, in spite of the fact that the lorry was not giving way for overtaking. 7. The consistent version of P.Ws. 3, 6 and 7 is that the driver of the bus drove the vehicle at high speed in a reckless manner and was trying to overtake the lorry which was going ahead of the bus, in spite of the fact that the lorry was not giving way for overtaking. It is also in evidence that the passengers in the bus actually warned the driver of the bus not to go at such high speed and go cautiously. In spite of that, the bus driver accelerated his vehicle and, in an attempt to overtake the lorry, went to his extreme right side and ultimately the bus capsized. 8. That the bus capsized is an admitted fact. But R.W. 1 would say that he was driving the bus only at a slow speed, that the lorry was originally corning only behind the bus but it overtook the bus and went ahead of it, then the lorry knocked down Annamalai who was going on cycle in the same direction as the two motor vehicles were moving and the lorry sped away. According to R.W. 1, as Annamalai was lying on the middle of the road, the bus had to be swerved to the extreme left side in order to avoid Annamalai being run over by the bus and, in that process, the bus got into a ditch and capsized. While the evidence of P.Ws. 3, 6 and 7 is that the bus capsized on the right side of the road and the bus actually fell on its right side, R.W. 1 would have it that it so capsized only left of the road and the bus fell on its ieft side. Unfortunately, none of the parties chose to examine the police officer who had visited the place of accident soon after the same. Even so, from the materials on record we have no doubt that the version of P.Ws. 3, 6 and 7 is true and the counter-version put forward by R.W. 1 has been rightly rejected by the Tribunal below. There are two important aspects which belie the present version of R.W. 1. In the claim petitions, M.O.P. Nos. Even so, from the materials on record we have no doubt that the version of P.Ws. 3, 6 and 7 is true and the counter-version put forward by R.W. 1 has been rightly rejected by the Tribunal below. There are two important aspects which belie the present version of R.W. 1. In the claim petitions, M.O.P. Nos. 60 and 61 of 1967, there are clear averments to the effect that a lorry was going ahead of the bus, that the bus was driven at a reckless speed and the bus driver was trying to overtake the lorry in spite of warning by the passengers of the bus, that the bus went to the extreme right in the process of attempting to overtake the lorry and the bus capsized on the right margin of the road. The driver, who is the 2nd respondent in the petition, has not filed any written statement. The 1st respondent, viz., the owner of the vehicle, has not denied in his written statement, that the lorry was going ahead of the bus and that the bus was trying to overtake the same. It has also not been denied that the bus capsized on the right side. There is not a word of the bus having to be driven to the extreme left of the road and the bus getting into the ditch on the left of the road resulting in the bus capsizing on its left side. Of course, the 1st respondent has not admitted that the bus was driven in a rash or negligent manner or that it was going at a reckless speed when it capsized. It is stated in the written statement that as the lorry, which was going ahead of the bus, knocked down the cyclist (Annamalai), the driver of the bus had to apply sudden brakes and that was the cause of the bus capsizing. This is an entirely different version from what is put forward by R. W. 1 in the witness box. As there has been no denial of the fact that the lorry was going ahead of the bus, that the bus was trying to overtake the same and that the bus capsized on the right side of the road, as far as the written statement goes, the present version of R. W. 1 cannot be accepted. As there has been no denial of the fact that the lorry was going ahead of the bus, that the bus was trying to overtake the same and that the bus capsized on the right side of the road, as far as the written statement goes, the present version of R. W. 1 cannot be accepted. The Tribunal below is perfectly right in accepting the evidence of P. Ws. 3, 6 and 7 regarding the circumstances under which the bus capsized. It is also significant that R. W. 1 had pleaded guilty to a charge of rash and negligent driving and causing injuries to the passengers, when he was prosecuted in the criminal Court. The finding of the Tribunal below that the accident, which resulted in injuries to minor Ravi and Meyyappan, was due to rash and negligent driving of the bus in question is correct. 9. Regarding the quantum of compensation, there is now no dispute as far as Meyyappan, the petitioner in M. O.P. No. 61 of 1967, is concerned. As seen earlier the Tribunal below has awarded a total compensation of Rs. 2,950 made up of Rs. 2,500 as general damages and Rs. 450 as special damages and that finding is not being questioned now. As far as this O. P. is concerned, the only question would be regarding the apportionment of the liability against the Insurance company. We will come to this question a little later. 10. In M. O. P. No. 60 of 1967, the finding of the Tribunal below that the minor petitioner is entitled to a sum of Rs. 2,100 towards special damages is not challenged before us. The only dispute is regarding the general damages of Rs. 25,000. The contention on behalf of the appellants (owner of the bus and the insurer thereof) is that the above sum fixed by the Tribunal below as general damages is too very high. Therefore the question is whether there is ground to reduce the above said sum of Rs. 25,000 fixed by the Tribunal below. P.W. 1 was a Civil Assistant Surgeon in the General Hospital, Madras, who had examined minor Ravi, he having been admitted in that hospital soon after the accident. There were three injuries. The first was lacerated wound, muscle deep, on the right arm. This is comparatively a minor injury. The other two are serious. 25,000 fixed by the Tribunal below. P.W. 1 was a Civil Assistant Surgeon in the General Hospital, Madras, who had examined minor Ravi, he having been admitted in that hospital soon after the accident. There were three injuries. The first was lacerated wound, muscle deep, on the right arm. This is comparatively a minor injury. The other two are serious. The injury described as No. 2 is an extensive lacerated wound over the right forearm and elbow, completely damaging and lacerating the muscles and fracturing the right humerous. Injury No. 3 is a lacerated wound on the back of the right wrist, exposing the bone. There was no radiatory pulsation. The child was transferred to the orthopaedic department and he was in the hospital for over two weeks. P. W. 1 says that the right hand has been permanently disabled. Photographs of this child are marked as Exhibits A-10 to A-15. A look at these photographs which had been taken very much after the accident, shows that the child has practically lost that limb, though it has not been amputated. The forearm and the hand are completely deformed due to the injuries. The evidence shows that this child was sitting in the right side of the bus and when the bus turned turtle on its right side, the child had been thrown off and the right forearm and hand had been very seriously crushed. It is not seriously disputed that the child has practically lost this limb. The question is whether, under the above circumstances, the compensation of Rs. 25,000 awarded by the Tribunal is so high that it calls for interference by this Court. 11. In a case like this, under the head “ general damages” compensation may have to be awarded taking into consideration (1) pain and suffering, both past and future ; (2) loss of what are called amenities, (i.e.), the pleasures that make life tolerable for most people ; (3) the chance of marriage becoming bleak ; (4) loss of earnings: (5) the cost of the attention to the victim, if any, he will need during the rest of his life ; and (6) the shortening of life due to the injury. But in this case the injury being to the right forearm and hand, it has not been claimed that due to this injury the child’s life has been shortened Therefore this child would be entitled to claim compensation under the first five heads. It is always extremely difficult to assess the quantum under the above heads. Birkett, L.J. observed in Bird v. Coc King and Sons Ltd.1: “The assessment of damages in cases of personal injuries is, perhaps, one of the most difficult tasks which a Judge has to perform..... The task is so difficult because the elements which must be considered in forming the assessment in any given case vary so infinitely from other cases that there can be no fixed and unalterable standard for assessing the amounts for those particular elements. Although there is no fixed and unalterable standard, the Courts have been making these assessments over many years, and I think, that they do form some guide to the kind of figure which is appropriate to the facts of any particular case, it being for the Judge, or for the appellate Court if they are reviewing the matter, to consider the special facts in each case; for I agree.....that one case cannot really be compared with another. The only thing that can be done is to show how other cases may be a guide. When therefore, a particulate matter comes for review, one of the questions is, how does this accord with the general run of assessment made over the years in comparable cases” Venkatadri, J., had to deal with a similar case in Ayesha Begum v. Veerappan2 . That was a case where a girl aged 5 years had sustained a permanent injury in her pelvic bone which prevented free movement of her legs for all time to come. Considering the disfigurement caused to the child, the psychological reactions to the same, uncertain marriage prospects, difficulty of child bearing and all other circumstances, the learned Judge held that the claim of Rs. 15,000 made on behalf of the child towards general damages was neither too low nor too high. The Tribunal below having awarded only a sum of Rs. 5,000 Venkatadri, J., allowed the appeal filed on behalf of the abovesaid child and awarded compensation of Rs. 15,000 towards general damages as claimed. 15,000 made on behalf of the child towards general damages was neither too low nor too high. The Tribunal below having awarded only a sum of Rs. 5,000 Venkatadri, J., allowed the appeal filed on behalf of the abovesaid child and awarded compensation of Rs. 15,000 towards general damages as claimed. In that judgment, Venkatadri, J., has referred to a number of decisions of the Courts in England which speak of the difficulties in assessing the compensation payable in a case like this. The Tribunal below, after referring to the judgment of Venkatadri, J., in the above case, stated that in the case before Venkatadri, J., the child was a girl which need not work for earning a livelihood and it was not expected to earn for the maintenance of others and that in the present case, the child being a boy and the future breadwinner of the family, the compensation of Rs. 25,000 claimed cannot be considered to be too high. 12. We consider that the distinction drawn by the learned Tribunal between the present case and that before Venkataari, J., is not right. In modern times, it is not correct to assume that a girl is not expected to work for earning a livelihood, as stated by the Tribunal below and that only a boy would become the future bread-winner of the family. The injuries sustained by the victim in the present case, though fairly serious, in that the right forearm has been deformed, the same cannot be said to be at any rate more serious than the injuries sustained by the girl-child in the case before Venkatadri, J. There the child had sustained a permanent injury in the pelvic bone which prevented free movement of her legs for all time to come. The permanent impairment of the pelvic bone is certainly a very serious matter, •especially for a girl-child. As the child has not been in a position to have free movement of her legs and the pelvic bone has been seriously affected and such impairment is a permanent one, it is quite likely that the child would not be in a position ever to enjoy sex life. In any event, we do not consider that the injury to the boy in the present case calls for more compensation than what has been awarded in the case of the girl-child before Venkatadri, J. 13. In any event, we do not consider that the injury to the boy in the present case calls for more compensation than what has been awarded in the case of the girl-child before Venkatadri, J. 13. The learned Counsel for the respondent referred to the decisions in Flint v. Lovell1 , Davies v. Powell Duffrya Associated Collieries, Limited2 , and Moray v. Woodfield3 , and contended that once the trial Judge assesses the compensation, the same should not be varied by the appellate Court unless the appellate Court is convinced either that the trial Judge acted upon some wrong principle of law, or that the amount awarded was so extremely high or so very small as to make it, in the judgment of the appellate Court, an entirely erroneous estimate of the damage to which the petitioners are entitled. But it is clear that even the Courts in England do make a distinction between an assessment of damage made by a trial Judge and that made by a jury. It has been pointed out in a number of cases that if the trial in which the compensation has been awarded is by a Judge alone, an appeal is a rehearing of the case and accordingly the Court of Appeal can vary the amount of damages awarded to what they consider is the proper amount. Of course, the assessment made by the trial Judge is not to be interfered with lightly. Even so, the appellate Court has to interfere if the sum awarded is out of line with the run of awards made in comparable cases. These principles are recognised by the Court of Appeal in England. In Charelsworth on Negligencc, 4th Edition, para. 1260, the position is summed up thus: “ On a trial by Judge alone,an appeal is a re-hearing of the case and accordingly the Court of Appeal can vary the amount of damages awarded to what they consider is the proper amount. The Court has, however, said. ‘Unless we come to the conclusion that the learned Judge took an erroneous view of the evidence as to the damage suffered by the plaintiff, or made some mistake in giving weight to the evidence that ought not to have affected his mind, or in leaving out of consideration something that ought to have affected his mind, we ought not to interfere. ‘The appellate Court will not interfere, unless the Judge has made ‘‘a wholly erroneous estimate of the damage suffered.” Although the Court of Appeal are slow to interfere with the award of a Judge, they will do so more readily than in the case of the award of a jury, and in particular they will interfere if the sum awarded is out of line with the run of awards made in comparable cases in recent years. The tendency is to wards a standardisation of damages, although it is recognised that exact standardisation is impossible and that the limits of variation are wide." 14. In Perumal v. State of Madras1 , Maharajan, J., had to consider the measure of damages in respect of the death of an infant. In that case, the Tribunal below had awarded a sum of Rs. 3,000 for the loss of the life of the child. This was enhanced by the learned Judge to a sum of Rs. 5,000. In doing so, the learned Judge observed: " Yet another difficulty that besets the Courts is this. Most appellate Courts refuse to interfere with the quantum of compensation awarded by the trial Courts on the ground that the sum awarded is neither unduly high nor unduly low. This principle of judicial neutrality has resulted in a lack of uniformity in the decisions of the trial Courts. In my experience, I have found that the compensation awarded for the death of the infant of the same age varies from Rs. 1,000 to Rs. 10,000 according to the discretion of the Judge concerned. The range of variation between one trial Judge and another in fixing the amount of compensation is almost whimsical and bewildering........In the absence of statutory guide-lines, I think that for the purpose of securing uniformity some workable formula should be evolved, which can be usefully followed by the trial Courts, after making marginal adjustments in the light of the peculiar facts of each individual case." No doubt those observations were made in the case of death of an infant and not in a case of permanent injury to an infant. Even so, the principle that there should be certain amount of uniformity with regard to award of compensation would apply even to the present case. As already seen, Venkatadri, J., held in Ayesha Begum v. Veerappan2 , that a compensation of Rs. Even so, the principle that there should be certain amount of uniformity with regard to award of compensation would apply even to the present case. As already seen, Venkatadri, J., held in Ayesha Begum v. Veerappan2 , that a compensation of Rs. 15,000 in the case of injuries causing permanent infirmity of a child aged about 5 years is neither to high nor too low. We think that in the present case also, the proper compensation payable is only Rs. 15,000 and not Rs. 25,000. 15. There is no dispute that the injured boy (minor Ravi) is entitled to the sum of Rs. 2,100 towards special damages as fixed by the Tribunal below. Therefore minor Ravi would in all be entitled to a total sum of Rs. 17,000. 16. The only other question is regarding; the liability of the Insurance company On this point the Tribunal below is not right. Under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act before the amendment of 1969, indisputably the liability of the Insurance company is limited to a sum of Rs. 2,000 per passenger in a bus if the policy is one conforming only to the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. That position is not disputed by any of the parties before us. The amended provision, which has increased the liability of the Insurance company, has no application to the present case as the accident occurred very much prior to the amendment and the claim itself had been made much earlier to the amendment. Therefore, the liability of the Insurance company would be only to the extent of Rs. 2,000 in the case of each of the two injured, viz., minor Ravi and Meyyappan. 17. The result is, C. M. A. No. 159 of 1968 filed by the owner of the bus is partly allowed, but C. M. A. No. 158 of 1968 is dismissed. C. M A. Nos. 330 of 1970 and 48 of 1973 filed by the Insurance company are partly allowed and it is directed that out of the sum of Rs. 17,100 awarded to minor Ravi (petitioner in M. O. P. No. 60 of 1957), the 3rd respondent Insurance company is liable to pay only a sum of Rs. C. M A. Nos. 330 of 1970 and 48 of 1973 filed by the Insurance company are partly allowed and it is directed that out of the sum of Rs. 17,100 awarded to minor Ravi (petitioner in M. O. P. No. 60 of 1957), the 3rd respondent Insurance company is liable to pay only a sum of Rs. 2,000 and the balance is payable by the owner of the bus, viz., the 1st respondent, and similarly in M. O. P. No. 61 of 1967, the Insurance company would be liable to pay only Rs. 2,000 out of the total sum of Rs. 2,950 awarded to Meyyappan, the petitioner in that case, and the balance of Rs. 950 is to be borne by the 1st respondent, viz., the owner of the bus. There would be no order as to costs in any of these appeals.