JUDGMENT : This application in revision is directed against the Sub-divisional Magistrate's ORDER :C. P. Sinha, J. dated 29.6.1970 under which he has taken cognizance in the case for the offences under Section 51 (b) (ii) and (iii) read with Section 63 of the Copyright Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) against these three petitioners. Their prayer is to quash the prosecution so initiated against them. The Magistrate has taken this cognizance on the basis of the complaint as filed by the present opposite party (annexure 1 to the revision petition). 2. Petitioner no. 2 Bishwanath Prasad Shahabadi is said to be the proprietor and sole distributor of petitioner no. 1, Nirmal Pictures. Petitioner no. 3, Lalji Bhagat, is the proprietor of Shyama Talkies, Katihar. The complainant (opposite party) is the author of the Hindi novel 'Gaon Ki Gori' which has been printed and published by his wife Sita Devi in 1961 at Sita Prakashan, Katihar. 3. The accusations made in the petition of complaint against these petitioners were these. After having written and published the above novel (Gaon Ki Gori) the complainant got its copyright reserved under the Act vide ORDER :no. L 1217/61 dated 22.7.1961 and thereby became the owner of this copyright. Thereafter, the complainant sent four copies of this novel to four cinema producers at Bombay in Decembar, 1961 for the purpose of its being filmed. He also sent several hundreds of its copies to the different bookstalls including one Maithili Pustak Bhavan at Katihar and the other to Singh Pustakalaya at Purnea. Accused Bishwanath Prasad Shahabadi under the banner of accused Nirmal Pictures in collusion with Nazir Hussain, however, got written in 1962 the story of this novel 'Gaon Ki Gori' in the book 'Ganga Maiya Tohe Piari Chadhaibo' and thereafter in 1962 they got it filmed without taking any prior consent or permission of the complainant. After having witnessed the screening of this picture in the cinema house, Shyama Talkies, Katihar, of the accused Lalji - Bhagat, the complainant filed a complaint (no. After having witnessed the screening of this picture in the cinema house, Shyama Talkies, Katihar, of the accused Lalji - Bhagat, the complainant filed a complaint (no. 191 C of 1963) in the court of the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Katihar in which cognizance was taken and the story writer Nazir Hussain is facing trial (it is not disputed that against that cognizance the accused person had moved the High Court for its quashing but that was dismissed and the case against accused Nazir Hussain is proceeding in the court below). 4. On 10.5.1963 the complainant sent notice to the accused Bishwanath Shahabadi protesting to his infringement of complainant's copyright in this regard by illegal exhibition of the infringing film "Ganga Maiya Tohe Piari Chadhaibo". Unmindful of that notice he (petitioner no. 2) as the sole distributor and proprietor of Nirmal Pictures (petitioner no. 1), which has its offices at Giridih, Calcutta and Bombay, has been getting illegally exhibited this film in various cinema houses by supplying its printed copies from its negative in his (petitioner no. 2's) possession. One of those copies has been seized under t he ORDER :s of the court from the Lotus Cinema, Calcutta - and it is lying in the custody of the court at Purnea. 5. That the complainant, on 23.6.1970, having learnt that accused no. 3 (petitioner no. 3) was knowingly getting exhibited one copy of this film in his cinema house Shyama Talkies since 19.6.1970 for profit and gain by way of trade he immediately went to the cinema house and met its proprietor (accused no. 3) who confessed to him his exhibition of the same from that day (19.6.1970) and further disclosed that he had - obtained this infringing film from the Calcutta Office of the Nirmal Pictures under the instruction of accused Bishwanath Prasad Shahabadi. On 23.6.1970, the complainant attended the evening show at the Shyama Talkies and noticed this film being screened. 6. Further allegation was that all the three accused are fully aware that this infringing fi]m is a colourable imitation and adaptation of complainant's infringed novel 'Gaon Ki Gori' and constituted an offence under the Act and also the fact that Nazir Hussain has been facing trial in respect of this infringement, but without caring for those facts they have been committing similar offences having no care for the position of law in that behalf. In paragraphs 9 to 14 of the petition of complaint the complainant endeavoured to show the similarity by reference to his book 'Gaon Ki Gori' and the picture 'Ganga Maiya Tohe Piari Chadhaibo' in ORDER :to support the truth of his allegation of infringement in the picture of his book (it does not seem necessary to detail out these averments at present). 7. On the above allegations the complainant asserted that accused nos. 1 and 2 (petitioner nos. 1 and 2) have committed offence under Section 63 of the Act by infringing copies of this film for the purposes of trade knowing that it prejudicially affected the complainant's copyright concerned. So also, he asserted of accused no. 3 in the matter who has notwithstanding his knowledge of these facts been exhibiting the infringing copy of the film in public by way of trade. The Sub-divisional Magistrate, on receiving this complaint, examined the complainant on solemn affirmation on 25.6.1970. On that date several rulings were placed before him for the complainant and on 29.6.1970, after perusal of those materials learned Magistrate, in his somewhat detailed ORDER :, took cognizance in the case against all the three accused under Section 51 read with Section 63 of the Act and transferred it to another Magistrate for disposal. Being aggrieved with this ORDER :, the accused persons have moved this revision for quashing of their prosecution, so undertaken. 8. Mr. Braj Kishore Prasad No.2, representing the petitioners, has seriously contended that the allegations in the petition of complaint, even if they are accepted at their face value, can by no stretch of imagination constitute an offence. In that position, no question of appreciating any evidence will arise and the complaint, as such, should have been thrown out by the Magistrate instead of taking cognizance in the matter. When this basic fact has been overlooked by the Magistrate, this Court must step in and set aside this cognizance and the prosecution of his clients to save them from unnecessary harassment of undergoing the trial for practically no offence, to serve the ends of justice. To elaborate this contention, he has urged that complainant's own statement, as averred in the complaint petition to exhibit close similarity between his book and the film, will show that there is no meeting ground between the two and they are wholly dissimilar. To elaborate this contention, he has urged that complainant's own statement, as averred in the complaint petition to exhibit close similarity between his book and the film, will show that there is no meeting ground between the two and they are wholly dissimilar. The novel 'Gaon Ki Gori' is written in the usual Hindi language whereas the language of the film is the local dialect 'Bhojpuri'. So also, there is great dissimilarity in the theme of the two plays as also the roles assigned to the different characters in the two. Comparing the two together, according to him, it would be manifest that the film is not even near this novel either in form or in substance much less its (novel) reproduction. In his submission even if the ideas of the two tally, that will not in any way bring the accused within the ambit of this law because it was always open to the story writer of 'Ganga Maiya Tohe Piari Chadhaibo' to take that idea and develop it in his own way with his skill and labour. To support these contentions he has referred to (1) E.M. Forster V. A. N. Parasuram (A. I. R. 1964 Madras 331), and, 2) Associated Publishers (Madras) Ltd. V. Bashyam (A.I.R. 1961 Madras 9. His further submission is that even if his above contention does not prevail but the case can on no account proceed against petitioners 1 and 2 (accused nos. 1 and 2) for the reason that the distribution of the film to accused no. 3 for the purpose of trade, if it was an offence at all, had taken place and completed at Calcutta so that the Katihar (Bihar) court has no jurisdiction to prosecute them. Moreover, since similar previous complaints at the hands of this complainant had already been dismissed against accused no. 2 (Bishwanath Prasad Shahabadi), he could not be prosecuted over again in this case. F or this view he has relied upon the Supreme Court authority in (3) Pramatha Nath Talukdar V. Saroj Ranjan- (A.I.R. 1962 S.C.876). On these contentions he has urged that if the Court does not feel inclined to quash the cognizance and prosecution of all the three petitioners, then it must do so in respect of at least two of them, namely, petitioner 1 and 2. 10. On these contentions he has urged that if the Court does not feel inclined to quash the cognizance and prosecution of all the three petitioners, then it must do so in respect of at least two of them, namely, petitioner 1 and 2. 10. After having carefully considered the above submissions made for the petitioners, I have not felt impressed with them as to think in terms of quashing, as prayed for. The Supreme Court in (4) R. P. Kapur V. State of Punjab (A.I.R. 1960 S. C. 866), which related to the question of quashing of criminal proceeding at of interlocutory stage in exercise of powers under Section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, has observed that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be, exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice; ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. While further observing that it was not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction, their Lordships pointed out by way of illustration, three class of cases where this power could and should be exercised. The second category, which would seem relevant, is, where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the First Information Report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. 11. No doubt, in the instant case the quashing of the cognizance ORDER :and the prosecution has been sought under the revisional jurisdiction of the Court under Section 435 read with Section 439, Criminal Procedure Code and not under its inherent power under Section 561 A. But, I think, these principles as laid down by the Supreme Court can well guide the Court in deciding the issue at hand in this regard. Keeping these principles in. Keeping these principles in. mind one has to examine the allegations as made in the complaint to find out whether even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in entirety they actually constitute no offence at all so that no question of appreciation of any evidence in the case is to arise. 12. On a perusal of the complaint petition it does not seem possible to take such a view. On the other hand, as those allegations stand, they would seem to need an investigation by court, according to law, to find out the truth or otherwise thereof to hold the accused guilty or free. Section 51 (b) (ii) of the Act makes a person liable of the infringement of copyright for his distribution either for the purpose of trade or to such an extent as to affect prejudicially the owner of the copyright. Under Clause (iii) the person who exhibits it in public by way of trade comes within the purview of this offence. Under the Explanation appended to this section, for the purposes of this section, the re-production of a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work in the form of a cinematograph film is to be deemed to be an 'infringing copy'. Under Section 63 of the Act the person knowingly infringing or abetting the copyright in a work is to be punished with imprisonment which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both. The complainant's claim of being the registered copyright owner of his above novel 'Gaon Ki Gori' which is said to have been infringed by the accused Nazir Hussain of the other case and the present accused has not been controverted at present. 13. In the case of Nazir Hussain as brought to this Court against his prosecution in the court below regarding his alleged infringement of the copyright of this complainant with regard to this book 'Gaon Ki Gori', (5) (1969 B. L. J. R. 12) the, Bench refused to quash that prosecution holding: "What this Court has, at present, to see is whether the petition of complaint discloses ample materials for investigation or whether there is legal evidence for a criminal court to examine those matters. It is not possible for this Court to examine these matters. It is not possible for this Court to examine these matters. There are ample' materials in this case which require investigation in a criminal court and that it would be expedient, in the interest of justice, to have them enquired into. There is no manifest or patent injustice apparent on the face of the present proceedings, which calls for interference by the exercise of the inherent and extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court under Section 561 A." It is not disputed that the trial of that case against this Nazir Hussain is still continuing. 14. The question whether there is similarity between the two works forming subject-matter of this dispute or not is a matter of details which will require to be investigated and found on merit during the trial. So also, the question whether the film is to be taken as being in no way a copy in form or substance of the complainant's book. It is not for this Court to go into the merit of this matter at this interlocutory stage as they would appropriately constitute question for a decision in accordance with law on the matters brought before the court during trial. All that this Court has to see at this stage is whether on the face value of the allegations made in the complaint no case is made out at all. But, as already observed, no such finding is possible on those allegations as made. The point whether the author of the book 'Ganga Maiya Tohe Piari Chadhaibo' which has been so filmed, is a colourable imitation or adaptation of the complainant's original book or whether the author of the subsequent book has simply taken that idea and developed it into the present work after applying his own labour and skill is also a matter for determination on merit by the trial court and this is not the time where this Court can examine it at I this preliminary stage when the I evidence is still to be gone into, and say one way or the other. 15. The above authorities, (2) A.I.R. 1961 Madras 114 and (1) A.I.R. 1964 Madras 331, as referred to by the petitioners to support their prayer for quashing at this preliminary stage would not appear to be helpful to them. 15. The above authorities, (2) A.I.R. 1961 Madras 114 and (1) A.I.R. 1964 Madras 331, as referred to by the petitioners to support their prayer for quashing at this preliminary stage would not appear to be helpful to them. Firstly, both these decisions relate to civil actions initiated in those cases by the persons aggrieved for the alleged infringement of their copyright under Section 55 of the Act. Moreover, they have been given on merit on the materials placed by the parties during trial of those suits. Here, as already stated, the trial of the criminal case is still to commence and all that has been done by the Sub-divisional Magistrate is to take cognizance and transfer it to another Magistrate for trial. Accordingly, it is not considered necessary to examine in any detail the impact of these rulings in the instant proceeding. 16. As observed above, under Section 51 (b)(ii) read with its Explanation the distribution of the alleged infringing film by petitioner nos. 1 and 2 at Calcutta to petitioner no. 3 if proved, comes within the mischief of this offence. On the face of it, there is not much scope for dispute that this distribution of the film was for the purpose of trade by way of its exhibition in the cinema house at Katihar of petitioner no. 3. Mr. Pradyumna Narain Singh, learned counsel for the complainant-opposite party, has, however, urged that the distribution so made by petitioners 1 and 2 could not be treated as a complete action unless it was followed by its exhibition for which it has been made over to petitioner no. 3. According to him, the consequence of that act of distribution has actually taken place at Katihar when the film was exhibited, and in such a circumstance, it is fully open to the Katihar Court to try them (petitioners 1 and 2) also along with petitioner 3. 3. According to him, the consequence of that act of distribution has actually taken place at Katihar when the film was exhibited, and in such a circumstance, it is fully open to the Katihar Court to try them (petitioners 1 and 2) also along with petitioner 3. His further submission is that according to the usual practice followed in such trade the distributor gets contracted portion of the sale proceeds earned from the exhibition of the film, and, as such, the question whether that distribution was to be taken as having fully completed at Calcutta for the purpose of trade within the meaning of this law or whether it was to be treated as complete after the film has been exhibited would require consideration on merit on the materials on record during trial. At this stage, according to him, any attempt on the part of this Court to make it a ground for quashing the cognizance as taken in the case will be premature and should not be legitimately resorted to interfere with that cognizance because, if the petitioners are so advised, they can well address the Magistrate on this aspect of the matter, during the trial, to seek his JUDGMENT : also in this behalf. These submissions of Mr. Singh cannot be taken to be devoid of any substance. No doubt, it will always be open to the petitioners to urge this point before the Magistrate at the appropriate stage and see if their (petitioners 1 and 2's) prosecution can be c10sed on this technical ground. At the present moment, when the trial is still to begin, it will not, I think, be proper to quash their prosecution on this score. After all, whether the distribution of the film at Calcutta alleged to have been made by the petitioners 1 and 2 to petitioner 3 has been for the purpose of trade or to affect prejudicially the owner of the copyright within this law so as to constitute an offence would require consideration and decision on the basis of materials which the parties may choose to produce before the court. Any definite decision on this point in this Court at this' early stage and quash the proceeding against these accused persons will, to my mind, be obviously premature. Any definite decision on this point in this Court at this' early stage and quash the proceeding against these accused persons will, to my mind, be obviously premature. As the complaint stands, the two acts, distribution and exhibition, are alleged to be prima facie interwoven, and in this context, the dropping of the prosecution against these accused persons on their these submissions would not be justified. 17. In this view of the matter, I would not deem it necessary to examine the single Judge decision of (6) J. N. Bagga V. All India Reporter Ltd. (A.I.R. 1969 Bombay 302) on which Mr. Singh has relied to justify the prosecution of all the accused persons in the court at Katihar. It is also noted that this decision, on its facts, may not be appropriately applied to the case at hand because the facts of the two are quite distinguishable. 18. So far as the petitioners' case regarding filing and dismissal of previous complaints against present petitioner no. 2, Bishwanath Prasad Shahabadi, is concerned, it is set out in paragraphs 3 to 10 of the revisional petition. As it has been said, the complaint of this opposite party against this petitioner no. 2 and others filed on 2. 5. 1963 was dismissed on 27.12.1963 against him (petitioner no. 2) and cognizance was taken against the accused Nazir Hussain only. The complainant's attempt to have this petitioner no. 2 summoned in the court of the transferee Magistrate in that case also failed on three occasions and against the third rejection ORDER :the complainant moved the Sessions Judge in revision which was allowed with ORDER :for further enquiry, but on his (petitioner no. 2's) moving the High Court against that Sessions Judge's ORDER :, the latter was set aside. The complainant thereafter is said to have filed a fresh complaint on those allegations at Araria which was dismissed by the Sub-divisional Magistrate under Section 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on 26.8.1969. His next complaint of 1.11.1968 before the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Katihar against this petitioner no. 2 was also dismissed on 14.8.1969 under Section 203, Criminal Procedure Code, and thereafter, this present complaint in which the impugned cognizance was taken. His next complaint of 1.11.1968 before the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Katihar against this petitioner no. 2 was also dismissed on 14.8.1969 under Section 203, Criminal Procedure Code, and thereafter, this present complaint in which the impugned cognizance was taken. On these facts, learned petitioners' counsel has strenuously urged that it was incumbent upon the Sub-divisional Magistrate to have dismissed this complaint also on the Supreme Court authority in (3) Pramatha Nath Talukdar V. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar (A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 876). 19. In this case, the Supreme Court has held that no doubt dismissal under Section 203, Criminal Procedure Code, is no bar to the entertainment of a second complaint on the same facts, but it will be entertained only on exceptional circumstances, e. g., where the previous ORDER :was passed on an incomplete record nr on a misunderstanding of the nature of the complaint or it was manifestly absurd, unjust or foolish which new facts which could not, with reasonable diligence, have been brought on the record in the previous proceedings, have been adduced. According to learned counsel for the opposite party, the case in hand relates to fresh set of facts leading to the infringement of his client's copyright concerned. In his submission, from the nature of the offence alleged against the petitioners it has to be treated as a continuing one so that every time they embarked upon it that created a cause of action for the complainant to call the aid of the court in the appropriate manner and this is what he has done in the present case because distribution of the picture by the first two petitioners to the third for its exhibition in his cinema house has to be treated as independent from their previous acts of its distribution for which he had separate cause of action against them. 20. There is no such case before me that the present petitioner no. 3, who is alleged to have exhibited this film in his cinema house at Katihar, was also an accused in the previous cases. As the case of the complainant is, accused nos. 1 and 2 had distributed copy of this film to accused no. 3 which the latter was found exhibiting in his cinema house at Katihar from 19. 3, who is alleged to have exhibited this film in his cinema house at Katihar, was also an accused in the previous cases. As the case of the complainant is, accused nos. 1 and 2 had distributed copy of this film to accused no. 3 which the latter was found exhibiting in his cinema house at Katihar from 19. 6.1970 and that its distribution by them had been effected ignoring the earlier notice which the complainant had sent to them protesting to their action of that distribution of the film to others as that amounted to infringement of his registered copyright in this matter. If this part of the complainant's case is to be believed, then in the context of the nature of the offence, which would appear to be continuing one, the complainant could prima facie be taken to have accrued a new cause of action in his favour in regard to this alleged violation. That being so, the remedy of filing a complaint for the same treating it to be a fresh violation of his copyright cannot be taken to be barred merely because his previous complaints regarding that distribution of the film to some others had been dismissed without taking cognizance. On these facts, I am inclined to think that on this authority of the Supreme Court the petitioners cannot appropriately invoke this Court to quash the present prosecution of petitioner no. 2 for this reason. 21. For the above reasons, I am of the view that the petitioners have failed to make out a case in this revision for interference with the impugned cognizance and prosecution against them. Accordingly, this revision has to be treated to be without merit and must fail. It is, therefore, dismissed. I must, however, make it clear that whatever observations I have made in this ORDER :they are meant for the present case and they should not in any way prejudice the mind of the court below against any of the parties on any point which, if and when urged, must be decided on its merit in accordance with law. Application dismissed