JUDGMENT CHANDURKAR J.- This petition filed by the State of Maharashtra and the Manager of the Government Press and Book Depot, Nagpur, is directed against the orders of the Payment of Wages Authority, Nagpur, and the District Judge Nagpur, holding that the respondent was entitled to his full salary during the period of his suspension. The facts in this case are not in dispute. The petitioner was working as a Composing Auxiliary at the Government Printing Press at Nagpur. He was suspended pending an inquiry for misconduct on 26-3-1964. The departmental proceedings resulted in a penalty in the form of reduction to the post of Mazdoor with effect from 24-12-1964. During the period of suspension the petitioner was paid subsistence allowance as provided by rule 151 of the Bombay Civil Services Rules. His claim was that during this period he was entitled to full wages at the rate of Rs. 97.50 inclusive of all the allowances and that the amount of Rs. 337.50 was illegally deducted. He, therefore, filed an application before the Payment of Wages Authority claiming Rs. 337.50 as deducted wages, Rs. 3,375.00 as compensation for deduction, and Rs. 225 as compensation for delay in payment of wages. It was the case of the State Government and the Manager of the Government Printing Press that the petitioner was rightly paid his subsistence allowance as provided by rule 151 of the Bombay Civil Services Rules. The Payment of Wages Authority, however, took the view that the petitioner was entitled to his full wages and not only to Rs. 61.02 per month which was paid as monthly subsistence allowance. It found that there was an illegal deduction to the extent of Rs. 37.48 per month and the total deduction of wages during the period of suspension worked out to Rs. 328.32. The Authority, therefore, directed the present petitioners to pay Rs. 328.32 to the respondent on account of the deducted wages during the period of suspension. The rest of the claim of the respondent was rejected. 2. The petitioners filed an appeal against the order of the Payment of Wages Authority challenging the view that the respondent was entitled to full salary during the period of suspension. The respondent also filed an appeal against the order of the Authority so far as it rejected a part of his claim. 2. The petitioners filed an appeal against the order of the Payment of Wages Authority challenging the view that the respondent was entitled to full salary during the period of suspension. The respondent also filed an appeal against the order of the Authority so far as it rejected a part of his claim. Both these appeals came to be decided by a common order by the District Judge, Nagpur, who confirmed the decision of the Payment of Wages Authority. Both the appeals, therefore, came to be dismissed. 3. It may be mentioned that both the Payment of Wages Authority and the learned District Judge, while upholding the contention of the respondent that he was entitled to full salary during the period of suspension heavily relied on a decision of this Court in K. P. Mushran v. B. C. Patil1 in which a Division Bench of this Court had taken the view that notwithstanding the order of suspension, the contract of employment was not suspended at all, that the relationship of master and servant between the employer and the employee continued to subsist, and that the obligation of the parties under the contract remained unaffected. The Division Bench, therefore, took the view that the employee was entitled to wages during the period of suspension and the Payment of Wages Authority was competent to order the employer to pay the full amount of wages during such period. The learned District Judge has taken the view that the Bombay Civil Services Rules did not make any provision regarding suspension and, therefore, the suspension was not according to any rule. 4. Mr. V. G. Hardas on behalf of the petitioners contends that during the period of suspension the respondent was not entitled to anything more than the subsistence allowance as provided by rule 151 of the Bombay Civil Services Rules and there was no question of the respondent making any claim on the basis of his salary which he was drawing before the date of his suspension. In support of this proposition Mr. Hardas has relied on a later decision of this Court in Thillai Natarajan v. Farnandes2 to which Chagla C.J., who was a party to the earlier decision was also a party. In support of this proposition Mr. Hardas has relied on a later decision of this Court in Thillai Natarajan v. Farnandes2 to which Chagla C.J., who was a party to the earlier decision was also a party. In that case Chagla C. J. distinguished his earlier view and it was held that the conditions of service of an employee of the railway authority with regard to his suspension and with regard to the wages to which he is entitled during the period of suspension are regulated by the rules framed by the Governor-General under section 241 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, has no application with regard to those conditions, and it is not open to an employee to claim an amount as being illegally deducted by the railway authority when that deduction is legal and permissible under the rules framed by the Governor General under the Government of India Act. According to Mr. Hardas, the respondent's conditions of service were those as laid down in the Bombay Civil Services Rules, and if he has been paid the subsistence allowance during the period of his suspension as provided in rule 151, it could not be said that there was any deduction of wages, much less an illegal deduction. We have gone through both these decisions, the latter of which was also cited by the learned District Judge, and it is clear that both the Payment of Wages Authority and the learned District Judge were in error in following the earlier decision in K. P. Mushran's case which was distinguished in the later decision in Natrajan's case. The facts in K. P. Mushran's case were that the railway employee who was respondent No. 2 in that case was under suspension from 23-2-1949 to 15-4-1950. He was, however, ordered by the railway authorities to remain at the headquarters during the period of suspension and during this period of suspension he was paid a suspension allowance which was less than the wages to which he was entitled. The employee was compelled to go on leave for a certain period on full pay and on half pay for the next four months and thereafter without any pay at all. The employee was compelled to go on leave for a certain period on full pay and on half pay for the next four months and thereafter without any pay at all. He was not charged with having committed any act which was contrary to the rules of service, and no result of any departmental enquiry was communicated to him. In these circumstances the employee went before the Payment of Wages Authority claiming that he was entitled to his full wages throughout the period as he was in the service of the railway authorities and his claim was allowed. A writ petition was filed by the railway authorities in which it was held that notwithstanding the order of suspension the contract of employment was not suspended at all, the relationship of master and servant between the employer and the employee continued to subsist and the obligation of the parties under the contract remained unaffected and the employee was entitled to wages during the period of suspension. In the course of the judgment, the Division Bench, referring to the decision of the Payment of Wages Authority, observed that the Authority has held that the rules which permit the employer to suspend his employee and to pay him a subsistence allowance which is less than his full wages are inconsistent with the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act, and, therefore, the liability of the employer to pay full wages to his employee is unaffected by the rule which gives the employer the power to suspend the employee." There was, therefore, no dispute in that case that certain rules were made by the Government of India under section 241 of the Government of India Act, 1935. Subsection (4) of section 241 of the Government of India Act, however, provided that notwithstanding anything in that section, but subject to any other provisions of that Act, Acts of the appropriate Legislature in India may regulate the conditions of service of persons serving His Majesty in a civil capacity in India, and any rules made under that section shall have effect subject to the provisions of any such Act. The Division Bench took the view that if the Authority had decided that the rule permitting the employer to pay him subsistence allowance during the suspension period was inconsistent with the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act, "it is difficult to understand why that decision is without jurisdiction." The Division Bench also further took the view that the, real nature of the suspension order and the subsistence allowance was that the employer imposed a fine on the employee and deducted it from his wages, and instead of paying the employee full wages, the employer paid him only a part of the wages, deducting the balance as a fine, though the railway authorities did not choose to call the difference between the subsistence allowance and the wages as a tine. Such a fine was not permissible to be imposed by the employer under section 1 of the Act, which alone provided for imposition of a fine. Thus, according to the Division Bench, the deduction was not covered by any of the provisions of sections 7 to 13 of the Payment of Wages Act. 5. The same Rules which were relied upon on behalf of the railway authorities in K. P. Mushran's case again came up for consideration before another Division Bench of which Chagla C. J. was a member, in Thillai Natarajan v. Farnandes. There the petitioner who was an abstract clerk in the office of the Goods Superintendent of the Central Railway at Wadi Bunder in Bombay was suspended on 5-9-1955 and he was earlier served with a notice to show cause why his services should not be terminated, on 27·8-1955. The monthly wages of the petitioner were Rs. 170/8/0, but for the month of September when he was suspended he was paid Rs. 123/12/0. The employee applied under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act to the Payment of Wages Authority claiming the balance of amount of Rs. 46/12/0. This application came to be dismissed and the employee, therefore, filed a petition under Article 227 of the constitution of India. On behalf of the petitioner in that case it was contended that the Payment of Wages Authority had failed give effect to a clear decision of the Court reported in Mushran v. Patil (cit. supra). 46/12/0. This application came to be dismissed and the employee, therefore, filed a petition under Article 227 of the constitution of India. On behalf of the petitioner in that case it was contended that the Payment of Wages Authority had failed give effect to a clear decision of the Court reported in Mushran v. Patil (cit. supra). While dismissing the petition of the employee, the learned Chief Justice distinguished the earlier decision and observed: "Turning to that judgment, a significant feature to which pointed attention was drawn was the fact that notwithstanding the suspension the railway authority had issued an order upon the petitioner there to the effect that he should remain in headquarters and report to his officer-in-charge every day until his case was finally decided, and we pointed out at page 1014 (the reference is to the page in 53 Bom. L. R.) that whatever might be correct position in other cases of suspension, what we had to consider and decide was what wall the position on the facts of that case, and on the facts of that case we came to the conclusion that the respective obligations of master and servant continued under the contract, that the employee was under an obligation to serve, and if the employee was under an obligation to serve the employer was under an obligation to pay wages. The Payment of Wages Authority in that case had also held that the rules of the railway authority with regard to the payment of subsistence allowance were bad as offending against the Payment of Wages Act and counsel for the railway authority wanted to argue that that decision of the Authority was erroneous in law. We refused to go into that question as in our opinion there was no error apparent on the face of the record, and we made it clear that we expressed no opinion whatever on the contention that the Authority had erroneously come to that conclusion, as that conclusion was arrived at with jurisdiction. We refused to go into that question as in our opinion there was no error apparent on the face of the record, and we made it clear that we expressed no opinion whatever on the contention that the Authority had erroneously come to that conclusion, as that conclusion was arrived at with jurisdiction. Therefore, this particular question as to whether the rules which offend against the Payment or Wages Act were bad was left us decided and that question now directly comes up before us for decision." Later, after considering the scheme of section 241 of the Government of India Act and referring to the provisions of Articles 309 and 313 of the Constitution of India, the Division Bench held that the conditions of service of the petitioner with regard to his suspension and with regard to the wages to which he was entitled during the period of suspension were regulated by the rules framed by the Governor-General under section 241 of the Government of India Act and the Payment of Wages Act had no application with regard to those conditions, and that it was not open to the petitioner to claim an amount as being illegally deducted by the railway authority when that deduction was legal and permissible under the rules framed by the Governor-General under the Government of India Act. Thus, the decision in Natarajan's case positively takes the view that where there are rules governing the grant of suspension allowance during the period of suspension of an employee, he will not be entitled to anything more than the suspension allowance. As observed by the learned Chief Justice in Natarajan's case the earlier decision in K. P. Mushran's case was a decision given on the facts of that case, and as the learned Chief Justice has himself observed, the question whether the rules dealing with the suspension allowance offended against the Payment of Wages Act and were, therefore, bad was not decided in that case. That question was expressly considered in the later case and the Payment of Wages Authority and the learned District Judge were, in our view, in error in following the decision in K. P. Mushran's case in preference to the decision in Natarajan's case. 6. That question was expressly considered in the later case and the Payment of Wages Authority and the learned District Judge were, in our view, in error in following the decision in K. P. Mushran's case in preference to the decision in Natarajan's case. 6. The learned District Judge also seems to have taken the view that there is no provision in the Bombay Civil Services Rules which gives the power of suspension to the State Government and that is probably why the learned District Judge took the view that the decision in Natarajan's case did not help the petitioners. Here again, in our view, the learned District Judge has fallen into an error. Rule 151 of the Bombay Civil Services Rules positively deals with the matter relating to suspension. The scope of rule 151 is no longer now debatable in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in B. R. Patel v. State of Maharashtra3. The law relating to suspension was exhaustively discussed in that case in the context of rule 151 of the Bombay Civil Services Rules. The plaintiff in that case was suspended under orders from the Surgeon-General with the Government of Bombay and the Government directed that the plaintiff-appellant should be allowed subsistence allowance at Rs. 153/5/0 from the date of his suspension. Subsequently, the plaintiff was prosecuted under section 161 of the Indian Penal Code. However, his conviction by the City Magistrate, Ahmedabad, was set aside by the Bombay High Court, and an application for special leave to appeal was rejected by the Supreme Court on 13-10-1952. On 27-11-1952 the Government issued another order in regard to the payment of subsistence allowance to the plaintiff. A departmental inquiry was held against him and an order of dismissal was made on 11-2-1960. However, before the conclusion of the departmental inquiry the plaintiff had served a notice on the State Government under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure and he filed a suit on 11.4.1953 for a declaration that the order of suspension was illegal and inoperative in law and he continued in service as though no order of suspension had been passed. This suit was obviously filed after his acquittal by the High Court but after the decision of the State Government to hold a departmental inquiry. This suit was obviously filed after his acquittal by the High Court but after the decision of the State Government to hold a departmental inquiry. In the suit which was tried by the High Court it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to salary and allowances up to the date when he was dismissed i.e. February 11, 1950, and a declaration was granted that the order of suspension was illegal and inoperative in law and the appellant continued to be on duty till 11-2-1960 as though no order of suspension had been made. A decree directing the State to pay to the appellant Rs. 51.135.28 was passed. The State of Maharashtra appealed against the judgment of the learned single Judge and the appellate Bench held that the State had inherent power to suspend the appellant and also to withhold full remuneration for the period of suspension under rule 151 of the Bombay Civil Services Rules. On this ground the Division Bench allowed the appeal and set aside the decree passed by the single Judge. Another ground given for dismissal of the suit was that the suit was barred under Article 14 of the Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act. With that, however, we are not concerned. The plaintiff then appealed to the Supreme Court. Dealing with the power of the Government to suspend a public servant, the Supreme Court observed: "It follows therefore that the authority entitled to appoint the public servant is entitled to suspend him pending a departmental enquiry into his conduct or pending a criminal proceeding, which may eventually result in a departmental enquiry against him. But what amount should be paid to the public servant during such suspension will depend upon the provisions of the statute or statutory rule in that connection. If there is such a provision the payment during suspension will be in accordance therewith. But if there is no such provision, the public servant will be entitled to his full emoluments during the period of suspension. On general principles therefore the Government, like any other employer, would have a right to suspend a public servant in one of two ways. It may suspend any, public servant pending departmental enquiry or pending criminal proceedings; this may be called interim suspension. On general principles therefore the Government, like any other employer, would have a right to suspend a public servant in one of two ways. It may suspend any, public servant pending departmental enquiry or pending criminal proceedings; this may be called interim suspension. The Government may also proceed to hold a departmental enquiry and after his being found guilty order suspension as a punishment if the rules so permit. This will be suspension as a penalty. As we have already pointed out, the question as to what amount should be paid to the public servant during the period of interim suspension or suspension as a punishment· will depend upon the provisions of the statute or statutory rules made in that connection." The Supreme Court considered the scope of rule 151 of the Bombay Civil Services Rules and it held that rule 151 empowers the State Government to withhold pay for the period of interim suspension but the Government servant is entitled under that rule to a subsistence allowance at such rate as the suspending authority may direct but not exceeding one· fourth of his pay. It was further held that rules 151 and 152 of the Bombay Civil Services Rules "comprise in their scope both kinds of suspension, whether it is a penalty or as an interim measure pending an inquiry into the conduct of the Government servant concerned or criminal proceeding against him." The appeal filed by the plaintiff-appellant thus came to be dismissed. In view of this decision of the Supreme Court and the provisions of rule 151 of the Bombay Civil Services Rules, it is clear that the learned District Judge was in error in holding that there was no rule in the Bombay Civil Services Rules which authorised suspension of an employee pending inquiry and that the suspension was illegal. Thus, if there is a provision in the Rules relating to conditions of service providing for the scale of payment during the period of suspension, the payment has to be made in accordance with such rules. In the instant case, admittedly, the payment was made to the respondent in accordance with rule 151 of the Bombay Civil Services Rules. That was the only payment to which he was entitled under law. In the instant case, admittedly, the payment was made to the respondent in accordance with rule 151 of the Bombay Civil Services Rules. That was the only payment to which he was entitled under law. There was, therefore, no question of any deduction being made from his wages because the question of deduction could arise only if the person is entitled to a certain amount of wages and what is paid to him is less than what he is entitled to. In a case where payment is made in accordance with the rules governing the payment of suspension allowance or subsistence allowance as it is called, though such amount is normally less than the amount of wages to which the employee is entitled during the period when he is not under suspension, the difference between the two cannot be termed as deduction much less a deduction illegally made. The application filed by the respondent under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act was, in our view wholly misconceived and was liable to be rejected. 7. In the view which we have taken, we quash the orders of the District Judge, Nagpur, and the Payment of Wages Authority, Nagpur, and dismiss the application filed by the respondent. The petition is thus allowed. In the circumstances, we make no orders as to Costs. Petition allowed.