JUDGMENT H. L. Agrawal, J. This appeal is by the defendant. There is also a cross-objection by the plaintiff. The plaintiff instituted a money suit for recovery of Rs. 13,786. 69/-. The plaintiff's case, in brief, is that tenders were invited for the construction and repair of certain roads in the town of Gaya by the defendant, and the tender of the plaintiff was accepted and a contract in the prescribed form (Ext. D) was entered into between the parties on or about 22.9.1956. It is the admitted case of the parties that on the verbal orders of the Superintending Engineer, Central Circle, Patna, and the Executive Engineer, Gaya East Division, Gaya, there were some modifications in the work entrusted to the plaintiff according to the original tender. The case of the plaintiff is that he was given an assurance by the aforesaid officers for the payment of the extra work done by him which was carried out under the direct supervision of the various officers of the Public Works Department at Gaya. The plaintiff completed the work on or about the 6th December 1956, but when the plaintiff submitted final bill for the original as well as extra work done by him, he was not paid in respect of the extra work done by him. The details of such extra work are given in schedule II of the plaint. There are seven items of extra work in this Schedule and I shall deal with the relevant items at a subsequent stage. It may be mentioned that the work in question was to be done during the 2500th Birth Aniversary celebrations of Lord Budha at Both Gaya. By letter dated 3-6-1958, which was received by the plaintiff on 5-6-1958, the Superintending Engineer, Central Circle, Patna, passed an order op the final bill of the plaintiff to the effect that if the plaintiff had already accepted the final bill in full settlement of all the demands, then no further action could be taken on his extra claims. The further case of the plaintiff is that the plaintiff went on representing his case from time to time before the Chief Engineer, Bihar, who by his letter dated 8-9-1959 informed the plaintiff that his claim for extra work was under consideration of the State Government. The further case of the plaintiff is that the plaintiff went on representing his case from time to time before the Chief Engineer, Bihar, who by his letter dated 8-9-1959 informed the plaintiff that his claim for extra work was under consideration of the State Government. Limitation has been sought to be extended by the plaintiff on the basis of this and some other letter. 2. In the written statement, the defence set up by the appellant is that the plaintiff was not entitled for extra works done by him, rather the case is that the plaintiff did not carry out any extra work, which could not be executed by the plaintiff without written order to that effect of the Executive Engineer, as per clause 2 of the agreement, and the Superintending Engineer or the Executive Engineer had never held out any promise to the plaintiff for making payment for any such extra work. The plea of limitation was also raised. In the trial Court, however, the plea regarding the maintainability of the claim of the plaintiff for works done under verbal order of the different officers of the Government was not pressed and the same was examined by it on merits. The trial Court accepted the claim of the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 8,602-44 only and disallowed the remaining portion of his claim. The plaintiff is also held entitled to pendentelite interest on the above amount at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the date of the final bill, that is, 18-4-1957 to 24-2-1965, the date of the' judgment}which has been calculated in the decree of the trial Court at Rs. 4,050-75. Six percent future interest has also been allowed to the plaintiff on expiry of a period of three months after the passing of the decree, the period fixed for the payment of the amount under sec. 82 of the Codde of Civil Procedure, till recovery. In the decree that has been prepared, however, the defendant has been directed to pay Rs. 12,653.19, being the total of the principal and the interest as aforesaid decreed by the trial Court, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 percent per annum after the expiry of a period of three months, that is, the plaintiff has also been granted interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum on the amount of Rs. 12,653.19, being the total of the principal and the interest as aforesaid decreed by the trial Court, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 percent per annum after the expiry of a period of three months, that is, the plaintiff has also been granted interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum on the amount of Rs. 4,050-75 as well decreed by the trial Court as interest. The, defendant has, therefore, filed the present appeal and the plaintiff a cross-objection. 3. Mr. Uday Sinha, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, has challenged the decree for interest namely the sum of Rs. 4,050-75 as, according to him, no interest could be allowed on the amount of interest. The other question which was most straneously pressed and is of some considerable importance is the question of limitation. I shall deal with the question of limitation in greater detail at a later stage. Learned counsel, however, did not advance any argument on the merits of the claim of the plaintiff as decreed by the trial Court and frankly conceded that there was no sufficient materials to challenge the said finding in that regard. 4. I will first dispose of the question regarding the grant of interest of Rs. 4,050-75, the amount decreed by the trial Court as interest on Rs. 8,602-44. According to the provision of section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code, the Court in passing a decree for payment of money, may, in the decree, order interest at such rate as it deems reasonable to be paid on the principal sum adjudged, from the date of the suit to the date of the decree, in addition to any interest adjudged on such principal sum for any period prior to the institution of the suit with further interest at such rate not exceeding six percent per annum as the Court deems reasonble on such principal sum (the underline are by me). The words underlined were substituted by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1956. By this amendment, power has been I given to a Court to grant further interest at a rate, not exceeding 6 per cent per annum on the principal sum decreed. There can be no direction for the grant of pendentelite or future interest on the amount 'of interest decreed for the period prior to the institution of the suit. By this amendment, power has been I given to a Court to grant further interest at a rate, not exceeding 6 per cent per annum on the principal sum decreed. There can be no direction for the grant of pendentelite or future interest on the amount 'of interest decreed for the period prior to the institution of the suit. In this case the suit was instituted on 3-6-1961. A decree has also been passed in favour of the plaintiff for future interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum on the amount of interest on Rs. 8,602-44. From the provisions of section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code, referred to above, there could be no grant of interest to the plaintiff on the amount of interest and, therefore, this part of the decree allowed by the trial Court has got to be set aside. The plaintiff will, therefore, be entitled to get future interest on Rs. 8,602-44 only. 5. Now I take up the question of limitation' which is the main question for decision in this appeal. According to the learned Standing Counsel, the proper Article to be applied in this case was Article 56 of the Indian Limitation Act (Old), whereas according to the plaintiff, the proper Article applicable is Article 120. Under Article 56, a period of three years has been provided for institution or a suit for the price of work done by a plaintiff for the defendant at his request, where no time has been fixed for payment, and the period of three years is to commence from the date of the completion of the work, that is, when the work is done. In the plaint, as it was filed, the plaintiff claimed extension of the period of limitation within the meaning of rule 6 of Order VII of the Code of Civil Procedure on the ground of acknowledgement of the plaintiff's claim by the defendant's authorised officers. It may be stated that if Article 120, which prescribes a period of six years, is applied to the present case, then the suit is much within the time and there was no necessity for the plaintiff to plead exemption from the period of limitation stated in paragraph 14 of the plaint. The plaintiff had, therefore, thought, when the suit was instituted, that it was only Article 56 which was applicable to his case. The plaintiff had, therefore, thought, when the suit was instituted, that it was only Article 56 which was applicable to his case. From the discussion on the question of limitation (issue No.4) also, it appears that the plaintiff had in the first instance pleaded for exemption of the period of limitation on the basis of certain alleged acknowledgment contained in some letters written by different officers of the defendant. The plaintiff's case, on this score was not accepted by the trial Court, and in paragraph 19 of the judgment, it has been held that these documents did not save limitation and that if Article 56 applied to the case, the suit was obviously barred by limitation. It was thereafter that the plaintiff pressed in the Court below for the application of Article 120 to his case. According to the plaintiff, in clause II of the contract (Ext. D) between the parties, the Executive Engineer was entitled to make alterations or additions to the original specifications to be carried on by the plaintiff and that the plaintiff did carry out extra work under the oral orders and assurance of the officers of the defendant at the spot for which he had been contemporaneously quoting rates which he would charge in his letters (Exts. 2 series). The defendant did not examine any witness in the suit to deny this assertion of the plaintiff, and on this basis the trial Court has held that the orders of the different, officers of the defendant at the spot for carrying out extra work by the plaintiff would amount to oral agreement between the parties, and the act of the plaintiff being not gratutious, the plaintiff was entitled under section 70 of the Indian Contract Act to recover the compensation for the work done by him under these agreements. Relying upon the case of the State of Bihar vs. Thawardas Pherumal1 the trial Court held that Article 120 applied to the case of the plaintiff and decreed the suit in part, as already indicated above. 6. Learned Standing Counsel in this court tried to distinguish Thawardas's case on the ground that the claim in that case was for the increased wages of labourers, and not for the price of work done by the plaintiff. 6. Learned Standing Counsel in this court tried to distinguish Thawardas's case on the ground that the claim in that case was for the increased wages of labourers, and not for the price of work done by the plaintiff. What had happened in that case was that after the completion of the agreement for the purpose of executing the work of setting tank and ancillary works at Sindri on terms and conditions mentioned in the same and while the said work was proceeding, the Government in the Ministry of Labour increased the wages of labourers in the coal-mining area covering the site at Sindri within its ambit as well, and thus the plaintiff had to pay wages at the increased rates to the labourers employed in those works. The rates in the indenture of agreement were settled on the basis of then prevailing rates of wages which were much lower than the wages fixed subsequently. The plaintiff had explained the circumstances of the case to the Department of the State Government and expressed his inability to execute the said works in the altered circumstances brought about by the notification increasing the wages, and the said officers appreciating the plaintiff's difficulty had promised to pay him additional sums to enable him to pay increased wages to the labourers employed in those works. When after the completion of the work, the plaintiff made his claim "for further and additional amount in order to pay increased wages to the labourers, they refused to make the payment. It was held that as there was no specific Article to cover such a claim, that is the claim for extra labour charges for the same work done, the suit was governed by Article 120 of the Limitation Act. Mr. Rameshwar Prasad No. 11, appearing for the respondent, however, submitted that as in the Thawardas's case (supra), so in the present case, the plaintiff did extra work under the oral orders and assurance of the officers of the defendant and had quoted higher rates for the extra work in the letters (Exts. 2 series), in which case neither Article 56 nor any other, Article had any application, and so in this case also Article 120 had direct application. 7. Learned counsel for the plaintiff also cited another decision of this Court in State of Bihar Vs. Rama Bhushan Basu2. 2 series), in which case neither Article 56 nor any other, Article had any application, and so in this case also Article 120 had direct application. 7. Learned counsel for the plaintiff also cited another decision of this Court in State of Bihar Vs. Rama Bhushan Basu2. The plaintiff of that case had entered into a contract with the Government in pursuance of tender for construction of a Raw Water Pump House and Intake Well for the Sindri Fertilizer Factory. Some of the items which were included in the final bill and payment of which -was refused as on account of difference in rates, measurements and recoveries for Iron and Steel reinforcements rods claimed for cleaning debris that fell within the Intake Well, claim for excavation through soft rock, and the like. All those works were a one by the plaintiff as and when became necessary during the execution of the contract work which were obviously no part of the contract. In answering the question of limitation as to the applicability of Article 56 of the Limitation Act, it was held that the nature of the contract which formed the basis of the tender amounted a request by the plaintiff that he may be entrusted with the works as a specified rate, and his request being accepted, he was allowed to execute the work. In that view, he was doing the work at the defendant's request, but it was at the other way about. Apart from this reason, the other reason for r holding that Article 56 had no application, was a term in the agreement providing for the mode of payment to the contractor. The final bill was to be submitted by the contractor within a period of one month of the date fixed for the completion of the work and a procedure for measurement of the work was also laid down. It was held that this provision indicated a time for payment and it could not be said that it was a case where there was no time fixed for payment. 8. Mr. Uday Sinha also placed reliance upon a Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Zila Parishad (District Board) vs. Smt. Shanti Devi and another 3. It was held that this provision indicated a time for payment and it could not be said that it was a case where there was no time fixed for payment. 8. Mr. Uday Sinha also placed reliance upon a Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Zila Parishad (District Board) vs. Smt. Shanti Devi and another 3. In that case a contract was entered into with the District Board for repairs of a road, The contractor was to complete the work within a particular time and thereafter on obtaining completion certificate from the Board's Engineer in respect of the work, which was to be done in accordance with the specifications, drawings, etc., he was to submit his bill. The Engineer however, on inspection by an overseer found the work very unsatisfactory and the contractor was I called upon to do it again and properly. This was done, but the payment for the work done was not made. One of the questions raised in the suit was the question of limitation and it was held that Article 56 of the Limitation Act would govern this case. It cannot be doubted that the. facts of the Allahabad case are entirely distinguishable as the claim in that case was squarely made for the work done under the contract, and there was not any, other claim, as in the present case, or as in the case of Thawardas or Rana Bhushan' Basu already referred to above, where a claim was made by the contractor either for additional work beyond the contract or on account of higher rates to intervening circumstances or modification or alterations in the original specifications or design. Mr. Sinha lastly placed reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Gannon Dunkerley and Co. Ltd. vs. the Union of India4. This was a case from a decision of this Court in a First Appeal. It is necessary to consider this case in a little greater detail. The Government of India had invited tenders for reinforced concrete work relating to the foundation and super-structure of the Fertilizer Factory building at Sindri” in the State of Bihar. The tender of the appellant was accepted and a formal contract was executed in November 1948. By the terms of the contract (Cl. The Government of India had invited tenders for reinforced concrete work relating to the foundation and super-structure of the Fertilizer Factory building at Sindri” in the State of Bihar. The tender of the appellant was accepted and a formal contract was executed in November 1948. By the terms of the contract (Cl. 12) in that case also, the Engineer-in-charge was authorised to make any alterations in, omissions from, additions to, or substitution for, the original specifications, drawings, designs and instructions, and the contractor was bound to carry out the work accordingly, for which payment was to be made at the same rates as were specified in the tender for the main work, and for such class of work, for which no rate was specified at the rates entered in the schedule of rates of the Hazaribagh P. W. D. district in force at that time. In order to appreciate the facts of that case in further details, we called for the record of the case, namely, First Appeal Nos. 190 and 213 of 1960, disposed of on the 19th January, 1965. During the course of the construction of the work to the appellant in that case, it was made known to it that an American concern, Messrs Chemical Construction Corporation of Newyork, was to advise and guide the work. It was the case of the Company that on account of the working drawings supplied by the Engineer in-charge there was substantial change in the nature and the quality of the work contracted for. The period of the completion of the work was extended on account of the delay made in supplying the drawings and specifications by the firm. The result was that the company had to incur heavy expenditure over materials and labour on account of the additional work which it was called upon to do and also due to the rise in the costs of those items, as a result of the delay. The Company, however, completed the work within the extended time, i. e. 28-2-1950. Thereafter some dispute arose between the parties with respect to the claim of the Company, and on five grounds stated in the judgment, the Company requested for making a reference of the disputes to the Arbitrator. The Company, however, completed the work within the extended time, i. e. 28-2-1950. Thereafter some dispute arose between the parties with respect to the claim of the Company, and on five grounds stated in the judgment, the Company requested for making a reference of the disputes to the Arbitrator. The Additional Chief Engineer ultimately agreed to refer the dispute to the Arbitrator with regard to the three matters only, namely, (1) rise in the cost of materials and labour due to delay in the supply of detailed working drawings; 2) claim due to the rise in the price of petrol and (3) claim for increase in the cost of materials and labour due to the other contractors also working at the site at that time. So far as the claim of the plaintiff based on the other two points, namely (i) complex nature of work requiring higher skilled labour and additional labour and materials on account of deviation in the nature of work, and (ii) for the additional work ordered to be done involving several times more than quantity of work that was originally mentioned, were, however, not referred to the arbitrator. The arbitrator rejected the claims of the Company in respect of all the three matters which were referred to him, and there after the Company filed a suit on August 9, 1956, claiming a decree for Rs. 3, 62, 674/9/6, being the amount claimed at the rate of 421/2 percent, above the contract rate, in the alternative a decree for Rs. 2,44,000/00, being the amount claimed at the rate of 28.1 per cent above the contract rate as was recommended by the Executive Engineer, or for Rs. 1,36,222.00 at the rate of 18.17 percent .above the contract rate as certified by the Superintending Engineer, The suit was contested by the Union of India on the ground, inter alia of limitation. The trial court held that the suit was not barred by• limitation as, according to it, the suit was• exempted from limitation on grounds of various official correspondence, and thus the claim was not barred. The finding of the trial Court was that there was a substantial change in the nature of the work and it became necessary for the plaintiff company to do extra work on that account, and the suit was, accordingly, decreed for Rs. 1, 36, 222.00. 9. The finding of the trial Court was that there was a substantial change in the nature of the work and it became necessary for the plaintiff company to do extra work on that account, and the suit was, accordingly, decreed for Rs. 1, 36, 222.00. 9. In the appeal by the Union of India before the High Court, only the plea of limitation was pressed, and it was contended that the suit was governed by the rule-of three years limitation, as provided in Article 56 of the Limitation Act. The plea was accepted by this Court, and thereafter the matter went to the Supreme Court. In paragraph 8 of the judgment of the Supreme Court, where the relevant facts to determine the question of limitation have been considered, it has been stated that the claim in the suit related to the revision of rates due to the complex nature of the work and increase in the quantity of work. In the subsequent paragraph of the judgment also, it has been very clearly held that a suit is governed by Article 56 if it arises out of a contract to pay the price of work done at the request of the defendant, which was not the case of the Company in that case, the claim being for payment at an additional rate over the stipulated rate in view of change in circumstances. Mr. Uday Sinha sought the aid of this decision on the observation in paragraph 9, namely, "The claim in the present case is for payment at an additional rate over the stipulated rate in view of change in circumstances, and not for price of work done by the appellant Company", and submitted that the residuary Article was applied by the Supreme Court in. this background. Learned counsel went on to submit toot the Supreme Court never intended to apply the longer period of limitation to cases where the claim was based upon the price of work already done, but only where it was for the difference in the contracted rate and the higher rate on account of change in circumstances. In the former type of cases according to learned Counsel, the Supreme Court intended to hold that they were J governed by Article 56. 10. It is difficult to accept this contention of the learned counsel. In the former type of cases according to learned Counsel, the Supreme Court intended to hold that they were J governed by Article 56. 10. It is difficult to accept this contention of the learned counsel. As it appears from the original record of the First Appeal as also from the statement in paragraph 8 of the judgment of the Supreme Court itself, the claim of the Company' in the suit related to the revision of rates as well as to increase in the quantity of work, a situation very much similar to that as in the present case. In the present case, the plaintiff was already paid for the work which he carried out in pursuance of the original specification and stipulations. But the dispute arose with reference to the modifications and alterations etc. which are in the nature, of (i) screening of stone chips, (ii) carpeting i. e. top sealing of the road with 3/8" down size chips to give a smooth surface to the road, (iii) additional expenditure incurred in respect of pre-mixing of the materials on account of raising the thickness from 11/2” to 21/2" in the top sealing of the road, (iv) change in the design of footpath by re-fixing road curves with cement mortar after they were originally fitted and fixed with brickedge soling according to the original design, (v) extra labour charges and re-fixing stone edging at the outer ends of the, foot-path with larger size of stones, (vi) claim for cutting small drains for flow of water at the time of consolidation work, a work not mentioned in the agreement, and for which other contractors were paid for, and, (vii) additional costs in making roadside pit overs with the help of cement, iron rods and flats, instead of fixing C. I. covers. The claim under the various items enumerated above certainly not covered by the original contract between the parties and the plaintiff had to carry out these works entailing additional and extra labour, which was not a part of the original contract. The claim in the suit, therefore, is based upon the revision of rates due to the increase in the quality of work as also for extra work done due to alterations and modifications in the original specifications, which was also the situation in Gannon Dunkerley's case (supra). The claim in the suit, therefore, is based upon the revision of rates due to the increase in the quality of work as also for extra work done due to alterations and modifications in the original specifications, which was also the situation in Gannon Dunkerley's case (supra). These additional works were done by the plaintiff not out of the original contract, but at the request of the various authorised agents of the defendant on the assurance given by them for making payments for these works to be done by the plaintiff. Article 56 therefore, will not, in my opinion, cover such a case. Mr. Sinha was not able to point out any other specific article in the Limitation Act which would apply to the facts of the present case and, therefore, Article 120 must be applied. The case of Gannon Dunkerley is, therefore of no assistance to the appellant and, in my opinion, it rather goes a long way to support the case of the plaintiff respondent. I would, accordingly, in agreement with the trial court, hold that the suit of the plaintiff was not barred by limitation and affirm the finding of the trial Court on this issue. 11. In the result, the appeal, save and except in relation to the grant of future interest on the principal amount of Rs. 8,602.44, as indicated earlier in paragraph 4, has got no merit and it must fail. 12. Now remains [or consideration the cross-objection filed by the plaintiff-respondent. This relates to the claims of the plaintiff which have been disallowed by the Court below either in full or in part. Mr. Rameshwar Prasad has pressed seriously the claim in relation to some of the items only. I now take up for consideration his submissions item wise. In the first item, namely, screening of stone chips, the plaintiff has claimed at the rate of Rs. 1/12/per 100 cft for screening 90,000 cft. of stone chips. The defendant granted the claim of the plaintiff on this account for 51, 223 cft. of chips, and that also at the rate of /-12/- per. 100 cft, only. The plaintiff, therefore, valued this item of claim at Rs. 1190/-. The trial Court allowed the claim of the plaintiff for the remaining quantity of chips, but maintained the rate of /-12/-per 100 cft. of chips, and that also at the rate of /-12/- per. 100 cft, only. The plaintiff, therefore, valued this item of claim at Rs. 1190/-. The trial Court allowed the claim of the plaintiff for the remaining quantity of chips, but maintained the rate of /-12/-per 100 cft. In support of this claim the plaintiff had stated in the plaint itself that other contractors were allowed by the Government for this nature of work at the rate of Rs. 1/14/- per 100 cft. In support of this plea, interrogatories were served upon the defendant by the plaintiff in the trial Court, and in reply to the same, it was admitted that the Public Works Department had made payment at the rate of Rs. 1/14/- per 100 cft. for screening stone chips to make them fit for use. In my opinion, therefore, there was no justification for not allowing the plaintiff's claim on this account at the rate of Rs. 1/12/when the Department had paid even at a higher rate to other contractors. The plaintiff will be, therefore, entitled to the balance of the amount under item No.1, namely, Rs. 824.18. 13. Mr. Prasad also seriously pressed the 6th item of the claim for cutting small drains for flow of water at the time of the consolidation work at the rate, of -/4/- per drain. This claim was disallowed by the Department and also by the trial Court. In answer to the interrogatories to question No.3 in this regard, it was admitted by the defendant that such a claim was allowed by the Department to other contractors at the rate claimed by the plaintiff Accordingly, I do not find any justification for not granting the claim for the plaintiff in this regard. The plaintiff will, therefore be entitled to the claim made under this head also, namely, Rs. 250/-. 14. Only one other item of claim was seriously pressed by the respondent, namely, the 7th item, in which there is a claim for Rs. 810/- on account of additional costs in making the covers. The plaintiff's case is that he had originally quoted for fixing cast iron covers on the catch-pits at the rate of Rs. 250/-. 14. Only one other item of claim was seriously pressed by the respondent, namely, the 7th item, in which there is a claim for Rs. 810/- on account of additional costs in making the covers. The plaintiff's case is that he had originally quoted for fixing cast iron covers on the catch-pits at the rate of Rs. 5/- but he was subsequently asked by the authorities to provide reinforced cement concrete covers according to the designs suggested by the authorities for which although angles and rods were supplied by the Department and cost of which materials had been recovered from the plaintiff's bill, no extra payment was made, although this change made the plaintiff to incur additional costs and wages. The trial Court rejected this claim under an erroneous impression that no deduction was made from the plaintiff's bill on account of the price of materials supplied by the Department, as would appear from paragraph 15 of its judgment. The position, however, seems to be otherwise. Mr. Rameshwar Prasad took us through Exts. A and A/2 which are Running Account Bills of the plaintiff as passed by the Department. Under the heading ‘Recoveries', learned counsel pointed out that there was, in fact, a deduction made by the Department for M.- S. rods, angles and flats from the balance bill. In this view of the matter, the plaintiff is entitled to the claim for Rs. 810/- under this head. 15. I do not find any merit in other items of the claim made in the cross-objection and they were also not seriously pressed. 16. The cross-objection of the plaintiff succeeds for a sum of Rs. 1884-18. The plaintiff will be entitled to interest from the date of the bill to the date of filing of the suit as well as pendentilite and future interest till recovery at the rate of 6 per cent per annum -as allowed by the Court below on the principal amount decreed by it. He will also be entitled - to proportionate costs. 17. In the result, the appeal and the cross-objection both succeed in part as indicated above, in paragraphs 11 and 16 of this judgment, and the decree of the Court below will stand modified accordingly. In view of the partial success of both the parties in this Court, they are directed to bear their own costs of this Court. Shambhu Pd. In the result, the appeal and the cross-objection both succeed in part as indicated above, in paragraphs 11 and 16 of this judgment, and the decree of the Court below will stand modified accordingly. In view of the partial success of both the parties in this Court, they are directed to bear their own costs of this Court. Shambhu Pd. Singh, J. ..... I agree. Appeal and cross-objection allowed in part.