STATE OF MAHARASHTRA v. ZAHID HUSSAIN KIKABHAI, Nagpur
1974-08-12
C.S.DHARMADHIKARI
body1974
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT-Accused Zahid Hussain, who is the Proprietor of Zahid Cottage Industries of Nagpur, was manufacturing Bharat Gandh and Excellent Nail Polish at house No. 684 in Shantinagar, Nagpur. He had applied for a licence to manufacture the Gandh and the Nail polish to the Drugs and Food Administration in the year 1965. However, his request was turned down. Inspite of this he continued to manufacture Gandh and Nail polish without any licence. On 6-3 1963 Shri Rajadhyaksha, the then Drugs Inspector approached the Commissioner of Police to help him in taking action against the accused. He was directed to approach Police station authorities. Accordingly Rajadhyaksha lodged a report at the Police station. Thereupon Police Sub-Inspector Karim filed an application before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, for seeking permission to investigate the offence. After getting necessary permission in this behalf Rajadhyaksha, Police Sub-Inspector and Panchas went to the residence-cum cottage industry of the accused and after due search the articles, namely, empty bottles, labels, stamps for nail polish, gandh, gilletine papers etc. were seized. These were the articles required for manufacturing of Gandh and nail polish. Apart from this, some manufactured Gandh and nail polish, bill books and letters were also found by the Drugs Inspector during the course of the seizure. A seizure memo was then drawn which is at Ex. 17 and the photographs recording the state of affairs at the time of seizures were also taken. After completing the investigation and sanction a complaint was filed by the Drugs Inspector Rahim, who took over charge from Rajadhyaksha. 2. It was the case of the prosecution that both these articles, namely, the Gandh and the nail polish, were cosmetics within the meaning of section 3 (aaa) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, referred to hereinafter as the Act, and the Rules framed thereunder, and as the accused was manufacturing the said cosmetics without the necessary licence as contemplated by section 18 of the Act he is liable to be convicted for the said offence read with section 27-A of the Act. 3. The accused in his statement under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure admitted that in the year 1965 he had applied for the licence for manufacturing Gandh and nail polish and his application was rejected. He further admitted that he was manufacturing the said articles without the licence.
3. The accused in his statement under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure admitted that in the year 1965 he had applied for the licence for manufacturing Gandh and nail polish and his application was rejected. He further admitted that he was manufacturing the said articles without the licence. The factum of the search and seizure of the articles was also admitted by the accused. He further stated that he was manufacturing Bharat Darbar Gandh only as no licence for the manufacture of the same was required. He further contended that he did not manufacture nail polish at any time and he was falsely implicated. 4. The prosecution in support of its case examined M. I. Rahim, the complainant, Police Sub-Inspector Patil and Rajadhyaskha. Apart from these witnesses the prosecution also examined the photographer who took the photographs of the search and the seizure, Panch Panjabrao and Hiralal who was the landlord of the house to establish the fact that the said house was let out to the accused and he was running a cottage industry therein. Two merchants, namely, Mohanlal and Gyanchand were also examined to show that they were purchasing the goods from the accused. One Gowardhan was also examined to establish the fact regarding printing of labels for the Gandh manufactured by the accused. 5. After appreciating all the evidence on record, the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, came to the conclusion that the prosecution has proved that the nail polish is a cosmetic and. the accused was found in possession of the nail polish and other articles for the purposes of manufacture and sale of nail polish. In this view of the matter he further found that the accused was obliged to obtain a licence for the manufacture of the nail polish, and therefore, found him guilty on that count. In the result, therefore, the accused was convicted for an offence under section 18 (c) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 for the manufacture, sale and possession of excellent Nail polish as well as under section 18 (a) (vi) of the said Act read with rule 146 made thereunder and was ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 500 or in default to suffer simple imprisonment for two months under section 27-A of the Act.
500 or in default to suffer simple imprisonment for two months under section 27-A of the Act. The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, however, held that Bharat Darbar Gandh is not a cosmetic within the meaning of the Act, and therefore, no licence for the manufacture of the same was necessary. Therefore, he acquitted the accused on that count. 6. Being aggrieved by the judgment of acquittal so far as Bharat Darbar Gandh is concerned, the State Government filed an appeal before this Court, being Criminal Appeal No. 213 of 1972. Being aggrieved by the order of conviction and sentence by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Second Court, Nagpur, convicting the accused for manufacture and sale of excellent nail polish, the accused filed an appeal which was heard and decided by the Additional Sessions Judge, at Nagpur. The Additional Sessions Judge vide his judgment dated 8-1-1973 confirmed the findings of fact recorded by the Court below and found the accused guilty under section 18 (c) and under section 18 (a) (vi) read with rule 146 and read with section 27-A of the Act. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Nagpur however, modified the order of sentence and ordered the accused to pay a fine of Rs. 100, or in default of payment of fine to suffer simple imprisonment for one month for all the counts. Being aggrieved by this dismissal of the appeal, the accused has filed revision application before this Court, being Criminal Revision Application No. 124 of 1973. As both the appeal filed by the State as well as the Criminal Revision Application filed by the accused arise out of the same prosecution, they are heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 7. Shri N. K. Deshpande, the learned counsel for the accused, contended before me that the prosecution launched against the accused was itself illegal and section 18 of the Act has not been brought into force by issuing any notification as contemplated by the said section. He contended before me that the Drugs Act, 1940 was subsequently amended by Act No. 21 of 1962 which came into force with effect from 27-6-1962.
He contended before me that the Drugs Act, 1940 was subsequently amended by Act No. 21 of 1962 which came into force with effect from 27-6-1962. By the said Amending Act the Drugs Act, 1940 came to be amended by the Amending Act, the title of the Act itself was amended and after the Act No. 21 of 1962 came into force, the original Drugs Act came to be known as the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. Section 18 was also amended by the said Drugs (Amendment) Act, 1962. For the first time in section 18 wherever the word "drug" appeared, the words "or cosmetic" were inserted. Therefore, in substance instead of having a separate legislation for cosmetic, the legislature chose to amend the Drugs Act itself and made a necessary provision for cosmetics also in the original Act itself. Under section 18 it was obligatory on the part of the State Government to issue a notification for fixing up a date and this was done by the State Government before present Amending Act came into force. Therefore, according to Shri Deshpande, unless afresh notification was issued under section 18 of the Act regarding "cosmetics", it was not obligatory on the part of the accused to have obtained any licence for the manufacture of cosmetic. Prior to coming into force of Act No. 21 of 1962 such a licence was not necessary for the manufacture of cosmetic and even after coming into force of the said Act as the State Government has not fixed any date in that behalf so far as cosmetics are concerned by issuing a necessary notification under section 18 of the Act, so far as the State of Maharashtra is concerned, the said provision has not come into force at all. Therefore, according to Shri Deshpande, no licence was necessary for the manufacture of cosmetic, and therefore, the conviction of the accused under section 18(c) read with section 18 (a) (vi) and section 27-A of the Act as well as rule 146 of the Rules framed under the Act is illegal. He further contended that assuming the said Act has come into force and a licence was necessary for the manufacture of cosmetics, neither the Gandh or the Nail polish could be termed as cosmetics within the meaning of the said Act. 8.
He further contended that assuming the said Act has come into force and a licence was necessary for the manufacture of cosmetics, neither the Gandh or the Nail polish could be termed as cosmetics within the meaning of the said Act. 8. On the other hand, while arguing the appeal filed by the State it is contended by Shri Rajkarne, the learned counsel for the State, that Bharat Darbar Gandh is also a cosmetic within the meaning of the Act, and therefore, for the manufacture of the same also a licence was necessary. According to Shri Rajkarne, the acquittal of the, accused on that count, therefore, is illegal and liable to be set aside. In reply to the contentions raised on behalf of Shri Deshpande, it was argued by Shri Rajkarne that as the date was already notified by the State Government under section 18 of the Act, it was not necessary to have issued a fresh notification after Act No. 21 of 1962 came into force. He further contended that the old notification was a good notification even after the amendment of the Act, and therefore, the prosecution as well as the conviction of the accused under the aforesaid sections and rule are perfectly legal. 9. For appreciating these rival contentions raised before me it will be useful to refer to certain relevant provisions of the Drugs Act. The Drugs Act 1940, which was known as the principal Act, came to be amended by the Parliament by Act No. 21 of 1962 called the Drugs (Amendment) Act, 1962. The said amending Act came into force with effect from 27-7-1964. By this Amending Act the title of the Principal Act was changed and thereafter the present Act came to be known as the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. By this Amending Act of 1962 various provisions of the Principal Act were also suitably amended. The statement and objects of the Drugs (Amendment) Act, 1962 read as under: "The continual development of research and application of various organic synthetics and intermediates to the formulation of cosmetics make it necessary to ensure that nothing is used in cosmetics which may have deleterious effects on the health of the people. Contact dermatitis is one of the evil effects of using certain cosmetics. Preparations which appear to be among the most frequent causes of dermatitis are deodorants, pomades, lipsticks and nail polishes.
Contact dermatitis is one of the evil effects of using certain cosmetics. Preparations which appear to be among the most frequent causes of dermatitis are deodorants, pomades, lipsticks and nail polishes. Apart from dermatitis following the use of certain cosmetics, there is also the bigger risk of the cumulative toxicity of azo and other synthetic dyes used in the manufacture of lipsticks, etc. It appears that while in the well-organised and equipped units of the cosmetic industry there is a fair amount of control, there are many units dispersed throughout the country where even elementary precautions for testing raw materials and observing hygienic conditions during manufacture are not taken. 2. The question of regulating the manufacture of cosmetics was discussed at the last meeting of the Central Council of Health held at Jaipur in October, 1960. The consensus of opinion was that the manufacture of cosmetics should be regulated, if necessary by extending the provisions of the Drugs Act, 1940 to them. It is accordingly proposed to amend the Drugs Act, 1940 suitably so as to provide for regulation of the manufacture of cosmetics and prohibition of import and sale of sub-standard and misbranded cosmetics. The Bill is intended to achieve that object." Therefore, to make a suitable provision for cosmetics the Principal Act was amended by the Parliament. The term "cosmetic" was defined by the said Act and thereafter the word "cosmetic" was either inserted or substituted in the various sections of the Principal Act. The amending Act was to come into force on such date as the Central Government may by notification in the Official Gazette appoint. By notification dated 16-7-1964 issued in exercise of the power conferred by section 1 (2) of the Amending Act of 1962, the Central Government appointed 27th July 1964 as the date on which the said Act was to come in force. Therefore, the Amending Act 21 of 1962 came into force with effect from 27-7-1964 and obviously it extended to whole of India.
Therefore, the Amending Act 21 of 1962 came into force with effect from 27-7-1964 and obviously it extended to whole of India. Sub-section (3) of section 1 of the Act reads as under: "It shall come into force at once; but Chapter III shall take effect only from such date as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint in this behalf, and Chapter IV shall take effect in particular State only from such date as the State Government may, by like notification, appoint ill this behalf." 10. In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (3) of section 1 of the Drugs Act, 1940, the Government of Bombay issued a notification dated 11-7-1958 in supersession of all the notifications issued in that behalf appointing the first day of August 1958 as the date from which Chapter IV of the Act was to take effect in the whole State of Bombay. The State of Bombay issued a further notification on the same date in exercise of the powers under section 18 of the Act, fixing the 1st August 1958 as the date for the purposes of the said section in respect of the whole of the State of Bombay. On the basis of these notifications contention is raised by Shri Deshpande, the learned counsel for the accused, that these notifications were issued for the purposes of the principal Act which governed only the drugs and did not apply to the cosmetics. Therefore, according to him, unless a fresh notification was issued under section 18 of the Act after the Act No. 21 of 1962 came into force, section 18 itself is not brought into force by fixing a date in that behalf so far as the cosmetics are concerned and hence it was not obligatory on the part of the accused to have obtained any licence for the manufacture of any cosmetic. According to him, this notification will only apply to the cases of drugs and cannot include within its import the cosmetics. He further contended that cosmetic was riot at all dealt with by the principal Act, and therefore, this is a fresh legislation on the topic. The only thing that the Legislature has done is that instead of having a separate Act regarding cosmetics only it chose to amend the Drugs Act.
He further contended that cosmetic was riot at all dealt with by the principal Act, and therefore, this is a fresh legislation on the topic. The only thing that the Legislature has done is that instead of having a separate Act regarding cosmetics only it chose to amend the Drugs Act. However, the legislation in that behalf is distinct and different, and therefore this should be treated as a separate and fresh legislation so far as cosmetics are concerned. According to him, the phraseology used in section 18, namely, 'in this behalf', clearly indicates that only the subject covered by the main section was covered by the notification also, and therefore, according to him, the said notification is good so far as drugs are concerned and is not available for the purposes of cosmetics. 11. It is not possible for me to accept these contentions of Shri Deshpande. It is pertinent to note that initially the Drugs Act of 1940 was already on the Statute book. What was done by the Act No. 21 of 1962 was to suitably amend the principal Act so as to cover within its import the cosmetics also. Therefore, by the Amending Act various sections were suitably amended either by process of substitution or insertion of the word "cosmetic". Even the title of the· principal Act was changed. The principal Act was already in force and the notifications contemplated by the various sections of the principal Act were already issued by the State Government as well as the Central Government. The principal Act as well as the Amending Act both are Central Legislations and even the Amending Act received assent of the President on 28th June 1962 and thereafter it was published in the Gazette of India on the same date, that is, 28-6-1962. By notification issued under sub-section (2) of section 1 of the Amending Act, the Central Government appointed 27th July 1964 as the date on which the said Act, namely, the Drugs (Amendment) Act, 1962 was to come into force. Therefore, as soon as the said Amendment Act came into force, the principal Act stood suitably modified and amended.
By notification issued under sub-section (2) of section 1 of the Amending Act, the Central Government appointed 27th July 1964 as the date on which the said Act, namely, the Drugs (Amendment) Act, 1962 was to come into force. Therefore, as soon as the said Amendment Act came into force, the principal Act stood suitably modified and amended. The said modifications made in the principal Act by the Amending Act became part and parcel of the principal Act itself, and therefore, in my opinion, it was not necessary for the Government to issue a fresh notification for bringing into force the provisions of the principal Act as amended by the Amending Act of 21 of 1962. Section 18 with which we are concerned in the present case reads as under: "18.
Section 18 with which we are concerned in the present case reads as under: "18. Prohibition of manufacture and sale of certain drugs and cosmetics: - From such date as may be fixed by the State Government by notification in the Official Gazette in this behalf, no person shall himself or by any other person on his behalf: (a) manufacture for sale, or sell, or stock or exhibit for sale, or distribute (i) any drug or cosmetic which is not of standard quality; (ii) any misbranded drug or misbranded cosmetic; (iii) any patent or proprietary medicine, unless there is displayed in the prescribed manner on the label or container thereof the true formula or list of ingredients contained in it in a manner readily intelligible to the members of the medical profession; (iv) any drug which by means of any statement, design or device accompanying it or by any other means, purports or claims to prevent, cure or mitigate any such disease or ailment, or to have any such other effect as may be prescribed; (v) any cosmetic containing any ingredient which may render it unsafe or harmful for use under the directions indicated or recommended; (vi) any drug or cosmetic in contravention of any of the provisions of this Chapter or any Rule made thereunder; (b) sell, or stock or exhibit for sale, or distribute any drug or cosmetic which has been imported or manufactured in contravention of any of the provisions of this Act or any Rule made thereunder; (c) manufacture for sale, or sell, or stock or exhibit for sale, or distribute any drug or cosmetic, except under, and in accordance with the conditions of, a licence issued for such purpose under this Chapter: Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to the manufacture, subject to prescribed conditions, of small quantities of any drug for the purpose of examination, test or analysis: Provided further that the Central Government may, after consultation with the Board by notification in the Official Gazette, permit, subject to any conditions specified in the notification, the manufacture for sale, sale or distribution of any drug or class of drugs not being of standard quality.
Explanation : The formula or list of ingredients mentioned in sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) shall be deemed to be true and a sufficient compliance with that sub-clause, if, without disclosing a full and detailed recipe of the ingredients, it indicates correctly all the potent or poisonous substances contained therein together with an approximate statement of the composition of the medicine." From the bare reading of section 18 it is quite clear that it was obligatory on the part of the State Government to have issued a notification in the Official Gazette for fixing up a date for purposes of section 18 of the Act. As already stated hereinbefore, the State Government had already issued a notification fixing a date in this behalf. The said notification issued on 11th July 1958 reads as under: "No. SRO. 1056:- In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (3) of section 1 of the Drugs Act, 1940 (XXIII of 1940), and in supersession of all notifications issued in that behalf, the Government of Bombay hereby appoints the 1st day of August 1958 as the date from which Chapter IV of the whole of the State of Bombay. No. SRO. 1056:- In exercise of the powers conferred by section 18 of the Drugs Act, 1940 (XXIII of 1940) and in supersession of all notifications issued in that behalf, the Government of Bombay hereby fixes the 1st day of August 1958 as the date for the purposes of the said section, in respect of the whole of the State of Bombay." Therefore, when the Amending Act 21 of 1962 was brought on the Statute book and came into force a date was already fixed by the State Government by notification in the Official Gazette. That was a notification issued for the purposes of section 18 of the Act. The obligation cast upon the State Government was to fix a date for bringing into force section 18 of the Act. The notification was issued for the purposes of section 18 as a whole. Thus it is quite clear that a date for the purposes of section 18 was already fixed by the State Government and said section was already in force so far as this part of the State is concerned.
The notification was issued for the purposes of section 18 as a whole. Thus it is quite clear that a date for the purposes of section 18 was already fixed by the State Government and said section was already in force so far as this part of the State is concerned. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, it was not necessary for the State Government to have issued a separate and fresh notification, only because section 18 was amended by Amending Act No. 21 of 1962. 12. As to what is the position in this behalf, when an Act is amended by another Act was stated by this Court in Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh v. State Industrial Court1. In that case the C. P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947 was subsequently amended by Madhya Pradsh Industrial Disputes Settlement (Amendment) Act, XXI of 1955. A contention was raised in the said case that the Amending Act did not come into force unless a fresh notification was issued by the State Government under section 1 (3) of Act of 1947. Repelling this contention it was observed by this Court: "In the instant case the amending Act of 1955 was submitted to the President for his assent. That assent was received on the 19th November 1955 and was published in the Madhya Pradesh Gazette on the 25th November 1955. Since the amending Act makes no provision regarding the date of its commencement, it must be held under sub-section 1 (b) of section 3 of the C. P. and Berar General Clauses Act that the amending Act came into force on the 25th November 1955. Now, since it came into force on that date, there was no need whatsoever to issue a notification under sub-section (3) of section 1. The restraints imposed by this latter provision were intended to apply to the provisions of the main Act which was enacted in the year 1947. It was open to the Legislature to extend those restrictions even to the provisions of the amending Act. It has however not chosen to do so. Therefore, the absence of a notification under sub-section (3) of section 1 is of no consequence. 6.
It was open to the Legislature to extend those restrictions even to the provisions of the amending Act. It has however not chosen to do so. Therefore, the absence of a notification under sub-section (3) of section 1 is of no consequence. 6. No doubt, where an Act is amended by another Act, the provisions of the amending Act become part of the parent Act, but it does not mean that the provisions of the amending Act never come into force except by following the procedure laid down in the parent Act for bringing them into force. The provisions of the amending Act could not become part of the parent Act without bringing into operation the amending Act. Once the amending Act came into operation, section 7-A which was introduced into or superimposed on the original Act also came into operation. Thus, the coming into force of section 7-A of the Act and its becoming part and parcel of the parent Act was a simultaneous process. Since section 7·A has come into force, the issue of the notification under sub· section (3) of section 1 bringing it into force would be redundant. It is for these reasons that we cannot accept the view taken in the earlier case." In the present case also when the principal Act was amended by Act No. 21 of 1962, the provisions of the amending Act became part of the parent Act as soon as the amending Act was brought into force. The restrictions imposed by section 18 of the Act were intended to apply to the provisions of the principal Act. The legislature has not chosen to impose or extend those restrictions to the provisions of the amending Act also. Once the amending Act came into force section 18 as amended was superimposed or introduced in the original Act and became part and parcel of the principal Act. According to the Webster's dictionary the word "insert" means, 'to put or thrust in to' introduce into and to put or fit (something) into something else. According to Concise Oxford dictionary the word "insert" means, place, thrust a thing into another or to introduce. By amending Act 21 of 1962, the word 'cosmetic" was inserted after the word "drug" in section I 8 of the principal Act.
According to Concise Oxford dictionary the word "insert" means, place, thrust a thing into another or to introduce. By amending Act 21 of 1962, the word 'cosmetic" was inserted after the word "drug" in section I 8 of the principal Act. Therefore, after the said word was inserted in section 1 8 by the amending Act, it became part and parcel of the parent act and thereafter the provisions of the parent Act will have to be read as amended. By the notifications issued by the State Government under the parent Act, Chapter IV of the Act was already brought into force. Section 18 with which we are concerned in this case is in Part IV of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. Similarly a notification was already issued by the State Government in the year 1958 fixing a date from which section 18 will come into force in the erstwhile State of Bombay and now the State of Maharashtra. Thus it is quite clear that Chapter IV as well as section 18 were already in force. Therefore, issuing of a fresh notification after the amending Act would be redundant and hence obviously not necessary. 13. In support of his contention Shri Deshpande has relied Upon various decisions. Shri Deshpande was relying upon a decision of the Mlldhya Pradesh High Court in Ramjilal v. Municipal Committee Piparia2 wherein it was observed that unless a date is fixed, the Act cannot come into force at all. He also relied upon a decision of this Court in Emperor v. Bhimabai3 and contended on the basis of the said decision that the same meaning should be given to the phraseology used in the section as well as in the notification~ According to him, when the notification was issued in the year 1958 the principal Act only covered drugs, and therefore, the said notification should also be restricted to drugs. He also relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Venkateswaraloo v. Superintendent, Central Jail, Hyderabad State4 and contended that the amending Act of 1962 cannot be construed retrospectively. He also relied upon certain other decisions of the Supreme Court in support of the contention that the legislation being penal in the nature should be strictly construed in favour of the accused. In my opinion, none of these decisions can help Shri Deshpande so far as the present legislation is concerned.
He also relied upon certain other decisions of the Supreme Court in support of the contention that the legislation being penal in the nature should be strictly construed in favour of the accused. In my opinion, none of these decisions can help Shri Deshpande so far as the present legislation is concerned. Though the notification under the principal Act was issued in the year 1958, no retrospective effect is being given to the legislation as such. The Amending Act No. 21 of 1962 was brought into force by the Central Government with effect from 27th July 1964. The provisions of the Act as amended are being implemented so far as the cosmetics are concerned, after the amending Act was brought into force. The said amending Act is not being implemented restrospectively. So far as the notification issued under the principal Act is concerned, the word "drugs" was not used in the notification itself. The notification was generally worded for fixing a date for the purposes of section 18 as a whole. Therefore, a question of assigning the same meaning to the phraseology used in the section or the notification will not arise in the present case. It is true that unless the date is fixed bringing into force the amending Act it will not come into operation. However, the Central Government has issued a notification under sub-section (2) of section 1 and has fixed 27th July 1964 as the date on which the said Act, namely, the amending Act No. 21 of 1962 will come into force. Therefore, the amending Act No. 21 of 1962 was brought into force by the Central Government by issuing the necessary notification in exercise of the powers conferred upon the Central Government by sub-section (2) of section 1 of the amending· Act of 1962. The coming into force of the amending Act and its becoming part and parcel of the parent Act was a simultaneous process. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, no -fresh notification was necessary for re-fixing a date so far as section 18 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act was concerned, because it was already brought into force by issuing necessary notification in the year 1.958 itself. 14. This aspect of the matter can be viewed from another point of view also.
14. This aspect of the matter can be viewed from another point of view also. By the amending Act, of 1962, namely, the Drugs (Amendment) Act, 1962, the words "or cosmetics" was inserted after the word "drugs" in the various sections. At the same time the provisions of the parent Act were also amended by process of substitution, substituting the new provisions in place of old one. So far as the amendment to section 18 is concerned, section 14 of the Act No. 21 of 1962, namely, the Drugs (Amendment) Act, 1962 provides as under: "14. Amendment of section 18: In section 18.of the principal Act, (a) in clause (a)- (i) in sub-clause (i), after the words "any drug", the words "or cosmetic" shall be inserted; (ii) for sub-clause (ii), the following sub-clause shall be substituted, namely (iii) any misbranded drug or misbranded cosmetic; (iii) for sub-clause (v), the following sub-c1au~es shall be substituted, namely:- (v) any cosmetic containing any ingredient which may render it unsafe or harmful for use under the directions indicated or recommended; (vi) any drug or cosmetic in contravention of any of the provisions of this Chapter or any rule made thereunder;" (b) in clause (b) and clause (c), after the words "any drug", the words "cosmetic" shall be inserted." Therefore, it is clear that in section 18 itself certain sub-clauses are substituted. 15. The word "substituted" is many times employed by the legislature for replacing the new provisions by cancellation of the previous one. The Supreme Court had an occasion to consider this aspect of the matter in Koteshwar Vittal Kamath v. K Rangappa Baliga5 and while construing the true meaning of phrase "substitution" it was observed by the Supreme Court: "The process of substitution consists of two steps. First, the old rule is made to cease to exist and; next, the new rule is brought into existence in its place." In this view of the matter, in my opinion, when the words were substituted by amending Act of 1962, there was repeal of the original words and an re-enactment so far as the substitution of the new words in place of the old one are concerned. To such an Act, in my opinion, the principles of section 24 of the General Clauses Act will aptly apply.
To such an Act, in my opinion, the principles of section 24 of the General Clauses Act will aptly apply. So far as the present Act is concerned, by amending Act of 1962 the very title of the principal Act was changed and was substituted by another title. At various places the words "drugs or cosmetics" were inserted by substituting the said words for the word "drug" in the principal Act. Section 24 of the General Clauses Act reads as under: "24. Where any Central Act or Regulation, is after the commencement of this Act, repealed and re-enacted with or without modification, then, unless it is otherwise expressly provided, any appointment, notification, order, scheme, rule, form or bye-law, made or issued under the repealed Act or Regulation, shall, so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions re-enacted, continue in force, and be deemed to have been made or issued under the provisions so re-enacted, unless and until it is superseded by any appointment, notification, order, scheme, rule, form or bye-law, made or issued under the provisions so re-enacted and when any Central Act or Regulation, which by a notification under section 5 or 5A of the Schedule Districts Act, 1874, or any like law, has been extended to any local area, bas, by a subsequent notification, been withdrawn from and re-extended to such area or any part thereof, the provisions of such Act or Regulation shall be deemed to have been repealed and reenacted in such area or part within the meaning of this section." From the bare reading of this section it is clear that as the principal Act was repealed and re-enacted with a modification and as no contrary intention has been expressed in the said legislation, the notification issued under the principal Act being not inconsistent with the provisions of the amending Act will continue in force and will be deemed to have been issued under the provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, as amended by the amending Act 21 of 1962. Such a view has already been taken by this Court in Poona Electric Supply Co. v. State6.
Such a view has already been taken by this Court in Poona Electric Supply Co. v. State6. In the said case it was held by this Court that the notification prescribing the time limit within which, the form in which and the authority to whom a notice under section 33 (1) of Electricity Act is to be given, issued prior to the amending of section 33 (1), continues to be in force after the amendment of the Act by virtue of section 24 of the General Clauses Act. Similar view is taken by this Court in Asumal v. State of Maharashtra7. In the said case the notification issued under unamended provisions of section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 came for consideration of this Court. In that case a contention was raised that Public Analyst and Food Inspector were appointed under the unamended provisions of the Act, and therefore, after the amendment they could not be deemed to be the Food Inspector and Public Analyst appointed under the new section 8 or section 9. Repelling this contention it was held by this Court : "The present sections 8 and 9 were nothing but a re-enactment of the repealed sections 8 and 9 of the Act as they stood prior to commencement of the Act 49 of 1964; Since the notifications appointing the Public Analyst and the Food Inspector were not in any way inconsistent with the provisions of sections 8 and 9 and those notifications were not superseded by any fresh notifications, in view of the provisions of section 24 of the General Clauses Act, in the absence of any express provision to the contrary in the Amending Act 49 of 1964 the notifications issued under the original sections 8 and 9 appointing a Public Analyst and a Food Inspector will be deemed to have been issued under sections respectively as they stand at present after the Amending Act of 1964." In my opinion, this principle will aptly apply to the present case also, and therefore, the notification issued under section 18 of the principal Act will continue to be in force even after the amending Act 21 of 1962 and will be deemed to have been issued under section 18 as amended.
Therefore it was not necessary for the State Government to have issued a fresh notification fixing a date for the purposes of the section 18 as amended by the amending Act 21 of 1962. 16. Then the only question remains for consideration in the present appeal as well as in the revision application is as to whether the Bharat Darbar Gandh or the Excellant Nail Polish could be said to be cosmetics within the meaning of the Drugs and cosmetics Act, 1940. The term "cosmetic” is defined as under: "3 (aaa). 'cosmetic' means any article intended to be rubbed, poured, sprinkled or sprayed on, or introduced into, or otherwise applied to, the human body or any part thereof for cleansing beautifying, promoting attractiveness, or altering the appearance, and includes any article intended for use as a component of cosmetic; but does not include soap." 17. It was contended by Shri Deshpande on behalf of the accused that Gandh or Nail polish is not used for the purposes of beautifying or promoting attractiveness or altering the appearance. According to Shri Deshpande, Gandh is used by Hindu Women as a custom. So far as Nail polish is concerned, he contended that it is used only for the purpose of polishing nails and is not used over the whole body. Therefore, the question of beautifying or altering the appearance of the body will not arise. It is not possible for me to accept this contention of Shri Deshpande. 18. P. W. 1 Mohommad Inamu Rahim, the Drug Inspector, in his cross-examination has stated that the Gandh is used by women for beautifying and promoting attractiveness and also for altering appearance. He further stated that the nail polish is also used for beautifying and promoting attractiveness and for altering appearance of human body. He further stated that if nail polish and Gandh are applied by dark complexion women it will promote attractiveness. A suggestion was made to him that Gandh is used by the Hindu woman as a custom only but this suggestion was denied by the witness. A suggestion was also made to him that the nail polish manufactured by the accused does not beautify or promote attractiveness and alter appearance. This suggestion was also denied by the witness. 19. P. W. 3 Mangesh Rajadhyaksha stated in his deposition that the colour of Darbar Gandh seized from the accused is reddish.
A suggestion was also made to him that the nail polish manufactured by the accused does not beautify or promote attractiveness and alter appearance. This suggestion was also denied by the witness. 19. P. W. 3 Mangesh Rajadhyaksha stated in his deposition that the colour of Darbar Gandh seized from the accused is reddish. He further stated that the red Gandh is used by ladies on their forehead. The witness further stated that red Gandh is used by married woman belonging to Hindu religion whose husband is living, but he could not say as to whether red Gandh is not used by Mohammedans, Christians and Parsis. He further stated that he cannot say that the red Gandh is used only as a custom by Hindu married women. According to the witness, nail polish is applied only to nails of fingers and toes and he is not aware whether nail polish is used for cleansing the nails. He further stated that it is not true that nail polish does not beautify or promote attractiveness. According to the witness, it is incorrect to say that even if the dark complexion ladies apply the nail polish it will not beautify or promote attractiveness or alter the appearance for better. In his cross-examination he further stated that he cannot say whether the nail polish is applied to any other part of the human body besides the nails. From the answers given by the witness and that too in the cross examination it is quite clear that the Gandh is applied by the women folk to their fore-heads, which is a part of the human body, for beautifying or promoting attractiveness or for altering the appearance of the fore-head. Similarly, nail polish is also applied to human body, namely, the nails, for beautifying or promoting attractiveness or altering appearance of the nails. The Legislature has chosen its own dictionary for defining the word "cosmetic". If the words used in the said definition clause are read in its context, it is quite clear that Bharat Darbar Gandh and the Excellent Nail Polish manufactured by the accused are cosmetics within the meaning of the said definition. 20. The provisions of section 18 (c) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 were considered by Supreme Court in Swantraj v. State of Maharashtra8.
20. The provisions of section 18 (c) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 were considered by Supreme Court in Swantraj v. State of Maharashtra8. While making a reference to the Act itself it was observed by the Supreme Court as under: "Every legislation is a social document and judicial construction seeks to decipher the statutory mission, (1) language permitting, taking the cue from the rule in Heydon's case of suppressing the evil and advancing the remedy. The Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (The Act, for short) is a life-saving statute." Then in para 9 of the judgment a reference was made to Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes' 12th Edition, p. 137) and then it was observed by the Supreme Court: "This manner of construction has two aspects. One is that the Courts, mindful of the mischief rule, will not be astute to narrow the language of a statute so as to allow persons within its purview to escape its net. The other is that the statute may be applied to the substance rather than the mere form of transactions, thus defeating any shifts and contrivances which parties may have devised in the hope of thereby falling outside the Act. When the Courts find an attempt at concealment, they will, in the words of Wilmot C. J. 'brush away the cob-web varnish, and show the transactions in their true light'." This benignant rule originated four hundred years ago in Heydon's case which resolved- "that for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law) four things are to be discerned and considered: (1st) What was the common law before the making of the Act. (2nd) What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide. (3rd) What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the Commonwealth.
(2nd) What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide. (3rd) What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the Commonwealth. And, l4th) The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the Judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico." From the statements and objects of the Amending Act 21 of 1962 quoted hereinbefore, it is quite clear that in view of development of research and application of various organic synthetics and intermediates to the, formulation of cosmetics, it was necessary to ensure that nothing is used in cosmetics which may have deleterious effects on the health of the people. Preparations which appear to be among the most frequent causes of dermatitis are deodorants, pomades, lipsticks and nail polishes. It seems that the question of research for manufacture of cosmetics came for discussion before the Central Council of Health and the consensus of opinion was that the manufacture of Cosmetics' should be regulated by extending the provisions of the Drugs Act, 1940, to them, and therefore, a proposal for amending the principal Act suitably for making necessary provisions for cosmetics was made by the Amending Act, 21 of 1962. 21. As observed by the Supreme Court in Swantraj v. State of Malmrashtra (cu. supra) the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 is a life saving statute. Prior to the Amending Act, 1962 there was no legislation for regulating the manufacture of cosmetics, and therefore, for doing away with the evil involved a remedy was thought for by amending the principal Act, namely, the Drugs Act, 1940. For the purposes of regulating the manufacture of cosmetics, the Legislature chose to define said term "cosmetic", including in its import any article which is intended to be applied to the human body or any part thereof even for the purposes of beautifying and promoting attractiveness or altering the appearance of the body. It is not necessary that it should be applied to the whole body.
It is not necessary that it should be applied to the whole body. Even if the article is applied to a part of the body and if it beautifies or promotes attractiveness or alters appearance, then also it will be a cosmetic within the meaning of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. If the present articles manufactured by the accused, namely, Bharat Darbar Gandh and the Excellent Nail Polish are considered in this context, in my opinion, it is quite clear from the evidence on record that the said articles, though applied to the part of the body, beautify and promote attractiveness and alter the appearance of the person. Therefore, they will be cosmetics within the meaning of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. 22. The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, had also observed in his judgment that there is no doubt that even the Gandh is used for attractiveness, but according to him, it is not used by people at large. According to him, some religious feelings are attached to it in certain sections of the Hindu community and then the learned Magistrate has further observed that it serves no better purpose than the voters ink. In my opinion, having held that the Gandh is used for attractiveness, the learned Judicial Magistrate has committed an error in holding that it is like a marking ink or voters ink, and therefore, is not a cosmetic. It may be that some Hindu women might be using it as a substitute for Kumkum. However, it is common knowledge that now-a-days the Gandh which is manufactured by the various commercial firms is manufactured in various colours and is being used for beautifying or promoting attractiveness. Therefore all the elements of definition are thus fulfilled. The language used by the Legislature for defining the Word is the true depository of legislative intent. The plain meaning cannot be whittled down by taking into consideration the meaning of 'cosmetic' as used in common parlance. In the most of modern Acts of Legislature there is an interpretation clause or a definition clause declaring that a word or phrase when found in the Act is to be understood as regards that Act in a certain sense or is to include certain things which but for the such definition clause it Would not normally include.
In the most of modern Acts of Legislature there is an interpretation clause or a definition clause declaring that a word or phrase when found in the Act is to be understood as regards that Act in a certain sense or is to include certain things which but for the such definition clause it Would not normally include. As a matter of fact, normally whenever a Legislature wants either to expand or restrict the normal connotation of the word, the said term is defined in the Act. Even otherwise, the dictionary meaning of the expression "cosmetic" is "A preparation to beautify or alter appearance of body or for cleansing, colouring, conditioning or protecting skin, hair, eyes, nails or teeth". (See Wabster's International Dictionary and M/s. Sarin Chemical Laboratory v. Commissioner of Sales Tax9• According to this dictionary meaning also the Bharat Darbar Gandh or Excellent Nail Polish will be items of cosmetics. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, the learned Judicial Magistrate committed an error in holding that Bharat Darbar Gandh is not a cosmetic within the meaning of the Act. It is pertinent to note that the accused himself has applied for a licence for the manufacture of Bharat Darbar Gandh as well as Excellent Nail Polish in the year 1965 and his application for the licence was rejected. From the correspondence placed on record, it is further clear that various warnings were given to the accused by the Drugs and Cosmetics Department that he should not manufacture Bharat Darbar Gandh or Excellent Nail Polish, because his application for licence has already been rejected. From this conduct of the accused, it is also clear that he was aware of the fact toot for manufacturing the Bharat Darbar Gandh or Excellent Nail polish a licence was necessary. 23. In the result, therefore, the appeal filed by the State Government, bearing Criminal Appeal No. 213 of 1972, is allowed and the accused is also found guilty for an offence of manufacturing Bharat Darbar Gandh without a licence. Therefore, in addition to the conviction and sentence imposed by the Courts below the accused is also convicted for an offence under section 18 (c) of the Act for manufacture, sale or possession for sale of Bharat Darbar Gandh. He is further convicted on the same count under section 18 (a) (vi) of the Act and rule 146 made thereunder.
Therefore, in addition to the conviction and sentence imposed by the Courts below the accused is also convicted for an offence under section 18 (c) of the Act for manufacture, sale or possession for sale of Bharat Darbar Gandh. He is further convicted on the same count under section 18 (a) (vi) of the Act and rule 146 made thereunder. As, however, it has not been proved by the prosecution that the Bharat Darbar Gandh manufactured by the accused was in any way harmful, the accused is sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 100, or in default to undergo simple imprisonment for one month on all counts for manufacturing of Bharat Darbar Gandh also. Consequently Criminal Revision Application No. 124 of 1973 filed by the accused is dismissed. The accused is granted one month's time to pay the additional fine of Rs. 100 as I am informed by Shri Deshpande that the accused has already paid the fine of Rs. 100 for his conviction for manufacturing the Excellent Nail polish. Appeal allowed; Revision dismissed.