JUDGMENT : M.L.Malik, J. ( 1. ) Shyam Kishore Agrawal (the respondent in the present appeal) filed a suit in the Court of the Additional District Judge, Mandla, for compensation for wrongful conversion of his goods. The suit was registered as Civil Suit No. 2-B of 1958. It was earlier dismissed on a preliminary finding that the Civil Courts jurisdiction to entertain it was barred under the provisions of section 220 (q) of the C. P. Land Revenue Act. The finding was challenged in appeal by Shyam Kishore Agrawal and this Court by its order dated the 5th October, 1962, set it aside, directing the Additional District Judge to frame all the issues of fact and law that arise in the case, and then decide upon the question of jurisdiction after recording evidence. The case was remitted to the trial Court with the following observations: "In our opinion, the proper course for the trial Court to follow is to first frame all the issues of facts and law that arise in the case and then to determine if and how far the trial of these issues is barred by ascertaining the limits of the jurisdiction of the Revenue Authorities, examining their powers under section 202 of the Act and then determining if and how far they have acted within their jurisdiction." ( 2. ) The Additional District Judge proceeded to record evidence and ultimately found that the Revenue Courts had assumed jurisdiction on no legal evidence whatsoever on the breaches of rules complained of and that the seizure and confiscation of the plaintiffs logs of timber by the Revenue Authorities was unlawful. Consequently he gave a decree for Rs. 2,32000/- in favour of the plaintiff. Aggrieved by the judgment, the defendant (State of Madhya Pradesh) has come up in appeal. ( 3. ) The appeal was heard on 22-4-1971, and the question that cropped up was whether a claim for damages could lie against the State when seizure and confiscation was done in the exercise of, or purported exercise of statutory powers. The Court thought it proper to invite findings on these issues of law. The Court retained seisen of the appeal and remitted certain issues for findings of the District Court. The findings that have been received, are against the plaintiff. The Court thought it proper to invite findings on these issues of law. The Court retained seisen of the appeal and remitted certain issues for findings of the District Court. The findings that have been received, are against the plaintiff. The learned Additional District Judge found that the seizure and confiscation was validly made under the sanction of the lawful authority and, therefore, the State was absolutely immune from the liability. There is thus an apparent conflict between the findings earlier recorded by the District Court and the findings now transmitted to this Court. On these findings, the inevitable result was that the plaintiffs suit deserved to be dismissed. ( 4. ) The plaintiff had filed the suit on the following averments; "(i) That he was the sole proprietor of the following, amongst others, Jar Kharidi villages in Mandla, Tahsil and District mandla, viz., Khursipar, Mohgaon, Patpara, Munsa- rai, Rehta Mohania and Amvar; (ii) That on 8-3-1951 the Deputy Commissioner, Mandla, granted him permission to extract Sal trees from the aforesaid villages subject to the condition that he would extract the trees from 1 /20th of the total area in each village, subject to a minimum of 10 acres, and also observe the rules framed under section 202 of the C. P. Land Revenue Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act); (iii) That in pursuance of the aforesaid permission, he cut 8663 mature Sal trees of and above in girth, in March, 1951 and that the said timber was then worth Rs. 2,30,000/-; (iv) That he had entered into a contract with one Kulbir Johar who had agreed to take the timber after it had been felled; that he was also entitled to saw them at the site and that the property in the goods would pass to him on payment of the price; (v) That on the coming into force of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act on or about 31-3-51, the forest in the aforesaid Jar Kharidi villages vested in the State and that the District Authorities thereafter prohibited the entry of the plaintiff and his contractor in the village forests for the removal of any timber therefrom; (vi) That he applied to the Deputy Commissioner through his contractor Kulbir Johar for permission to remove the trees that had been cut by him in pursuance of the permission, dated 8-3-1951, and that he was permitted to remove the entire timber by 23-4-51; (vii) That inspite of this permission, neither he nor his contractor was allowed to enter the forest to remove the said timber on the allegation that a case of breach of the Forest Rules committed by the plaintiff in respect of the aforesaid forests was under investigation and that he could not be allowed to remove the said timber until the investigation was over; (viii) That the defendant (State) through its servants, seized the timber lying in the forests belonging to the plaintiff; (ix) That in the revenue case relating to the breach of the rules framed under section 202 of the Act, the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Jabalpur, who held the enquiry, came to the conclusion that the plaintiff had committed breaches of rules 2 (a), 2 (c), 5 (1)(b), 5 (l)(c), 5 (1) (e) and 5 (2), that he therefore imposed a penalty of Rs. 3,000 /- and that he also ordered confiscation and sale of the timber seized under section 202 (3) of the Act; (x) That on appeal the Board of Revenue set aside the order with respect to the breaches of rules 2 (a), 5 (1) (b), 5 (1) (c) and 5 (2) but confirmed it with respect to the breaches of rules 5 (1) (c), 5 (1) (e) and 2 (c); that the Board held that the breaches of rules 5 (1) (c) and 5 (1) (e) were trivial, but it held, solely in relation to the breach of rule 2 (c), that the penalty imposed as well as the confiscation ordered were correct; (xi) That the finding of the Revenue Officers that he had been guilty of the breaches of the rules framed under section 202 of the Act was erroneous as it was based on no evidence (xii) That the order imposing a fine of Rs. 3,000 /- was ultra vires and without jurisdiction and that the order ordering confiscation of the timber was also ultra vires and without jurisdiction; (xiii) That the finding of the Revenue Officer that he had cut the timber from more than 1/20th area was unwarranted in law, it being based on a misinterpretation of the permission granted by the Deputy Commissioner, Mandla, and not based on any legal evidence; (xiv) That the defendant (State) did not take proper care of the seized timber which consequently deteriorated in value; (xv) That the said timber was illegally sold by the defendant (State) by auction for Rs. 39,000/-; and (xvi) That the defendant (State) had thus wrongfully converted to its own use the timber belonging to the plaintiff, who was entitled to recover from it the sum of Rs. 2 30 000 as compensation for wrongful conversion of this property and Rs, 2,000/- as the excess amount of fine levied without the authority of law." ( 5. ) The States contention was that the plaintiff had done indiscriminate cutting of the timber trees spread over the entire forest area, in breach of the conditions on which permission was granted by the Deputy Commissioner. He did not confine his operation to 1 /20th area and that too, constituting a compact block. That he had committed breach of the rules framed under section 202 of the C. P. Land Revenue Act. He did not confine his operation to 1 /20th area and that too, constituting a compact block. That he had committed breach of the rules framed under section 202 of the C. P. Land Revenue Act. The Deputy Commissioner, when apprised of the ruthless exploitation of the forest, initiated proceedings against the plaintiff and his contractor. The timber was seized on 11-8-1951. Enquiry was made into the breaches and the matter went in appeal to the Board of Revenue. The Board of Revenue upheld the order of the Additional Deputy Commissioner with respect to breaches of Rules 5 (l)(c), 5 (1) (e) and 2 (e). The ultimate result was that the timber was ordered to be confiscated and the plaintiff was made to pay a penalty of Rs. 3000/-. The State raised the following pleas of law in defence : (i) That the Civil Courts jurisdiction was barred under the provisions of section 220 (q) of the C. P. Land Revenue Act, since the breach of the C. P. Land Revenue Act, since the breach of Rules framed under section 202 was a matter which the Revenue Officer was by the Act exclusively empowered to determine, decide or dispose of. (ii) That no liability under tort would arise when the seizure and confiscation was done under orders of a Revenue Court in the exercise of statutory powers and the act complained of was in fact, the exercise of the sovereign powers by the State; and (iii) That the suit was barred by limitation. ( 6. ) The learned Government Advocate has pressed the very points in appeal and he must succeed in all of them. As regards the first point, question connected with, or arising out of the exercise of power under section 202 of the C. P. Land Revenue Act, is excepted from the jurisdiction of the Civil Court under section 220 (q) of the Act. The Deputy Commissioner, in the present case had acted under the provisions of Rule 5-A of the Rules framed under section 202 of the Act; whereby he was authorised to suspend the clearing and disposal of forest growth to enable him to investigate if the operations in progress were in accordance with rules. The seizure was ordered under this provision. The Deputy Commissioner, in the present case had acted under the provisions of Rule 5-A of the Rules framed under section 202 of the Act; whereby he was authorised to suspend the clearing and disposal of forest growth to enable him to investigate if the operations in progress were in accordance with rules. The seizure was ordered under this provision. The investigation done after the seizure of the timber, disclosed that the plaintiff had committed various breaches of the rules, the major one being exploitation of the forest much in excess of the authority. He had not restricted the cutting to 1 /20th of the area. Under the provisions of section 202 (3), the Deputy Commissioner could order confiscation and sale of the timber. He acted under this provision and the stock seized was ordered to be sold. ( 7. ) The action taken by the Deputy Commissioner was thus in exercise of the powers under section 202 of the C. P. Land Revenue Act and the Civil Courts jurisdiction on any question arising out of such exercise of powers, was barred. The Civil Courts interference could only be invoked if it could be shown that the Revenue Court had acted beyond their limits of authority, or had acted ultra vires, or had refused to exercise jurisdiction, or had acted mala fide or arbitrarily or in violation of the fundamental principles of natural justice or perversely. But it is always to be remembered that the special tribunal constituted under the Special Act, has jurisdiction to decide questions which are necessary for the purpose of giving or refusing relief under the particular statute. If certain state of facts has to exist before the Special Tribunal exercises jurisdiction, the tribunal must find that those facts exist. The jurisdiction of the Revenue Officer depended in the present case on establishment of a fact in issue which was, whether the plaintiff had committed breach of forest rules or breach of the conditions imposed in the permission granted. It is this issue which the legislature intended that the Revenue Officer should try. The Civil Court could not sit in judgment over a finding of the Revenue Court on a pretext that it was a jurisdictional fact wrongly decided by the Revenue Officer. It is this issue which the legislature intended that the Revenue Officer should try. The Civil Court could not sit in judgment over a finding of the Revenue Court on a pretext that it was a jurisdictional fact wrongly decided by the Revenue Officer. The Revenue Officer decided the issue both as a jurisdictional fact and fact in issue, and the Revenue Officer alone could try that issue. (See: Paika Dasaru Rajeshwar Balaji, AIR 1957 Bom. 239 (F. B.). 2. 1969 MP L J 1 = AIR 1969 SC 78 . ( 8. ) Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have deduced seven diverse views from the decisions of the various High Courts and the Supreme Court in para. 32 of their Judgment in Dhulabhai v. State of M. P., 1969 MP L J 1 = AIR 1969 SC 78 . relating to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court by a special law. We propose to quote the first two views: "(1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals the Civil Courts jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the Civil Courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in confirmity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. (2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the Court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedis provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Where there is no express exclusion, the examination of the remedies and the schema of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. Where there is no express exclusion, the examination of the remedies and the schema of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in Civil Courts are prescribed by the said statute or not." It would be clear from these views that the Additional District Judge could not possibly sit in judgment over the finding of the Revenue Officer that the plaintiff had committed breach of the forest rules and of the conditions imposed by the Deputy Commissioner in the permission granted. We have examined the order of the Additional Deputy Commissioner who had made the enquiry and the order in appeal passed by the Board of Revenue. The finding, in our view, was based on sufficient credible evidence. This is what the Board of Revenue observed in paras 7 and 8 of its Order: Para 7: "It has now to be seen whether the restriction imposed by the Deputy Commissioner was obeyed by the appellant Shyam Kishorelal Agarwal. This aspect of the case has been examined by the Additional Deputy Commissioner at considerable length in paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 of his order. It is clear that cutting was not restricted to any particular part of the area and that it must have taken place over very much more than 1 /20th of the area. The total area classified as big tree forest, small tre forest and hillocks and rocks, in the 6 villages of Mansarai, Amwar, Rehta alias Mohania, khursipar, Patpara and Mohgaoan, amounts to 8233 acres. I have taken the calculation most favourably to appellant Shyam Kishorelal Agarwal by including the area classed as hillocks and rocks in this total. 1 /20th of the area works out to 411 acres. I have taken the calculation most favourably to appellant Shyam Kishorelal Agarwal by including the area classed as hillocks and rocks in this total. 1 /20th of the area works out to 411 acres. It is admitted that the total number of trees felled are 8663 and that all these trees are above 3 1/2 feet in girth, the average number of trees per acre, therefore, comes to 21, whereas according to the evidence of the Range Officer (A. W. 9) the density of such trees would be about 5 or 6 trees per acre only. If appellants contention that he obeyed the restriction imposed by the Deputy Commissioner is accepted, then we find a density of 21 trees per acre which is at variance with all the evidence on record. The spot inspection note of the Additional Deputy Commissioner himself also indicates that cutting was not confined to any particular locality but was spread over the entire forest area and this is supported by the evidence of the Revenue Inspector (C. W. 1) in cross-examination. I find it impossible to believe that Sal trees of more than 3.1 feet in girth would be found at a density of 21 per acre in malguzari forest, particularly malguzari forest which has been already worked in the past. (Shyam Kishorelal Agarwal admits having removed about 10,000 trees of this size before the present operation.)" Para 8: "I come to the conclusion, therefore, the cutting was done in more than 1 /20th of the area. The trees cut were Sal, a prohibited species. The restriction imposed by the Deputy Commissioner was not obeyed and all the cutting, therefore, becomes unauthorized. A breach of rule 2 (c) has, therefore, been committed, but there has been no breach of rules 2 (a) or 2 (b)." ( 9. ) Then there was Tahsildars report (Ex. D-7). He writes towards the end that while on his way he could see felled trees lying scattered all over the forest area and that the cutting of trees was not confined to any particular area. The D. F. O. s report (Ex. P-l5) is still worse. He writes that the contractor had done felling out of the whole area and thus removed about nineteen times more than the permitted quantity of produce. ( 10. The D. F. O. s report (Ex. P-l5) is still worse. He writes that the contractor had done felling out of the whole area and thus removed about nineteen times more than the permitted quantity of produce. ( 10. ) It is pertinent to note that whereas the plaintiff who was earlier permitted to cut the timber trees, could hardlv extract 10,000 trees during the years 1948, 1949 and 1950, he, under the present permission, did a very fast job of cutting as many as 8663 trees within a period of less than three weeks. This was bound to excite anybodys suspicion and more so when the event took place on the eve of the Abolition of Proprietary Rights. The Malguzar knew that he was losing his jungles for good and the period available was too short. The evidence recorded by the Additional Deputy Commissioner, reveals that a thousand sawyers did the ruthless cutting all over the area and no tree over the girth of 3 1/2 was left. The Board of Revenue writes a sad note in para 16 (Ex. P-2) : "The ruthless denudation of the forest done by appellant Shyam Kishorelal Agarwal has caused a set back to regeneration, the effects of which will be felt for the next 80 years, the period needed for the present saplings to develop into seed bearing trees." ( 11. ) With such evidence as this, we fail to see what prevailed over the Additional District Judge to hold that the Revenue Officers had acted on no legal evidence at all, or that they had acted on their imaginations and conjectures. We rather find perversity in the finding of the Additional District Judge instead. In our view, therefore, the Civil Court could not entertain the suit when the matter lay within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Revenue Courts and when the Revenue Courts had acted within their jurisdiction. Their proceedings do not reveal any fraud, arbitrariness or perversity. ( 12. ) On the second point, the authority of the Supreme Court in Kasturi- lal v. State of U. P., AIR 1965 SC 1039 . must be followed. Their proceedings do not reveal any fraud, arbitrariness or perversity. ( 12. ) On the second point, the authority of the Supreme Court in Kasturi- lal v. State of U. P., AIR 1965 SC 1039 . must be followed. In para 21, the law has been succinctly stated thus: "Thus it is clear that this case recognises a material distinction between acts committed by the servants employed by the State where such acts are referable to the exercise of sovereign powers delegated to public servants, and acts committed by public servants which are not referable to the delegation of any sovereign powers. If a tortious act is committed by a public servant and it gives rise to a claim for damages, the question to ask is: was the tortious act committed by the public servant in discharge of statutory functions which are referable to, and ultimately based on, the delegation of the sovereign powers of the State to such public servant? If the answer is in the affirmative, the action for damages for loss caused by such tortious act will not lie. On the other hand, if the tortious act has been committed by a public servant in discharge of duties assigned to him not by virtue of the delegation of any sovereign power, an action for damages would lie. The act of the public servant committed by him during the course of his employment is, in the category of cases, an act of a servant who might have been employee by a private individual for the same purpose. The distinction which is clear and precise in law, is sometimes not borne in mind in discussing questions of the States liability arising from tortious acts committed by public servants. That is why the clarity and precision with which this distinction was emphasised by Chief Justice Peacock as early as 1861 has been recognized as a classic statement on the subject." In the said case, the gold seized by the police officers under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, was misappropriated by a Head Constable who was in charge of the Malkhana and who had absconded. The Court said that the State was immune from liability for the tortious acts of its servants committed in the course of employment and in the exercise of statutory functions delegated to them by the Government. ( 13. The Court said that the State was immune from liability for the tortious acts of its servants committed in the course of employment and in the exercise of statutory functions delegated to them by the Government. ( 13. ) In a Full Bench decision of our own High reported in State of M. P. v. Deviial, 1970 MPLJ 145 ., the facts were indentically similar to that in the present case. The Malguzar had cut the trees in contravention of the Rules under section 202 of the Land Revenue Act and the timber was directed to be confiscated and sold. The action of confiscation was taken under section 202 (3) of the Act. The Court held that the State was not liable for the tortious act committed by a public servant in the discharge of the statutory functions. The Supreme Courts decision in Kasturilas case has obviously guided the Full Bench decision which is now a binding precedent. [See also the decision in The State of M. P. v. Smt. Bhuribai and others First Appeal No. 204 of 1968, decided on the 31st March 1971 (1971 MPLJ Note 113.). The decision goes a step further in enunciating the law that the State would not be liable for the tortious act of its servant even when the order of confiscation is quashed in a writ proceeding.] ( 14. ) Where the statute authotised doing of a certain thing, the party injured by that act, has no remedy whatsoever unless the statute itself allows him a remedy. An act done under a statutory power is never unlawful or tortious. It is only when the authority to whom statutory powers are conferred, is guilty of some irregularity or excess, that the question arises whether the State would be liable for acts of the servant purported to have been done in the exercise of statutory powers. The immunity from liability is in fact against such acts which are done in the purported exercise of the statutory powers. [See: Maharani Gurucharan Kaur v. Province of Madras, AIR 1944 PC 41. ( 15. ) The learned counsel realizing the position of law accepted in the Full Bench decision in Devilals case and in an earlier decision of this Court in State of M. P. v. Singhai Kapoorchand, 1961 MPLJ 456 . [See: Maharani Gurucharan Kaur v. Province of Madras, AIR 1944 PC 41. ( 15. ) The learned counsel realizing the position of law accepted in the Full Bench decision in Devilals case and in an earlier decision of this Court in State of M. P. v. Singhai Kapoorchand, 1961 MPLJ 456 . which again related to an action taken under section 202 of the G. P. Land Revenue Act, endeavoured to get over it by contending that the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Jabalpur, to whom the case was entrusted for enquiry by the Deputy Commissioner, Jabalpur, had no jurisdiction whatsoever to deal with it and the order that he passed was a nullity. An appeal before the Board of Revenue against an order which was a nullity, would not improve matters. The argument proceeded thus: The illicit felling was done in Mandla District and the Revenue Officer at Mandla had the initial jurisdiction to proceed with the enquiry. The plaintiff, finding the Revenue Officers biased, sought a transfer of the case to some other District. The Board of Revenue vide Ex. P-4 ordered transfer of the case to the Court of the Deputy Commissioner, Jabalpur, for disposal according to law. The Deputy Commissioner, Jabalpur, derived powers and jurisdiction from this order of the Board of Revenue to deal with a matter over which he otherwise had no territorial jurisdiction. The assignment of the case to him was, according to the counsel, an assignment persona designata. The Deputy Commissioner, Jabalpur, was in a sense a delegate appointed by the Board of Revenue for the trial of the case. He could not create a sub- delegate and assign the case to him. Shri G. A. Sharma, the Additional Deputy Commissioner, to whom the case was assigned, could not, therefore, make the enquiry. The Deputy Commissioner, Jabalpur, alone or his succes- sor-in-office, could hear and dispose of the matter. ( 16. ) The argument did not appeal to us. The transfer of the case was not made to the Deputy Commissioner persona designata but it was a transfer to the Court of the Deputy Commissioner, Jabalpur. The words "to the Court of" are significant. It was a case thrown into the pool of business of the Court of the Deputy Commissioner at Jabalpur. The transfer of the case was not made to the Deputy Commissioner persona designata but it was a transfer to the Court of the Deputy Commissioner, Jabalpur. The words "to the Court of" are significant. It was a case thrown into the pool of business of the Court of the Deputy Commissioner at Jabalpur. If such was the meaning implicit in the order, the Additional Deputy Commissioner who shared the business with the Deputy Commissioner as used to be assigned to him, could definitely deal with the case, and in so dealing he exercised all the power of a Deputy Commissioner. Reference may be made to sections 9 and 9-A of the C. P. Land Revenue Act. Section 9-A (4) is relevant. It reads as under: Section 9-A (4):- This Act and every other enactment for the time being in force (and any rule made under this Act or any such other enactment) shall apply to the Additional Deputy Commissioner, when exercising any powers or discharging any duties under sub-section (3), as if he were the Deputy Commissioner of the district or the Collector." Under this deeming clause, the Additional Deputy Commissioners and the Deputy Commissioner constitute but one Court for disposing of the Courts business. We may incidentally look to section 3 of the Land Revenue Act. Additional Deputy Commissioners have not have been shown in a separate category of Revenue Officers. They fall in the category of Deputy Commissioners if the list of the categories is exhaustive as it ought to be. ( 17. ) Since we hold that the case was allotted to the business pool of the Court of the Deputy Commissioner, Jabalpur, it could be assigned by the Deputy Commissioner, Jabalpur, to Shri G. A. Sharma, Additional Deputy Commissioner, Jabalpur. Their powers were concurrent. And even if the transfer was to the Deputy Commissioner, Jabalpur in his official capacity, the Additional Deputy Commissioner would be put in the same position on the case being allotted to him, since he would be acting as a Deputy Commissioner and exercising all his powers. [See: Mahadeo Raoji v. Anant Ganesh Bhagwat and others, AIR 1957 Bom. 147 (F B).] ( 18. ) The order passed by Shri G. A. Sharma was, therefore, not a nullity. He had jurisdiction to hear the case once it was assigned to him by the Deputy Commissioner, Jabalpur. ( 19. [See: Mahadeo Raoji v. Anant Ganesh Bhagwat and others, AIR 1957 Bom. 147 (F B).] ( 18. ) The order passed by Shri G. A. Sharma was, therefore, not a nullity. He had jurisdiction to hear the case once it was assigned to him by the Deputy Commissioner, Jabalpur. ( 19. ) On the third point, which relates to limitation, in our view, Article 14 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, should govern the case. Article 14 reads as follows:- "14.- To set aside any act or order of an officer One Year The date of the of Government in his official capacity, act or order." not here-in-otherwise expressly provided for. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent argued that nowhere in the plaint was a relief sought that the order of the Board of Revenue be set aside. The suit was for a consequential relief straight and, therefore, upon the plaint allegations as they stood, Article 14 would not be attracted. ( 20. ) The question that must be asked is whether it was necessary for the plaintiff to get rid of an order made by an Officer of the Government which stood in his way before he could obtain the relief prayed for. If the consequential relief flowed only on setting aside that order, the suit must be deemed to be one for setting aside the order and Article 14 would apply. It cannot be seriously disputed that the order passed by the Board of Revenue was a quasi judicial order valid and binding until it was set aside. Under the provisions of section 220 of the Land Revenue Act, the Civil Courts jurisdiction was excepted on certain matters which were exclusively triable by Revenue Courts. The proceeding under section 202 of the Act was one such matter. Unless the Civil Court declared the order of the Revenue Court a nullity or beyond jurisdiction, the order was absolutely binding on the plaintiff and he could not lay his hands on the goods seized or confiscated. That being so, whether or not the plaintiff had expressly asked for the relief of setting aside the order of the Board of Revenue, the relief was implicit in the plaint allegations for the application of Article 14 [See: Lady Dinbai v. Dominion of India, AIR 1951 Bom. 72 . That being so, whether or not the plaintiff had expressly asked for the relief of setting aside the order of the Board of Revenue, the relief was implicit in the plaint allegations for the application of Article 14 [See: Lady Dinbai v. Dominion of India, AIR 1951 Bom. 72 . and Pooranchand Sharma v. Smt. Saila Bala Dassi and another,1962 MPLJ 198=1 L R 1962 M P 774. ] Applying Article 14 of the Limitation Act, the suit is very much barred by limitation. ( 21. ) The second Article of the Limitation Act, 1908, that could be invoked is Article 29, which reads as below:- "29.-For compensation for wrongful seizure One year The date of the seizure." of moveable property under legal process. The plaintiffs grievance was that the seizure of the timber was wrongful since he had done the cutting within the permissible limits, without contravening the Rules framed under section 202 of the C. P. Land Revenue Act. It was undoubtedly a seizure under legal process. Till the investigation was in progress, the plaintiff could say that the property seized was liable to be returned to him and the possession of the Court was possession on his behalf. But sooner the investigation was over and the order of confiscation was made, it would be a wrongful seizure in the eyes of the plaintiff. The suit should then have been brought within one year from the date of the final order of confiscation. Applying Article 29, the suit has been filed much beyond limitation. [See: State of M. P. v. Smt. Bhuribai, 1962 MPLJ 198=1 L R 1962 M P 774. relying on Maaras Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Shalimar Works Ltd., ILR 42 Cal. 85. Pannaji Dtvichand Finn v. The Firm of Smaji Kapurchand, ILR 53 Mad. 621. Krishna v. Siiaram, 1930 N L J 209 = AIR 1931 Nag. 47. Nagoba and othtrs v. Madholala Kalar, 4 N L R 49. and Jamshed Butt v. State, AIR 1957 Nag. 71.]. ( 22. ) In the opinion of the Additional District Judge, Articles 48/49 or 120 of the Limitation Act would apply We are, however, of the opinion that he was in error in applying either of these Articles. Articles 48 and 49 read as under: Article 48:- "For specific moveable property Three years. 71.]. ( 22. ) In the opinion of the Additional District Judge, Articles 48/49 or 120 of the Limitation Act would apply We are, however, of the opinion that he was in error in applying either of these Articles. Articles 48 and 49 read as under: Article 48:- "For specific moveable property Three years. When the person having lost, or acquired by theft, or dis- the right to the posses- honest misappropriation or con- sion of the property first version, or for compensation for learns in whose posses- wrongfully taking or determining sion it is." the same. Article 49:- "For other specific moveable pro- Three years. When the property is perty or for compensation for wrongfully taken or in wrongfully taking or injuring or injured, or when the wrongfully detaining the same. detainers possession be-comes unlawful." The two Articles contemplate a suit relating to "specific moveable property" or for compensation for wrongfully taking or detaining the same. The present suit having been filed almost six years after the sale of the logs, was not a suit for the return of the specific moveable property but just for compensation. The property was not in possession of the detainer and the question of the possession getting unlawful did not arise to attract Article 48, or Article 49. Under Article 48, the cause of action accrues on the date the owner of the goods first learns in whose possession his goods have passed. The date of the seizure in 1951 which the plaintiff says, was a wrongful seizure, would give him cause of action for the suit. A suit in 1958 would definitely be barred. If we apply Article 49, the injury to the goods is caused towards the end of 1952 when they are transferred to a third person who has not retained the goods in specie. A suit in 1958 would be hopelessly barred by limitation. For the proposition that the two Articles contemplate a suit for "specific moveable proverty", reference may be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in Raghunath Das v. Gokal Chand, AIR 1958 SC 827 .. ( 23. ) We may cite another pertinent decision of the Madras High Court reported in G. P. Ventataraman and Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1958 Mad. 321 . ( 23. ) We may cite another pertinent decision of the Madras High Court reported in G. P. Ventataraman and Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1958 Mad. 321 . wherein the appellants potatoes were wrongfully sold by the Railway Administration without due notice of auction under section 53 (2) of the Railways Act. By such sale, the Railway Administration was guilty of conversion. It was contended by the appellant that a suit for compensation for conversion of the goods would be governed by Article 48 of the Limitation Act. Their Lordships negatived the contention This is what they said : "For the purposes of this case, it is not necessary to define conversion beyond quoting the following sentence from Salmond on Torts 11th Edition page 330: Every person is guilty of conversion who without lawful justification deprives a person of his goods by delivering them to someone else so as to change the possession." Since we have found that the defendants deprived the plaintiff of its goods without lawful justification and delivered the goods over to the purchaser at the auction, the defendants were guilty, in the technical sense of the term, of conversion. We find that the sale was wrongful and that subject to limitation, the plaintiff was entitled to compensation." Then quoting Article 48 of the Limitation Act, their Lordships observed : "Looking at that Article independently of the authorities relied on, this suit is not clearly within the language of that article. The plaintiff does not sue for specific moveable property lost or acquired by theft, or dishonest misappropriation or conversion. The suit was insti tuted in 1950. Even if the potatoes had not been sold, they would by of no use in 1950 to the plaintiff or anybody else and it is altogether out of the question that anybody in 1950 would sue for the specific moveable property which was consigned to the railways in 1948 for carriage to Shalimar. There has, of course, been "conversion". A person might sue for specific moveable property where it has been detained and such detention amounts to conversion or where the property has been transferred to another, and such act of transfer amounts to conversion. But even where the act alleged is conversion, unless the relief prayed for is possession of the specific moveable property, the earlier part of that article will not apply. But even where the act alleged is conversion, unless the relief prayed for is possession of the specific moveable property, the earlier part of that article will not apply. The latter part of the article would apply where compensation is prayed for wrongfully taking or detaining the same. The goods in this case were taken by the railway administration lawfully, on being consigned to them for carriage. On the plaintiffs own allegation, the goods have been disposed of and are not detained. We may note in passing that, if the suit were laid immediately after the sale to Sinha and Brothers, and while they were yet capable of being delivered to the plaintiff and the suit were for possession of the goods, then, the suit would be a suit of the kind provided for by section 11 (d) of the Specific Relief Act. Under section 11 (d) of the Specific Relief Act, a person who is in possession of a particular article of moveable property of which he is not the owner, may be compelled specifically to deliver it to the person entitled to its immediate possession when the possession of the thing claimed has been wrongfully transferred from the claimant. Where conversion of that sort is alleged and on the basis of such cause of action, specific moveable property is sought to be recovered, Article 48 of the Limitation Act would directly come into play. Article 48, in our opinion, has no application to a case where possession has been transferred by conversion and the relief claimed is not possession of the specific moveable property so transferred but compensation for such conversion." ( 24. ) We are in respectful agreement with the view taken by their Lordships of the Madras High Court that where goods have been disposed of and are no longer in detention, Article 48 or 49 would not apply. Their Lordships do not give a positive opinion whether to such a case Article 36 could be made applicable though they say that a conversion of the type gave cause of action for compensation for misfeasance, which Article 36 provides for. Taking such view of the matter, even if a suit for compensation for conversion were covered by Articles 48/49, the cause of action would accrue on the date of sale of the logs i. e. sometime in 1952. Taking such view of the matter, even if a suit for compensation for conversion were covered by Articles 48/49, the cause of action would accrue on the date of sale of the logs i. e. sometime in 1952. It was for the plaintiff to plead that date which he has deliberately withheld. We are told that the logs were sold sometime towards the end of 1952. The suit for compensation is filed in 1958, much after the period of limitation. ( 25. ) The residuary Article 120 of the Limitation Act could not be invoked when Article 14 and 29, in our view, fully apply to the case. ( 26. ) We may say a word about the quantum of compensation that could be decreed, had the plaintiff succeeded in proving that the order of confiscation passed by the Board of Revenue was ultra vires. No satisfactory evidence has been given on the value of the logs at the time of seizure. No witnesses have come forward to say what the rate of timber was in April, 1951. It appears, the logs were sold by public auction sometime after June, 1952 for a sum of Rs. 39000. The logs already debarked to save them from deterioration. We have reason to feel that the auction brought a reasonable market value. The compensation that could then be awarded should not have exceeded Rs. 39000. If the timber was worth anything more, the plaintiff or his contractor Kulbirsingh would surely have offered a better bid. ( 27. ) In the result, the appeal succeeds. The decree of the trial Court is set aside. The suit of the plaintiff respondent shall stand dismissed with costs. He shall pay to the appellant State their costs of this appeal and also of the trial Court. Counsels fee as per schedule. Appeal allowed.