Judgment :- 1. The petitioner, who was working as a Grade I Surveyor, Re-Survey Party, Neyyattinkara, in the year 1968 seeks to quash Exts. P-5 and P-7 orders, by which a minor punishment of stoppage of increment for two years with cumulative effect, was imposed on him by the Director of Survey and Land Records, which was confirmed by the Government in appeal. It is not necessary to detail the facts of the case here. Suffice it to say, that the departmental superiors found the petitioner guilty of neglect of duties. 2. Ext. P-1 is the memo issued to the petitioner by the Director of Survey and Land Records indicating the charges framed against him and calling upon him to submit his explanation within 15 days. The petitioner submitted his explanation Ext. P-2. Thereafter, Ext. P-3 was issued on 10th January 1970 by the Director of Survey and Land Records, Board of Revenue, directing the petitioner to show cause why he should not be reverted to the next lower grade permanently, for a period of five years, for his deliberate neglect of duty. He was also directed to submit his explanation, if any, within 15 days of the receipt of the order. It was also stated in Ext. P-3 that failure to submit explanation within the stipulated period, will entail an ex parte decision against him. The petitioner was also informed whether he desired to be heard in person. Ext. P-4 is the detailed explanation filed by the petitioner praying that he be absolved of all the charges levelled against him. There was no clear statement in Ext. P-4 to the effect that he desired to be heard in person. Ultimately, Ext. P-5 order was passed imposing a punishment of stoppage of increment for two years with cumulative effect. Ext. P-5 took a lenient view of the allegations against the petitioner considering his age and chances of improvement in future. An appeal was filed against this order before the Government and the Government by Ext. P7 order dismissed the appeal. These are the two orders which are sought to be quashed in this writ petition. 3. The petitioner contends that the orders are bad in law, since the procedure adopted by the disciplinary authority is against R.15 and violative of the principles of natural justice. The punishment originally contemplated by Ext. P7 order dismissed the appeal. These are the two orders which are sought to be quashed in this writ petition. 3. The petitioner contends that the orders are bad in law, since the procedure adopted by the disciplinary authority is against R.15 and violative of the principles of natural justice. The punishment originally contemplated by Ext. P-3 was a major punishment under the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1960, hereinafter referred to as the Rules, that of reduction in rank permanently for five years. However, the punishment imposed by Ext. P-5 order was a minor punishment under the Rules. R.15 prescribes the procedure to be followed when a major punishment is proposed. It is submitted by the learned Government Pleader that a personal hearing was not given to the petitioner since he did not ask for it in Ext. P-4 written statement. The question is, whether there is non-compliance with the requirements of R.15 and if so, does it violate the proceedings since only a minor punishment is given ultimately. 4. The petitioner relied on a Division Bench ruling of this Court reported in Koruthu v. Electricity Board 1971 K. L. T. 780, where Mathew, J., as he then was, who spoke for the Bench discussing the scope of R.15 of the rules in the context of Art.311 of the Constitution observed, that the rule in essence, embodies the content of reasonable opportunity to be provided to a person holding a civil post under the Government in a disciplinary proceeding for imposing penalties specified in Art.311 of the Constitution. Art.311 (2) also clearly indicates the fact that a delinquent in a disciplinary proceedings should be given an opportunity to be heard in person so that he can effectively take part in the proceedings. This not having been done, the final order was quashed. The learned judge was considering a more or less similar case. It was contended there that R.15 (1) uses the expression "as far as may be" and hence where the delinquent did not indicate the need for a personal hearing, absence of an enquiry in his presence cannot vitiate the finding. This contention was repelled and it was held that R.15 made it obligatory on the Enquiry Officer to conduct an enquiry, which means an enquiry after notice in his presence. 5. The learned Government Pleader contended that though Ext. This contention was repelled and it was held that R.15 made it obligatory on the Enquiry Officer to conduct an enquiry, which means an enquiry after notice in his presence. 5. The learned Government Pleader contended that though Ext. P-3 indicated a major punishment, what was ultimately awarded was only a minor punishment and therefore it was not incumbent upon the disciplinary authority to scrupulously adhere to the mandate in R.15. I am afraid, this contention cannot be accepted as correct. When once the disciplinary authority informs the delinquent of its intention to impose a major punishment, it is necessary to follow the procedure laid down for such an enquiry. If, after the final enquiry, the disciplinary authority feels that in the circumstances of the case a major punishment is not necessary, the disciplinary authority is perfectly at liberty to alter the original proposal of imposing a major penalty into a minor one. In this case, the petitioner was told of the proposal to impose a major punishment. He is entitled to a personal hearing. The final decision after the enquiry cannot govern the procedure that has to be followed. 6. The decision reported in Narayanan Nair v. State of Kerala and another 1970 K. L. J. 1069 was brought to my notice. In that case Eradi, J. has observed as follows: "It is not permissible for the disciplinary authority to shift Over from one procedure to the other at the stage of passing the final order so as to deprive the Government servant concerned of an effective opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken against him which is guaranteed to him even under R.16." The principle laid down in that case is also pressed into service in this case. The peculiar facts in that case have to be borne in mind. There, the Tribunal, the disciplinary authority, found that the delinquent was not guilty of the charges. The Tribunal initiated proceedings under R.15 (1) (a) and complied with the procedure laid down for the enquiry. The Tribunal exonerated the delinquent holding that the charges were net proved. The Government was not satisfied with the finding of the Tribunal. According to the Government, two of the charges were prima facie proved and held that it was a fit case for the imposition of the penalty of censure. The Tribunal exonerated the delinquent holding that the charges were net proved. The Government was not satisfied with the finding of the Tribunal. According to the Government, two of the charges were prima facie proved and held that it was a fit case for the imposition of the penalty of censure. However, since the petitioner had by that time retired, it was placed on record that the petitioner would have been awarded the penalty of censure if he was in service. There, the Government did not give any opportunity to the delinquent, before imposing the punishment, disagreeing with the Tribunal. Eradi, J. agreed with this contention and set aside the punishment. An appeal was filed against the judgment as Writ Appeal No. 255 of 1970, wherein Govindan Nair, J., as he then was, observed "that we express no opinion about the scope and ambit of R.15 and 16 of the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, and as to what procedure should be followed before inflicting a minor penalty after completion of an enquiry commenced under R.15," since the petitioner in that case had retired on 4th August 1967 and no action under the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules was taken and no imposition of penalty seems to be permissible under these rules read by themselves. It was observed by the Division Bench that the question will have to be decided, if it arises again, in other appropriate proceedings. 7. I feel no doubt, that in a case initiated under R.15, a minor punishment can be awarded instead of a major punishment as originally proposed if the procedure laid down in R.15 is adhered to. But action initiated under R.16, cannot ultimately end in the imposition of a major punishment. But whether a disciplinary authority can, after initiating action under R.15, change its mind subsequently, and follow the procedure under R.16 midway, and award a minor punishment, is not free from doubt. Since in this case, the procedure laid down in R.15, as construed by the Division Bench of this Court referred to above, has not been scrupulously adhered to, in so far as the petitioner was not given a personal hearing, the petitioner is entitled to succeed in this writ petition. In the result, Exts. P5 and P7 are quashed and the writ petition is allowed. There will be no order as to costs. In the result, Exts. P5 and P7 are quashed and the writ petition is allowed. There will be no order as to costs. Allowed.