JUDGMENT 1. THIS appeal arises out of a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act in which the learned Land Acquisition judge dismissed the appellants' objection against an award made by the l. A. Collector, Chinsurah. 2. THE appellants are Hematite kumar Mullick, Radhika Nath Mallick and Madan Mohan Mullick. They were the objectors before the learned L. A. Collector. 13 plots of land of different varieties, namely, sali, suna, tank, doba began and pan boroj were acquired. In most of the plots, the appellants had 16 annas interest and in one of the plots the appellants had 8 annas interest. There are also structures on some of the plots. From 16, i.e. the reference by the learned L. A. Collector under Section, 18, shows that only 10 plots were acquired but form 13a, i.e. copy of the award, shows that 13 plots of land have been acquired and the Collector has assessed value in respect of all the 13 plots. Mr. Hemanta Kumar Mitra appearing on behalf of the appellants very strongly contended that three of the acquired plots were not considered by the. L. A. Collector and no assessment was made in respect of those plots. At the first instance we1 thought that mr. Mitra was correct but such an objection was never taken before the learned L. A. Judge. On going through the original records, we are satisfied that though in Form 10 only 10 plots have been mentioned, the award shows that actually 13 plots have been acquired by the learned L. A. Collector and all these 13 plots were assessed by the L. A. Collector and compensation was awarded in respect of all the 13 plots. This being the position there is no substance in the contention raised by Mr. Mitra that three plots were left out of consideration by the learned l. A. Collector. Again it may be noted that the description and area of the plots as mentioned in the reference form is not correct, and ongoing through the award and the record of rights we find the correct position is as follows : The appellants had 16 annas interest in the following plots of which are given below : - Plots. Description. Area. 3859 Sali 18 3864 Garden 11 3872 Garden 38 3863 Garden 31 3865 Bastu 15 3868 Bastu 93 3869 Bank of tank. Description. Area. 3859 Sali 18 3864 Garden 11 3872 Garden 38 3863 Garden 31 3865 Bastu 15 3868 Bastu 93 3869 Bank of tank. 11 3871 Doba 27 3861 Sali 44 3870 Suna 42 3860 Sali 42 3866 Suna 19 3. THERE were pan boroj on plot nos. 3870, 3866; there were trees on plot Nos. 3872, 3863, 3868, 3869 and 3861, there were structures on plot No. 3865. In respect of plot No. 3862 which is doba, the appellants had 8 annas interest. The total area is. 27 and they in their share had. 13. 4. AFTER getting notice of acquisition the petitioners filed an objection under Section 9 of the L. A. Act wherein they stated that there were various fruit trees etc. yielding an income on the said lands; the list of trees was given in Schedule Ka, that on two bighas of the said land there stands a pan boroj in running condition and the same has of late been reconstructed; there are valuable timber trees at different places of the said land; that there are two temporary structures and one structure with tiled covering; that exclusing all expenses the objectors derive a minimum income of Rs. 1000/-from the properties included in the notice and the families of the objectors are maintained thereby; lastly, it is stated that the present assumed value is altogether fit to be rejected. It is seen that in the objection no specific amount was claimed by the objectors by way of compensation. The L. A. Collector valued began and pan boroj lands at Rs. 15,000/-per acre, suna land at Rs. 11,250/- per acre, sali land at Rs. 7,500/- per acre and tanks dobas at Rs. 2810/- per acre. He has, besides assessed compensation for trees at Rs. 1045-12-0 and for structures at Rs. 5935-II-9 p. It is seen from the award that a total sum of Rs. 48,664-3-3 p. was awarded to the objectors in respect of the 13 plots acquired by the L. A. Collector. 5. THE only point for consideration before the learned L. A. Judge was whether the compensation awarded is fair and adequate and if not, what should be the fair and reasonable compensation for the lands concerned. 48,664-3-3 p. was awarded to the objectors in respect of the 13 plots acquired by the L. A. Collector. 5. THE only point for consideration before the learned L. A. Judge was whether the compensation awarded is fair and adequate and if not, what should be the fair and reasonable compensation for the lands concerned. The learned Judge after considering the documents filed by the parties and also the oral evidence adduced by the objectors came to the conclusion that the assessment made by the Collector has been more than fair and that the petitioners should have had no grievance on that account. In that view of his finding, the objection raised by the objectors was dismissed. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and decree the objectors have come up before this Court in appeal. 6. MR. Hem Chandra Dhar appearing on behalf of the State takes a preliminary point and contends that the claimants are not entitled to claim any higher compensation than what has been awarded in the case in view of the fact that no specific amount as to the valuation was made by them in respect of the acquired lands in their objection under section 9 of the L.A act. That being so, according to the provision of Section 25 (2) of the Act they cannot get as compensation any amount in excess of what has been awarded by the Collector. Mr. Mitra submits in reply that after getting notice of the acquisition the claimants submitted their claim under section 9 (2) which is Ext. A in. this case. It is true that no specific amount was claimed by them as regards compensation but it was stated in Ext. A that the present assumed value is altogether fit to be rejected. In stating so, they gave a detail of their income out of the properties going to be acquired. This being the position Mr. Mitra submits that provision of Section 25 (2) of the Act should not stand in the way. It is seen from the judgment of the learned Judge that this point was urged by the learned Government pleader before him. The learned Judge, noted the argument at length in his judgment but had not come to any finding on the said point. It is seen from the judgment of the learned Judge that this point was urged by the learned Government pleader before him. The learned Judge, noted the argument at length in his judgment but had not come to any finding on the said point. He, however, allowed the claimants to adduce oral and documentary evidence and on the evidence on record decided all the objections raised by the claimants. Section 25 reads as follows: - (1) When the applicant has made a claim to compensation, pursuant to any notice given under Section 9, the amount awarded to him by the Court shall not exceed the amount so claimed or be less than the amount awarded by the collector under Section 11. 2) When the applicant has refused to make such claim has omitted without sufficient reason (to be allowed by the judge) to make such claim, the amount awarded by the Court shall in no case exceed the amount awarded by the collector. 3) When the applicant has omitted for a sufficient reason (to be allowed by the Judge) to make such claim, the amount awarded to him by the Court shall not be less than, and may exceed, the amount awarded by the Collector. The Section is very clear to say that when the applicant makes claim to compensation, the Court cannot allow an amount in excess of the amount so claimed. In this case no specific amount has been claimed and that being so, it is necessary to find whether in this case the applicants can get an amount in excess of what has been awarded by the Collector. The Section also lays down "where the claimant refused to make any claim or omits to make any claim without sufficient reason, the amount awarded by the Court cannot exceed the amount awarded by the collector." But when the omission is for a sufficient reason and the Judge finds so, the amount awarded to him by the Court may exceed the amount awarded by the Collector. On this point several decisions have been referred to by the learned Advocates. On this point several decisions have been referred to by the learned Advocates. In (Secretary of State for India v. Gobind lal Bysak and another 12 C.W.N. 263) it has been held "where no claim pursuant to a notice under Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act was made by a party interested to make a claim, the l. A. Judge under Sub-section (2) had no power to make an award for an amount exceeding that awarded by the Collector unless the claimant satisfied him that he had sufficient reason for refraining from making his claim in due time." In (Gyanendra Nath Pal v. Secretary of State for India 25 C. W. N. 71), notice under section 9 was served on the Appellant directing him to appear before the deputy Collector on a certain date to make a statement and to give particulars of his claims. He appeared before the deputy Collector on that date and probably made some verbal statements. On the following day he filed a petition stating his claim, and about a month afterwards the award was made. It was held "that the petition filed on the following day should be regarded as a sufficient compliance with the notice under Section 9 of the Act or alternatively should be regarded as a sufficient reason for allowing the appellant to come in under Clause (3) of section 25". In this case, the case reported in 12 C.W.N. 1263 was distinguished. In (Chigurupati Subbanna v. District labour Officer, East Godavari A.I.R. 1930 madras 618) it has been laid down 'what the Act does require is that there should be a specific claim namely a claim, which states in rupees the value the claimant places upon his property and where there has been no such claim, the provisions of Section 9 (2) cannot be said to have been complied with. "In another Madras Case reported in A.I.R. 1653 Madras 943 (V.S. Subramania Chettiar and another v. State of Madras) the claimant wanted to postpone making claim, in hope that Government would cancel notification. The Acquisition Officer did not inform him that failure to state the amount of the claim would, under the provisions of the Act, disentitle him from having the amount of the award raised in any subsequent reference before the Court. The claimant was not aware of provisions of the Act. The Acquisition Officer did not inform him that failure to state the amount of the claim would, under the provisions of the Act, disentitle him from having the amount of the award raised in any subsequent reference before the Court. The claimant was not aware of provisions of the Act. It was held that the penal provisions of section 25 (2) should not be strictly applied. "In (Secretary of State v. F. E. Dinshaw A. I. R, 1933 Sind 21), the district Judge failed to consider if failure of claimant to specify amount of claim was with or without sufficient cause. It was held that the Appellate Court can consider that question and condone omission for sufficient grounds. In this case it was further held "that Section 9 does not require claimant to specify amount of compensation claimed in respect of each sub-head of section 23". In (State of Bihar v. Anant Singh A.I.R. 1964 Patna 83) it has been laid down "before Section 25 (1) can be restored to, it must be proved to the satisfaction of the Court, that the applicants had made no claim to compensation after valid notices under section 9 had been given to them. It must be strictly proved that the applicants had refused to make any claim or had omitted to make any claim before the collector pursuant to any notice given under Section 9. It is not enough to prove that statements of claim in writing had not been filed before the collector; what is to be proved under section 25 (1) is that the applicants had not made claims to compensation and not that the applicants had not filed statements in writing before the collector. There is no obligation on the interested person to file statements in writing unless they are required to do so as contemplated by Section 9 (2). It was held that the mere fact that they may not have made any statement in writing is not sufficient to uphold the contention base on Section 25 of the act, unless there is evidence to show that the applicants had not made any oral claim before the Collector and there is sufficient evidence to prove that valid notice had been served up on them under Section 9 of the Act. " 7. IN the present case it appears from Ext. " 7. IN the present case it appears from Ext. A that the claimants filed a written objection according to the provisions of Section 9 (2) As has already been indicated, it is true that they did not specify the amount which they claimed, but nevertheless they objected to the proposed valuation made by the Collector and clearly stated that the present assumed value is altogether fit to be rejected. The objection was filed on 15th May, 1956. The Collector took notice of this objection and passed an order on 23.5.1956 to the effect that enquiry will be made on 28, May at the locality between 8 and 9 a. m. and it was directed that the lawyer should be informed. The collector, however, did not ask the claimants to make a specific claim regarding the compensation. The learned l. A. Judge to whom the reference was made and who decided at length all the objections raised by the claimants did not throw away the reference on the ground that the petitioners are not entitled to claim any amount in excess of what has been awarded by the collector. It appears that though the objection was raised by the Government pleader, the Learned L. A. Judge proceeded according to the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 25 and thought that though no specific claim was made, there was sufficient reason for not so making. As has been observed in A.I.R. 1930 Sindh 21 that "it is the duty of the District Judge as to whether the failure of the claimant to specify the amount of his claim was with or without sufficient cause and whether he would be prepared to condone such omission. Where the District Judge fails to apply his mind to the consideration of the question as to whether the failure of the claimant to specify the amount of his claim was with or without sufficient cause and whether he would be prepared to condone such omission the appellants court can consider that question and condone the mission provided that there are sufficient grounds. " 8. " 8. FROM the judicial decisions referred to above we find that the real position is that where the claimant flailed to specify the amount of his claim before the L. A. Officer in the belief that he was not required to do so, such belief would indubitably afford a sufficient ground for condonation and the L. A. Officer dealt with the claim on the materials placed before him without demur and without requiring the claimant to make the claim more specific. In the present case a written objection was filed that objection was taken into consideration and enquiry was ordered to be made and the claimants were not asked to specify their claims. It also appears that though the bar of sec. 25 (2) was pleaded on behalf of the Government before the learned L. A. Judge the learned L. A. Judge did not come to any finding and allowed the claimants to lead evidence and considered all the objections on evidence on record. This being the position, we are of the opinion that in this case as an objection has been made with regard to the proposed valuation, simply because no specific claim has been made, Section 25 (2) cannot stand in the way. Even if it be held that the claimants were bound to make a specific claim then also in the circumstances of the case it must be found that there were sufficient reasons for not making a specific claim. With regard to the Collector's assessment Mr. Mitra in the first place submits that the learned Judge's finding with regard to the valuation of the structure is based on misappreciation of evidence. The learned Judge finds "according to the evidence of P. W 5 himself the boroj structures together with the value of the pan leaves and plants therein should have been valued at about Rs. 4,000/- The assessment of Rs. 5,935-11-9 P. on account of structures presumed to include the value of the three rooms and that of the boroj structures with the pan leaves and plants therein and the compensation assessed in this regard is in conformity with the claim of P.W.5 as put forward in his evidence "P.W.5 states that there were three rooms on the land. He claims Rs. 2,000/- as compensation for the same. There are pan borojes on the land. He claims Rs. 2,000/- as compensation for the same. There are pan borojes on the land. There was structure on the land for the borojes and these cost about Rs. 3,000/- per bigha including the price of the pan leaves and plants. We find from the documents that on plot No. 3870 there was pan boroj and the area is. 19. So the total area is. 61. So if the evidence of P.W.5 is to be accepted then the price of pan Borojes would be near about rs. 6,000/ -. Adding to it Rs. 2,000/- for the structures it makes a total of about rs. 8,000/- So it cannot be said that assessment of Rs. 5,935-11-9 P. on account of 3 rooms and that of the boroj structures with the pan leaves and plants is in accordance with the petitioners' claim itself. We are of the opinion that the fair assessment for the structures and pan borojes (including the structures in them) should be rs. 7,500/ -. 9. MR. Mitra then submits that so far as compensation with regard to the trees are concerned, the Collector has not considered that there was considerable number of valuable fruit bearing trees and only assessed a sum of rs. 1,045-12-0 P. The learned Judge disposed of the matter simply by saying that "the objection is that these (trees) were not taken into consideration at the time of calculating the price due to them. The award shows a sum of Rs. 1,045-12-0 P. assessed on account of the trees and as such the objection that these were not taken notice of in-calculating the price is baseless. " In the objection to the petition under section 9 of the L. A. Act, a list of the trees has been made an Annexure to the said petition. The petitioners have examined P. W. 3 Gopinath Mondal who was the mali of the garden under the petitioners. In his evidence he states that there were 25/30 cocoanut trees, 7/8 mango trees, 10/12 aricanut trees, 10 lemon trees, 50/55 papai plants, two palm trees, 10 date trees, one jamrul tree, one jackfruit tree, one guava tree and a bababa grove comprising of 2,000 plants. All the trees used to bear fruits. It is true that in cross-examination he states that he never counted the trees and plants. He lived in the thatched shed. All the trees used to bear fruits. It is true that in cross-examination he states that he never counted the trees and plants. He lived in the thatched shed. The trees and plants were in the garden at the time the possession of garden was delivered. P. W. 5 Radhika Nath Mallik, one of the petitioners, also gives a list of the various trees. He also tries to give an approximate idea about the price of the various trees. It is true that there are some discrepancies with regad to the number of trees as given by P. W. s 3 and 5 but those discrepancies are minor. No suggestion was put to either of the witnesses to the effect that the number of trees as mentioned by them were not there. In this connection it is worth mentioning that the learned l. A. Collector chose not to examine any witness to show that actual number of trees that were on the land at the relevant time. This being the position it must be found that the assessment of Rs, 1,045-12-0 P. as price of trees is most in adequate and we think that the learned L. A. Collector ought to have assessed Rs. 2,000/- as price of trees. 10. THE third objection raised by mr. Mitra is with regard to the compensation for fishes which are alleged to have been in the tank at the time of the acquisition. The L.A. Collector did not assess any compensation in respect of fishes in the tank and the learned Judge found that the learned L. A. Collector was right in not assessing any compensation as there is no evidence on record to show that the petitioners were not entitled to any compensation in this respect. On this point also no evidence was adduced by the learned L. A. Collector as to the real position with regard to the fishes In the tank at the time of acquisition. The petitioners have examined gopinath Patra who is P.W.2. It is his evidence that he used to rear fish and used to catch the same. The jheel used to yield about 30 mds. of fish a year. He managed the tanks for 7/8 years because his father used to do so The babus used to get Rs. 1,000/- as net profit per annum from the jheel and the other tank. The jheel used to yield about 30 mds. of fish a year. He managed the tanks for 7/8 years because his father used to do so The babus used to get Rs. 1,000/- as net profit per annum from the jheel and the other tank. P. W. 5 states that there were two tanks in the garden and there were about 30/40 mds. of fish therein at the time of taking possession by the o. P. The fish was worth Rs. 3,000/-to Rs. 3,500/ -. He got notice of the possession but he could not catch the fish as it was the rainy season and the tanks were overfull. Considering the facts that there is no evidence on the side of the L. A. Collector and there is satisfactory evidence on the side of the objectors, the learned Judge was not correct to say that no compensation should have been assessed for the fishes. Considering the facts and circumstances we assess Rs. l,500/- for fishes. Fourthly Mr. Mitra submits that the L. A. Collector has awarded the value of sali lands at Rs. 7,500/- per acre and that of tank and doba at Rs. 2,810/-per acre. Mr. Mitra contends that this valuation is without any basis and as a general rule the tanks and dobas are always valued at half the rate of solid land. In this connection Mr. Mitra refers to a recent decision of this High court reported in A.I.R. 1972 Calcutta 333 (State of West Bengal v. Ganesh chandra Mitra and others ). In paragraph 15 Their Lordships held "it appears from Park's Principles and practice of valuations (4th edition page 72) that the Courts have adopted during the past few years a method of valuing tanks at one-half the value of solid land. Although the learned author has termed this method as a Rule of thumb method, in our opinion, in the absence of proper materials enabling the Court to determine the value of the tank in a logical and scientific manner, it will not be unreasonable for the Court to adopt this method. "We are also of the opinion that the tanks and dobas in this case should be valued at half the value of sali lands. That being so, according to the Collector's own valuation, the tanks and dobas ought to have been valued at the rate of Rs. 3,750/-per acre. 11. "We are also of the opinion that the tanks and dobas in this case should be valued at half the value of sali lands. That being so, according to the Collector's own valuation, the tanks and dobas ought to have been valued at the rate of Rs. 3,750/-per acre. 11. NEXT we come to the objection raised by Mr. Mitra with regard to the land as made by the Collector. Mr. Mitra submits that in the first place, the learned Judge was wrong to reject the sale deeds filed on behalf of the claimants and to accept most of the sale deeds filed by on behalf of the L.A. Collector. We have gone through all the sale deeds and the evidence adduced on this point by the witnesses examined by the claimants. We have also considered the reasonings offered by the learned L.A. Judge in not accepting the sale deeds filed on behalf of the claimants. We find that the learned L.A. Judge was quite correct in not accepting the price of lands which have been sold by the different sale deeds, ext. 1 series. He rightly excluded ext. B (1), he was also right in accepting Exts. B, B2 and B3 as the basis for ascertaining the market value of the lands covered thereby at the relevant time. Mr. Mitra in this connection also raises an objection that the learned l. A. Judge was wrong in placing reliance upon Ext. D, which is a judgment passed by the learned L.A. Judge, hooghly. It appears from Ext. D that it is a judgment passed by this very court in a reference which arose out of the same Land Acquisition Case no. V-2 of 1956-57 out of which the present reference has arisen. That reference was in respect of valuation of certain plots of land which are almost contiguous to those covered by the present reference and the judgment shows that the valuation was made by the collector was accepted by the Court as fair and adequate. Mr. Mitra contends that a judgment not inter parties is not admissible in evidence. On this point Mr. Mitra very much relies on a decision reported in A.I.R. 1960 Bombay 78 (Special Land Acquisition Officer, bombay v. Lakhamsi Ghelabhai). It is a decision of Shelat, J. as his lordship then was. Mr. Mitra contends that a judgment not inter parties is not admissible in evidence. On this point Mr. Mitra very much relies on a decision reported in A.I.R. 1960 Bombay 78 (Special Land Acquisition Officer, bombay v. Lakhamsi Ghelabhai). It is a decision of Shelat, J. as his lordship then was. His Lordship held that "a judgment not inter parties in land acquisition reference and relating to land situate near the land in question is not admissible in evidence either as an instance or one from which the market value of the land in question can be inferred or deduced. Such a judgment cannot obviously fall under sections 40 to 43 or under Section 11 or Section 13 of the Evidence Act. "His lordship dissented from the two division Bench judgments reported in A.I.R. 1925 Cal. 481 and A.I.R. 1927 Cal. 874. Their Lordships of the division Bench of the Calcutta High court in both the cases relied on a privy Council decision reported in I.L.R. 36 Cal. 967. Shelat J. explained the reasoning of the said decisions and was of the opinion that the Privy council case as no authority relying on which Their Lordships of the Division bench of the Calcutta High Court could hold otherwise. In A.I.R. 1925 calcutta 481 (Madan Mohan and another v. Secretary of State) Newbould and Ghose, JJ. held "in assessing the market value of a piece of land the price paid in other transactions relating to land in the neighborhood must be of some value. What its value is, it is for the Court of fact to determine; but we hold that it cannot be rejected as inadmissible on the ground given in the judgment of the learned President. For the view we take we have the authority of the judicial Committee of the Privy council in the case of Secretary of State v. Indian General Steam Navigation, and railway Co. (36 Cal. 967). In that case certain judgments of the High court in other proceedings were relied on by the claimant. It was argued on behalf of the appellant to the judicial Committee that these judgments were not evidence of the value of the land in dispute. Their lordships, after stating in their judgment that the High Court in a very careful judgment had revised the earlier awards, dismissed the appeal, holding that no question of principle was involved in it. It was argued on behalf of the appellant to the judicial Committee that these judgments were not evidence of the value of the land in dispute. Their lordships, after stating in their judgment that the High Court in a very careful judgment had revised the earlier awards, dismissed the appeal, holding that no question of principle was involved in it. There cannot be a clearer authority that previous decisions in land acquisition cases are relevant in a subsequent case where the market value of lands in the same neighborhood is in issue. In A.I.R. 1927 calcutta 874 (Secretary of State v. Amulya charan Banerjee and others) B.B. Ghose and Roy, JJ. relying on the same Privy Council case held "prices which are given by Collector to people whose lands are acquired and who accept them, are valuable evidence in ascertaining the market value of the property in suit. " we have gone through the Privy council decision and do not agree with shelat, J. that the Privy Council decision referred to above does not lay down the principle that the judgment not inter parties and relating to other lands is not admissible in evidence either as an instance of one from which the market value of the property in. question can be deducted or inferred. We do not therefore place any reliance on the view taken by Shelat, J. in A.I.R. 1960 Bombay 78 in preference to the two Division Bench Judgments of this Court, and that being so, we negative the contention raised by Mr. Mitra. In this connection it may be noted that the learned Judge did not arrive at his conclusion solely on this single document, Ext. D, but along with all other oral and documentary evidence he considered this as another item of evidence which he was perfectly within his rights to do. 12. IN the result, the appeal is allowed on contest with costs. We assess the value of structures at Rs. 7,500/-; we assess Rs. 2,000/- for trees; we assess Rs. 1,500/- for fishes ; we also find that the tanks and dobas should be valued at the rate of Rs. 3,700/- per acre. The trial Court is directed to pass a decree in accordance with the findings made above. The hearing fee being assessed at 30 gold mohurs. Let the records be sent down immediately.