JUDGMENT 1. THE petitioner is a Director-Secretary of the contai Co-operative Bank Limited (hereinafter referred to as the Bank). The Bank is managed by a Board of 9 directors. The election of l/3rd members of the Board was due to be held on November 12, 1972. On November 9, 1972 a suit being Title Suit No. 383 of 1972 was instituted by one Manindra nath Bisui against the Bank in the first Court of Munsif at Contai, inter alia, for a declaration of his right to contest in the election of members of the Managing Committee of the Bank. On the prayer of the plaintiff, a temporary injunction was granted by the learned Munsif restraining the Bank from holding the election on November 12, 1972 or on any subsequent date. The petitioner received a letter from the respondent No. 1, the Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies, midnapore III, Contai intimating him that in terms of the Government notification dated May 25, 1973, the Managing Committee of the Bank had been superseded and the respondent No. 3 was appointed as administrator under proviso to section 26 (1) of the Bengal Cooperative Societies Act, 1940 as amended by the Amendment Act of 1973. Further, it was stated in the said letter that the respondent No. 1 had assumed charge of the Bank from the afternoon of May 31, 1973. A copy of the notification has been annexed to the petition out of which this Rules arises and marked with the letter 'e'. The notification inter alia states as follows: - And whereas the members of the managing committee of the said bank, in contravention of the mandatory provisions of by-laws 25 (3), have been advancing loans to persons exceeding the maximum credit limits without maintaining the share holding ratio of 1 to 10 to the loanee, (to give an example)have advanced Rs. 30,000 to Shri D.K. Mondal, a Director of the said bank on the said bank on the 19th, June, 1972 and have further advance to the said shri D.K. Mondal along with other directors of the Cine and Supply Corporation private Limited a loan amounting to Rs. 60,000 on the 19th June 1972; and whereas the members of the managing committee of the said bank advanced to the Cine and supply Corporation Private Limited a loan of rs. 60,000 on the 19th June 1972; and whereas the members of the managing committee of the said bank advanced to the Cine and supply Corporation Private Limited a loan of rs. 60,000 on the 19th June 1972, against hypothecation of cinema properties and equipments of the said Corporation (two of the Directors of the said Corporation being the Directors of the said bank), repayable in 35 monthly instalments on and from July 1972, and that the said instalments have begun falling due without any repayment since October 1972; and whereas the members of the managing committee of the said bank have been, in spite of shortfall of liquid assets, persistently granting loans to interested parties including Directors of the said bank-sometimes to the extent of even rupees two lakhs, ignoring the maximum credit limit previously fixed by the Board and violating section 14 of the Banking Regulations Act, 1949; and whereas the members of the managing committee of the said bank have been granting loans and advances to defaulters without getting their applications properly processed and adequately checked, that such loans are being sanctioned only to satisfy the borrowers' interest and not the interest of the said bank and that thus the over dues of the said bank have been gradually mounting up without any effective steps being taken to reduce the same; and whereas the members of the managing committee of the said bank without reasonable security of the loan applications and without assessing the paying capacity of the applicant borrowers have been advancing loans to different businesses in which some of the Directors of the said bank themselves are involved; and whereas the members of the managing committee of the said bank have not taken any legal action against a large number of defaulting members, even though their outstanding loans have been long over-due for more than three years; and whereas during 1970-71, the elected honorary Secretary of the said bank had allowed extension or time for repayment of loan totaling rs. 24,000 without any specific authority vested in him for the said purpose under the by-laws and without any subsequent ratification of the same by the members of the managing committee of the said bank; and whereas the members of the managing committee of the said bank have been advancing loans to the Directors of the said bank to enable them to repay their outstanding earlier loans and thus to save them from being disqualified to remain as members of the managing committee for their default; and whereas on account of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the governor is of opinion- (1) that the managing committee of the said bank has- (a) persistently made defaults and has been greatly negligent in the performance of its duties imposed on it by the Bengal Co-operative Societies act, 1940 and the rules and by-laws made there under, and (b) committed acts which are prejudicial to the interest of the said bank, and (c) that immediate dissolution of the said bank is essential in the interest of the said bank and the cooperative movement as a whole; now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 26 of the bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1940, the Governor is pleased hereby- (a) to dissolve, with immediate effect, the managing committee of the contai Co-operative Bank Limited at contai, in the district of Midnapore, the members of which shall forthwith vacate their offices, (b) to appoint the Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies, midnapore III Range, as Administrator of the said Bank, in addition to his own duties, for one year with effect on and from the date of this order to manage the affairs of the said bank, and (c) to direct that the said Administrator shall exercise all the powers and perform all the duties of the managing committee of the said bank as provided in the said Act and the rules and bylaws made there under. 2. BY the said notification, the Managing Committee of the Bank has been dissolved by the State Government in exercise of its power conferred by the proviso to section 26 (1) of the act. The petitioner has challenged the notification as illegal, inoperative and void and has prayed for a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the said notification. BY the said notification, the Managing Committee of the Bank has been dissolved by the State Government in exercise of its power conferred by the proviso to section 26 (1) of the act. The petitioner has challenged the notification as illegal, inoperative and void and has prayed for a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the said notification. The petitioner has also prayed for a writ in the nature of quo warranto against the appointment of and usurpation of office of the Administrator by the respondent No. 1. Before considering the contentions made on behalf of the petitioner, it is necessary to refer to section 26 (1)of the Act which runs as follows :- "26. The petitioner has also prayed for a writ in the nature of quo warranto against the appointment of and usurpation of office of the Administrator by the respondent No. 1. Before considering the contentions made on behalf of the petitioner, it is necessary to refer to section 26 (1)of the Act which runs as follows :- "26. (1)-If, in the opinion of the registrar"- (a) the managing committee of any co-operative society- (i) has persistently made defaults, or has been grossly negligent, in the performance of the duties imposed on it by this Act or the rules or by-laws, or (ii) has committed any act which is prejudicial to the interest of such society or other co-operative societies, or (iii) has willfully disobeyed or willfully failed to comply with any lawful order or direction issued by the State government or the Registrar; or (b) the affairs and business of a cooperative society have, due to persistent default or negligence in the performance of duties on the part of the members of the managing committee or a section thereof; or otherwise, come to a stand-still, the Registrar may, after service of a notice upon such committee and giving such committee an opportunity of being heard, by an order in writing stating reasons therefore, dissolve such committee, the members of which shall forthwith vacate their offices and the registrar shall appoint one or mere administrators to manage the affairs of such society for such period not exceeding two years at a time as may be specified in the order and may also by an order in writing extend the period, so, however, that the total period shall not exceed five years; provided that if, on receipt of a report from the Registrar, the State government is of opinion that in view of one or more of the aforesaid circumstances immediate dissolution of the managing committee of a co-operative society is essential in the interest of such society or the co-operative movement in general, the State Government may, without giving such committee any notice, by notification in the Official gazette, giving reasons therefore, dissolve such managing committee, the members of which shall forthwith vacate their offices, and the State Government shall appoint one or more administrators to manage the affairs of such society for such period not exceeding two years at a time as may be specified in the order and may also by order extend the period, so, however, that the total period shall not exceed five years; provided further that no such step towards immediate dissolution of any central bank or co-operative land mortgage bank, or the West Bengal central co-operative land mortgage bank or the west Bengal State co-operative bonk shall be taken by the State Government without consultation with the Reserve bank. " 3. MR. Datta Majumdar, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner has strenuously urged that before the order of supersession was passed by the State Government no inquiry having been made by the Registrar under sub-section (1), and the government having made the notification on the report of the Registrar, the notification is illegal and void. He submits that under sub-section (1), the registrar may, after service of a notice upon the Committee and giving such committee an opportunity of being heard, by an order in writing stating reasons therefore, dissolve he Committee or he may forward a report for the consideration of the state Government under the proviso and that, if the State government is of the opinion that the committee should be dissolved, it will then dissolve the Committee. It is contended that the Registrar cannot submit a report to the State Government without complying with the procedure laid down in sub-Section (1) and the State Government cannot act under the proviso of any such report of the Registrar. In the instant case, the Registrar has not proceeded in accordance with sub-section (1) and as such the notification or the order of supersession in inoperative and void. The question, therefore, is whether the proviso includes within it by necessary implication the procedure laid down in sub-section (1) for the purpose of dissolving the Managing Committee of a co-operative Society by the State Government. 4. UNDER sub-section (1), the Registrar has been conferred with the power of dissolving the Managing Committee of a Co-operative Society. It has been specifically provided that before dissolving the Managing Committee and appointing one or more Administrators to manage the affairs of a Co-operative society, the Registrar will have to serve a notice upon the Committee and give such committee an opportunity of being heard. If after hearing the Managing Committee, the Registrar is of the view that such committee should be dissolved, he will pass an order accordingly giving reasons therefore. On the other hand if he is of the opinion that the Committee need not be dissolved he will not pass any order dissolving the Managing Committee. I am not impressed with the contentions made on behalf of the petitioner. On the other hand if he is of the opinion that the Committee need not be dissolved he will not pass any order dissolving the Managing Committee. I am not impressed with the contentions made on behalf of the petitioner. Sub-section (1) does not provide nor does it contemplate that after holding an inquiry, the Registrar will prepare a report and submit the same for the consideration of the State Government for the exercise of its power under the proviso. The proviso also does not provide for any such procedure to be adopted by the registrar. When the Registrar holds an inquiry under sub-section (1) it is entirely for him to decide whether the committee should be dissolved or not. It may be that under the proviso the state Government has to act on the report of the Registrar, but it cannot be said that such a report has to be made by the Registrar in accordance with the procedure laid down by the provisions of sub-section (1). It is true that the proviso is a part of subsection (1). The substantive part of sub-section (1) confers the power of dissolution of the Managing Committee on the Registrar and the proviso confers the power on the state Government. The respective powers are to be exercised in certain manners which have been expressly laid down. In such circumstances, it is difficult to read into the provisions something which is not there either expressly or by necessary implication. I am, therefore, unable to accept the said contentions of mr. Datta Majumdar. It is next contended that in dissolving the Managing Committee under the proviso the State Government is to act judicially or quasi judicially in accordance with the principles of natural justice. This contention requires some consideration. I am, therefore, unable to accept the said contentions of mr. Datta Majumdar. It is next contended that in dissolving the Managing Committee under the proviso the State Government is to act judicially or quasi judicially in accordance with the principles of natural justice. This contention requires some consideration. In the decision of the Supreme Court in Province of bombay v. Khusaldas (1950) S.C.R. 621, Das, J. (as he then was) has laid down the following principles for the purpose of deciding whether an authority is a quasi judicial authority and whether he is required to proceed judicially- (i) If a statute empowers an authority, not being a Court in the ordinary sense, to decide disputes arising out of a claim made by one party under the statute which claim is opposed by another party and to determine the respective rights of the contesting parties who are opposed to each other, there is a Us and prima facie and in the absence of anything in the statute to the contrary it is the duty of the authority to act judicially and the decision of the authority is a quasi judicial act; (ii) If a statutory authority has power to do any act which will prejudicially affect the subject, then, although there are not two parties apart from the authority and the contest is between the authority proposing to do the act and the subject opposing it, the final determination of the authority will yet be a quasi judicial act provided the authority is required by the statute to act judicially. 5. A question naturally arises whether the provisions of the proviso require the Registrar and the State government to act judicially. In my opinion, the proviso does not either expressly or by necessary implication cast any duty upon them to act judicially before any order for dissolution of the Managing Committee of a Cooperative Society is passed by the State government. It has been expressly provided in the proviso that the State government may dissolve the Managing Committee without giving such committee any notice. This indicates that the State Government is not to proceed judicially. It has been expressly provided in the proviso that the State government may dissolve the Managing Committee without giving such committee any notice. This indicates that the State Government is not to proceed judicially. It has to form an opinion as to the existence of one or more of the circumstances mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) on the report of the Registrar as a preliminary step to the exercise of its power of dissolution of the Managing Committee under the proviso. The proviso does not require the State Government to form an opinion in a judicial manner. The same principle as laid down by the Supreme Court in the State of Madras v. C.P. Sarathy and another A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 53, in connection with the making of an order by the State Government under section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 also applies to the instant case. It has been observed by the Supreme court that in making a reference under section 10 (1) the Government is doing an administrative act and that became it has to form an opinion as to the factual existence of an industrial dispute as a preliminary step to the discharge of its function does not make it any the less administrative in character. In my opinion, therefore, the order of dissolution which is passed by the state Government under the proviso is an administrative order and not a quasi judicial order. 6. IN Radheshyam Kare and another v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and others A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 107, the question before the Supreme Court was whether section 53a of the C.P. and berar Municipalities Act, 1922 required the State government to act judicially. Section 53a (1) is as follows :- "if a committee is not competent to perform the duties imposed on it or undertaken by it by or under this Act or any other enactment for the time being in force and the State Government considers that a general improvement in the administration of the municipality is likely to be secured by the appointment of a servant of the government as the executive officer of the committee, the State Government may, by an order stating the reasons therefore published in the Gazette, appoint such servant as the executive officer of the committee for such period not exceeding eighteen months may be specified in such order". It was held by the majority of the learned Judges of the Supreme Court that the action taken by the State Government under section 53a wan not a judicial or a quasi judicial act but was an administrative act. It was further held that the requirement that the State Government must give reasons for the order did not necessarily require it to record a judgment judicially arrived at. The provisions of section 53a (1) referred to above are somewhat similar to the provisions of the proviso to section 26 (1). The Allahabad High Court in iqbal Ahmed v. State of U.P. and others A.I.R. 1962 Allahabad 264 has held that the State Government, while acting under section 36 (1) of the U.P. Town areas Act, 1914 for the purpose of superseding a town area committee only discharges administrative duties and does not perform any judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The provisions of section 36 (1) of U.P. Town Areas Act, 1914 are similar to section 53a (1) of the C.P. and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922. In Messrs. Tinsukia Development corporation Ltd. v. State of Assam and another A.I.R. 1961 Assam 133, a Full bench of the Assam High Court has held that the State Government while making a declaration under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act does not act in any quasi judicial capacity, for there is no duty cast upon the Government under the provisions of the said act or any rules framed there under to act judicially. A similar view has been expressed by the Gujarat High Court in patel Gandalal Somnath and others v. State of Gujarat A.I.R. 1963 Gujarat 50. The Supreme Court also in Jayantilal amratlal Shodhan v. F.N. Rana and others A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 648 has laid down that the report of the Collector under section 5a of the Land Acquisition Act is an administrative report, relying upon which the Government makes its decision under section 6 of the said Act whether or not to notify the land for acquisition; that the decision that any particular land is needed for a public purpose is an administrative decision and that it is for the purpose of arriving at that decision that the Act requires that certain inquiries be made. Lastly, I may refer to a decision of the allahabad High Court in Chhote Lal and others v. State of U.P. I.L.R. (1960) 2 Allahabad 539. Lastly, I may refer to a decision of the allahabad High Court in Chhote Lal and others v. State of U.P. I.L.R. (1960) 2 Allahabad 539. In that case, the state Government passed an order of supersession of the Municipal Board of hapur under section 30 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916. It has been held that the order of the State Government is an administrative order and not a judicial or a quasi judicial one. The decisions referred to above supports the view taken by me that the order of the State Government under the proviso to section 26 (1) of the Act is an administrative order and that no duty is cast upon the State Government to act judicially or quasi judicially. 7. I may now consider the contention of the petitioner that in making an order under the proviso the State Government has acted in violation of the rules of natural justice. Strictly speaking the question as to whether an executive authority should follow the rules of natural justice in passing an administrative order does not arise but as observed by S.R. Das J. in Radeshyam's case referred to above, even in an administrative action, the executive authority has to observe the ordinary rules of fair play. In a later decision of the supreme Court in A.K. Kraipak and others v. Union of India and other's A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 150, Hegde J. observed as follows : - "in an welfare state like ours it is inevitable that the jurisdiction of the administrative bodies is increasing at a rapid rate. The concept of rule of law would lose its validity if the instrumentality of the State are not charged with the duty of discharging their functions in a fair and just manner. The requirement of acting judicially in essence is nothing but a requirement to act justly and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously." Hegde, J. has referred to the following observations of the Supreme Court in. a previous decision in Suresh Koshy george v. University of Kerala A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 198-"the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. The requirement of acting judicially in essence is nothing but a requirement to act justly and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously." Hegde, J. has referred to the following observations of the Supreme Court in. a previous decision in Suresh Koshy george v. University of Kerala A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 198-"the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice should comply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the inquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case "the same principle has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in a subsequent decision in M/s. Shree krishna Gyamodaya Sugar Limited v, the State of Bihar and others A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 2042. 8. NOW we are to see whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case the State Government has violated any rule of natural justice. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the order of dissolution of the managing Committee has been passed by the State Government behind the back of the Managing Committee without giving it a reasonable opportunity of being heard. It has been already found that in making an order under the proviso the State Government is not required to act judicially. At the same time, as laid down by the Supreme Court it has to be seen whether the State Government has observed the rules of fair play and discharged its functions in a fair and just manner. If it is found that the State Government has acted justly and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously, in that case it must be held that there has been no violation of the rules of natural justice even though the Managing Committee was not given a hearing or called upon to show cause before the order dissolving the Managing Committee was passed. The report on the basis of which the impugned notification was made is a report of inspection of the bank held by the Registrar under section 82 of the Act. The report on the basis of which the impugned notification was made is a report of inspection of the bank held by the Registrar under section 82 of the Act. A copy of the report has been annexed to the affidavit-in-opposition of the respondents nos. 1, 2 and 3 and marked with the letter 'e'. It appears from the report that the Registrar held the inspection on four different dates and concluded the same on March 29, 1973. The manager and Senior staff of the Bank extended their help to the Registrar in conducting the inspection. The petitioner who was the Secretary of the managing Committee of the Bank was present on one day only i.e., on March 28, 1973. It is apparent from the report that the Registrar collected the facts and figures included in his report from the books, documents and papers maintained by the Bank which were supplied to him by the officers of the bank to the knowledge of the petitioner who, as aforesaid, was present on march 28, 1973 during the inspection. The inspection which was made by the registrar was an official inspection in. accordance with the provisions of the statute. 9. THE report reveals a deplorable state of affairs of the Bank caused due to willful and motivated acts of the managing Committee which is prejudicial to the interest of the Bank. Instances of such acts have been mentioned in the impugned notification, a portion of which has been quoted above. In paragraph 25 of the petition out of which this Rule arises, it has been alleged inter-alia that the contents of the notification palpably indulges in vague, sweeping and reckless general allegations, never brought to the knowledge of the petitioner or the managing Committee, which are obviously motivated, manufactured and wholly incorrect without disclosing any particulars, materials and essentials, with the curious design to seek to discredit the petitioner and the Managing committee and significantly enough to condemn them unheard against all principles of natural justice. These allegations made in paragraph 25 are untrue on the face of the records. In the notification, facts have been stated with particulars. To give one example, in the notification it has been stated that in contravention of the mandatory provisions of by-laws 25 (3), the members of the Managing Committee have advanced Rs. These allegations made in paragraph 25 are untrue on the face of the records. In the notification, facts have been stated with particulars. To give one example, in the notification it has been stated that in contravention of the mandatory provisions of by-laws 25 (3), the members of the Managing Committee have advanced Rs. 30,000/- to Shri D. K. Mondal, a Director of the Bank on June 19, 1972, and have further advanced to the said D. K. Mondal along with other directors of the Cine and Supply Corporation Private Limited a loan amounting to Rs. 60,000. 00 on June 19, 1972. Further, the loan of Rs. 60,000. 00 advanced to the said Corporation on june 19, 1972 against hypothecation of cinema properties and equipments of the said Corporation two of the Directors of which being the Directors of the Bank, was repayable by 35 instalments on and from July 1972, but there had been no repayment since October 1972. These facts and other facts stated in the notification have neither been dealt with in the petition nor specifically denied. I have gone through the report of the Registrar, a copy of which has been annexed to the affidavit-in-opposition of the respondents Nos. 1 to 3. The report contains detailed particulars of all facts mentioned in the report. It is neither vague nor is lacking in any material particular. The petitioner has filed an affidavit-in-reply, but he has not dealt with any fact stated in the report. The said D.K. Mondal who is respondent No. 5 has entered appearance in the Rule and has also filed an affidavit-in-opposition, but curiously enough he has not also specifically referred to and denied the allegations made against him in the notification. In these circumstances there cannot be any doubt that the allegations made both in the notification and in the report of the Registrar are matters of record of the Bank and the petitioner and the other members of the Managing Committee are not in a position to deny any of these allegations. The facts mentioned in the notification fully satisfy the requirements of clauses (a) and (b) of section 26 (1) of the Act and the State Government was fully justified in dissolving the Managing Committee of the Bank. The facts mentioned in the notification fully satisfy the requirements of clauses (a) and (b) of section 26 (1) of the Act and the State Government was fully justified in dissolving the Managing Committee of the Bank. In view of the facts and circumstances mentioned above, it must be held that in dissolving the Managing Committee neither the Registrar nor the State Government acted arbitrarily or capriciously, but they acted bonafide in accordance with rules of natural justice and fair play. No other point has been argued in this rule. 10. FOR the reasons aforesaid, the rule is discharged, but there will be no order as to costs.