Judgement SARMA, J. :- This is an appeal under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act by the Insurer M/s Phoenix Assurance Co. Ltd., hereinafter called the appellant, against the award dated 29-7-71 of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Cachar, awarding a sum of Rs. 6,000/- by way of compensation to the petitioner - respondent Kalpana Rajput, a minor girl represented by her father, on account of the injuries sustained by her in a motor accident. 2. The petitioners case was that on 1-4-1968 at about 7.30 A. M. she was knocked down by a motor-truck bearing No. ASC 2401 owned by opposite party No. 1 Khalilur Rahman and insured with the opposite party No. 2 - the present appellant, at Itkhola Road of Silchar town as a result of which she sustained several injuries including a grievous injury, i. e. fracture of the right tibia resulting in permanent deformation of her leg. On account of the injury she had to be treated as an indoor patient in the Civil Hospital at Silchar for about a year. In her application she claimed a sum of Rupees 15,000/- as compensation without giving any particulars. 3. The claim was resisted by both the opposite parties by filing two separate written statements on similar grounds. It was not denied that the truck belonging to opposite party No. 1 and insured with opposite party No. 2 knocked down the petitioner causing some injuries to her. They however denied that the accident occurred due to any rashness, negligence or fault of the driver of the vehicle and alleged that it was due to circumstances beyond the control of the driver and mainly due to the negligence of the petitioner herself. The claim was also resisted on the ground that it was fanciful and highly inflated. 4. Several issues were framed by the Claims Tribunal, including one, as to whether the claimant was injured due to rashness, negligence or fault of the driver of the vehicle, which was issue No. 4. The petitioner examined four witnesses including the Doctor who examined her injuries and her father. Opposite party No. 1 (the owner of the vehicle) examined the driver of the vehicle in support of his case. No evidence was adduced by opposite party No. 2 i. e. the present appellant. 5. The petitioner examined four witnesses including the Doctor who examined her injuries and her father. Opposite party No. 1 (the owner of the vehicle) examined the driver of the vehicle in support of his case. No evidence was adduced by opposite party No. 2 i. e. the present appellant. 5. On a consideration of the evidence adduced by the parties the learned Tribunal, in deciding the issue No. 4. held that he was unable to conclusively hold that the accident occurred due to rashness, negligence or fault on the part of the driver. This issue was accordingly answered in the negative. In the result the Tribunal held that the owner of the vehicle was not liable to pay any compensation. In view of the injuries sustained by the petitioner particularly her leg injury which is said to have caused permanent deformation and partial disablement, the Tribunal however held that the appellant, with whom the vehicle was insured, was liable to pay compensation. The Tribunal assessed the compensation for her injuries at Rs. 5,500/- and that for the expenses incurred for her treatment at Rupees 500/- and thus it awarded to the petitioner a sum of Rupees 6000/- as compensation payable by the appellant. Against this order the present appeal has been filed by the Insurance Company. The claimant-petitioner did not file any appeal, but on receipt of notice of the appeal filed by the Insurance Company, she filed a cross-objection challenging the finding of the Tribunal on issue No. 4 and also the adequacy of the quantum of the compensation awarded by the Tribunal. 6. Shri K. L. Jain, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted before us that the Tribunal having held that the driver of the vehicle was not guilty of any rashness or negligence and that the owner was not liable to pay any compensation, committed an error in law in awarding compensation to the petitioner payable by the appellant. He further contended that the cross-objection filed by the petitioner-respondent is not maintainable in law. Shri S. K. Senapati, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 conceded that if the driver was not guilty of any negligence and for that matter the owner was not liable to pay any compensation the appellant whose liability is only vicarious, cannot be made liable as has been done by the Tribunal. Shri S. K. Senapati, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 conceded that if the driver was not guilty of any negligence and for that matter the owner was not liable to pay any compensation the appellant whose liability is only vicarious, cannot be made liable as has been done by the Tribunal. But he submitted that the finding of the learned Tribunal on issue No. 4 is erroneous and against the weight of evidence and that the respondent No. 1 is entitled to make this submission to support the award even without any cross-objection. He also made his submission that the cross-objection filed by the respondent No. 1 is maintainable in law and that upon the evidence on record the respondent is entitled to higher compensation, as claimed by her. It was further contended by him that the appellant is not entitled in law to urge that the driver was not guilty of negligence or that the compensation awarded by the Tribunal is excessive. 7. There can be no dispute that in the present appeal the respondent No. 1 can support the award even on a ground decided against him, without any cross-objection and that this Court can re-appraise the whole evidence to decide if the award is sustainable. The first point that falls for determination therefore, is whether the accident took place due to any rashness or negligence on the part of the driver of the vehicle. C. W. 3 Durgalal Lala and C. W. 4 Balbir Singh Rana were examined by the petitioner as eye witnesses to the occurrence. C. W. 3 Durgalal stated in his evidence that on 1-4-1968 at about 7.30 A. M. while he was proceeding on his cycle he saw the truck No. ASC 2401 coming from the opposite direction at a high speed. He was alarmed at the speed of the moving truck and got down from his cycle. The truck then crossed him and when he was about to ride the cycle again, he heard a creaking sound due to application of the brake of the truck. Then coming near the vehicle he found the petitioner Kalpana Rajput lying on the road side with injuries on her person and the truck No. ASC 2401 standing there. The truck then crossed him and when he was about to ride the cycle again, he heard a creaking sound due to application of the brake of the truck. Then coming near the vehicle he found the petitioner Kalpana Rajput lying on the road side with injuries on her person and the truck No. ASC 2401 standing there. He also saw a water supply truck of the Municipality standing on the other side of the road discharging water into a road side water-storage tank. C. W. 4 Balbir Singh Rana who is a tenant of the father of the petitioner stated in his evidence that on the date of occurrence he was proceeding from his home at Malogram to Itkhola side accompanied by the petitioner Kalpana Rajput and another girl to call a midwife to attend his wife who was then in advance stage of pregnancy. When they reached, Itkhola they saw one water supply truck of the Municipality just halting by the side of the road. In the meantime the truck No. 2401 came from the opposite side at a very high speed and after crossing the water supply truck knocked down Kalpana Rajput causing fracture on her leg. He then informed the petitioners father about the accident. Abdul Manaf, who was examined as witness of the opposite party is the driver of the truck No. ASC 2401. He stated that on the date of accident while he was coming from Itkhola side with his truck a Municipal water supply truck which was proceeding ahead of his truck stopped near a water-storage tank at Itkhola on the side of the road. At this he tried to cross the water supply truck by the left side. The petitioner suddenly appeared from the side where the water supply truck was standing and fell in front of his truck and dashed against the bumper of his truck and thus she received her injuries. He denied that he drove the truck at a great speed and asserted that the accident occurred due to circumstances beyond his control. These are the only witnesses to give evidence as to how the accident took place. 8. He denied that he drove the truck at a great speed and asserted that the accident occurred due to circumstances beyond his control. These are the only witnesses to give evidence as to how the accident took place. 8. It appears from the evidence of the above witnesses that the truck No. ASC 2401 was following the Municipal Water supply, truck from Itkhola side towards Malogram and when the water supply truck stopped near a road side water storage tank to discharge water the truck ASC 2401 tried to take pass on its left side and that no sooner it crossed the water supply truck, the girl Kalpana Rajput who was coming towards Itkhola side was knocked down. The evidence of the driver that the girl suddenly appeared before the truck and that she was knocked down by the bumper may be probable but for that reason alone it cannot be held that the driver was not negligent. It is seen from the evidence of the witnesses that the road at that place was not wide. It was hardly sufficient to allow two vehicles to pass. When the truck No. ASC 2401 was following the water supply truck it was very likely that the girl who was coming from the opposite direction, was not aware of the following truck and having found the water supply truck stopping on one side of the road she tried to go to the other side. In such circumstances when the driver of the following truck tried to take pass by its left side it was his duty to slow down the speed and to give sufficient warning to the pedestrians of his intention to change the course by blowing horn. Both C. Ws. 3 and 4 have stated that the truck was coming at a very high speed. There is no reason to disbelieve them. It is true that C. W. 4 is a tenant of the father of the petitioner but there is nothing in evidence to show that C. W. 3 is in any way interested with or related to the petitioner. There is also no evidence that the driver blew any horn when he tried to take pass. Even the driver himself in his evidence has not stated that he blew his horn. There is also no evidence that the driver blew any horn when he tried to take pass. Even the driver himself in his evidence has not stated that he blew his horn. A driver who wishes to change the direction or overtake another vehicle must make sure that it is safe to do so and give a clear signal to indicate his intention. In the instant case the driver by driving the vehicle at a high speed and not slowing down the same while taking pass on a narrow road and by not giving signal to the pedestrians about his intention to do so by blowing horn failed to take reasonable care and caution. Had he taken such care and caution as demanded of him the unfortunate accident could have been avoided in our opinion. We have therefore no hesitation to hold that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent conduct of the driver. The learned Tribunal was not justified in our opinion in holding that the driver was not guilty of any negligence merely because the injuries sustained by the petitioner were not more serious. It is because she did not receive the full impact of the vehicle and was knocked down only by the bumper as stated by the driver. That being the position the owner of the vehicle cannot escape liability and consequently the appellant will also be vicariously liable. The award of the learned Tribunal directing the appellant to pay the compensation to the respondent No. 1 must therefore be sustained. The appellant cannot urge that the award is excessive unless it contravenes any term of the Insurance Policy, which is evidently not the case. In fact the appellant also did not urge before us that the compensation awarded is excessive. 9. The next question that falls for determination is whether the cross-objection filed by the respondent No. 1 is maintainable, to consider about the increase of the amount of compensation, as prayed for by the respondent. 10. The contention of Mr. In fact the appellant also did not urge before us that the compensation awarded is excessive. 9. The next question that falls for determination is whether the cross-objection filed by the respondent No. 1 is maintainable, to consider about the increase of the amount of compensation, as prayed for by the respondent. 10. The contention of Mr. Jain in this regard was as below; The claim petition is now to be decided in accordance with the provisions contained in Sections 110 to 110-F of the M. V. Act which were substituted in place of the old Section 110 by Section 80 of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1956 and the Rules framed under Section 111 of the said Act (hereinafter called the Rules). These sections contain a self-contained Code and the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code except as specifically provided for in the Rules, are not applicable. There is no provision either in the aforesaid sections or in the Rules which makes the provisions of Order 41 of the C. P. C. applicable to an appeal under Section 110-D of the Act nor there is any provision in the said sections or in the Rules analogous to Rule 22 of Order 41 of the C. P. C. Moreover the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is not a Court and its decision is not a decree but an award. As the Tribunal is not a Court and the Civil Procedure Code is not applicable to it, the High Court also in deciding an appeal preferred to it under Section 110-D does not function as a Court, an appeal is only a continuation of the original proceeding. As the decision of the Tribunal is not a decree and the High Court does not function as a Civil Court in deciding such an appeal, the provisions of Rule 22 of Order 41 of the C. P. C. relating to cross-objection have got no relevance at all. The right to file cross-objection, like the right to appeal is a creature of statute and as no such right is given by the M. V. Act or the Rules thereunder, the cross-objection is not maintainable. In support of this contention Mr. Jain relied on two decisions of this Court, both of Single Judge, one of Islam J. passed in Motor Owners Insurance Co. In support of this contention Mr. Jain relied on two decisions of this Court, both of Single Judge, one of Islam J. passed in Motor Owners Insurance Co. v. Renuka Roy, AIR 1973 Gauhati 142 and another of Bindra J. passed in Misc. Appeal (First) No. 17 of 1971, Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nani Choudhary, which was disposed on 6-9-73* besides two other decisions namely, Bokaro Rampur Ltd. v. Kathara Coal Co., AIR 1969 Pat 235 and Fazilka Dabwali Transport Co. v. Madanlal, AIR 1968 Punj and Har 277. * Reported in 1974 Acc. CJ 269 (Gauhati). 11. In refuting the above contention, Mr. S. K. Senapati, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1. on the other hand, contended as below: In hearing an appeal under Section 110-D of the M. V. Act the High Court acts as a Court and not as a Tribunal with special jurisdiction. The right to claim compensation for negligence of someone is a common law right. This right has not been created by the M. V. Act. Chapter VIII of the M. V. Act only introduces a speedy remedy to enforce that right. An appeal arising out of such claim is therefore heard by the High Court in ordinary civil jurisdiction and not by virtue of any special jurisdiction and so the provisions of R. 22 of Order 41 of the C. P. C. will be applicable. In support of this contention he relied on several decisions namely Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Kuldip Lal Bhandari, 1969 Acc. CJ 276 : (AIR 1970 Delhi 37 (FB)) Manjula Devi Bhuta v. Manjusri Naha 1968 Acc CJ 1 (Madh Pra) and Delhi Transport Undertaking v. Rajkumari, 1972 Acc. CJ 403 (Delhi). 12. In AIR 1973 Gau 142 the only ground on which the learned Single Judge held that there is no right of filing cross objection in an appeal under Section 110-D of the Act is that Rule 20 of the Rules which makes applicable certain provisions of the C. P. C. to a proceeding before the Claims Tribunal, does not include Order 41 of the C. P. C. The said Rule is as below :- "20. Code of Civil Procedure to apply in certain cases :- The following provisions of the first Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall so far as may be, apply to proceedings before the Claims Tribunal, namely, Order V Rules 9 to 13 and 15 to 30; Order IX, Order XIII. Rr 3 to 10: Order XVI. Rules 2 to 21: Order XVII; and Order XXIII. Rules 1 to 3". It is obvious that this Rule is applicable only to a proceeding before the Claims Tribunal. It does not necessarily mean that it will also apply to an appeal before the High Court. 13. In deciding the point at issue in Misc. Appeal (First) No. 17 of 1971* of this Court the learned Single Judge mainly relied on the Supreme Court decision in Hans Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 947 . The question that fell for determination by the Supreme Court in that case was whether the High Court in dealing with an appeal under Section 19 (f) of the Defence of India Act, 1939 acts as a Court and its judgment is a judgment within the meaning of clause 10 of the Letters Patent. It was held in that case that in deciding such an appeal the High Court does not act as a Court but as Arbitration Tribunal and its judgment is not a judgment but an award. This proposition laid down in the case was expressly dissented from by the Supreme Court in its later decision in Collector of Varanasi v. Gauri Shankar, AIR 1968 SC 384 . In this later case, relying on the decision in National Telephone Co. v. Postmaster General 1913 AC 546, the Supreme Court held : * Reported in 1974 Acc CJ 269 (Gau). "Prima facie it appears incongruous to hold that the High Court is not a Court. The High Court of a State is at the apex of the States judicial system. It is a court of record. It is difficult to think of a High Court as anything other than a Court. We are unaware of any judicial power having been entrusted to the High Court except as a court. Whenever it decides or determines any dispute that comes before it, it invariably does so as a court. It is a court of record. It is difficult to think of a High Court as anything other than a Court. We are unaware of any judicial power having been entrusted to the High Court except as a court. Whenever it decides or determines any dispute that comes before it, it invariably does so as a court. That apart when Section 19 (1) (f) specifically says that an appeal against the order of an arbitrator lies to the High Court, we see no justification to think that the legislature said something which it did not mean." This later decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1968 SC 334 (supra), it appears was not brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge while deciding the Misc. (First) Appeal No. 17 of 1971* of this Court. In view of the aforesaid later decision of the Supreme Court it can no longer be contended that whenever an appeal is taken to the High Court from the decision passed by a Tribunal, the High Court also acts as a Tribunal. An award under Sec. 19 (1) (f) of the Defence of India Act is by an Arbitrator. If in deciding an appeal against the award of an Arbitrator the High Court acts as a Court, as held by the Supreme Court, there can be no reason why it will not act as such, while deciding an appeal from a decision of a Tribunal like the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. * Reported in 1974 Acc. CJ 269 (Gau). 14. In AIR 1968 Punj and Har 277, which has been relied on by Mr. Jain, the case of AIR 1958 SC 947 (supra) was followed. As we have already pointed out the principle on which that decision was based was expressly dissented from, by the Supreme Court in its later decision. The decision in Fazilka Dabwali Transport Cos case AIR 1968 Punj and Har 277 can therefore, no longer be said to be good law. 15. In AIR 1969 Pat 235 , the question arose as to whether the respondent was entitled to file cross objection in an appeal filed before the High Court under Section 20 of the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957. There is no provision in that Act for such cross-objection. 15. In AIR 1969 Pat 235 , the question arose as to whether the respondent was entitled to file cross objection in an appeal filed before the High Court under Section 20 of the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957. There is no provision in that Act for such cross-objection. It provides only for an appeal under Section 20 of the Act to the High Court from the decision of the Tribunal constituted under Section 14 (2) of the Act. On this ground alone the High Court held that the cross objection was not maintainable. The High Court did not take into consideration any of the decisions of the Supreme Court or of the Privy Council having bearing on the point, which will be presently referred to in coming to the above finding. That apart, we do not know all the relevant provisions of this Act. Without knowing the same it is difficult to hold that this decision has got any bearing on the present case. 16. The Rule is now well settled that when a statute directs that an appeal shall lie to a Court already established, then that appeal must be regulated by the practice and procedure of that Court. In 1913 AC 546, which was relied on by the Supreme Court in AIR 1968 SC 384 the Rule was laid down by Viscount Haldane L. C. in the following terms : "When a question is stated to be referred to an established Court without more it in my opinion, imports that the ordinary incidences of the procedure of that Court are to attach and also that any general right or appeal from its decisions likewise attaches." In Secretary of State for India v. Chilkani Rama Rao ILR 39 Mad 617 : (AIR 1916 PC 21) the claim of a person to some interest in land reserved by the Government as forest area was tried first by the Settlement Officer under the Madras Forest Act and an appeal was provided for in the Act to the District Judge. There was no express provision for further appeal to the High Court. The question for determination was whether the District Judge acted as such in his ordinary capacity and jurisdiction so that an appeal would lie to the High Court under the Code of Civil Procedure. There was no express provision for further appeal to the High Court. The question for determination was whether the District Judge acted as such in his ordinary capacity and jurisdiction so that an appeal would lie to the High Court under the Code of Civil Procedure. Their Lordships of the Privy Council observed: "It was contended on behalf of the appellant that all further proceedings in Courts in India or by way of appeal were incompetent, these being excluded by the terms of the statute just quoted. In their Lordships opinion this objection is not well founded. Their view is that when proceedings of this character reach the District Court, that Court is appealed to as one of the ordinary Courts of the country with regard to whose procedure, orders and decrees the ordinary rules of the Civil Procedure Code apply." In N. S. Thread Co. v. James Chadwick and Bros, AIR 1953 SC 357 an appeal was preferred to the High Court under Section 76 of the Trade Marks Act. The question that arose for determination was whether further appeal lay to the High Court under the Letters Patent as there is no provision in the Trade Marks Act for any further appeal. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held : "Obviously after the appeal had reached the High Court it has to be determined according to the rules of practice and procedure of that court. The rule is well settled that when a statute directs that an appeal shall lie to a Court already established then that appeal must be regulated by the practice and procedure of that Court." 17. The question as to whether the High Court acts as a Tribunal or as a Court in deciding an appeal under Section 110-F of the M. V. Act and whether its decision is a judgment or an award came up for decision before a Special Bench of the Delhi High Court in 1969 Acc. CJ 276 : (AIR 1970 Delhi 37 (FB)) which has been relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent. CJ 276 : (AIR 1970 Delhi 37 (FB)) which has been relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent. After surveying most of the decisions of the Supreme Court as well as of the Privy Council having some bearing on the point and relying particularly on the decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1968 SC 384 (supra) the Court observed as below : "The implication of the above observation of the Supreme Court (in Collector of Varanasi v. Gauri Shankar as quoted above) is that the theory that an appeal takes colour from the original proceeding is not to be carried too far. It is to be noted that there are three aspects to be considered viz. (1) the nature of the Tribunal, (2) the nature of the proceeding before it, and (3) the nature of the decisions given by it. It would not be correct to say that merely because the Tribunal was not a Court or the proceeding before it was not a suit or its decision was not a judgment, but an award, the High Court hearing appeal against its decision would not be a Court or the proceeding before the High Court would not be in its ordinary jurisdiction or that the decision of the High Court on such appeal would not be a judgment. Therefore, even if the original proceeding took place before the Arbitrator resulting in an award, the appeal to the High Court did not turn the High Court itself into a persona designata or an Arbitration Tribunal and did not therefore, make the judgment of the High Court an award. If the High Court acts as such in considering an appeal from the award given by an Arbitrator under section 19 of the Defence of India Act, then it would appear that the High Court would also be acting as a High Court in hearing an appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act (Shri Chand v. Union of India) and also in hearing an appeal under Section 30 of the Workmens Compensation Act against the decision of a Commissioner given thereunder. We need not, however, consider here these more far reaching implications of the Supreme Court decision in Collector, Varanasi v. Gauri Shankar. We need not, however, consider here these more far reaching implications of the Supreme Court decision in Collector, Varanasi v. Gauri Shankar. But the limited implication which is relevant for our purpose is that in hearing the appeal under Section 110-D of the Act, the High Court must be held to be acting as a High Court and not as a Tribunal, in as much as the claim for compensation for negligence is a common law right not created by a statute and the claim is considered by the Tribunal in its entirety without limitation with the result that an appeal to the High Court is made in its ordinary Civil Jurisdiction. In fact an appeal by special leave under Art. 136 lies to the Supreme Court against the determination or order of a Tribunal. The High Court also has the superintendence over other Courts and Tribunals under Article 227 of the Constitution. It has never been doubted that the Supreme Court and the High Court act as the Supreme Court and the High Court in functioning under Articles 136 and 227 of the Constitution respectively and do not act as an Arbitrator or a Tribunal in doing so. For the same reason the High Court would also act as the High Court and not as a Tribunal in hearing the appeal under Section 110-D of the Act." Relying on the decision of the Privy Council in AIR 1916 PC 21 (supra) and of the Supreme Court in AIR 1953 SC 357 (supra), a Division Bench of the M. P. High Court in 1968 Acc CJ 1 held that normal rules of practice and procedure of the High Court would apply normally in an appeal under Section 110-D of the M. V. Act, and as such provision of Rule 22 of Order 41 can be availed of by respondent in such an appeal. Relying on this decision a Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in 1972 Acc CJ 403 took a similar view. 18. Relying on this decision a Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in 1972 Acc CJ 403 took a similar view. 18. The principle that clearly emerges from the decision of the Supreme Court and of the Privy Council mentioned earlier is that whenever an appeal to the High Court is provided for in any statute from the decision of any Tribunal and there is nothing more limiting the jurisdiction or procedure of the High Court, the High Court will act as a Court and such appeal will be regulated by the usual practice and procedure of the Court Section 110-D of the Act provides for an appeal to the High Court against the decision of the Claims Tribunal. There is nothing in the Act or in the Rules limiting the jurisdiction or powers of the High Court in dealing with such an appeal. The provisions of Rule 20 of the Rules as quoted earlier are meant for the Tribunal and it has got nothing to do with the procedure of the High Court in dealing with an appeal. Section 110-F of the Act bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court only to entertain the original claim and it has got nothing to do with the powers of the High Court in dealing with an appeal. The right to claim compensation for injury or death due to the negligence of some person is not a creature of the M. V. Act, it is a common law right existing from before. The provisions of Sections 110 to 110-F of the Act were introduced only to provide a cheap and speedy remedy in respect of such a claim and could not have been intended to cut down or modify the common law right in any way. On a consideration of all these aspects of the question and in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court as well as of the Privy Council referred to above, which go to support the contention of the respondent, we are in respectful agreement with the view taken in 1968 Acc CJ 1 (Madh Pra) (supra), and 1972 Acc CJ 403 (Delhi) (supra), that the provisions of Rule 22 of Order 41 of the C. P. C. can be availed of by a respondent in such an appeal. 19. 19. Let us now proceed to consider whether there is any substance in the cross-objection filed by the respondent No. 1 to enhance the amount of compensation awarded by the learned Tribunal. As already pointed out the respondent in her claim petition claimed a sum of Rupees 15000/- as compensation without giving any particular whatsoever. In course of his evidence the father of the petitioner who was examined as C. W. 2 stated that he had to spend Rs. 3000/4000/- for treatment of his daughter. He has not led any evidence in support of such expenditure. The statement is also as vague as anything. Under the circumstances the learned Tribunal was unable to accept his contention in regard to such expenditure but all the same it awarded a sum of Rs. 500/-on account of such expenditure considering the nature of the case. We do not find any reason whatsoever to interfere with this award relating to the expenses said to have been incurred for the treatment of the petitioner. 20. The Tribunal has awarded a sum of Rs. 5500/- as compensation on account of the injuries sustained by the respondent No. 1 with the following observation :- "It has been found that the claimant sustained injuries in the accident. Her right leg was fractured, I have seen her at the time of hearing. She was still limping and there is no doubt that as a result of the injuries on the heel she has been disabled to a certain extent and there is every likelihood that the disablement is permanent. The girl at the time of the accident was aged about six years and as she grows up, she is bound to be handicapped in carrying out her daily chores and other routines by such disablement ............taking into account the nature of the injuries, disablement suffered and the age of the claimant. I am of the view that a sum of Rs. 5,500/- would be reasonable and adequate assessment as compensation." From the evidence of the doctor we find that the girl sustained four injuries as described below : 1. One lacerated injury 6"x2"x1/3" on the front of right leg. 2. One abrasion 1"x½" on the right heel. 3. One abrasion 1/3" in diameter on the lower part of the back. 4. Fracture of right tibia. Injury No. 4 is grievous and others are simple. One lacerated injury 6"x2"x1/3" on the front of right leg. 2. One abrasion 1"x½" on the right heel. 3. One abrasion 1/3" in diameter on the lower part of the back. 4. Fracture of right tibia. Injury No. 4 is grievous and others are simple. The Doctor has not stated in his evidence anything as to whether as a result of the fracture of the tibia the leg of the petitioner would remain permanently deformed and will result in her disablement. In the absence of any evidence from the Doctor in that regard we are unable to hold that the petitioners leg will remain deformed for ever and will result in her permanent partial disablement. There is also no evidence on the basis of which the compensation can be assessed. Under the circumstances we do not find any substance in the cross-objection filed by the respondent No. 1 to increase the amount of compensation. 21. In the result both the appeal as well as the cross-objection stand dismissed. We leave the parties to bear their own costs. D. PATHAK, J. :- I agree. Appeal and Cross objection dismissed.