JUDGMENT Chandrasekhara Menon, J. 1. On the basis of a report and mahazar prepared by a Village Officer and forwarded to the Tahsildar, Kottarakkara, a Land Conservancy case numbered as L.C. 82/71 was taken against one Issac Pappachan and two others. The case was persons named in the report and mahazar encroached upon on the Government land in Survey No. 457/1A of Mylom village and cut and attempted to remove four black wood trees standing thereon. The report showed that this Issac Pappachan was the instigator of this cutting and six other persons were named therein who had taken part in this operation. The three persons including Pappachan to whom notices under section 12 of the Land Conservancy Act had been issued appeared before the Tahsildar and seems to have filed statements denying the charge against them and at the same time accusing the present petitioners who are personnel belonging to the Revenue Department as those who were involved in the cutting of trees. 2. Notices were then issued to the petitioners in what is prescribed as the B form under the Act. The notices were under section 12 of the Act. They appeared before the Tahsildar who recorded their statements. They denied having any knowledge of the occurrence. 3. It might be stated here that the petitioners were neither given the copies of statements taken from those who are alleged to have accused them of the offence or even an extract or summary of the allegations contained therein. After recording of the statements, without any further enquiry into the matter, the Tahsildar passed an order holding the petitioners along with the other defendants in the case guilty of the accusation made against them and directed realisation of three times the value of the trees cut which was fixed at Rs. 5,601 from the petitioners as well as the other accused in the case. Ext. P-3 which is the copy of the said proceedings of the Tahsildar would indicate that the Tahsildar had recorded statements from seven persons. The petitioners contend that these statements were taken behind their back and they were not informed about the contents of these statements. The petitioners were, it is further alleged, not afforded any opportunity, to controvert the allegations made against them in these statements. They were riot allowed to cross- examine those persons. 4. The petitioners contend that these statements were taken behind their back and they were not informed about the contents of these statements. The petitioners were, it is further alleged, not afforded any opportunity, to controvert the allegations made against them in these statements. They were riot allowed to cross- examine those persons. 4. The petitioners were not, it is stated, even served with the copy of this Order. They came to know of it only when the Tahsildar issued notice to them in Form C calling upon them to remit the amount awarded as damages as per Ext. P-3. They then appealed before the Revenue Divisional Officer, who dismissed the same. In regard to the contention that the order of the Tahsildar was vitiated by violation of the rules of natural justice the appellate authority said that the Tahsildar need only comply with rules provided under the Land Conservancy Rules. How that Authority had approached these questions could best be pointed out by extracting the following passage from his order. "The records would show that the appellants who were given an opportunity did not take pains to adduce evidence against the materials gathered by the Tahsildar. There is no force in the argument that the burden to supply the appellants with the materials gathered was with the Tahsildar. Actually the ball was in their court and the appellants should have realised that the Tahsildar had strong evidences against them. They have failed evidently to probe deeper, presumably taking things in a lighter vein. I can only say that the omission on the part of the appellants in not having taken up the opportunity given to them when they were served with a B form notice cannot be made good at this stage."� 5. The petitioner did not face better in their revision before the District Collector. The District Collector said that an elaborate enquiry recording statements in the presence of offenders and opportunity to cross-examine witnesses etc. is neither contemplated in the Act and the Rules nor feasible in the scheme of things. Exts. P-5 and P-6 are the copies of the orders of the Revenue Divisional Officer and the Collector respectively. The petitioners seek to quash these orders on the main ground that they are violative of the principles of natural justice. 6. is neither contemplated in the Act and the Rules nor feasible in the scheme of things. Exts. P-5 and P-6 are the copies of the orders of the Revenue Divisional Officer and the Collector respectively. The petitioners seek to quash these orders on the main ground that they are violative of the principles of natural justice. 6. On an examination of the relevant provisions of the Act and the Orders impugned in these proceedings, I am inclined to agree with the contentions of the counsel for the petitioner. As is indicated in the wording of section 10 of the Act, the Tahsildar is here adjudging a dispute as to whether the defendants in the L.C. case have cut down the trees and if so, what is the damages that should be realised from them, based on the value of the trees cut. But for the special statute, this is a dispute that should have been settled by the ordinary civil courts of the land. The adjudication might result in deprivation of substantial property of the individuals concerned by way of payment of damages. Moreover, the case is based on something illegally done by the persons. Therefore, should not they be given the fullest opportunity to meet the charges? They should be able to controvert the statements made against them by cross-examining, if necessary, the persons who made the statements. It is obvious then that the copies of such statements should be made available to them. No doubt in certain quasi judicial proceedings, the authorities may have the right not to disclose the source of their information which may form the basis of their action. The principle there, is that the persons who are the channel by means of which the detection is made should not be unnecessarily disclosed. If you call the name of the informer in such cases, no man will make a discovery and public justice will be defeated. The informer may not be visited with the fear of reprisal. In such cases if every detail in the statements made by the informer were disclosed that might itself give the informer away and put him in peril. However, even in those cases the person concerned should be given sufficient indication of the accusation or objections raised against so that he could meet them. Proceedings under the Act will not come within those types of cases. However, even in those cases the person concerned should be given sufficient indication of the accusation or objections raised against so that he could meet them. Proceedings under the Act will not come within those types of cases. Here the Government is given an easier procedure that they would have got if they had gone to the civil court. That does not mean they would take evidence behind the back of the person charged with the wrong or refuse to disclose the source or the nature of statements made against him on the basis of which the case is to be decided. The alleged wrong-doer should be given the statements made against him and the maker of the statement should be made available for cross-examination, if necessary. 7. When the principles of natural justice are to apply and their scope and extent are lucidly stated by Lord Denning, M. R. in Regina v. Gaming Board, Ex. P. Benaim 1970 2 W.L.R. 1009. The following passages in that decision would be of relevance here at page 1016: "It is not possible to lay down rigid rules as to when the principles of natural justice are to apply: nor as to their scope and extent. Everything depends on the subject-matter: see what Tucker, L. J. said in Russell v. Norfolk (Duke of) [1949(1) All E. R. 109,118] and Lord Upjohn in Durayappah v. Fernand [1967(2) A. C. 337, 349]. At one time it was said that the principles only apply to judicial proceedings and not to administrative proceedings. That heresy was scotched in Ridge v. Baldwin (1964 A. C. 40). At an other time it was said that the principles do not apply to the grant or revocation of licences. That too is wrong. Reg v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Ex parte Parker [1953(1) W. L. R. 1150] and Nakkuda Aliv. Jayaratne (1951 A. C. 66) are no longer authority for any such proposition. See what Lord Reid and Lord Hodson said about them in Ridge v. Baldwin (1964 A. C. 40, 77-79, 133)"�. 8. It was further observed at page 1017: "The statute says in terms that in determining whether to grant a certificate, the Board" ˜shall have regard only to the matters specified. It follows, I think, that the Board have a duty to act fairly. 8. It was further observed at page 1017: "The statute says in terms that in determining whether to grant a certificate, the Board" ˜shall have regard only to the matters specified. It follows, I think, that the Board have a duty to act fairly. They must give the applicant an opportunity of satisfying them of the matters specified in the sub-section. They must let him know what their impressions are so that he can disabuse them. But I do not think that they need quote chapter and verse against him as if they were dismissing him from an office, as in Ridge v. Baldwin (1964 A. C. 40); or depriving him of his property as in Cooper v. Wandsworth Board, of Works (1863-14 C. B. N. S. 180) After all, they are not charging him with doing anything wrong."� (Underline Supplied) "Where an oral hearing is given, a tribunal must, it has been laid down, consider all relevant evidence which a party wishes to submit; inform every party of all the evidence to be taken into account, whether derived from another party or independently; allow witnesses to be questioned; allow comment on the evidence and argument on the whole case. The right to call and to cross-examine witnesses is therefore, as a general rule, part of the procedure required by natural justice. But there is no need for the strict legal rules of evidence to be observed". 9. Prof. S. A. De Smith states in his Judicial Review of Administrative Action under the heading conduct of the hearing at page 190 (2nd Edn.): "A party must have an adequate opportunity of knowing the case he has to meet, of answering it and of putting his own case. Duty of adequate disclosure. If prejudicial allegations are to be made against him, he must normally, as we have seen, be given particulars of them before the hearing so that he can prepare his answers. In order to protect his interest he must also be enabled to controvert, correct or comment on other evidence or information that may be relevant to the decision. If prejudicial allegations are to be made against him, he must normally, as we have seen, be given particulars of them before the hearing so that he can prepare his answers. In order to protect his interest he must also be enabled to controvert, correct or comment on other evidence or information that may be relevant to the decision. If this material is available before the hearing, the right course will usually be to give him advance notification so that he will not betaken by surprise; but it cannot be said that there is a hard and fast rule on this matter, and in general natural justice will be held to be satisfied if the material is divulged at the hearing, which may have to be adjourned if he cannot fairly be expected to make his reply without time for consideration. If relevant evidential material is not disclosed at all to a party who is potentially prejudiced by it, there is prima facie a breach of natural justice, irrespective of whether the material in question arose before, during or after the hearing. This proposition can be illustrated by a large number of modern cases involving the use of undisclosed reports by administrative tribunals and other adjudicating bodies. If the deciding body is or has the trappings of a judicial tribunal and receives or appears to receive evidence ex parte or holds ex parte inspections during the course or after the conclusion of the hearing, the case for setting the decision aside is obviously very strong: the maxim that justice must be seen to be done can readily be invoked. 10. It has been laid down by the Supreme Court that the requirements of natural justice in any given case must depend, to a great extent, on the facts and circumstances of each case. The requirements of natural justice depend on (i) the circumstances of the case, (ii) the nature of the enquiry, (iii) the rule under which the Tribunal is acting, and (iv) the subject-matter that is being dealt with. Tersely put the extent and application of the doctrine of natural justice cannot be imprisoned within the straight jackets of a right formula ”set Union of India v. Roy A.I.R. 1968 S. C. 850, Bharat Barrel and Drum Co.v. Bose A.I.R.1967 S. C. 361 and New Prakash Transport Co. v. New Suwarna Transport Co. A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 232. Tersely put the extent and application of the doctrine of natural justice cannot be imprisoned within the straight jackets of a right formula ”set Union of India v. Roy A.I.R. 1968 S. C. 850, Bharat Barrel and Drum Co.v. Bose A.I.R.1967 S. C. 361 and New Prakash Transport Co. v. New Suwarna Transport Co. A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 232. In the last mentioned case the Supreme Court said that the guiding criterion in the matter is rules of natural justice vary with the varying constitutions of statutory bodies and the rules prescribed by the legislature under which they have to act, and the question whether in a particular case they have been contravened must be judged not by any preconceived notion of what they may be but in the light of the provisions of the relevant Act. In the second mentioned case A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 361 the Supreme Court again observed that the court should not proceed as if there are any inflexible rules of natural justice of universal application. The court therefore has to consider in each case whether in the light of the facts and circumstances of that case, the nature of the issues involved in the inquiry, the nature of the order passed arid the interests affected thereby, a fair and reasonable opportunity of being heard was furnished to the person affected. The Supreme Court quoted with approval the following passage of Lord Parmoor in Local Government Board v. Arlidge 1915 A. C. 120: " Where, however, the question of procedure is raised in a hearing, before some tribunal other than a court of law, there is no obligation to adopt the regular forms of judicial procedure. It is sufficient that the case has been heard in a judicial spirit and in accordance with the principles of substantial justice. In determining whether the principles of substantial justice have been complied with in matters of procedure, regard must necessarily be had to the nature of the issue to be determined and the constitution of the Tribunal. 11. Taking into consideration the nature of the issue that had to be determined in these proceedings and also in the light of the fact that but for the special statute concerned the matter would have gone before civil court, I am of the view that the petitioners contentions have to be upheld. 12. 11. Taking into consideration the nature of the issue that had to be determined in these proceedings and also in the light of the fact that but for the special statute concerned the matter would have gone before civil court, I am of the view that the petitioners contentions have to be upheld. 12. The impugned order, for the reasons put forward be the counsel for the petitioners the facts have not been controverted before me is therefore void and ineffectual to bind the parties. The original petition is, therefore, allowed, but this will not stand in the way of the authorities taking fresh appropriate action against the petitioners in accordance with law in regard to the alleged wrong doing.