JUDGMENT - R.K. JOSHI, J.:---The respondents-plaintiffs took out a notice of motion on 19-4-1973 against the appellant-defendant, the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, for an injunction restraining the Corporation from enforcing or taking any steps in removing or demolishing the structure in dispute situate at Daruwalla Compound. S.V. Road, Malad, Bombay-64. The notice of motion was made absolute and it is against this order the Corporation has come in appeal. 2. The few facts material for the disposal of this appeal at this stage, briefly stated, are that plaintiff No. 1 is Diwansingh Shawansigh and his wife Leena is impleaded as plaintiff No. 2. Both of them claim to be the owners in respect of a shed standing on a space of 28 ½ X 10 having galvanised sheet roof and C.I. sheet walls at Daruwalla Compound. S.V. Road, Malad, Bombay-64. Plaintiff No. 1 Diwansingh is alleged to be the tenant in respect of the land and the shed stands in his name in the Municipal records. According to the plaintiffs it was constructed prior to the merger of Malad area in Greater Bombay and it was assessed by the Municipal Corporation. Alleged the plaintiffs further that on 10-4-72 they received a notice from the Corporation asking them to show cause why the structure be not demolished as it was an unauthorised construction. The plaintiffs submitted that it was neither an addition or alteration, nor a new erection of the shed, but they were trying to replace some of the sheets which had worn out due to the ravage of sun and rain. At one state the Corporation was satisfied and convinced on the plaintiffs bona fides but again on 11-4-1973 another notice was received under which Corporation threatened to demolish the same. The shed is standing there since before 1957 and what the plaintiffs carried out was minor repairs for which no permission was required under the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act. 3. On making these allegations they moved the Court for interim rule by taking out a notice of motion virtually summarizing the grievances alleged to in the foregoing paragraphs and prayed for an ad interim rule restraining the Corporation from enforcing the said notice or demolishing the said structure. 4. 3. On making these allegations they moved the Court for interim rule by taking out a notice of motion virtually summarizing the grievances alleged to in the foregoing paragraphs and prayed for an ad interim rule restraining the Corporation from enforcing the said notice or demolishing the said structure. 4. The appellant (defendant Corporation) resisted the motion mainly on the ground that on 19-1-1972 Mukadam Shri Marwadi detected this unauthorised structure; therefore he submitted his report with a rough sketch and forthwith a stop work notice under section 354-A of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act (which would be hereinafter referred to as "the Act") was issued. The notice was served on plaintiff No. 1 but with little effect and in the round of inspection on 13-3-1972 the construction was found to be completed. Therefore, these subordinate officers further moved in the matter and the plaintiffs were called upon to explain their alleged misconduct. They replied that only wooden posts were erected and few sheets were being replaced. This was somewhere in April, 1972, but the Assistant Engineer of the concerned Ward called upon plaintiff No. 1 to produce all the relevant documents to substantiate his submissions and also ordered the department concerned to find out whether such a shed ever existed, whether it was assessed and whether any tax was paid. As the record revealed nothing to corroborate the allegations of the plaintiff, a notice under section 488 of the Act was issued on 11-4-1973 conveying to him that the sub-engineer in this Ward would enter the premises on 13th April, 1973 to execute the notice viz., to demolish the structure, but before he could carry out the work the plaintiff rushed to the Court on 18th April, 1973 and obtained the rule by suppressing the material fact that the first notice was issued on 19th January, 1972 and the matter was being dealt with for process according to the various provisions of the Act, and the results thereof. Suppressing these material facts and capitalising the subsequent notice, they obtained the interim rule and on hearing both the sides to notice of motion came to be made absolute as stated above. 5. Suppressing these material facts and capitalising the subsequent notice, they obtained the interim rule and on hearing both the sides to notice of motion came to be made absolute as stated above. 5. As I read the learned Judges order, he nowhere makes any reference to the basic grievance of the Corporation that for the first time in January, 1972 a notice under section 352-A was issued, nor does he refer to the subsequent reports made by the officers from time to time and the results of the enquiry. He founded his order only on one assessment bill of 1963-64 and the mention of the name of plaintiff No. 2 in the margin. This assessment bill trends the learned Judge as sufficient evidence of the existence of this erection which was saved from the operation of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act which had legalised the erection of such structures standing prior to 1964. 6. The very first report submitted by the Mukadam Shri Marwadi is self-elequent. It seems he visited these premises in the due discharge of his duties on 19-1-1972 and he found plaintiff No. 1 constructing two room; therefore, a notice under section 354-A was issued. This section empowers the Commissioner to stop erection of a building or work commenced or carried on unlawfully. The only limitations on his powers are that the work should be of such a type as has been described in section 342 of the Act. 7. Section 342 speaks of the steps to be taken by persons who are desirous of carrying out any work or making any additions or alterations to buildings. The only limitations on his powers are that the work should be of such a type as has been described in section 342 of the Act. 7. Section 342 speaks of the steps to be taken by persons who are desirous of carrying out any work or making any additions or alterations to buildings. We are more concerned with sub-sections (b) and (c) under sub-section (b) every person who intends to make any alteration or repairs to a building, not being a frame-building, involving the removal or re-erection of any external or party-wall thereof or of any wall which supports the roof thereof to a certain extent defined therein, shall give to the Commissioner, a notice in the form prescribed sub-section (c) contemplates cases on alteration or repairs to a frame-building, involving the removal or re-erection or more than one half of the posts in any such wall thereof as aforesaid sub-section (d) further lays down that he should seek permission if he desires to remove or reconstruct any portion of a building on a street which stands within the regular line of such street. 8. It must be made clear at the outset that whatever may be the allegations of the present plaintiff, he has returned his own verdict about the nature of the work and has not given any notice to the Commissioner under section 342 nor has he sought permission. But when the notice under section 354-A was issued, he was given an opportunity, but before that, it appears, the subordinates were directed to find out whether any such structure ever existed, whether it was assessed and the reports were in the negative. At one stage in reply to this notice or while explaining his case Diwan Singh by his letter dated 18-4-1972 made certain confessions or admissions which have been overlooked by the learned trial Judge. No doubt , to begin with, he asserted that he has not erected an unauthorised structure and vaguely said that it has been in existence since long. The next statement is more significant. It reads thus : "Since the monsoon season is to come very shortly, I had changed some C.I. sheets of the roof and the walls which had worn out having been very old. If you object to the same I am prepared to put the original sheets and take away the replaced ones. The next statement is more significant. It reads thus : "Since the monsoon season is to come very shortly, I had changed some C.I. sheets of the roof and the walls which had worn out having been very old. If you object to the same I am prepared to put the original sheets and take away the replaced ones. Please excuse me for not having taken the required permission from the B.M.C. I hope you will condone the same." These concluding lines certain an explicit admission although they are qualified to a certain extent. But the record of the Corporation shows that the first part of the plaintiffs submission that he was attempting to replace certain sheets or that it was not an unauthorised structure is not a correct statements of facts. 9. Reference in this context may be made to another section 347 which has some hearing. It lays down that no person shall commence to erect any building or to execute any such work as is described or referred to in section 342 until he has given notice of his intention to erect such work and the Commissioner has either intimated his approval of such work or failed to intimate his disapproval thereof within a specified time. All these statutory provisions in the instant case are observed by the plaintiffs in breach. 10. Now, much is made one bill when is for the period October 1963 to March 1964. It is in respect of a house bearing No. P. 5928 12/6, C.B. Road. In the column names of various persons are mentioned and in the margin of this bill which seems to have weighed with the learned Judge, there are two more names. The first M.P. Traporewala, the owner and lessor of the land. The occupiers name is shown as Leena DSouza. But this is simply a bill. It reflects very little on the portions held by Leena or the payment actually made by her. On the reverse thereof no name of the addresses is mentioned. It is not unlikely that it was meant for one of those various persons mentioned in the main column. Anyway the document as it stands and reads does not connect this bill with the property now in dispute. 11. On the reverse thereof no name of the addresses is mentioned. It is not unlikely that it was meant for one of those various persons mentioned in the main column. Anyway the document as it stands and reads does not connect this bill with the property now in dispute. 11. As observed a little earlier, the matter was thoroughly inquired into by the officers concerned as to whether this shop was really in existence prior to 1964, whether it was assessed and all the reports were against the plaintiffs as the record revealed nothing. The last report in the series is to the effect that the shed in question viz. the shed which the Corporation intended to demolish, was not assessed to Municipal taxes so far i.e. up to the end of December 1972. The report is actually dated 13-1-1973. 12. But after that another notice under section 488 of the Act was issued on 17-4-1973. This section empowers the Commissioner to enter into or upon any building or land with or without assistants or workmen, in order to make any inspection or survey to execute any work which is authorised by the Act. On service of this notice the premises were visited and it was found to be a new structure altogether. This apart, the Corporation seems to have received a number of complaints from different persons in the locality that the plaintiffs had not only erected these structure but they were being let out by taking high Pagdis. The plaintiffs were given an opportunity to appear before the Deputy Commissioner and on given a full hearing he came to the conclusion that these structures were unauthorised and erected without obtaining the previous permission of the Corporation. 13. Despite these clear records which speak volumes against the plaintiffs much was said by Mr. Vadern that the bill discloses the name of the wife whereas the notice is served on the husband. The concessions are made by the husband before the Corporation and the wife never figured. He reiterated repentedly that as the monsoons were in the offing he was simply trying to replace some of the worn out sheets. But one cannot be oblivious to the material facts that neither in the plaint nor in his affidavit there is any reference to the notice under section 354-A which was issued in January 1972. He reiterated repentedly that as the monsoons were in the offing he was simply trying to replace some of the worn out sheets. But one cannot be oblivious to the material facts that neither in the plaint nor in his affidavit there is any reference to the notice under section 354-A which was issued in January 1972. Suppressing this material fact and the subsequent developments he has approached the Court to obtain this equitable relief. It is needless to add that one who seeks equity must come with clean hands. Many material facts are not only suppressed but it appears, the lower Court to a certain extent has been misled. The reference to the name of Leena in the margin of the notice referred to in one of the foregoing paragraphs in neither here nor there. As pointed out, it does not even remotely connect the bill with this property now in dispute. The view taken by the lower Court is patently erroneous and the learned Judge has misread the entire evidence. I find little justification for sustaining this order which is not corroborated either by the factual aspects or the provisions contained in the various sections. Therefore, it will have to be set aside. 14. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The order of the lower Court is set aside with costs throughout. -----