JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) IN this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of india, the petitioners challenge the demand for levy of octroi duty in pursuance of the notification, dated 28-6-1963 (Petitioners Annexure-A) extending the limits of the Dewas Municipality in exercise of powers under section 5 (4) (b)of the M. P. Municipalities Act, 1961. According to the petitioners, the octroi duty could not be demanded unless it was imposed and levied as contemplated by section 129 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961. The other contention, raised on behalf of the petitioners is that the exemption having been granted by the State Government on different occasions, the respondents are not entitled to recover the octroi duty, which had been specifically exempted by the State Government in exercise of powers conferred by section 132 of the m. P. Municipalities Act, 1961. These are the two main points involved in the present case. ( 2. ) THE facts leading to the filing of the present writ petition are as follows: The industrial area where the petitioner concern is located was not within the limits of the Dewas Municipality. The petitioner started its concern as a small scale unit in the month of May, 1962. Bv notification, dated 28-6-1963 (Petitioners Annexure-A), the industrial area was included within the municipal limits. But, even so, there was no notification that all taxes in force in the Municipal area would be applicable to the extended area newly included within the Municipal limits. ( 3. ) THE State Government in exercise of powers conferred by section 132 of the M. P. Municipalities Act, 1961, issued the notification No. 124-11694-XVIII-U, dated 12th July, 1963 (Respondents Annexure-IV, to be found at p. 99 of the paper-book) published in the M. P. Gazette, dated 26th July, 1963, Part II at page 558, issued an order exempting the small scale units from payment of octroi duty for a period of five years from the date the industrial unit would go into production. But the exemption was to cease in any case on 31-3-1971. It is not disputed that the petitioner was entitled to exemption under this notification for a period of five years from the date it went into production, but, in no case, that exemption was to last beyond 31-3 1971. ( 4. But the exemption was to cease in any case on 31-3-1971. It is not disputed that the petitioner was entitled to exemption under this notification for a period of five years from the date it went into production, but, in no case, that exemption was to last beyond 31-3 1971. ( 4. ) THEREAFTER, the State Government issued another exemption order on similar lines, vide notification No. 25-XVIII-U-I-65, dated 13-1-1966, published in the Madhya Pradesh Rajpatra, dated 1 1-2-1966, Part II, at page 158 (petitioners Annexure-A/1 ). This notification stated that only such units of industry specifically mentioned in the Second Schedule, Parts I and II, as had gone into production on or after the 1st August, 1961, or might go into production thereafter would be entitled to exemption from payment of octroi levied by the Municipalities. The exemption was limited to the raw materials and capital equipment specified in the Parts|i and II of the Second Schedule. The exemption was available on such raw materials and capital equipment whether imported directly by the industrial units or by local dealers. In respect of octroi duty already paid prior to the date of publication in the gazette of the orders, no refund would be admissible. The rest of the notification specified procedure for obtaining an exemption. This order also stated that exemption was to be available for a period of five years from the date the industrial unit would go into production, but was to cease, in any case, on 31-3-1971. As such, both these notifications granting exemption provided a period of five years and, in ho case, the exemption would last beyond 31-3-1971. ( 5. ) THEREAFTER, the State Government by notification No. 115xviii-Nagar-1, dated 17-4-1971, published in the M. P. Gazette, dated 23-4-1971 (Petitioners Annexure-B) again granted complete exemption in respect of octroi duty. Clause kh of the notification stated as follows: translated into English it would read as follows: "such existing units or such units under construction, which have been getting exemption under the notification, dated 13-1-1966, will be entitled to such exemption for a period of five years from the date they have been enjoying such exemption. " We are not concerned with the rest of the notification. But, it is this clause, which calls for an interpretation by this Court. " We are not concerned with the rest of the notification. But, it is this clause, which calls for an interpretation by this Court. In this connection it is to be noted that the petitioners were given exemption under the first and the second exemption orders for a period of about 3 years and 9 months i. e. upto 10-4-1967 and thereafter the exemption was not given. The Municipal Council challenged the petitioners right to get exemption and consequently the matter was referred to a committee, known as Octroi Exemption Committee, which consisted of three members. As per the resolution of the Octroi Exemption Committee, passed in its meeting, dated 4-5-1968, and communicated vide letter no. 2272, dated 6-5-1968 to the petitioners, it was found that the petitioners unit had substantially extended during the relevant period and as such, tht petitioners were entitled to exemption for a period of five years with effect from 19-11-1968 (Vide Respondentsannexure-12, to be found at pages 136-137 of the paper-book ). That resolution provided that exemption was to come into effect from the date of proceedings, i. e. from 19-11-1968 and was to last till 31-3-1971. As such, under the second exemption notification, the petitioners were getting exemption and the question is whether the petitioners will be entitled to exemption for a period of five years from that date as per the exemption notification, dated 17-4-1971 (petitioners Annexure-B), clause kh of which provided that any unit getting the benefit of exemption under the notification, dated 13-1-1966, would continue to enjoy the exemption for a period of five years from the date that it enjoyed the exemption under the second exemption notification. Clause kh as it reads and interpreted correctly would clearly imply that the petitioners would be entitled to exemption from octroi duty from 19-11-1968 to 18-11 1973. ( 6. ) HOWEVER, the Octroi Committee of the Municipal Council, dis-satis-fied with this state of affairs passed a resolution, dated 27-5-1971 {respondents annexure-26, to be found at page 214 of the paper-book) asserting that the interpretation put by the Octroi Exemption Committee was wrong and that the Municipal Council had the power to demand octroi duty from the petitioners. ( 6. ) HOWEVER, the Octroi Committee of the Municipal Council, dis-satis-fied with this state of affairs passed a resolution, dated 27-5-1971 {respondents annexure-26, to be found at page 214 of the paper-book) asserting that the interpretation put by the Octroi Exemption Committee was wrong and that the Municipal Council had the power to demand octroi duty from the petitioners. Subsequently on 18-7-1971 (Respondentsannexure-27, to be found at page 217 of the paper-book) the Municipal Council passed a resolution asserting that the old units were not entitled to any exemption and as such, a demand for payment of octroi duty was made against the petitioners. Thereafter, the Collector, as Chairman of the Octroi Exemption Committee, wrote a letter to the President of the Dewas Municipality on 3-8-1971 (Petitioners annexure-C-1, to be found at page 35 of the paper-book) giving his opinion that the petitioners under the third exemption notification were entitled to exemption from octroi duty for a period of five years with effect from 19-11-1968. The Director of Industries also as per the letter, dated 26-7-1971 (Petitioners annexure C-2, to be found at page 37 of the paper-book) similarly opined that the petitioners were entitled to exemption from octroi duty for a period of five years from 19-11-1968. As the Municipal Council did not agree with those opinions of the Collector and the Director of Industries, a demand was made from the petitioners for payment of octroi duty and consequently, the petitioners filed this writ petition challenging the action of the Municipal council. ( 7. ) SECTION 132 of the M. P. Municipalities Act, 1961, vests the power of exemption from taxes in the State Government. It is as follows:- "the State Government may, on its own motion or otherwise after giving the Council an opportunity of expressing its views in the matter, by order, exempt from payment of any tax in whole or in part any person or class of persons or any property or description of properties for the purpose of granting protection to any industry or for any other purpose in public interest subject to such condition as may be specified in such order. " Therefore, if the State Government grants exemption in respect of any tax, a municipal Council cannot challenge that exemption and it will have no lawful authority to make a demand in respect of such tax exempted by the State government. " Therefore, if the State Government grants exemption in respect of any tax, a municipal Council cannot challenge that exemption and it will have no lawful authority to make a demand in respect of such tax exempted by the State government. In this connection we might advert to the pronouncement of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Bagalkot City Municipality v. Bagalkot cement Co. , AIR 1963 SC 771 = (1963) Supp (l)SCR 710. wherein their Lordships made the following observations : - "it was contended on behalf of the appellant that since at the time the municipal district was extended an opportunity had been given to the respondent to object, it could not now take any exception to the imposition of the octroi duty on the ground that it had no opportunity to object to the rule levying the duty or the bye-law fixing octroi limits when these were made. All this seems to us to be to no purpose. The respondent is not basing its objection to pay the octroi duty on this ground. All that it says is that it is not liable as its factory is not within the octroi limits. It raises a question of interpretation of the bye-law. The fact that the respondent could have objected to the extension of the municipal district is wholly irrelevant in interpretating the bye-law fixing the octroi limits and the only question ra this case is of such interpretation. We may add that if a bye-law is invalid because it had not been published to persons likely to be affected by it, it would not become valid when the municipal district of the municipality concerned was extended on notice to everyone entitled to object to the extention. " In that case, the Municipality was constituted under the Bombay District municipal Act, 1901. Section 4 of the Act gave powers to the Government to declare any local area as a Municipal district and to extend, contract or otherwise alter the limits of the Municipal district. The area in question was not included within the Municipal limits originally, but it was subsequently included by a specific order. Therefore, the question arose whether the taxes in force in the Municipal area would automatically be deemed to be imposed and levied to the newly added area. The area in question was not included within the Municipal limits originally, but it was subsequently included by a specific order. Therefore, the question arose whether the taxes in force in the Municipal area would automatically be deemed to be imposed and levied to the newly added area. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court negatived the contention that taxes in force in the original area would automatically be applicable to the newly added area. ( 8. ) IN this connection we may further advert to the pronouncement of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in The Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. v. The state of Haryana and another, AIR 1972 SC 121 . wherein their Lordships made the following observations: "in the present appeals, the High Court came to the conclusion that by reason of the provisions contained in section 5 (4) of the Act taxes would automatically become leviable to new areas added to the Municipal Limits. The High Court fell into the error of holding that taxes became automatically leviable in new areas. The High Court relied on the decision of this Court in Bagalkot City Municipality v. Bagalkot Cement Co. to support the conclusion of taxes becoming automatically leviable in extended areas on the ground that by reason of the provisions contained in section 5 (4) of the Act the inhabitants of the included area would suffer all the burdens that are inherent in their inclusion within the Municipal limits. This conclusion of the High Court is not supported either by the decision of this court or by the provisions of the statute. In the first place, a taxing provisions always receives a strict interpretation for the obvious reason that there must be clear and express language imposing a tax and the date from which such tax shall come into effect. Notifications under the Act are the only authority and mandate for imposition and charge of tax. Notifications are not made applicable to include areas under section 5 (4) of the Act. There cannot be any taxation by implication. Secondly, in the Bagalkot City Municipality case, (supra), there was no provision comparable to section 5 (4) of the Act and this court did not decide that taxes would become automatically leviable. Notifications are not made applicable to include areas under section 5 (4) of the Act. There cannot be any taxation by implication. Secondly, in the Bagalkot City Municipality case, (supra), there was no provision comparable to section 5 (4) of the Act and this court did not decide that taxes would become automatically leviable. On the contrary, this court in the Bagalkot City Municipality case (supra), in interpreting the words "municipal district" occurring in a bye-law did not extend the meaning of the "municipal District" to include areas which were subsequent to the making of the bye-law added within the limits of the Municipal District. The reason given by this Court was that the expression "municipal District" in the bye-law referred to the "municipal District" as existing when the byelaw was framed. The words "municipal District" in the bye-law were not construed to relate to extended areas in the Bagalkot City Municipality case (supra ). Section 48 of the Municipal Act provided that a bye-law could be made only with the sanction of the Government. The further provisions of section 48 in the Bagalkot City Municipality case (supra) required publication of a proposed bye-law for the information of the persons likely to be affected thereby. The lack of publication of the bye-law to the Bagalkot Cement Company affected by the bye-law was held to be an additional reason for refusing to extend the meaning of the words "municipal District" to include extended areas. There is no such aspect in the present appeals. The Bagalkot City Municipality case (supra) is, therefore, of no aid in interpreting section 5 (4) of the Act in the manner the High Court did. " ( 9. ) IT is true that in the case which was before their Lordships of the supreme Court, the word notification was not there in section 5 (4) of the punjab Municipal Act, 1911. That section spoke of rules, bye-laws, orders, directions and powers and did not significantly mention the word notification. " ( 9. ) IT is true that in the case which was before their Lordships of the supreme Court, the word notification was not there in section 5 (4) of the punjab Municipal Act, 1911. That section spoke of rules, bye-laws, orders, directions and powers and did not significantly mention the word notification. It was for that reason that their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the word notification not being there, the same could not be construed to be synonymous to rules, bye-laws, orders, directions and powers and, therefore, the Municipal Council of Sonepat could not make a demand for octroi duty in respect of raw-materials, components and parts imported by the industrial unit within the industrial areas of Sonepat town. ( 10. ) THIS question was considered by us in The Motilal Agarwal Mills, pvt. Ltd. Birlanagar v. The Gwalior Municipal Corporation and Govt, of M. P. , M. P. No. 142 of 72 (Gwalior Bench) especially with reference to the two Supreme Court cases mentioned above. In that case the industrial area near Gwalior City was not included within the municipal limits. It was so included for the first time on 30-8-1953. The question, therefore, was whether by inclusion of the area within the Municipal limits, the taxes in force in the original area would automatically be applicable to the newly added area. Relying on the said two Supreme Court decisions, a Division Bench of this Court held that there would be no automatic application of the existing taxes to the newly added area. We may observe that they have to be specifically applied. ( 11. ) WITH respect to this case the learned Advocate General urged that this case and the case of the Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. v. The State of Haryana and another {supra) would be distinguishable on the ground that in section 5 (4)of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, as also in section 406 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, the word notification is not there; while the section mentions only rules, bye-laws, regulations, orders, directions and powers. It is true that that point of distinction is certainly there. The punjab Act and the M. P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, merely talk of rules, bye-laws, orders etc. and do not mention the word notification. Therefore, in those Acts any notification imposing a tax is not contemplated. It is true that that point of distinction is certainly there. The punjab Act and the M. P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, merely talk of rules, bye-laws, orders etc. and do not mention the word notification. Therefore, in those Acts any notification imposing a tax is not contemplated. It is true that the word notification is specifically mentioned, in section 8 of the M. P. Municipalities Act, 1961. Therefore, we are required to examine as to what is the effect of inclusion of the new area within the Municipal limits under sections 5 and 8 of the M. P. Municipalities Act, 1961. Sections 5 and 8 are at under: "section 5.- Notification of intention to create or alter limits or abolish Municipalities- (1) The State Government may, by notification, signify its intention- (a) to declare any local area to be a Municipality; or (b) to include within a Municipality any local area contiguous to the same; or (c) to exclude from a Municipality any local area comprised therein; or (d) to amalgamate two or more contiguous Municipalities and to constitute one municipality in their place; or (e) to split up a Municipality and to constitute two or more Municipalities in its place; or (f) to withdraw the whole area comprised in any Municipality from the operation of the Act. (2) Every notification under sub-section (1) shall define the limits of the local area to which it relates. (3) Any adult inhabitant of the local area defined in the notification under sub-section (1) may, if he objects to anything therein contained, submit his objection, in writing, to the Collector within forty-five days from the date of publication of the notification and all objections so received shall, within forty five days thereof, be forwarded by the Collector to the State Government with his comments thereon. (4) On receipt of the objections along with the comments under sub-section (3), the state Government may, after considering the same and passing orders thereon, by notification with effect from a date to be specified therein,- (a) declare the local area to be a Municipality; or (b) include the local area or any specified" part thereof in the Municipality or exclude it therefrom; or (c) constitute a new Municipality in place of the Municipalities amalgamated; or (d) split up the existing Municipality and constitute two or more Municipalities in its place, as the case may be, or (e) withdraw the whole area comprised in the Municipality from the operation of this Act; as the case may be. " "section 8. Effect of including a local area in a Municipality -. When a local area has been included in a Municipality by a notification under sub-section (4) of section 5, all notifications, rules, bye-laws, orders, directions, notices and powers made, issued, or conferred under this Act and in force throughout the Municipality at the time, shall, unless the state Government, by notification, otherwise directs apply to such local area. " ( 12. ) WE are concerned with section 8. As such, section 5 mentions a notification of intention to create or alter limits or abolish Municipalities; while section 8 provides that when a local area has been included in a Municipality by a notification under sub section (4) of section 5, all notifications, rules, bye-laws, orders, directions, notices and powers made, issued, or conferred under this Act and in force throughout the Municipality at the time, shall, unless the State Government, by notification, otherwise directs apply to such local area. The section clearly contemplates that all notifications in relation to taxes shall automatically apply to such newly added area no sooner by a notification, the area is included within the Municipal Limits. Therefore, it is not necessary for a Municipal Council to follow the procedure laid down by section 129 of the M. P. Municipalities Act, 1961, on every occasion. ( 13. ) FROM this point of view there can be no doubt that the two Supreme court cases mentioned above and the Division Bench case of this Court, namely, the Motilal Agarwal Mills, Pvt. Ltd. , Birlanagar, Gwalior v. The Gwalior Municipal Corporation and Govt, of M. P. {supra) are distinguishable. ( 13. ) FROM this point of view there can be no doubt that the two Supreme court cases mentioned above and the Division Bench case of this Court, namely, the Motilal Agarwal Mills, Pvt. Ltd. , Birlanagar, Gwalior v. The Gwalior Municipal Corporation and Govt, of M. P. {supra) are distinguishable. Consequently, we would uphold the contention of the learned Advocate General on this point. ( 14. ) IT was also urged by the learned Advocate General that, in fact, there was no expansion of the unit during the relevant period so as to entitle it to the benefits of exemption granted by the exemption notification, dated 19-11-1968 (Respondents Annexure-11 ; to be found at pags 136-137 of the paper-book) and exemption notification, dated 17-4-1971 (Petitioners Annexure-B, to be found at page 32 of the paper-book ). We may observe that it is purely a question of fact, which it was competent for the Exemption Committee to decide. This Court does not sit as an appellate Court over the actions of authorities constituted under the statutes or enactments. There was material before the Exemption Committee to come to the conclusion that the petitioners unit was substantially expanded during the relevant period and as such, it was entitled to exemption under the two exemption notifications. That, in our opinion, should be the end of the matter. Consequently, we uphold the petitioners contention that in accordance with the letter of the Collector, dated 3-8-1971 (Petitioners Annexure-C/1, to be found at page 35 of the paper-book) and the opinion of the Director of Industries, dated 26-7-1971 (Petitionersannexure-C/2, to be found at page 37 of the paper-book), the petitioners were entitled to exemption for a period of five years with effect from 19-11-1968, and in this view, the demand of the Municipal Council for payment of octroi duty by the petitioners was not only unjustified, but also illegal. We may further clarify that the further exemption would be in respect of the expanded portion only. However, it is for the exemption Committee to work out that aspect and not for us to say anything more. ( 15. We may further clarify that the further exemption would be in respect of the expanded portion only. However, it is for the exemption Committee to work out that aspect and not for us to say anything more. ( 15. ) CONSEQUENTLY, the writ petition filed by the petitioners is allowed and by a writ of mandamus, the Municipal Council is restrained from taking steps from recovering the octroi duty from the petitioners for the period from 19-11-1968 to 18-11-1973 and as regards the amount of exemption with respect to the expansion, the matter is left for decision by the Exemption Committee. The petitioners shall be entitled to their costs of this petition as against the respondents. Counsels fee shall be Rs. 200/ -. The outstanding amount of the security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioners. Petition allowed.