JUDGMENT - R.K. JOSHI, J.:---The short point of law involved in this Revision Application is, whether, under the facts and circumstances, this Court should interfere, in the exercise of its powers under section 115 of Civil Procedure Code, to disturb an interlocutory order made by the lower Court during the pendency of the suit disallowing certain piece of evidence and the question arises in this way. 2. The present petitioner, (hereinafter referred to as Venubai for the sake of brevity) had taken the suit premises hearing Shop Nos. 8 and 9 in a building known as Gulabchand Tejmal Chawl situate at 335 Trikamdas Road, Kandivali (West), Bombay. Gulabchand Tejmal, the owner of the building, is respondent No. 1 before this Court and Mr. V.M. Kurulkar, respondent No. 2 was the Advocate who represented Venubai in the last litigation to which I would make a reference shortly. 3. The landlord, respondent No. 1 Gulabchand Tejmal, brought R.A.E. Suit No. 444 of 1962 against Venubai for ejectment on half-a-dozen grounds which inter alia, included default, erection of permanent structure, bona fide requirement for personal use and occupation, and breach of Clause (c) of section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act. The suit was resisted probably on every conceivable ground. It reached the stage of hearing on 29th March, 1965. The landlord was put into the box and part of his evidence was recorded. At that stage parties put in the cannot terms compromising the claim, but the consent terms which find place at page 56 of the present compilation, were signed by the plaintiff, Gulabchand Tejmal, as well as his learned Advocate, and for the defendant-tenant only by the Advocate Mr. Kurulkar. The consent terms bore no signatures of Venubai. Pursuant to the consent terms, a decree was made on 29th March, 1965. 4. On 3rd April, 1965 Venubai made an application to set aside the decree mainly on the grounds that Mr. Kurulkar had no authority to compromise, that Mr. Kurulkar had colluded with the landlord Gulabchand, and the compromise decree was obtained by fraud. Mr. Kurulkar advised Venubais husband, who was present in the Court, to compromise. But her husband thought with an assurance that he would consult Venubai and return, left the Court hall on 29th itself but could not turn up in time. On the next day he reached the Court and contracted Mr. Mr. Kurulkar advised Venubais husband, who was present in the Court, to compromise. But her husband thought with an assurance that he would consult Venubai and return, left the Court hall on 29th itself but could not turn up in time. On the next day he reached the Court and contracted Mr. Kurulkar, and to his shock and surprise, he found that the matter was compromised referred to above, The application to set aside the decree was dismissed on 5th June, 1965. Venubai went in revision No. 352 of 1965 to the Appellate Bench of the learned Judges of the Small Causes Court, Bombay, but with little success. Against this order she approached the High Court in Special Civil Application No. 2200 of 1968, and every point summarised in the foregoing paragraph appears to have been stressed by the learned Advocate who appeared for Venubai. The learned Single Judge of this Court (Deshpande, J.) rejected the application without any order as to costs. The order was made on July 16, 1969. 5. On this background, Venubai filed R.A. Declaration Suit No. 1433 of 1969 against the landlord. Gulabchand and her ex-Advocate Mr. Kurulkar for a declaration that the decree in RAE Suit No. 444 of 1962 was void inoperative, bad in law, and for an injunction restraining the landlord from executing the same, with some other ancillary reliefs which are needless to be dilated at this stage. In this long-drawn plaint in which there is a history of the past litigation, it is alleged in para 8, which is the sheet anchor of the present claim for the avoidance of the decree, that the same was obtained by fraud, through Mr. Kurulkar had no authority to compromise on behalf of Venubai, he had colluded with Gulabchand. The three principal grounds were fraud, collusion and want of authority on the part of the learned Advocate to compromise. The landlord Gulabchand put in his answer stoutly denying these accusations and the parties went to trial. 6. Issues were framed covering these contentions as well as other defences raised, touching the jurisdiction, limitation, proper valuation and maintainability of the suit etc. The issue are reproduced by the learned trial Judge who was seized of the matter, and they find a place at page 26 of the present compilation. 6. Issues were framed covering these contentions as well as other defences raised, touching the jurisdiction, limitation, proper valuation and maintainability of the suit etc. The issue are reproduced by the learned trial Judge who was seized of the matter, and they find a place at page 26 of the present compilation. Barring technical issues, the two most important issues cover the question of fraud, collusion and want of authority on the part of Mr. Kurulkar. 7. After the issues were framed and the matter, reached the stage of hearing, the plaintiff stepped into the witness box and probably she had spoken to the undisputed preliminaries. An attempt was made by her learned Advocate to put certain questions to convince the Court as to how the consent decree was otherwise bad in law. He endeavoured to point out that none of the grounds set up by Gulabchand in his earlier suit possessed a tinge of reality nor did the Judge apply his mind when he allowed the compromise to culminate into a decree. This being, a decree made under the Bombay Rent Control Act, in the absence of the requisite grounds and without application of mind about the probability of the existence of such ground, the decree would stand vitiated. The learned Advocate for Venubai tried to wedge the matter a little further by referring to the past litigation and attempted to bring on record the existence or otherwise of all the various grounds referred to by Gulabchand in his plaint. In view of the relations between the landlord and the tenant and the improbability of the parties arriving at a compromise, an objection was raised by Mr. Lashkari appearing for the landlord Gulabchand that all these questions were inadmissible. The learned Judge was requested to allow questions and answers to go on the record by reference to various sections of the Evidence Act, and in particular, to sections 3 to 10 and 44. But the learned trial Judge on getting the main thread of the present litigation and the primary issues involved, disallowed these questions. 8. This order was made on 18th June, 1973. Against this order Revision Application No. 243 of 1973 was preferred before the Division Bench of the Small Causes Court which refused to interfere and rejected the application on 26th November, 1973. It is this order, which is impugned by Mr. 8. This order was made on 18th June, 1973. Against this order Revision Application No. 243 of 1973 was preferred before the Division Bench of the Small Causes Court which refused to interfere and rejected the application on 26th November, 1973. It is this order, which is impugned by Mr. Morje appearing for Venubai in this Revision Application. 9. In his very elaborate and exhaustive argument Mr. Morje has left very little unsaid on behalf of Venubai, and much of it, with due respect to him, was besides the point. The short question involved and formulated, at the outset, is whether this Court should interfere in the order made by the lower Court in disallowing the question at this stage in the exercise of its powers under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. 10. Before referring to a few of the numerous authorities cited and which have really some bearing on the question at issue, I may, without narrating the harrowing details, observe that virtually all the grounds now urged before me by Mr. Morje were covered in the Special Civil Application of Venubai by the learned Advocate, who represented her before the learned Judge and one and all of them were rejected. But I am not resting my judgment on the observations made by Deshpande, J., who decided the Special Civil Application or on the reasoning adopted by him. I am mentioning these particulars just to point out that Morjes arguments were nothing short of rehearsal of what was urged before Deshpande, J. 11. Mr. Morje for the appellant argued at great length that half a dozen grounds mentioned in the last plaint, were purely imaginary and the learned Advocate Mr. Kurulkar had no authority to compromise. The three important issues would commonly be substantiated by falling back upon the background which has a bearing on the last litigation and which facilitated Gulabchands claim. But I am unable to share his views. As I read the plaint in the present case, he has no where said that the decree in the last litigation, which was obtained by compromise, stands vitiated because the learned Judge did not apply his mind to the requirements of the statutory provisions or that the decree travelled beyond the ambit of section 12 or section 13 of the Bombay Rent Act. By attention was drawn to the consent terms in which reference is made to payment of compensation for the period from 1965 to 1968, and the undertaking given not to cause any nuisance to the landlord or to make any alternation. According to Mr. Morje, these grounds must exist or there should be some iota of evidence to enable the Court to accept the terms and to make a decree pursuant to them. Before touching the authority, I may only point out that in para 3 of this very plaint he has alleged that the plaintiff also denied the other allegations in the suit and had deposited the arrears of rent in the Court in the said suit. Mere deposit in the Court before of the suit may or may not enable the tenant to the protection of section 12. It is no where made clear whether the case was really covered by section 12(3)(a) or 12(3)(b) of the Bombay Rent Act. A bare and passing reference to these averments is made in para 3 but no case is put up in the entire plaint that the decree was vitiated on the numerous grounds which were agitated before me during the course of the hearing of this revision application. 12. Pausing for a while here, it may be made clear that such an attempt was made in making an application and taking the matter to the High Court. It is borne out by the observations made by my learned Brother Deshpande, J. It is clear that the plaintiff (Landlord) was put into the witness box and part of his evidence was recorded. Next it is apparent that the Vakalatnama executed by Venubai in favour of Mr. Kurulkar, in terms, authorised him to compromise the claim. It has been, further observed that throughout the proceedings it was not Venubai but her husband who instructed Mr. Karulkar and attended to this litigation. A similar point that the decree travels beyond the scope of the Bombay Rent Act was urged with reference to various Supreme Court rulings which are negatived. The learned Judge was also not prepared to accept the plea of collusion between Gulabchand and Kurulkar. These are all questions of fact which were once agitated before this vary Court and ruled out. In putting the very question or questions on similar lines, it is obvious that Mr. The learned Judge was also not prepared to accept the plea of collusion between Gulabchand and Kurulkar. These are all questions of fact which were once agitated before this vary Court and ruled out. In putting the very question or questions on similar lines, it is obvious that Mr. Morje is trying to reopen the same gates which were closed for him by Deshpande, J. These observations reflect a good deal on the factual aspect of the case and the conduct of the parties. 13. Now adverting to the legal aspect, great reliance was placed by Mr. Morje on the various Supreme Court rulings which dwell on the validity or otherwise of compromising decrees falling under the Rent Control Acts of the various States and decided by the Supreme Court. It is needless to refer to those authorities in detail which are reported in (Bahadur Singh v. Muni Subrat Dass)1, 1969(2) S.C.R. 432, (Ferozi Lal Jain v. Man Mal)2, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 794, (Kushalaya Devi v. K.L. Bansal)3, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 638 and (K.K. Chari v. R.M. Seshadri)4, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1311. The ratio of these decisions, to put it in a nutshell, is that the rent courts are not competent to pass a decree either in invitum or with the consent of the parties on a ground which is de hors the Act or ultra vires the Act. 14. However, the entire case law on this topic was reconsidered by the Supreme Court in the latest pronouncement in (Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpotrai Iccharam)5, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 471. Their Lordships made it clear that consent decrees in such actions are not necessarily nullities if there be a clear admission in the compromise incorporated in the decree of the fundamental facts which would constitute a ground for eviction under section 12 or section 13 of the Bombay Rent Control Act. It would be presumed that the Court was satisfied about the existence of such statutory ground. Such a decree for eviction, though apparently passed on the basis of a compromise, would be valid. The pertinent observations appear in para 26 of the judgment and they read thus: "Such material may take the shape either of evidence recorded or produced in the case, or, it may partly or wholly be in the shape of an express or implied admission made in the compromise agreement, itself. The pertinent observations appear in para 26 of the judgment and they read thus: "Such material may take the shape either of evidence recorded or produced in the case, or, it may partly or wholly be in the shape of an express or implied admission made in the compromise agreement, itself. Admissions, if true and clear, are by far the best proof of the facts admitted. Admissions in pleadings or judicial admissions, admissible under section 58 of the Evidence Act, made by the parties or their agents at or before the hearing of the case, stand on higher footing than evidentiary admissions. The former class of admissions are fully binding on the party that makes them and constitute a waiver of proof. They by themselves can be made the foundation of the rights of the parties." As the matter is being tried by the learned Judge in the lower Court on merits, without expressing myself on these aspects of the case, I may only add that I am not oblivious of these observations of the Supreme Court. They afford a sound answer to Mr. Morjes repeated arguments before me. 15. These considerations apart, the relevant issues pressed in the case, cover the field of fraud, collusion and want of authority on the part of Mr. Kurulkar. The important question would be whether the material sought to be introduced by Mr. Morje as to how the relations between the landlord and the tenant stood when the last suit was filed or what the imputation were between them, whether the grounds really existed or not etc., would not be germane to the points at issue. My attention was also drawn to the various sections from 3 to 11 and 44 of the Evidence Act, but in stressing those parts of his argument he is ignoring the basic requirement of these sections. Section 3 envisages facts and issues and that expression has been defined to mean any fact whether by itself or any connection with other facts the existence, non-existence, nature, or extent of any right, liability, or disability, asserted or denied in any suit or proceedings necessarily follows. Pausing for a while here, at the cost of repetition, I may add that the three pertinent questions are fraud, collusion and want of authority. Pausing for a while here, at the cost of repetition, I may add that the three pertinent questions are fraud, collusion and want of authority. Much stress was laid on the provisions contained in section 5 or section 6 which speak of relevant facts and relevancy of facts forming part of the same transaction. Facts which, though not in issue if they are so connected with a fact in issue as to form part of the same transaction, they become relevant. Even if one were to apply these tests, I fail to understand how he could introduce the old material. It is needless, to my mind, to mention the remaining sections because I have found that they have no bearing on the points involved. 16. This takes me to the crucial question as to whether in the revision and at this stage I should upset the order of the lower Court and the point is squarely covered by an authority of our Court in (Isa Adam v. Bai Mariam)6, A.I.R. 1973 Bom. 304, decided by the Division Bench of this High Court. But before referring to the relevant observations in this case I may make a reference to the view taken by Masodkar, J. in (M/s. Sanjay Cotton Co. v. Omorakash)7, A.I.R. 1973 Bom. 40. The point before the learned Judge was somewhat similar apparently, but arising in altogether a different context. While dealing with the bare aspect as to whether the High Court should in all probability interfere with the inter-locutory orders and the ambit of Clause C of section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, his Lord ship proceeded to observe that clause C of section 115 has however since its inception, has proved a cockpit of judicial debate both as to its efficiency as well as its sweep viz. the power conferred by this section upon the High Court. 17. The relevant portion of section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code with reference to Clause C would read thus :--- "The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court sub-ordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such sub-ordinate Court appears ................. (a) .............................................. (b) ............................................. (a) .............................................. (b) ............................................. (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity." By no stretch of imagination can it be said in the instant case that the learned trial Judge who was seized of this matter had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit or he has failed to exercise any jurisdiction vested in him and putting all the charitable interpretation of what has been said by Mr. Morje, and if one were to agree with him for a moment, (I do not share his views. This I must make it clear) it would be worthwhile to note that it is well-settled principle of law where a Court has jurisdiction to determine a question and where it determines that question, it cannot be said that it has acted illegally or with material irregularity because it has come to an erroneous decision on a question of fact or even of law. In the case of (Malikarjun v. Narhari)8, I.L.R. 25 Bom. 337 the privy Council very aptly observed that the (lower Court) made a sad mistake. It is true but the Court has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right. Even if one were to be with Mr. Morje these observations would form a complete and sound answer to the various points urged by him so far as the legal aspect are concerned. One may call the ruling given by the learned trial Judge as a sad mistake if it comes to that, although I am not prepared to do so, but that does not confer the revisional jurisdiction on the Court. Moreover, observations of Masodkar, J. strongly relied upon by Mr. Morje have been made in altogether different context. 18. There the facts were quite different and on the disputed documents or questions of facts, it was common ground that they were not only relevant to form the material evidence relating to the liability of the defendants and particularly of defendant No. 1; as it had direct bearing on the liability of defendant No. 1, it would certainly be a fact in issue and if the lower Court were to shut out the evidence on such issue my learned Brother Masodkar, J. was justified in interfering in exercise of this power under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. 19. 19. I have already pointed out the salient features of the litigation and how the facts sought to be brought on record are co-related with the issues framed by the learned Judge on which the parties have gone to trial. On this background the legal aspect falls to be determined. In Isa Adam v. Bai Mariam two primary issues were raised as to what was the market value of the property in question and whether the defendant be allowed to prove by oral evidence any separate agreement or understanding for the purpose of contracting by adding or subtracting from the terms of evidence when admission was made to lead the evidence which ran counter to contradict the terms of the contract. It was disallowed as being inadmissible and against that order Isa Adam had approached the Court in revision with reference to certain observations made by the Privy Council in (Rajah Amir Hassan Khan v. Shao Baksh Singh)9, 11 I.A. 237, (P.C.) and (Balkrishna Udayar v. Vasudeva Aiyar)10, 44 I.A. 26. Their Lordships pointed out that the exclusion of evidence by the learned Judge would at the most be point of law in which the question of jurisdiction is not involved nor would it be appropriate to interfere at such a stage by exercising the jurisdiction under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. Authorities apart, under the singular circumstances of this case, having regard to the chequered career which it has to its credit and the attempt to bring back the old material on record which is forbidden by law and bearing in mind the observations of the Division bench, I am reluctant to interfere with the order passed by the Division Bench of the Small Cause Court. 20. In the result, the application is dismissed. The rule is discharged with costs. -----