JUDGMENT 1. - The relevant facts in all these writ petitions are not in dispute and are also identical in material particulars. As they raise identical controversy they shall be disposed of by a common order. 2. The Divisional Forest Officer, hereinafter called the D.F.O. by his sale notice dated 15.9.1973 notified all concerned that contract for minor forest produce in various ranges of forests of Chittorgarh District shall be put to auction on 22nd of September, 1973, at 11 A.M., at D.F.O's Office Chittorgarh. It was stated in the notice that those desirous of taking forest contract may give their bids at the auction. It was further stated that the auction shall take place according to the Sale Rules which could be obtained from the office of the D.F.O. on payment of Rs. 1.30p. Previously on more than one occasion the D.F.O. had issued sale notices regarding the auction of the minor forest produce on identical terms excepting one condition that the D.F.O. shall point out the forest ranges which were to be kept for the labour cooperative societies. It may be mentioned that such a condition was not embodied in the auction notice of 15th September, 1973 on the written request of the forest contractors. As schedule the auction took place in regard to the various areas on 22nd September, 1973 and the petitioner's bids were the highest. It is alleged that the petitioners as per the Sale Rules deposited one fourth of the bid price with the D.F.O. under a receipt and further that the petitioners submitted to D.F.O. the agreement form duly signed on behalf of the Government of Rajasthan and waited for the orders to deposit the remaining balance of the auction money. According to the petitioners they did not hear anything from the D.F.O. and later on came to learn that the contract in regard to which their bids were highest have been allotted to the respondents Nos. 4 on the amount which was one percent more than the highest bid. This order of allotment in favour of the respondents Nos. 4 is dated 22nd of October, 1973, and has been reproduced in all the petitions. It has been alleged that the order of respondents Nos. 1 to 3 allotting the contract to the respondent No. 4 is absolutely illegal and without jurisdiction. This order of allotment in favour of the respondents Nos. 4 is dated 22nd of October, 1973, and has been reproduced in all the petitions. It has been alleged that the order of respondents Nos. 1 to 3 allotting the contract to the respondent No. 4 is absolutely illegal and without jurisdiction. The petitioners' case is that it was not open to the respondents Nos. 1 to 3 to cancel the auction finalised in their favour without any lawful cause or authority nor there is law regarding allotment of area in ranges to the various or labour cooperative societies in manner it has been done. The petitioners' say is that once there was an open bid at the auction the same could not have been cancelled unless the respondents would have given substantially a higher bid under clause 14 of the Sale Rules of 1958, as the power of allotment of an area is limited till the auction is not complete and as soon as the hammer fell there remained no power with any authority to allot the auctioned area. The further case of the petitioner is that any preference over & above the petitioners to the respondent S.No. 4 is discriminatory & is violative of A.14 of the Constitution of India & that the respondents Nos.1 to 3 have acted in arbitrary & high handed manner in asking the petitioners to withdraw their one fourth of the amount deposited with the D.F.O. The petitioners have therefore, prayed for issue of a writ or direction or order quashing the impugned order dated 29.10.1973 and further to command the respondents Nos. 1 to 3 to execute the agreement on behalf of the Governor of Rajasthan and honour the contract. 3. The State has not filed return in writ petitions but has submitted reply to the stay petitions in all the cases wherein it has disclosed its case. The case of the State as given in the reply to the stay application is that there was no concluded contract in favour of the petitioners and, therefore, the petitioners had no legal right to bring these writ petitions. It has been alleged that the matter if at all is a case of breach of contract simpliciter and for that proper remedy is by way of a suit and not by proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It has been alleged that the matter if at all is a case of breach of contract simpliciter and for that proper remedy is by way of a suit and not by proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The allotment in favour of the respondents No. 4 has been justified on the ground that impetus has to be given to the cooperative movement. To the similar effect is the reply to the stay application by the respondent No.4. 4. It is not in dispute that at the auction the petitioner's bid was highest. It is also, not in dispute that the contracts for which the petitioner's bid was the highest have been allotted to the cooperative societies respondent in each case. The first question that arises for consideration is whether the petitioner had legal right in his favour. The contention of the petitioner is that as soon as the hammer had fallen they had acquired the right to the contract and respondents Nos. 1 to 3 had no jurisdiction to cancel their contract which had conferred upon them a vested right. It was argued that the auction had taken place under the Sale Rules regarding the contract of forest which are statutory rules and under the rules once the earnest money was deposited it was not open to pass over the auction bid except under Rule 14 of the Rules. It is submitted that under Rule 14 of the Sale Rules before undoing the auction there should have been an application of a higher bid containing an offer of a substantial higher bid within 24 hours from the date of the falling of the hammer followed by a deposit of portion of the amount as may be determined by the D.F.O. According to the learned counsel no such application was made by the respondent Cooperative Society and, therefore the act of the respondents Nos. 1 to 3 in cancelling the petitioner's contract is against the provisions of the Sale Rules. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Rules have been made under the Rajasthan Forest Act and have also been published in the Government Gazette dated 1.5.1958, and have been issued under the authority of the Government. The learned counsel went on to contend that the Rules are covered under Section 26A of the Forest Act hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'. The learned counsel went on to contend that the Rules are covered under Section 26A of the Forest Act hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'. In the alternative it has been submitted that the Rules could be under section 76 of the Act which empowers Government to frame the Rules for the purpose of carrying out the object of the Act. 5. This bring me to the question as to whether the Sale Rules have statutory force. The Rules do not ex-facie show that they have been issued in the exercise of the powers conferred on the Government under section 26A or under Section 76 of the Act. The Rules are divided into 7 parts. The first part is under the head of preliminary; the second part relates to proceedings and conditions of auction, the third part relates to special provisions in regard to felling down of the trees. The fifth part deals with the transit of the forest produce under the transit pass etc. The sixth part deals with the clearance of the forest and the hygenic condition etc. and the last part i.e. the 7th part is under the head of miscellaneous. Obviously looking to the comprehensive nature of the Rules under the various parts they cannot be taken to have been made in the exercise of powers under section 26A (e) of the Act. Section 26A (e) of the Act reads as follows:- "26A (e) The felling, uprooting, tapping, gridling, sawying, conversion and removal of trees and timber and the collection, manufacture and removal of forest produce such forests;" From the very look of the section 26A these comprehensive Rules cannot be brought under section 26A. As regards Section 76 of the Act is concerned. I am not satisfied that these Rules have been made in the exercise of the powers under that section. It is well to remember that when ever the Govt. comes out with the Rules in the exercise of its statutory powers it invariably indicates that the Rules have been issued in exercise of powers conferred under a particular section. This is conspicuously absent in this case which fact goes against the contention of the learned counsel. Mere publication of Rules in the Government Gazette will not grant them the statutory sanction in absence of their being promulgated in the exercise of statutory powers under the Act. This is conspicuously absent in this case which fact goes against the contention of the learned counsel. Mere publication of Rules in the Government Gazette will not grant them the statutory sanction in absence of their being promulgated in the exercise of statutory powers under the Act. In the Act there appears to be no provision for authorising the D.F.O. to enter into contracts to hold auction of minor forest produce. To my mind it appears that the Sale Rules are merely administrative instructions and cannot be held to be made in exercise of the statutory powers of the Government. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the Rules are not of statutory character but are merely administrative instructions. Therefore, it cannot be held that any statutory breach has been committed by the Government when it had not accepted the higher bid of the respondents No. 4 entitling the petitioner to ask for mandamus in this behalf. I am fortified in this view by mine by G.J. Fernandez v. State of Mysore, AIR 1967 SC 1353 wherein it has been held that where there has been any breach of the executive instructions that does not confer any right on any member of the public to ask for a writ against the Government for the infringement of such rules. 6. The contention that the petitioner had acquired a vested right by virtue of acceptance of his bid by the D.F.O. is equally untenable. It is true that the petitioner's bid was the highest. But at the same time it is to be noticed that no agreement as required under Article 299 of the Constitution was entered into between the parties which is a condition precedent before conferring any right upon the petitioner. The position of law in this behalf is very well settled and it will be sufficient to only cite the bench authority of this Court reported in State v. Raghunath Singh, AIR 1974 Raj 4 . The forest admittedly belonged to the Government and the right under the contract did not accrue and could not have accrued merely by auction bid unless the contract was entered into between the competent parties. The forest admittedly belonged to the Government and the right under the contract did not accrue and could not have accrued merely by auction bid unless the contract was entered into between the competent parties. The auction was conducted by the D.F.O. Granting that the hammer had fallen at the auction, the D.F.O. was not competent to accept the offer in view of the lack of financial powers to enter into contract in the amount in excess of Rs. 1000/-. It may be mentioned here that the financial powers delegated to the Forest Department Officers by the cabinet decision Secretariat (O & M Section) Circular No. F.16.34 O & M.62 dated 31st May, 1962, the D.F.O. was only authorised to enter into the contract only upto the amount of Rs. 1000/-. The statement showing the powers delegated to the officers of the Forest Department Rajasthan is reproduced here in below "(a) Financial Powers Delegated to Forest Department Officers : S.No. Nature of Power Authority to which power is delegated Extent of power delegated 1 2 3 4 5 1 to 17 xxxx xxxx xxx 18. To sanction refund of deposits made by a contractor as security for due performance of the contracts provided there has been no breach of contract Full powers to the authority competent to sanction the contracts 19. To sanction refund of revenue or receipts of Department C.C.R. upto Rs. 10,000. C.F. upto Rs. 5,000/-. D.F.O. upto Rs. 200/- (Subject to existing limitation and conditions) 20. To execute and sanction of contracts, security bonds and other instruments in connection with administration of forests and the business of the Department CCF upto a limit of Rs. 15,000/- per annum in each case for contract not exceeding a period of two years CF Upto a limit of Rs. 6000/- per annum in each case for contract not exceeding a period of two years DFC Upto a limit of Rs. 1000/- in each contract not exceeding one year. 21. xxx xxx xx From the above table it will appear that the D.F.O. had been delegated the powers of making contract upto the amount of Rs. 1000/- only. D.F.O. obviously could not confer legal rights by auction until the agreement was concluded by the competent Forest Officer who could be only the Conservator of Forest. 21. xxx xxx xx From the above table it will appear that the D.F.O. had been delegated the powers of making contract upto the amount of Rs. 1000/- only. D.F.O. obviously could not confer legal rights by auction until the agreement was concluded by the competent Forest Officer who could be only the Conservator of Forest. The Conservator of Forest did not give any sanction nor did he enter into any contract conferring any legal right in favour of the petitioner. The question of issuing mandamus for complying with the petitioner's alleged contract could hardly arise in the case. 7. The next contention of the counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner being the highest bidder and having deposited the earnest money, he was aggrieved person and interested party and under the principles of natural justice the Government should not have allowed the contract to the respondents No. 4 in arbitrary manner. Reliance in this regard has been placed on K.N. Guru Swami v. State of Mysore, AIR 1954 SC 592 , the D.F.O. South Khetri & Others v. Ram Sanehi Singh, 1970 UJ (SC) 291 and Union of India v. Hariram Samji Thakar (Civil Appeal No. 794 of 1968 decided on 5.2.1968) . The last two cases are clearly distinguishable. In the D.F.O. South Khetri & Others v. Ram Sarohi Singh, 1970 UJ (SC) 291 the Forest Officer had auctioned the timber and the auction bidder had removed the goods. The matter was taken before the higher authority and the decision of the Forest Officer was cancelled with giving opportunity to the affected party of being heard and in these circumstances the Supreme Court held that even in administrative matter the principles of natural justice require that the party whose rights to property are being affected must be heard before any adverse order is passed. In Hariram Samji's case (C.A. No. 794 of 1967 decided on 5.2.1968) the property in the goods had passed and despite that the authorities had cancelled the auction without affording any reasonable opportunity of being heard to the opposite party. In both these cases adverse orders were passed affecting the property right of the concerned parties and, therefore, on the principles of non observance of the principles of natural justice the Supreme Court had set aside those orders. In both these cases adverse orders were passed affecting the property right of the concerned parties and, therefore, on the principles of non observance of the principles of natural justice the Supreme Court had set aside those orders. In the instant case there was no legal right much less property right as the contract was not concluded &, therefore these cases cannot be brought to the aid of the petitioner. Guruswami's case (AIR 1954 SC 593) was a case of excise contract for liquor. In that case the liquor contract was knocked down in an auction by the Deputy Excise Commissioner in favour of one, A who was the highest bidder. B who was present at the auction did not bid. B saw the Excise Commissioner and offered Rs. 5000/- in excess of A's bid. B's offer was accepted and A's bid was cancelled. Subsequently the Deputy Excise Commissioner's order. It was held that A obtained no right to the licence by mere fact that auction had been knocked down in his favour the acceptance being subject to sanction of the Commissioner. Accordingly the relief regarding A's right to the licence by issuance of a mandamus was refused as there was no concluded contract. However, their Lordships while dealing with the question of allotting the contract to B observed that A could complain against the allotment in favour of B by way of a writ as B was interested in the contract & had a right under the laws of the State to receive the same treatment and be given the same chance as anybody else. Their Lordships further observed that in that case the person who was favoured with the contract was present at the auction but did not bid and had he done so A would have also raised his bid and that the way in which B was favoured with the contract was a furtive one as it would tend to leave the door wide open for nepotism and corruption if such matters are settled by private treatise behind the back of the interested parties. In S. Sinha v. S. Lal & Co., AIR 1973 SC 2720 on the strength of the authority of Venkateswarao Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1) it has been held that a person who has been pre-judicially affected by the act or omission of an authority can files writ even though he has no propriety or even fiduciary interest in the subject matter. This is permissible on the principle that the Court will intervene ex debito justiatiae when the public interest demands its intervention. 8. From the above discussion it will appear that an interested person aggrieved by the action of a public officer could complain by writ in appropriate case if the officer had acted adversely affecting the right of the party without any notice to him. But whether in a particular case intervention should be made ultimately rests in discretion of the court. The question, therefore, arises whether this is a fit case where the intervention should be made for cancelling the allotment made in favour of the respondent No. 4. It may be that the order of the respondents No. 1 to 2 was rather arbitrary and ordinarily should not have been made in the manner in which it has been made. But at the same time it is well to remember that the writ of mandamus is not a matter of course and is within the discretion of the court which discretion has of course to be exercised in a judicial manner. There is no legal right in the petitioner for grant of contract in their favour. The Governor of Raj in exercise of his powers has approved the rules for the allotment of forset coupes fixation of prices of coupes and sale of forest produce for the benefit of the forest cooperative societies in Rajasthan. These rules have been published in the Rajasthan Rajpatra part 'Ga' dated May 1, 1958 p. 219. These rules are of course of administrative character but they are a beneficial piece of instructions for giving fillip to the cooperative societies which may belong to scheduled caste or scheduled tribes or labourers and artisans by profession. These rules make concessional provision for the labourers and artisans in matter of minor forest produce contract and are intended to give fillip to the forest labourers for the amelioration of their economic condition. These rules make concessional provision for the labourers and artisans in matter of minor forest produce contract and are intended to give fillip to the forest labourers for the amelioration of their economic condition. In the present case formerly at three occasions even in the auction notice the reservation was indicated in the auction notice but in the notice of 15.9.1973 no reservation was made at the request of the contractors to the detriment of the forest labourer's cooperative societies. The cooperative society is constituted of forest labourers who have got no individual strength to take contract and it will not be in the interest of justice to dislodge them on the principle of ex debito justiatiae which leans in favour of the respondent No. 4 as they were not given any reservation by the Government at the time of the auction despite the declared policy of the Government. In the totality of facts and circumstances of these cases it cannot be said that there has been flagrant miscarriage of justice to the petitioner. On the other hand substantial justice has been done. There is therefore no need for interference by issuance of a writ of mandamus for cancelling the allotment in favour of respondent No. 4 looking to the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case. 9. Before parting with the case, I am constrained to observe that the Government Officers in acting according to their sweet will without caring for the declared policy of the Government for making provisions of allotment to backward class like forest labour and also taking subsequent decision behind the back of the petitioner lacked propriety and has consequently given rise to this litigation. In fairness therefore, the respondents Nos. 1 to 3 deserve to be saddled with costs of the petition. 10. In the result, these writ petitions fail and are hereby dismissed. The respondents Nos. 1 to 3 however shall pay the costs of these petitions to the petitioners. The amount of the petitioners if any lying with the Govt. in regard to auction shall be refunded to the petitioners. *******