JUDGMENT S. Ali Ahmad, J. The petitioner has been detained in pursuance of an order dated the 1st of May, 1974, passed by the District Magistrate and Deputy Commissioner of Hazaribagh (Respondent No.2) under section 3 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and has been lodged in the Central Jail at Hazaribagh. The aforesaid order of detention was made as respondent no. 2 was satisfied that, with the view to preventing the petitioner from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or the maintenance of the public order, the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community, it was necessary to make an order that he be detained. The grounds of detention were served on the petitioner on the 5th of May, 1974. The order of detention, as appears from the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents, was approved by the State Government on the 11th of May, 1914, which was conveyed to the petitioner on the 13th of May, 1974. 2. This application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed challenging the detention of the petitioner and also for issue of a writ in the nature of habeas-corpus. 3. Mr. Brajkishore Prasad No. II, appearing for the petitioner, has argued that the detention of the petitioner is illegal on three accounts, namely, (a) that grounds nos. 8, 9 and 10 are subject-matter of a criminal prosecution which has been initiated under section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act on the basis of a first information report lodged by one Ramehwar Prasad Singh, Block Development Officer, Barhi; it is said that this case related to the alleged recoveries made on the 30th of April, 1974, from the shop and the godown of the petitioner; (b) that the order of detention is not specific as to whether it has been made for the security of the State or for the maintenance of public order; and (c) that grounds nos. 1, 3, 4 and 5 are vague. 4. I propose to deal with the three points raised by Mr. Brajkishore Prasad No.II, learned counsel for the petitioner, seperately. With respect to the first point, Mr. Prasad has argued that grounds nos. 1, 3, 4 and 5 are vague. 4. I propose to deal with the three points raised by Mr. Brajkishore Prasad No.II, learned counsel for the petitioner, seperately. With respect to the first point, Mr. Prasad has argued that grounds nos. 8, 9 and 10 are subject matter of a criminal prosecution and they cannot be the basis for a valid detention order under the Act. He submits that, on account of the pending prosecution, it is not possible for the petitioner to make an effective representation as provided in the Act. According to him this amounts to denial of proper and reasonable opportunities to make an affective representation. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the case of Biram Chand v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, 1974 B.B.C.J. 48. The facts of the case referred to above are quite distinguishable with the facts of the present case. In the aforesaid case decided by their lordships of the Supreme Court, the order of detention was passed on the 3rd of September, 1973, whereas, the cases referred to in the grounds of detention were instituted much before the order of detention was passed. In the instant case, it appears, the criminal prosecution was not started prior to the order of detention, dated the 1st of May, 1974. In my opinion, subsequent initiation of any criminal proceeding cannot vitiate order of detention already passed. I do not think the case reported in 1974 Bihar Bar Council Journal 434 (supra) helps the petitioner and, as such, I do not find 'any fault in the order of detention on this ground. 5. The second point urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner also has no substance. It is true that, in the order of detention supplied to the petitioner, a disjunctive expression "or" has been used. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents, it has been stated that "the security prisoner has been detained only with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community". In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents, it has been stated that "the security prisoner has been detained only with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community". A true copy of the detention order has been appended as Annexure "A" to the counter-affidavit which shows that the order of detention was made with a view to preventing Shri Jamuna Prasad (petitioner) from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. It appears that, on account of careless mistake on the part of the authority "security of the State or" has not been penned through in the copy supplied to the petitioner. Further, a perusal of the grounds served on the petitioner will show that the petitioner has been detained only with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. Mr. Brajkishore Prasad No. II has relied on two decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Kishori Mohan Bera v. The State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1749 and Akshoy Konai vs. The State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 300 wherein it was held that the mechanical use of disjunctive "or" disclosed that the District Magistrate was not sure in his mind about the precise ground for detaining the petitioner or that he had mechanically reproduced the language used in section 3 (a) (ii) of the Act. I have held above that the petitioner has been detained with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community, and by mistake, "security of the State or" was not penned through in the copy of the order served on the petitioner. It is also important to note that, in the grounds of detention, the expression "security of the State or" does not find place. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that respondent no. 2 was not sure in his mind about the precise ground for detaining the petitioner or that he had mechanically reproduced the language used in section 3 (a) (ii) of the Act. 6. With regard to the third point about the vagueness of grounds nos. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that respondent no. 2 was not sure in his mind about the precise ground for detaining the petitioner or that he had mechanically reproduced the language used in section 3 (a) (ii) of the Act. 6. With regard to the third point about the vagueness of grounds nos. 1, 3, 4 and 5, the argument of Mr. Brajkishore Prasad is that they do not disclose sufficient materials so as to enable the petitioner to make an effective representation. It will be convenient to quote all the ten grounds of detention which are as follows : - 1. "Yah ki apne parmawashyak aapurti ke samano ki Chor Bazari karte rahen hain. Maida, Chini, Karuwa Tel aadi bahut matra me jama kiye huye hain aur aisa hi najayaj Byapar chhipkar pichhle kayi salo se kar rahe hain. 2. Yah ki aapne Sarso Tel, Maida, Soda aadi samano me milawat bhi karte hain aur use chori se bechte hain. 3. Yah ki aap chor bazarion ka Sardar bankar jo iska birodh karta hai, oose Tarah-Tarah ki dhamki dete hain aur chhipaye huwe chij dena band kar dete hain. 4. Yah ki aap dukan me pratidin karib 20-25 Bara Tin Sarso ka Tel Kala Bazar me bechte hain. 5. Yah ki aap Shudh Sarso ka Tel ka marka Lagakar usme milawat ka dusra Tel Bharkar Tin band kar chori chhipe galat byapar karte hain. 6. Yah ki aap Maida, Jo ki ek niyantrit Khadya Padarth hai, ki kala bazari karte hain. 7. Yah ki dinank 30-4-74 ko chhapa marne par aapke angan ke kuye se ek bhathi mila hai jisse aap band sil torne aur band karne ka kam karte hain, jise aap janch ke dauran chupke se kuye ke andar fek diye. 8. Yah ki puchh tachh karne par aapke dwara kisi prakar ka licence stock register, cash memo, rasid tatha anya koyi kagjat nahin dikhaya gaya. Stock register nahin rakhne ke pichhe aapka udyeshya yah hai, ki aap sarkari karon (tax) se bachna chahte hain aur chor bazari, munafakhori, jamakhori aadi dwara atyawasyak samagriyon ko gupt rup se makan me chhipakar rakhte huwe bhukhi janta ki jindagi ke sath khilwar karte hain. 9. Yah ki dinank 30-4-74 ko aapke dukan aur godam me chhapa marne par jo saman mile, usse aapke upar lagaye gaye aaropon ka samarthan hota hai. 10. 9. Yah ki dinank 30-4-74 ko aapke dukan aur godam me chhapa marne par jo saman mile, usse aapke upar lagaye gaye aaropon ka samarthan hota hai. 10. Yah ki aapke Godam tatha ghar se nimnalikhit pariman me khadyann tatha atyawashyak samagri japta kiya gaya jise aap chhipakar rakhe huwe the :- (i) Gehum-141 Bora (Standard Bag) (ii) Karuwa Tel-191 Tin (15 kilo 800 Gram pratyek) (iii) Maida-1 Bora (Standard Bag) (iv) Chini-45 Bora ( ” ” ) (v) Soda-3 Bora ( ” ” ) (vi) Cement-66 Bora ( ” ” ) 7. A perusal of grounds nos. 7, 8, 9 and 10 will show that a raid was conducted on the 30th of April 1974, and, in that raid, besides a Bhathi, wheat, mustard oil, maida, Sugar, soda and cement were recovered which were hoarded and concealed in an illegal manner. Bhathi was used for the purpose of breaking the seals and adulterating the mustard oil. 8. So far as grounds nos. 1, 4 and 5 are concerned, they are only inferences from ground nos. 7, 8, 9 and 10 and not independent grounds as such. Apart from this, having regard to the nature of the alleged activities, no more details could be gathered. 9. So far as ground no. 3 is concerened, there appears to be some element of vagueness. It could have been stated, as to who were the persons, who were threatened by the petitioner or were refused sale of hoarded articles; but, in my opinion, vagueness of this ground is of no help to the petitioner. This ground, even if excluded, would not reasonably have affected the subjective satisfaction of the appropriate authority. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has argued, that, if one of the several grounds is found to be non-existent, irrelevant or vague, the order of detention cannot be sustained. He is correct. That is the general proposition of law; but there is a rider to this. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has argued, that, if one of the several grounds is found to be non-existent, irrelevant or vague, the order of detention cannot be sustained. He is correct. That is the general proposition of law; but there is a rider to this. This Court, in Criminal Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 53 of 1974, decided on the 13th of June, 1974, has, on a consideration of number of cases decided by the Supreme Court, held that, if some of the grounds which are non existent or irrelevant, are of a nature, which could not have reasonably affected the subjective satisfaction of the appropriate authority, this court on the ground of irrelevency of the grounds would not quash the order of detention. A perusal of the grounds served on the petitioner will show, that, the petitioner was indulging m blackmarketing, hoarding and profiteering. The refusal to sell the hoarded articles or to give threats to such persons who were critical to such activities could not have reasonably affected the subjective satisfaction of respondent no. 2. I do not see any justification to interfere with the order of detention. I also think that the vagueness is not of a nature which could reasonably prevent the petitioner from making an effective representation as provided in the Act. He could very well have denied the allegation in spite of the fact that some details were lacking in this ground. 10. There is no merit in this application which is, accordingly, dismissed. S. Sarwar Ali, J. I agree. Application dismissed.