JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS is an appeal by the accused-appellant against his conviction under section 302, Indian Penal Code, and sentence of imprisonment for life, by the Sessions Judge, Narsimhapur, in Sessions Trial No. 18 of 1971, decided on 2-3-1972, for having murdered one Shamlal of Village Sankal on 30-6-1970. ( 2. ) THE case of the prosecution, briefly stated is that at the noon time on the fateful day when Govind Prasad (P. W. 3), Bhikamsingh (P. VV. 4)Rajaram (P. W. 8), and Jagdish (both carpenters) and few others were at the place of one Achhelal in connection with the making of a boat for Govind prasad (P. W. 3) and Bhikamsingh (P. W. 4) by the aforesaid carpenters, the deceased also reached there. The deceased told these persons that the appellant and one Ganesh were having a conspiracy to murder him. On this umedsingh (P. W. 6), relation of the appellant, whose house was in the neighbourhood, was called and one Mohammed was sent to call any of the village Kotwars ; in the meanwhile, the appellant reached armed with the gun at the spot and, despite the dissoation of all persons present, he fired it at the deceased, consequent to which the deceased died at the spot. It is also said that he had attempted to reload the gun, but Saheblal (D. W. 7) this Saheblal (on some stage of the record is referred as Sahebsingh also), son-in-law of the appellant and others snatched the gun from him. It is further said that the gun (Article D), which was hidden in the house of the appellant, was recovered pursuant to trie information of the appellant contained in the memorandum (Ex. P-8 ). ( 3. ) THE defence was of insanity. The trial Court repelled the defence and on the basis of the evidence on record found the appellant guilty of murder and, accordingly, convicted and sentenced him as above. ( 4. ) SO far as the finding of the trial Court that the appellant fired the gun at the deceased consequent to which he sustained the injuries as deposed by Dr. Ranjit (P. W. 8) and resulted in his death has not been challenged before us by the learned counsel for the appellant. ( 4. ) SO far as the finding of the trial Court that the appellant fired the gun at the deceased consequent to which he sustained the injuries as deposed by Dr. Ranjit (P. W. 8) and resulted in his death has not been challenged before us by the learned counsel for the appellant. However, to satisfy ourselves, we have looked into the record and perused the evidence of the eyewitnesses Govind Prasad (P. W. 3), Bhikamsingh (P. W. 4), Ghasiram (P. W. 5), umedsingh (P. W. 6), Parsadi (P. W. 7), Rajaram (P. W. 8) and Khubchand (P. W. 9) whose evidence the trial Court has relied for the finding that (he deceased was shot dead by the gun by the appellant. All these witnesses have consistently asseverated that the appellant shot dead the deceased. There appears to be no reason 10 take a contrary view. Doctor Ranjit (P. W. 8) has also opined that the injury was a gun shot injury and was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. ( 5. ) THE only question raised and vigorously argued before us by the learned counsel for the appellant was that the appellant did the act under insanity and, from the evidence on record, his defence squarely falls within the ambit of section 84 of the Indian Penal Code, and he is, therefore, entitled to the benefit under that section. ( 6. ) THUS, the only and the vital point for determination, in the instant case, is whether the appellant is entitled to the benefit of the plea of insanity under section 84, Indian Penal Code. This section runs as under: "84. Act of a per son of unsound mind - Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law. " On the reading of the aforesaid section, we get that the test of insanity has been provided by law. The test, for the exemption from the conviction and punishment for the crime on the ground of insanity, is the legal test laid down in this section and not the medical test of insanity. " On the reading of the aforesaid section, we get that the test of insanity has been provided by law. The test, for the exemption from the conviction and punishment for the crime on the ground of insanity, is the legal test laid down in this section and not the medical test of insanity. On the dichotomy of the said section, we get three classes of legal insanity : (i) A person is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, i. e. , the physical act he is doing. (ii) A person is incapable of knowing that he is doing wrong. (iii) A person is incapable of knowing that he is doing what is contrary to law. The first one refers to the offenders consciousness of the bearing of his act on those who are affected by it, the second and the third to his consciousness of its relation to himself. With respect to the legal interpretation of the word wrong in section 84, indian Penal Code, reproduced above the criterion is not legal right and wrong, but moral right and wrong. The word wrong here cannot be taken to mean contrary to law. The very fact that the framers of the Indian Penal Code used both the words wrong or contrary to law indicates that the word wrong does not mean contrary to law. This is a concluded position in law that legislature would not use a word which is redundant. In case the word wrong is interpreted to mean contrary to law, those words already being in the section the word wrong becomes redundant. Hence, we are of the firm view that the word wrong means morally wrong. We agree with the view taken on this question by Singh, J. in a decision Rambharose v. Stale of M. P, 1974 MPLJ 406 . Section 84 in the Indian Penal Code virtually embodies the M Naughten rule, which was drawn up following the trial of a man named M Naughten who was tried for the murder of Mr. Drummond. His acquittal has followed on the ground of insanity (See M Naughtens case, (1843)-60 All E R 229.) Section 84 embodies the fundamental maxim of criminal law actus non fakir reum, nisi mem sit rea. In other words, there is no insane criminal, homicidal act by an insane is not criminal. Drummond. His acquittal has followed on the ground of insanity (See M Naughtens case, (1843)-60 All E R 229.) Section 84 embodies the fundamental maxim of criminal law actus non fakir reum, nisi mem sit rea. In other words, there is no insane criminal, homicidal act by an insane is not criminal. The acts of the insane, which in the sane would be criminal, lack the core of the offence mens rea. ( 7. ) NOW, ere we scrutinise the evidence on record as to whether the instant case falls in either of the aforesaid classes, we shall consider the question of onus of proof. Section 84 falls in Chapter IV of the Indian Penal Code, entitled "general Exceptions". Thus, section 105 of the Evidence Act would come into play for determining the onus of proof. According to this section, the onus would be on the accused person. To discharge this onus, the burden on the accused cannot be equated with the burden on prosecution in criminal cases. The burden on the accused person cannot berated higher than a burden on a party to civil proceedings wherein a finding can be based on pre-ponderence of probabilities. ( 8. ) THE view, regarding the legal position, on the question of onus and burden of proof, taken by us in the preceding paragraph is so well settled that we do not consider it necessary to refer to a large catena of decisions by their lordships of the Supreme Court and of various High Courts including this court reported in law reports stating this legal position. We would, however, reproduce the following observations from the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Dahyabhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1964 SC 1563 . "it is fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be innocent and, therefore, the burden lies on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution, therefore, in a case of homicide shall prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused caused death with the requisite intention described in section 299 of the Indian Penal Code. This general burden never shifts and it always rests on the prosecution. The prosecution, therefore, in a case of homicide shall prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused caused death with the requisite intention described in section 299 of the Indian Penal Code. This general burden never shifts and it always rests on the prosecution. But, section 84 of the Indian Penal Code provides that nothing is an offence if the accused at the time of doing that act, by reason of unsoundness of mind was incapable of knowing the nature of his act or what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law. This being an exception, under section 105 of the Evidence Act the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within the said exception lies on the accused, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances. Under section 105 of the Evidence Act, read with the definition of shall presume in section 4 thereof, the Court shall regard the absence of such circumstances as proved unless, after considering the matters before it, it believes that the said circumstances existed or their existence was so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that they did exist. To put it in other words, the accused will have to rebut the presumption that such circumstances did not exist, by placing material before the Court sufficient to make it consider the existence of the said circumstances so probable that a prudent man would act upon them. The accused has to satisfy the standard of a prudent man. If the material placed before the Court, such as, oral and documentary evidence, presumptions, admissions or even the prosecution evidence, satisfies the test of prudent man the accused will have discharged his burden. The evidence so placed may not be sufficient to discharge the burden under section 105 of the Evidence Act, but it may raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of a Judge as regards one or other of the necessary ingredients of the offence itself. It may, for instance, raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the judge whether the accused had the requisite intention laid down in section 299 of the Indian penal Code. It may, for instance, raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the judge whether the accused had the requisite intention laid down in section 299 of the Indian penal Code. If the Judge has such reasonable doubt, he has to acquit the accused, for in that event the prosecution will have failed to prove conclusively the guilt of the accused. There is no conflict between the general burden, which is always on the prosecution and which never shifts, and the special burden that rests on the accused to make out his defence of insanity. " ( 9. ) THERE is one more important aspect, that it is the state of mind at the time of the offence, neither ante offence nor post offence, which is to be determined, albeit to arrive at the conclusion the mental state of mind, both antecedent and subsequent to the event would be relevant. The Courts have to encounter a great difficulty, in arriving at a finding in such cases, as yet there is no instrument which may be probed in to get with mathematical accuracy of the mental condition of the accused at the time of commission of the offence. It is not that easy that to determine whether there is a fracture, we have an X-ray and see the condition depicted on a photo. It has to be inferred on the appreciation of the evidence of the persons who had the occasion to observe the behaviour and conduct of the man concerned prior to, at the time of, and after the commission of the offence and the available medical evidence. ( 10. ) WITH all this in mind, we proceed to consider the evidence. It is undisputed that the appellant came from his house with a loaded gun and shot at the deceased. It is also undisputed that at the place where the occurrence took place quite a good number of persons were there in a group when the appellant reached there. Then we have the evidence of the eye-witnesses, who tell us that when the appellant came to the spot he was putting on only Dhoti and his body was smeared with cowdung. We are ignoring the evidence of Hakamsingh (P. W. 1), whose presence at the spot at the time of shooting is held to be doubtful by the trial Court. We are ignoring the evidence of Hakamsingh (P. W. 1), whose presence at the spot at the time of shooting is held to be doubtful by the trial Court. Govindprasad (P. W. 3), in paragraph 2, states that immediately on arrival, the appellant asked the deceased not to stir (Tas-se-mas) otherwise he would be shot. His further evidence, in paragraph 13, is to the effect that the appellant was advised not to commit the mistake of firing and to go home, whereupon the appellant replied that why did the deceased practise sorcery at him, due to which he was having pain in the stomach ( 11. ) ON the resume of the evidence as above we, in nut-shell get the following that- (i) the appellant had armed with a loaded gun and went from his residence to the spot; (ii) he had carried with him more ammunition for loading the gun and had the understanding that after firing once, it was to be reloaded and also knew to load it; (iii) he had the understanding that by shooting with a gun a human being would be killed; and (iv) he had gone to the spot with a determination to shoot the deceased. ( 12. ) IN Rambharose v. State of M. P. 9supra) relying on Baswantrao Baji-rao v. Emperor, AIR 1949 Nag. 66 at p. 71. it has been observed "a man is properly said to be ignorant of the properties and operation of the external agencies which he brings into play". In the light of what we have found from the evidence discussed so far, it is not a case where the circumstances indicate that the appellant did not know that he was shooting by a gun a human being consequent to which the man shot would die. It is not that he was feeling that he was playing the game of hunting at animals or doing shooting practice by aiming the shot at a toy. In our opinion, therefore, the case of the appellant does not fall in the first category out of three categories stated by us in paragraph 6 of this judgment. ( 13. It is not that he was feeling that he was playing the game of hunting at animals or doing shooting practice by aiming the shot at a toy. In our opinion, therefore, the case of the appellant does not fall in the first category out of three categories stated by us in paragraph 6 of this judgment. ( 13. ) THE question that remains for consideration is whether the case of the appellant falls within either or both of the categories, i. e. , No. (ii) and (iii)of section 84, Indian Penal Code, mentioned hereinabove, i. e. , was the appellant incapable of knowing that he was doing what was either morally wrong or contrary to law. Now to consider this question, we would like to draw assistance from the relevant question and answer in M Naughtens case which has been referred to with approval in a decision of this Court in Rambharose v. State of M. P. (supra ). The relevant question and answer are reproduced below: "question No. IV:-If a person under an insane delusion as to existing facts commits an offence in consequence thereof, is he thereby excused ? answer:-The answer must, of course, depend on the nature of the delusion; but making the same assumption as we did before, namely, that he labours under such partial delusions only, and is not in other respects insane we think he must be considered in the same situation as to responsibility as if the facts with respect to which the delusion exists were real. For example, if under the influence of this delusion, he supposes another man to be in the act of attempting to take away his life, and he kills that man, as he supposes, in self-defence, he would be exempt from punishment. If his delusion was that the deceased had inflicted a serious injury to his character and fortune and he killed him in revenge of such supposed injury, he would be liable to punishment. " ( 14. ) WE now proceed to examine the evidence. We have been taken through the evidence of Ramcharan (P. W. 2), Govindprasad (P. W. 3), Bhi-kamshing (P. W. 4), Ghasiram Kotwar (P. W. 5), Umedsingh (P. W. 6), Par-sadi (P. W. 7), Khubchand (P. W. 9), Narmadaprasad (P. W. 12), Dr. Y. C. V. Rajan, Civil Surgeon (D. W. 1), Dr. ) WE now proceed to examine the evidence. We have been taken through the evidence of Ramcharan (P. W. 2), Govindprasad (P. W. 3), Bhi-kamshing (P. W. 4), Ghasiram Kotwar (P. W. 5), Umedsingh (P. W. 6), Par-sadi (P. W. 7), Khubchand (P. W. 9), Narmadaprasad (P. W. 12), Dr. Y. C. V. Rajan, Civil Surgeon (D. W. 1), Dr. Ramkishan Nema, Assistant Surgeon (D. W. 2), Jitendranath Nigam (D. W. 3), Jailor, Sub-Jail, Narsimhapur, phoolsingh (D. W. 4), Sarju Bai, wife of the appellant (D. W. 5), Badriprasad (D. W. 6), a Vidya, Saheblal alias Sahebsing (D. W. 7), son-in-law of the appellant, Dr. Shabdasharan, Superintendent, Mental Hospital, Gwalior (D. W. 9), Dr. Arun Datta (D. W. 10), Medical Officer-in-charge, Central jail, Gwalior and Sheikh Gaffar, Jail Warden (D. W. 11 ). ( 15. ) WE would first refer to the evidence of the near relations of the accused-appellant, because naturally they are supposed to have a greater opportunity of observing the appellant. We consider the evidence of Sarjubai (D. W. 5 ). She is the wife of the appellant. In the very first paragraph of her statement she states that the appellant was mad, but this clearly is her inference. She has further deposed that the appellant had hallucinations that somebody was beating him and used to shout for help ; that he used to pass stool and urinate on the bed in the night and used to jump on the bed ; that he did not get proper sleep ; that he used to tear of his clothes; that he used to smear his body with ashes, earth and cow-dung; that sometimes for 15 days continuously he did not take food and used to throw the food that was served to him. Then she states that to cure him yagna was performed, Jawaras were kept and was also taken for treatment to latgaon Piparia; but with no result. She has also stated that a day before the incident, the condition of the appellant was serious, he was, therefore, kept confined in a room, but owing to his constant cries that somebody was chasing him to kill, he was set free; that on the date of incident his eyes were reddish, appearance was dreadful; and that he was putting mud and cowdung in the mouth. She has denied that the appellant ever complained of stomach pain. She has denied that the appellant ever complained of stomach pain. We now turn to the evidence of Saheblal (D. W. 7 ). He is the son-in-law of the appellant. He states that he had started residing at Sankal, the place of the appellant, for about three months before the event, to look after the appellant. As against this his mother-in-law, Sarjubai (D. W. 5) has deposed that he was called only about four days before the event. However, he has corroborated Sarjubai (D. W. 5) about the general behaviour and conduct of the appellant. Then he has deposed as under regarding the condition of the appellant at the time of the incident: One Badriprasad Vaidya (D. W. 6) has made a bald statement that he had treated the appellant for madness for 4-5 days, but as he was not cured he had advised for taking to Indore or Jabalpur. He has not given the specific dates of his treatment. He has also stated that he does not keep any register of patients. In our view, his evidence deserves no credence. ( 16. ) TAKING the stock of evidence referred to hereinabove with regard to the mental condition of the appellant prior to the incident, we get the following result: (i) that the appellant had on some occasions hallucination that some one chased him to kill; (ii) that he was indifferent to food and did not get proper sleep; (iii) that he complained about pain in stomach, irritating sensation in the body, loss of taste for food ; (iv) that sometimes he used to remove the clothes, smear mud and cowdung over his body ; (v) that he had suspicion of witchcraft practised on him by the deceased ; and (vi) that he used to move about in the village, sometimes putting on good garments and sometimes bad one. One thing is significant that none of the witnesses has deposed having seen him doing any violent act and the evidence did not disclose homicidal tendency. The indifference to food, removing or tearing of clothes or garments, smearing of cowdung may be an abnormal behaviour which can be in order to get relief from the stomach pain, heat and irritation which the appellant is said to have been feeling and deficiency of sleep may by due to pain in stomach, irritation and heat in body. ( 17. ( 17. ) WE now come to the discussion of the evidence subsequent to the arrest of the appellant. The appellant was arrested on 2-7-1970. We will first take up the medical evidence. Dr. R. K. Nema, Assistant Surgeon (D. W. 2) has deposed that the appellant was under his observation from 3-7-1970 to 20-8-1970; that he u*ed to examine him weekly; that he had recorded his observation from 3-7-1970 to 4-8-1970 ; that thereafter he had observed him only on 20-8-1970 along with Dr. Y. G. V. Rajan (D. W. 1 ). About the result of his observations, he has deposed, in paragraph 5 of his statement, which is reproduced herein below:- "during the period of my observation I found appetite of the patient not good. He did not dress properly. He had disturbed sleeps at night. He talked little and irrelevant at times. At times his talk was proper and at times it was obscured. He showed slowness of thoughts. He showed diurnal variation of mood. He showed no suicidal tendency nor abused others. His look was anxious. " As a consequence of the aforesaid observations, he opined vide Ex. D-7 that "though definite opinion cannot be given about unsound mind but I suspect it to be a case of Depressive Psychosis for which it is advisable to refer him to the Mental Hospital, Gwalior, if deemed proper. " dr. Y. C. V. Rajan (D. W. 1) was the Medical Officer at Narsimhapur. He has opined vide Ex. D-4 and deposed about his observation as under in paragraph 3 of his statement: "it was observed that the accused was getting disturbed sleep at night. His look was anxious, talked little and irrelevantly at times. He did not dress properly, did not take meals properly. There was diurnal variations of mood. Orientation time and place was not proper, appetite was not good. Did not abuse others. Slowness of thought. Did not answer questions correctly. " In the cross-examination of this witness, it has been brought out that he observed the appellant only on 20-8-1970 for about 20 minutes along with dr. Nema (D. W. 2 ). His report is mostly based on the observations of others (paragraphs 9 to 12 of his statement ). We further get from his evidence as to what is depressive psychosis : "depressive psychosis is one of the functional phsychosis. Nema (D. W. 2 ). His report is mostly based on the observations of others (paragraphs 9 to 12 of his statement ). We further get from his evidence as to what is depressive psychosis : "depressive psychosis is one of the functional phsychosis. Because of depressive psychosis patient suffers from deep depression and retardation of intellectual and physical activities. Because of variation of mood the patient may have delusions. They may take forms delusions of granduer and unworthiness and other types thereof. The patient may suspect that some one may murder him or that persons are plotting against him, or that his wife is unfaithful to him. " Then we get from his evidence that- "delusions such a patient may have or may not have at times. A man may not have proper sleep due to variations in mood. Sometimes it may be that a persons appetite may not be good in jail because he is not accustomed with jail life. " Then we have the evidence of Dr. Shabdasharan (D. W. 9), Superintendent, Mental Hospital, Gwalior. This witness deposed to have examined the appellant on 10-2-1971, 24-2-1971, 17-3-1971 and 31-3-1971. It appears that on the first day of his examination, agreeing with the observation of the medical officer, who had referred the case to him, he was of the opinion that the patient was suffering from depressive psychosis and he advised the treatment written in the Medical case-sheet, (Ex. D-7) (Paragraphs 1 and 2 of his statement ). This doctor did not note his observation. He neither knew nor talked to the medical officer on whose observations he based his opinion. Here it would be useful to point out that in Ex. D-7 the observations at portion B to B are said to be in the hand-writing of Dr. A. U. Khan (refer paragraph 4) of the statement of Dr. Arun Datta (D. W. 10 ). This Dr. A. U. Khan has not been examined while this witness, i. e. , Dr. Shabdasbaran (D. W. 9) has acted on this part of the report of observation also. This witness has in paragraph 6 of his statement stated : "depressive psychosis can result from worries but no positive opinion can be given about that. This Dr. A. U. Khan has not been examined while this witness, i. e. , Dr. Shabdasbaran (D. W. 9) has acted on this part of the report of observation also. This witness has in paragraph 6 of his statement stated : "depressive psychosis can result from worries but no positive opinion can be given about that. If a person deliberately remains silent then at first glance it would not be possible to distinguish whether his silence was deliberate or because of some ailment. I would require greater observation. I observed the patient in that light. I have not made any separate note of the results of my observations. " Then we have the evidence of Dr. Arun Dutta (D. W. 10 ). He was the medical Officer-in-charge, Central Jail, Gwalior. He had observed the appellant on 24-2-1971 and reported as below: "patient is silent and keeps mum. He is morose, works well when ordered, clean in habit, sleeps well, put up to psychatrist. This was on 24-2-71. It is written at C to C at ex. D-7. It is in my hands and bears my signature. " In the cross-examination this witness stated that he based his report on the observation of the notes of the jail staff. He did not make a note of his own observation. ( 18. ) THUS, on the above resume of the medical evidence, we get that it is most vacillating. No doctor has constantly observed the appellant and made his own notes except Dr. Nema (D. W. 2), who had observed the appellant weekly during the period 3-7-1970 to 4-8-1970 and made his own notes. Dr. Nema (D. W. 2), Dr. Rajan (D. W. 1) are not specialised in mental diseases. Dr. Nema (D. W. 2) has frankly reported that he was not definite, he only suspected depressive psychosis. Dr. Rajan (D. W. I) observed the appellant only for about 20 minutes on 20-8-1970. Similar is the position regarding the observations of Dr. Shabdasharan (D. W. 9) and Dr. Arun Datta (D. W. 10 ). One thing is certain that all the doctors have based their opinion about depressed psychosis whatever worth it is on : (i) Want of proper sleep. (ii) Indifference to food. (iii) At times observance of silence. Similar is the position regarding the observations of Dr. Shabdasharan (D. W. 9) and Dr. Arun Datta (D. W. 10 ). One thing is certain that all the doctors have based their opinion about depressed psychosis whatever worth it is on : (i) Want of proper sleep. (ii) Indifference to food. (iii) At times observance of silence. The relevant portions of the evidence of these doctors, reproduced obove, itself indicate that indifference to food may be due to loss of appetite; want of sleep may be due to variations in the mood and worries; silence can be deliberate also. The defence version itself is that the appellant was constantly complaining of pain in stomach, irritating sensation in the body, as such it may be due to that ailment also. A man after having committed a crime is bound to be in worries due to which also all these things are possible. ( 19. ) THEN we have the evidence of the jail authorities with regard to the behaviour of the appellant in the jail immediately after the arrest. Jitendra nigam (D. W. 3), who was jailor in the sub-jail, Narsimhapur, has stated that on the date of admission the appellant had complained of irritation in his fingers; next day when he got the report that the appellant did not take his meals, he went on round and found that broken pieces of bread were lying on the floor and when he inquired of the appellant as to why he was not taking the food the appellant did not reply. He has further stated that on the question of eating of food by the appellant, he had received complaints only for two or three days after his admission and thereafter he did not receive reports either way ; that on his round on the first night of the admission of the appellant, he found him sitting by the side of the bed and thereafter on certain occasions he found him sleeping and on some occasions he found him sitting over the bed or by the side of the bed. One thing very significant which this witness has stated is that when he used to visit the prisoners in the jail, the appellant used to stand up like other prisoners. One thing very significant which this witness has stated is that when he used to visit the prisoners in the jail, the appellant used to stand up like other prisoners. This indicates that the appellant had the capacity to recognise persons and was alive of the required respect that was to be paid to respective persons. Sk. Gaffar (D. W. 11) has stated about the general behaviour of the appellant that he was indifferent to food ; did not use to sleep in the night; used to talk at random. The evidence of these jail authorities does not indicate anything beyond the general evidence of the witnesses discussed in paragraph 10 regarding the behaviour of the appellant prior to the event. As such this evidence does not carry the matter further. 19. In addition to the above evidence, we would also like to refer the evidence regarding the seizure of the gun (Article D) vide seizure memo Ex. P-9. This memo is, dated 1-7-70. The witnesses to the memo are Govind Prasad (P. W. 3) and Bhikamsingh (P. W. 4) in addition to the Head Constable, Hari-shankar Tiwari (P. VV. 15 ). These witnesses have asseverated that the appellant had on demand produced the gun (Article D ). Our purpose in referring this part of evidence is only to indicate the mental state of the appellant that he knew what was asked, where was it lying and produced it. We need not be understood that we are treating it as an evidence of recovery under section 27 of the Evidence Act as was the contention of the prosecution. ( 20. ) THUS, on the totality of the evidence and the circumstances, our conclusion is that the appellant has failed to prove that he was insane so as to be deprived of his reason, in consequence whereof, he was deprived of his ability to intend. In short, his cognitive faculties were not impaired to the extent that he could not intend or could not have mens rea. The appellant was not labouring under any delusion which betokens dissociated cerebral action. It is true that in the evidence, it has appeared that he had hallucination that someone was chasing him to beat; but it was not about the deceased. The appellant was not labouring under any delusion which betokens dissociated cerebral action. It is true that in the evidence, it has appeared that he had hallucination that someone was chasing him to beat; but it was not about the deceased. He did not have the delusion that the deceased was attacking to kill him and in his self-defence he killed him or that he had the delusion that his sufferings would be cured by killing the deceased. From the following circumstances which are clinching, it can indubitably and unerringly held that the shooting to death of the deceased was a designed, pre-mediated and well-intended act of the appellant by way of revenge for the suspected practice of sorcery by the deceased on him : (i) The appellant goes to the spot with a loaded gun, carries more ammunition with him. (ii) Picks up the deceased from amongst the crowd. (iii) Prefaced his act by a command to the deceased not to move from his place and an expression of his motive for the act that the deceased had practised sorcery on him. The sheer abnormalities in behaviour cannot be used as an umbrella to protect the offenders on the ground of insanity. Such abnormalities can well be pre-tended by offenders as preconceived defence to their planned criminal act. It is on the totality of the evidence and circumstances of the individual case that a matter has to be decided. ( 21. ) THE learned counsel for the appellant relied on the decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Ratanlal v. State of M. P. , 1971 M PL JS77 (S. G ). The principles as laid down in this case for deciding the plea of insanity have been borne in mind by us. As regards the facts the instant case is quite distinguishable from the facts of that case. ( 22. ) IN the result, our conclusion is that the appeal does not merit to be allowed. It is accordingly dismissed and the judgment of the trial Court is maintained and the conviction and sentence of the appellant are confirmed. Appeal dismissed.