Judgment C.P. Sinha, J. This revision is directed against the conviction and sentence of the petitioner as made by the Magistrate Mr. C. Razak under his order dated 6.2.1972. This conviction purports to have been done under section 112 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter described as the Act). It imposes a fine of Rs.100/- upon the petitioner and in default there of to suffer simple imprisonment for seven days. According to the petitioner, he has been obliged to move this revision because the sentence so imposed is non-appealable. 2. The facts relevant for this hearing, which arc not in controversy, are these. The petitioner, on 6.2.1972, was driving his father's private Ambassador Car no. BRP 6031. He held a driving licence which was fully valid at that time. The car was intercepted by the checking squad on the road and it was found carrying 7 passengers though its sitting capacity, as noted in its certificate of registration, was only five including the driver. The car along with the driver was then produced before the checking Magistrate, who examined him (petitioner) under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. During that examination the petitioner pleaded guilty and on that the Magistrate convicted and sentenced him as above. It is said the fine was paid then and there for which the Magistrate issued to him the necessary receipt. 3. Mr. Roy Paras Nath, learned counsel for the petitioner has seriously challenged the legality of this conviction on the ground that, on the facts as they stood, his client has committed no offence whatsoever under law. According to him, since this was a private motor car, merely because it was found carrying more passengers than its scheduled capacity it did not amount to any offence on his part under the Motor Vehicles Act, or the rules made there under. In that situation, his submission is, the Magistrate should have held that he had committed no offence and discharged him. But instead of doing so, under misconceived notion of law he thought that he was guilty for an offence under section 112 of the Act, and convicted him as such. In that situation, his submission is, the Magistrate should have held that he had committed no offence and discharged him. But instead of doing so, under misconceived notion of law he thought that he was guilty for an offence under section 112 of the Act, and convicted him as such. His further contention is that merely because that conviction of his was passed on his having pleaded-guilty to the charge during his examination under section 342, Criminal Procedure Code, that cannot operate as a bar to this Court's quashing it if it holds that conviction to be unwarranted in law. 4. After having heard learned counsel for the petitioner as also learned State counsel, I am firmly of the view that the conviction cannot be sustained and has got to be set aside. The argument of the State counsel that since it is based on the petitioner's confessing his guilt, this Court should be reluctant to interfere with it in its revisional jurisdiction cannot be said to be well founded. 5. As it will be noticed from the subsequent discussions, on the facts alleged against the petitioner he has to be held to have committed no offence under the Act, or the rules there under. In that situation, question of his having pleaded guilty to the charge of carrying more passengers in his car than its usual capacity could not be of any particular consequence, as to be made a bar in his way of getting rid of it in this revision. It is open to him to show that his alleged acts did not bring him within the mischief of law. As such, his mere pleading guilty to it when questioned in court could not make him guilty as such to secure a conviction therefore. If law does not make him guilty how can he be held so simply because he thinks and expresses so in answer to a court question. It is the thinking of law and not his own thinking which can make him guilty of the offence alleged. 6. In re. If law does not make him guilty how can he be held so simply because he thinks and expresses so in answer to a court question. It is the thinking of law and not his own thinking which can make him guilty of the offence alleged. 6. In re. U.R. Ramaswami under similar circumstances, the learned Judge had held that ordinarily on a plea of guilty there is a bar under section 412 for an appeal except as to the legality or extent of sentence, still if the facts do not amount to an offence, the plea of guilty is no bar for an appeal on merits and it does not stand in the way of the accused being acquitted. He' further held that unless the accused distinctly admits each and every fact necessary to constitute an offence, he can not be convicted merely on his plea. In this decision he relied on an earlier Division Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in Emperor V. Bararji Raghunath Gujrati. This Bombay decision had been pronounced in the criminal revision which had been presented by the accused against his conviction and sentence for cheating. The accused in that case had sold goods worth Rs.2/13/- to a customer and on receiving from him two currency notes, one of Rs.2/8/- and the other of Rs.1/- he tendered to the customer only 9 annas 3 paise saying that the notes were not worth their face value and that 1 anna 9 paise was charged on that account. He was accordingly prosecuted for having cheated the customer by doing so. In the court he pleaded guilty to the charge and the Magistrate convicted and sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs.25/-. Their Lordships (allowing that revision) held that whether on the admitted facts the accused ought to be held to have committed the offence of cheating was a question of law, as to which the plea of the accused was immaterial. They further held him not guilty of the offence of cheating on those facts. Their Lordships (allowing that revision) held that whether on the admitted facts the accused ought to be held to have committed the offence of cheating was a question of law, as to which the plea of the accused was immaterial. They further held him not guilty of the offence of cheating on those facts. Dealing with his plea of guilt, they observed that they felt certain that the accused never intended by his plea of guilty to admit more than that the facts alleged against him were true, whether on these facts he ought to be held to have committed the offence of cheating is really a question of law, as to which the plea of the accused must be considered immaterial. Magistrates sometimes make mistakes of this kind, they think that because an accused person admit the facts, therefore he admits that he has committed the offence with which he is charged. This is one of those cases in which the admission of the facts does not amount to an admission of the offence therefore, they will proceed to deal with the case as if there were no plea of guilty. 7. In the instant case, as I have shown above, the facts are not disputed. As it appears from the record, when the petitioner was produced before the Magistrate,' he interrogated him saying that on that day (6.2.1972) when his car no. BRP 6031 was checked near Agam Kuan it was found to have more passengers in it than its scheduled capacity and whether he had committed an offence. To this his reply was "Ji Ha kasoor Kiya hai". Upon this, the Magistrates convicted and sentenced him as above. The question which the court put to him did not indicate as to what particular offence and in what manner he had committed it. He was simply asked to state whether he had committed the offence to which his reply was in the affirmative. On the question and the answer, as they are, it may not be incorrect to think that all that he had intended to' admit under this answer was that the facts as alleged against him were correct. He was simply asked to state whether he had committed the offence to which his reply was in the affirmative. On the question and the answer, as they are, it may not be incorrect to think that all that he had intended to' admit under this answer was that the facts as alleged against him were correct. Whether on those facts as admitted by him he was to be held guilty for the commission of an offence under section 112 of the Act, under which the Magistrate convicted him, was obviously a question of law to be considered on merit by the Magistrate, and his simple answer admitting the guilt was not of any material consequence as to secure his conviction merely on that basis. Even though he admitted having indulged in those acts, the Magistrate was not absolved of his responsibility to find out if his that admission brought him within the mischief of law to constitute an offence. If it did not in the eye of law he should have discharged him. It, however, appears that the Magistrate lost sight of this important aspect but took him to be guilty of the offence charged acting on his plea of guilty. This was obviously a mistake on his part. 8. Coming to the question of merit of the offence on these uncontroverted facts, learned counsel has fairly conceded that he has not been able to get hold of law in the Motor Vehicles Act, or the rules made thereunder, or for the matter of that under any law under which he could be held guilty of commission of an offence. In this view of the matter, his driving of the car in that manner constituted no offence on his part in law. Obviously, therefore, his conviction therefore has to be treated against law and cannot stand. As such, the impugned order convicting and sentencing the petitioner in the manner done must be set aside. 9. In the result, the application is allowed and the petitioner is acquitted. It is further directed that the fine of Rs.100/- realised from him should be refunded. Application allowed.