Per K.S. Ujwal, (G.L. Mehta, Chairman C.S. Gupta and R. Mookerjee in agreement)— A Division Bench of this Board heard this special appeal and requested the Chairman to constitute a Bench consisting of more than two members to give an authoritative pronouncement on the following question:— "In view of the Larger Bench Judgment reported in 1969 R.R.D. 318, and in view of the fact that section 74 of the Land Revenue Act is similar to Section 222 of the Tenancy Act, is there, subject to the provisions of Section 77, a right of special appeal against a decision of a Single Member of the Board in a case under the Land Revenue Act and, if not, will the proviso to Section 10(1) of the Land Revenue Act and Section 77(b) of the same Act be deemed to be sterile section ?" 2. A bench of three members was constituted for the purpose. The majority of the counsel who appeared before this three Member Bench felt that it would be in the fitness of things if,in view of the larger Bench judgment in the case of Sodagarsingh vs. Revad Ram (1969 R.R.D. 318) a full bench consisting of 5 or more Members is constituted to hear this matter. The Honble Chairman was accordingly requested to cons-titute a Full Bench of 5 Members. The present Full Bench consisting of 5 Members was, therefore, constituted for deciding this reference. 3. The present applicant Kistoorchand, to be hereinafter called the applicant, filed an application under Section 84 Rajasthan Land Revenue Act for revising the orders made by the Revenue Appellate Authoritv, Udaipur, (Camp Jaipur) on 11-3-69. This revision was registered at no. 113/1969. It was fixed for hearing for 15-3 72 when Shri Motilal Jain appearing on behalf of the applicant pleaded no instructions. The revision was dismissed in default on the above mentioned date. 4. An application was filed on behalf of the applicant on 24.3.72 by Shri Motilal Jain for the restoration of the revision. The application was decided on 14-4-72 and it was ordered that the application is accepted on condition that the applicant shall pay Rs. 100/, awarded to the non-applicant Chander Singh on 14.4.72 as costs and a further sum of Rs. 100/-, as costs to compensate the non-applicant for the restoration of the revision, by 1-5-72. The application was decided on 14-4-72 and it was ordered that the application is accepted on condition that the applicant shall pay Rs. 100/, awarded to the non-applicant Chander Singh on 14.4.72 as costs and a further sum of Rs. 100/-, as costs to compensate the non-applicant for the restoration of the revision, by 1-5-72. It was further ordered that in the event of the applicant failing to pay the above mentioned amount of Rs. 200/- as costs, the application for restoration shall be deemed to have been rejected. 5. On 3-5-72 Shri Ved Vrat the learned counsel for the non-applicant filed an application to inform the Board that the applicant had not complied with the conditions of the order dated 14.4.72 and hence the application for restoration should be treated as dismissed as decided on 14.4.72. This application was hardly necessary because the ordet dated 14.4.72 makes it abundantly clear that the application will be deemed to have been rejected if the condition regarding the payment of costs is not fulfilled by 1-5-72. However, since the application had come up, the Board by its order dated 7-6-72 held that the application for restoration is dismissed because the applicant has not complied with the conditions of order dated 14-4-72. 6. Applicant then filed a special appeal under Section 10 Rajasthan Land Re-venue Act against the order dated 14-4-72 challenging it on the ground that the learned Member was in error in ordering the acceptance of the application for restoration on condition of payment of costs. 7. When this special appeal came up for hearing before the D. B. of the Board a preliminary objection was, raised it seems, by the learned counsel for the non-applicant. It was urged by him that the special appeal is not maintainable in view of the decisions of the Board in the cases of Sodagar Singh vs. Revadram (1969 R.R.D. 318), Janta Khanpur Vs. Bherun Singh (1973 R. R. D. 55) and Devsi vs. Jugal Kishore (1973 R.R.D. 58). 8. On behalf of the applicant it was urged that the above mentioned decisions did not stand in the way of the maintainability of this special, appeal. The learned members constituting the D.B. feeling that different views had been expressed by different Benches decided to make a reference. 9. It was argued that no case for reference is made out. 8. On behalf of the applicant it was urged that the above mentioned decisions did not stand in the way of the maintainability of this special, appeal. The learned members constituting the D.B. feeling that different views had been expressed by different Benches decided to make a reference. 9. It was argued that no case for reference is made out. The present reference has evidently been made under section 11 Rajasthan Land Revenue Act. A question of law can be referred, for opinion to a Bench. The Member making the reference has to record in writing his reasons for making the reference. The reference will be competent if it fulfills the requirements of the law under which it is made. Amongst other things, which do not presently concern us, a reference under Section 11 must fulfil the following condition viz -the question referred must arise from the case or proceeding in which the reference is made. The question for consideration before the Bench which made the reference was whether the law allowed a special appeal against the impugned order dated 14-4-1972. The Bench was not required to decide whether special appeal can be heard against decisions of a different nature than the one impugned; nor was it required to decide whether the proviso to Section 10 Land Revenue Act empowered the Board to admit special appeals against judgments under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. These questions do not arise from the proceedings before that Bench. The Board is required to decide disputes between parties to the proceedings on the facts and circumstances of each case in the light of the law applicable to those facts. The Board is not required by the Land Revenue Act to pose hypothetical questions and then set about deciding such questions. We have therefore to see whether the reasons recorded by the reference making Bench show that a question of law requiring our opinion arises out of the proceedings. 10. On going through the order of reference we find that after discussing the judgments in 1969 R.R.D. 318 (Saudagar Singh Vs. We have therefore to see whether the reasons recorded by the reference making Bench show that a question of law requiring our opinion arises out of the proceedings. 10. On going through the order of reference we find that after discussing the judgments in 1969 R.R.D. 318 (Saudagar Singh Vs. Revad Ram), 1973 R.R.D. 55,-1973 R.R.D. 58 and Nagji vs. State of Rajasthan (Special Appeal No. 64 of 1970 Jalore), our learned brothers recorded the opinion, firstly, that they did not agree with the opinion that the ruling of the larger Bench in the case of Saudagar Singh vs. Revad Ram (1969 R. R. D. 318) did not correctly interpret the law and secondly that special appeals shall lie in respect of decisions (not mere orders) passed by a single Member except in the circumstances mentioned in Section 77 Land Revenue Act. The learned Members thus upheld the decision in Saudagar Singhs case that section 10 does not provide for a special appeal against orders as distinct from decision which later word is synonymous with the word judgment. 11. Now the preliminary objection is that as the order impugned in these proceedings is not a decision within the meaning of Section 10 in view of the rule propounded in Saudagar Singhs case, no question of law requiring determination arose out of the proceedings. The learned members having concurred with this aspect of the view taken in Saudagar Singhs case subscribed to the view that an order as distinct from a judgment cannot be challenged by invoking the provisions of Section 10 Land Revenue Act. This part of the decision in Saudagar Singhs case is not dependent upon the case being under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. It deals with the meaning and scope of the word decision. It makes a difference to the applicability of the rule whether the order is in a case under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act or under the Land Revenue Act. Proviso to Section 10 Rajasthan Land Revenue Act has, in this view of the matter, no application to orders which do not fulfil the requirements of Judgment. Therefore in the view taken by the learned Members, the question whether a special appeal is maintainable against the order dated 14 4 72 does not arise from the order of reference because the impugned order has not been held by them to be a judgment. 12. Therefore in the view taken by the learned Members, the question whether a special appeal is maintainable against the order dated 14 4 72 does not arise from the order of reference because the impugned order has not been held by them to be a judgment. 12. The learned counsel for the non-applicant in his preliminary objection urged that the question whether a special appeal lies against a judgment in a case under the Land Revenue Act, not falling under Section 76(b) Land Revenue Act, did not arise from the proceedings before the reference making Bench. The Bench was not competent to refer a question of law not arising from the case before it howsoever important the question may have appeared to it from the academic point of view. 13. While arguing in support of the maintainability of the appeal, one of the amicus curiae, Shri S.N. Parik, argued that the impugned order is a decision within the meaning of Section 10 Land Revenue Act and hence the reference is competent because an adjudication on the maintainability of a special appeal against it is a condition precedent to the referring D.B. being into the merits of the case. To establish the contention that the impugned order is a decision for the purposes of Section 10 Land Revenue Act, Shri Parik relied upon judgments reported as A. I. R. 1960 Allahabad 692, AIR 1960 Calcutta 532 and A. I. R. 1971 Supreme Court 2337. 14. The controversy arising out of the contention of the non-applicant that the impugned order is not a decision within the meaning of Section 10 Land Revenue Act and Shri S.N. Pariks argument explained in the last para goes, in our opinion, to the root of the controversy relating to the maintainability of reference. The reference is competent only if the impugned order is a decision within the meaning of Section 10 Land Revenue Act because the reference order does not leave any doubt that the Honble Members making it believe that the controversy arises only if the impugned adjudication is such a decision as distinct from a mere order. We, therefore, propose to first adjudicate on this point in the light of the authorities cited. We, therefore, propose to first adjudicate on this point in the light of the authorities cited. Needless to say that other points urged would not be required to be gone into, if we conclude that the impugned order is not a decision within the meaning of Section 10 Land Revenue Act. 15. Let us first ascertain the nature of the impugned order. As already stated the application under Sec. 84 Land Revenue Act for revising the orders of the Revenue Appellate Authority having been dismissed in default, on the applicants Pleader pleading no-instructions, an application was filed on 24-3-72 for restoring the revision application. By the impugned order dated 14-4-72 this application was accepted on condition of the applicant paying costs to the non-applicant. Thus what has been impugned is a restoration order. 16. 1960 Allahabad 692 is a full Bench decision in a letters patent appeal, in which it has been held that the term judgment does not necessarily exclude an order and that an order of a single Judge of the High Court dismissing an appeal against an order granting a temporary injunction, is an order which finally determines the rights of a party to a specific temporary relief and its purpose is to make a judgment fully effective. This authority distinguishes between orders which merely regulate procedure, or orders which are merely a step towards obtaining final adjudication, on the one hand, and orders, which stem from a suit, and have the purpose of making the judgment, if obtained, fully effective. It would appear that on account of this decision, an order which is merely a step towards obtaining a final adjudication is not a judgment, while an order which finally determines the right of a party to a specific temporary relief, is a Judgment. 16A. The order impugned in the present reference was made on an application for the restoration of the revision proceedings to enable the applicant to obtain a final adjudication on the application for restoration. It is thus merely a step towards obtaining a final adjudication. 16A. The order impugned in the present reference was made on an application for the restoration of the revision proceedings to enable the applicant to obtain a final adjudication on the application for restoration. It is thus merely a step towards obtaining a final adjudication. The impugned order does not finally determine the right of either party to a specific temporary relief like temporary injunction and in this view of the matter this decision does not help the learned counsel in establishing the contention that the impugned order is a decision within the meaning of Sec. 10 Land Revenue Act because as would be presently shown, a decision for the purposes of Sec. 10 Land Revenue Act, is a judgment. 17. Similarly the rule propounded by the Honble Supreme Court in A. I. R. 1971 Supreme Court 2337 (Radhey Shyam Vs. S. B. Singh) does not help him. In this case it was held that an order allowing an application under order 21, Rule 90 is a judgment for the purposes of letters patent appeal. An order of this type on an application under order 21, Rule 90 has been held to be a judgment by this decision because proceedings under the above rule raise a controversy, between the parties, affecting their valuable rights and the order allowing the application certainly deprives the purchaser of rights accrued to him as a result of the auction sale. This decision cannot be said to help in establishing that the order impugned in the present reference is a judgment because the impugned order does not affect any accrued valuable rights of the applicant. 18. The third authority cited by Shri Parik namely 1960 Calcutta 532 is not traceable because there is no case reported as above in the all India Reporter. It can therefore be said that the above mentioned authorities do not help the applicant side prove that the impugned order is a judgment and thereby show that the reference is competent. 19. We can now examine the meaning of the word decision for the purposes of Sec. 10 Land Revenue Act. It can therefore be said that the above mentioned authorities do not help the applicant side prove that the impugned order is a judgment and thereby show that the reference is competent. 19. We can now examine the meaning of the word decision for the purposes of Sec. 10 Land Revenue Act. A perusal of the proviso to Sec 10 would show that the word decision in this proviso has been used as a synonym of word judgment and this intention of the legislature is made explicit by the introduction of the clause "if the Member who passes the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal." This matter had come up for consideration by the Board in the case Saudagar Singh Vs. Revad Ram (1969 R. R. D. 318) and placing reliance on the meaning given to this term in Gyan Singh Vs. Mahant Ramnath (1964 R. R. D. 213), the learned Members constituting the full Bench which pronounced the judgment, said that the view that the term decision and judgment in Sec 10(1) are synonymous, is accepted as correct. This view has not been challenged in this reference and it has not any where been stated in the reference that there is need to examine this view. It can therefore be said that for the purposes of Sec. 10 a decision is a judgment and an adjudication would not be a judgment within the meaning of the law relating to special appeal if instead of finally determining the rights of a party, the order is only a step towards obtaining a final adjudication. And, as the impugned order, allowing the appellants request, for restoring his revision application to the file, was a step towards obtaining a final adjudication and did not give a final decision adversely affecting any valuable rights of the appellant, it does not qualify for the nomenclature decision that is judgment within the meaning of Section 10 Land Revenue Act. Since the impugned order is not a decision within the meaning of Section 10 (1), Section 10 cannot be invoked to maintain an appeal against this order even if Section 10 is held to allow a special appeal against a judgment finally determining the rights of a party. Since the impugned order is not a decision within the meaning of Section 10 (1), Section 10 cannot be invoked to maintain an appeal against this order even if Section 10 is held to allow a special appeal against a judgment finally determining the rights of a party. The question whether a special appeal against the impugned order is maintainable does not in the above view of the matter, arise out of the facts and the circumstances of the case because the impugned order is not a decision within the meaning of Section 10 Land Revenue Act. The reference is not therefore competent because the question whether a special appeal lies against a judgment ( not merely an order) does not arise out of the proceedings before the Bench because the impugned order is not a judgment within the meaning of Section 10 Rajasthan Land Revenue Act. The reference is therefore, incompetent and is returned with the above remarks. Per K. S. Lodha—The facts giving rise to this reference have been stated at length by my learned brother Shri Ujwal, Member. I need not restate them. 1 may at once come to the question whether this reference is competent. 21. The learned members of the Division Bench who have made this reference have observed in para No. 5 of their order "we are of the opinion that special appeals will lie in respect of decisions (not mere orders) passed by a Single Member except in the circumstances narrated in Section 77 of the Land Revenue Act." Apparently they were of the opinion that no special appeal would lie against a mere order which is not a decision. In the present case the order challenged in the special appeal is an order restoring a revision dismissed in default. This is a mere order and would not fall within the ambit of the term decision or judgment as envisaged by Section 10 Land Revenue Act, as pointed out by my learned brother Shri Ujwal, Member. That being so on the observation of the referring bench itself the special appeal was not maintainable and therefore the occasion of referring the question framed by them as a matter of fact does not arise. Such a question therefore, cannot be said to be arising out of the proceedings before the referring bench. The reference is accordingly incompetent.