ORDER This is an application for grant of a certificate that this is fit case to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution. The applicant was tried for the offence of murder under Section 302, of the Indian Penal Code by the Additional Sessions Judge, Margao. He was convicted for murder and sentenced to the lesser penalty of imprisonment for life. The appeal preferred to this Court was, after being heard on merits, dismissed, and the conviction and sentence, maintained. 2. Shri Lobo, learned advocate appearing for the applicant, has raised some minor points in support of this application. However, all these points were points of fact as they related to the appreciation of evidence by the trial Court or by this Court and hence I need not consider them at all in the present application. The only point which merits consideration and which was strenuously argued by Shri Lobo was that in the trial Court some of the eye-witnesses to the incident were not examined; that the non-examination of the eye-witnesses has resulted in the breach of the well-settled principle by the Supreme Court and High Courts that all the eye-witnesses should be examined by the prosecution; that the breach of this well-laid down principle is therefore a substantial point of law and that therefore this is a fit case for the issuance of a certificate by this Court under Article 134(1)(c). 3. Before I dwell upon the point raised by Shri Ataide Lobo, I would like to consider the case law on the granting of a certificate. The Supreme Court in a number of decisions have laid down certain principles before a certificate of fitness is granted. The Supreme Court has laid down that the word "certify" is a strong word; that it postulates exercise of judicial discretion by the High Court and the certificate should ordinarily show on the face of it that the discretion was invoked and properly exercised. It has been well-laid down that no question of fact of whatever importance should be made a ground for the granting of a certificate and thereby render the Supreme Court an ordinary court of appeal. The High Court is expected to exercise its discretion in granting certificated sparingly and with care. Unless there is some error of a fundamental character certificates are not expected to be granted. The High Court is expected to exercise its discretion in granting certificated sparingly and with care. Unless there is some error of a fundamental character certificates are not expected to be granted. The case must invoke a substantial question of law, a question of law of general public importance or of great private importance or a question of law which has not been settled by the Supreme Court and an authoritative decision on the point of law in view of the conflicting decisions of the High Courts is necessary. This is not intended to be an exhaustive list. But in short it may be said that the certificate would not be granted unless there are exceptional and special circumstances. 4. The point raised by Shri Ataide Lobo does not fall in any of such categories. It is a point which is a well-settled point of law. It is true that it has been well-laid down that the prosecution must examine all the eye-witnesses to the case and specially in murder cases and that failure to examine the eye-witnesses may throw some doubt on the case of the prosecution. However, this is a point of fact which must be considered by the trial Court and the first appellate court. On perusal of the judgment of the trial Court I find that the point raised by the accused in the trial Court was as regards non-examination of Wagmare. No point was raised as regards the non-examination of some of the eye-witnesses, as was done in the appellate court. As regards the non-examination of Wagmare, the trial Court has considered the point in depth and has given cogent reasons as to why no adverse inference should be drawn against the prosecution for the failure to examine the said witness as that witness could not be traced with the best efforts made. The point of non-examination of some of the eye-witnesses was raised in his Court when the appeal was heard and as I found that this point was not raised in the trial Court, that it was not put to the investigation officer that he had for any motive not examined those witnesses and as I found that there was nothing on record to suggest that any adverse inference should be drawn against the prosecution. I came to the conclusion that there was no substance in that point. I came to the conclusion that there was no substance in that point. It may be mentioned that the witnesses which according to Shri Ataide Lobo were not examined, were not even cited as prosecution witnesses, as their statements were not even recorded by the investigating agency which was most probably because the investigating agency could not get them. I have also held in my judgment in appeal that those witnesses could not even be called eye-witnesses to the incident in the strictest sense. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed in the case of Karnesh Kumar Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1968 SC 1402 = (1968 Cri LJ 1655) that :- "A prosecutor should never adopt the device of keeping back eye-witnesses only because their evidence is likely to go against the prosecution. The duty of the prosecutor is to assist the Court in reaching a proper conclusion. It is open, however, to the prosecutor not to examine witnesses who in his opinion have not witnessed the incident, but normally, he ought to examine all the eye-witnesses in support of his case. But in a case where a large number of persons have witnessed the incident, it is open to him to make a selection. The selection must, however, be fair and honest and not with a view to suppress inconvenient witnesses. Therefore, if it is shown that persons who had witnessed the incident have been deliberately kept back, the court may draw an adverse inference and in a proper case record such failure as constituting a serious infirmity in the proof of the prosecution case, AIR 1954 SC 51 = (1954 Cri LJ 338) and AIR 1965 SC 328 = (1965 (1) Cri LJ 350), Rel. on. Where the High Court on an examination of the evidence held that it was not possible to say that the prosecution had deliberately withheld the two witnesses from any oblique motive and there was nothing in the evidence to suggest that they were not produced because they would have turned to be inconvenient witnesses. on. Where the High Court on an examination of the evidence held that it was not possible to say that the prosecution had deliberately withheld the two witnesses from any oblique motive and there was nothing in the evidence to suggest that they were not produced because they would have turned to be inconvenient witnesses. Held that in such circumstances it could not be said that the High Court ought to have drawn an adverse inference." The present case is a case which is well covered by the observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, that is to say, there is nothing on record to suggest that any of the witnesses were not produced because they would have deposed against the prosecution and therefore no adverse inference could be drawn. 5. I find that there is no cogent reason adduced which would entitle the applicant for the issuance of a certificate that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court. ORDER :- The application is dismissed. Application dismissed.